

The Coming African Hour



Dialectics of Opportunities and Constraints

Edited by Luc Sindjoun

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THE COMING AFRICAN HOUR:

Dialectics of Opportunities
and Constraints

Edited by Luc Sindjoun

Africa Institute of South Africa
PO Box 630
Pretoria 0001
South Africa

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INTRODUCTION:

PROBLEMATIZING DEVELOPMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN AFRICAN POLITICS

Luc Sindjoun

Development is an issue whose permanent presence on the African/Africanist intellectual agenda is remarkable. It has been institutionalised in economy through development economics (Lundahl and Ndulu, 1996). It is important to note that such an approach has a perverse effect or latent consequence: Africa as an irreducible scientific exception; African economics cannot be studied like other (normal) economics. Development in the study of African politics is a phoenix theme. Its theoretical success is linked to two schools of thought:

1. The developmentalist school in its mode of writing and explaining Africa has contributed to the consecration of the concept of development in African studies (Finkle and Gable, 1971; Chilcote, 1981: 272-283; Coleman, 1960:247-368). Despite the variety of approaches unified under the “developmentalist school” banner, there is an “air de famille” among them that is constituted by the presentation of Africa as being involved in a process of change from tradition to modernity. The dichotomous demarcation between tradition and modernity has been relinquished for various reasons: industrial or modern western societies have traditional characteristics; institutional modernization through the state can be accompanied and nourished by the reinforcement and reinvention of traditional roles as demonstrated in Nigeria and Cameroon (Schraeder, 2000: 27; Sindjoun, 2002); (tradition envisaged as a social capital can help to understand and to appropriate the capitalist and democratic modernity as illustrated by the creation of saving societies on primordial solidarity or the use of traditional images of palaver to justify the necessity of collective deliberation within the country.) The dichotomous demarcation was flawed; the teleological nature of the developmentalist school was an epistemological hindrance to the apprehension of reality. It however, possessed the merit of putting on the research agenda the analysis of the transformation of Africa. The developmentalist school as embodied by the modernization school has resurfaced mainly after the post-Cold War era thanks to the liberalization process of African countries; that process is to some extent assimilated into the modernization of African political systems (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997). The developmentalist theory is a narration of liberal progress; it is an early Afro-optimism. It is important to notice here that it is the African development as perverted by others whose analyses are imprinted by

the “Western” experience of development. To highlight this reality is not part of the rhetoric of victimization (Mbembe, 2002: 239-273), it is a “reflexive analysis” of the discourse that reveals the socio-historical circumstances influencing the elaboration of concepts and theories.

2. The radical political economy school or critical tradition is linked to the concept of development to a large extent. It is an approach that had since 1970 influenced the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). The Marxist inspiration and sometimes devotion of that school of thought has prioritized economics and development in the scientific and intellectual agenda. In other terms, by taking into account the infrastructure, African scholars like Claude Ake, Dani Nabudere, Samir Amin, Yash Tandon had given a radical interpretation to development; it is a dialectical approach that is pessimistic (when it analyses the reality of capitalistic development in Africa) and optimistic (when it envisages an alternative and the triumph of popular concerns) (Ake, 1981; Nabudere, 2000). The current trend of globalisation has revived the radical approach to development in Africa. Here and now, globalization is perceived as “the final conquest of capital over the rest of the world” (Tandon, 2000: 57). Meanwhile, development is apprehended as the result of “delinking” from the “inequitable global system” and “taking advantage of a new alliance of global forces” (Tandon, 2000: 79). According to Okwudiba Nnoli, “...there is a need for an alliance to constitute a national society comprising the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie...” (Nnoli, 2000: 188). The radical school of development does not delink completely from western perspectives at least because its Marxist orientation is culturally and historically rooted to the western world. It is to some extent an illustration of the dialectical articulation of Political Science between the universality of concepts and the relativity of things.

As a matter of fact, the theoretical and practical career of development is a brilliant one.

At the theoretical level, the success of the concept of development in Africa has to do not only with its global resonance but also with the concern of African scholars in relation with their milieu; it is not only an intellectual preoccupation but also a practical commitment (Preston, 1999: 1-29). That is why the discourse on the crisis of development theory (Leys, 1997) is to be revisited in Africa. To a large extent, development theory in Africa was and is not only a matter of concepts and ideas; in the radical school, development theory is a weapon, a tool for the transformation of the world. Then development theory acquires an autonomy from the pertinence of its predictions or analyses and becomes valid through the charm of practical goals and the evocative power of development: Development theory cannot fail when there is a need for development. Generally the failure of the development project is explained through three broad arguments: “Firstly, it could be said that while the goal of the project was well formulated, the implementation of the project was flawed; secondly, it could be argued that the project’s goal formulation rather than its implementation was deficient; and thirdly, it could be said that both the goal formulation of this project and its implementation were faulty” (Matthews, 2003: 3). Those arguments are correct; however, if one changes the frame-

work of analysis, their deficiencies appear. Development is also a fiction or a representation that creates beliefs, that mobilizes feelings and dreams of peoples. The people's point of view may differ from the interpretative and critical analysis when the latter is involved in elucidation; the former is embedded with beliefs, feelings and dreams. The suggestive efficacy of development as an idea can transcend failings provoked by the deficiency of the formulation and implementation of the project. In the same order of ideas, it is too categorical to assume that development as a narration has lost its rallying strength or to reject the idea of development in favour of post-development (Kiely, 1999: 30-55). Even if development is not a neutral idea or practice, it has been appropriated and reinterpreted in different cultures and societies. Therefore, the scientific challenge is to go beyond the western circumstances that initially influenced development (Rist, 2001). Development has multiple biographies according to societies and cultures. The African biography of development is more complex than some ideas formulated by the post-development theory such as "development as an action of the evil west against a noble South". The main neglect of the debate on development is constituted by the weak attention paid to the effective economy of development as a mental and empirical practice. To criticize the content of development as a belief does not constitute a hindrance by taking into account its empirical and mental effects (Rist, 2001).

The practical or political career of development as a rallying idea in Africa has remained constant. Post-colonial Africa is a theatre of the manifestation of development visions. In fact, there is a missing link to be re-established between the post-colonial condition and the idea of development. The African radical discourse on the colonial condition is governed by the narrative of deprivation, misfortune and underdevelopment (Nabudere, 2000). From the onset, decolonisation or more precisely the struggle for independence was legitimated by a narrative of progress and development. The post-colonial condition in Africa has a baggage of ascension; colonization being described as a key moment of the process during which Europe underdeveloped Africa (Rodney, 1981). Taking into account the history of colonization in the analysis of current African postures is not a fetishization of the past; it is a way to shed light on a past that had structured post-colonial identity in Africa. The success of the development idea in Africa is linked to the rejection of colonialism and the envisioning of a better society that can reflect the aspirations of those who had suffered from oppression and slavery. Such context gives development a mystical meaning.

Post-colonial Africa promotes a culture of development. By culture of development, I am referring to a set of norms, rules, institutions and practices that shape development as a compulsory reference or standard, as a myth of thought and action. Since independence, development thinking is a constant in Africa from the Organization of African Unity Charter to the African Union Constitutive Act, passing through the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980, the Abuja treaty in 1991 and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (Maloka, 2002: 1-7). The African career of development at the continental level is a regular one. The 21st century is witnessing the success of NEPAD as a collective vision of development that transcends the usual trade-off between democracy and economic development. NEPAD constitutes a paradigm that reconciles democracy and economic development; the former is presented as the prerequisite of the

latter. Such orientation is in contradiction with the 1960s, '70s and '80s during which the pursuit of economic development was the pretext to shrink the political arena, to reduce the sphere of rights and liberties. The move from "cruel choice" to mutual compatibility between development and liberal democracy made in the NEPAD document is an explicit self criticism of African leaders who had defended contrary positions in the past; it is a lesson given by African leaders to some scholars who are still religiously opposed to liberal democracy and accept the possibility of a "no-party system" or a "no-party democracy" (Mamdani, 1999: 16-17). NEPAD's vision of development can be considered part of "the new thinking on development" (Bhagwati, 1999: 50-64). It opens new perspectives in development thinking within the continent. It is a paradigmatic change in African politics.

The normative and institutional consecration of development in Africa through declarations, treaties, plan of actions and regional organizations had not always been followed by success. But it is an indicator of an option. Contrary to the pretensions of Afro-pessimistic literature, Africa had never said no to development. It is now a fashion in an important trend of French Africanist literature (that places itself under the intellectual umbrella of Jean François Bayart and Achille Mbembe) to present Africa as a continent that offers no insights into development, as a "necropolis", a continent that is committing suicide (Smith, 2003) due to the lack of developmental perspectives. The misfortune of Africa cannot be articulated around the argument of absence of union. However, past practices can be blamed to some extent. But, here as elsewhere, the labelling of practices is a challenge to the plurality of itineraries; they amount to intellectual laziness. The divergent pathways of development in Africa are meaningful; the normative convergence of African politics around the issue of development constitutes an important denominator.

What precedes shows that development is still a pertinent issue in the study of African politics. From one period to another, development in Africa has been enriched by new meanings. The period 1990-2000 has witnessed the flourishing of the democratic conception of development. It was in an all-encompassing sense related to the struggle for independence when justice was the other name for development (Mamdani, 1997: 17-25). Nowadays in the ethical conception of development, there is not, contrary to Mamdani's assumption, a shift of paradigm from justice to reconciliation (Mamdani, 1997: 23-25). Development is not a trade-off between justice and reconciliation; justice and reconciliation are both part of the same dynamic and moving continuum. The dialectics of justice and reconciliation configures the complex reality of development.

This volume is about the reality of development in Africa; it is part of the current African debates around development visions. The different chapters that constitute this book were presented initially during the 14th biennial congress of the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) in June 2003 in Durban (South Africa).

For the sake of clarity and convenience, I decided to select papers according to a Political Science perspective. Then, I organized the book around six core ideas:

1. The first part of the book which is made of five essays, deals with the interaction among state, democracy and development. It examines the way in which the duo democracy/development affects conflict and governance (chapter I); the African appropriateness of liberal values (chapter 2); the problematic use of elections to institutionalise peaceful ways of doing politics (chapter 3); and the role and the size of state in a developmental process (chapters 4 and 5).
2. The second part of the book, with two essays, addresses the issue of natural resources as being important in the process of good governance.
3. The third part, with three essays, goes beyond the state perspective of development by taking into account the role of civil society.
4. The fourth part, with four essays, apprehends conflict management as a key component of developmental governance.
5. The fifth part, with five essays, brings back the debate on the state in its complex relation with societies, from the Nigerian and South African perspectives.
6. The sixth part, with four essays, focuses on development strategies in Africa from an articulation between autonomy or self reliance to dependency, voluntarism and reality.

At the end of the journey, I consider that those different parts are complementary in the understanding of the meaning and the reality of development in Africa. In this book, from a Political Science perspective, development is analysed in relation with governance. It appears that development as an aspiration for a better society means an aspiration for a better mode of governance. From what precedes, developmental governance is a substantive mode of governance nourished by democratic values, based on a fecund articulation between state and civil society; developmental governance is a mode of governance mindful of equity in the distribution of the revenues of natural resource exploitation. It is structured by the prevention of conflicts and articulated around the identification of all the individuals with the state.

In sum, the 14th biennial AAPS congress provided an opportunity to bring back to classical political debate the nature of governance and political regimes. At this level, the water of ethics and Political Science are mixed; it becomes difficult for Political Science to pretend to be a value free discipline. When Political Science meets development values, ideals and standards are closed. However, it is important to notice that the chapters that constitute this book are based on observation and careful analysis of reality. Value judgments are derived only from the interpretation of findings.

For me, editing this book had been a marvellous intellectual adventure. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Musa Abutudu and Michel Temtsa for their assistance. Last but not least, my wife Christiane witnessed and encouraged my efforts to harmonize papers that contain apparently divergent ideas. After having accompanied me to the 14th AAPS biennial congress in Durban, she has been a real companion in editing the proceedings.

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1

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEMOCRACY/DEVELOPMENT RELATIONSHIP FOR CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE

Dirk Kotze

AN ELUSIVE CORRELATION?

The late 20th century at the end of the Cold War was not only characterized by the third wave of democratisation (Huntington), but also did not meet the expectation of a decrease in the incidence of conflict and violence.

Qualitative assertions or predictions present to us the view that democracy is one of the most assured guarantees against conflict. Moreover, the “democratic peace” assumption predicates that democratic societies do not engage in conflict with each other. A third dimension can be added to the correlation. Socio-economic development is considered to be either a catalyst for democratisation, or a consequence of democratisation. It presents us with a triad of assumed correlations, namely:

that democratisation (including good governance) is directly and positively correlated with conflict resolution/prevention;
that socio-economic development is directly and positively correlated with democracy;
and therefore, that democratisation and socio-economic development provide a necessary structural basis for resolving deep-rooted conflicts.

For the purpose of this chapter these assumed correlations serve as a hypothesis. A concrete illustration of the practical relevance of this hypothesis is the fact that the World Bank has embraced it. Its package of conditionalities include good governance and multi-party democratisation, as well as economic structural adjustment. Structural adjustment serves as the blueprint for socio-economic development. The third component (conflict) is implied in reconstructing the state. A state without the necessary institutional capacity, or a predatory state, is often the cause of conflict. Therefore a properly institutionalized state was the focus of the World Bank's World Development Report in 1997.

Much research has already been conducted about the relationship between democracy and development (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000; Quinn and

Woolley, 2001; Przeworski, 1991; Freedom House <http://freedomhouse.org>; Iheduru, 1999; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Landa and Kapstein, 2001). Similar research about a relationship between democracy and development on the one hand, and conflict resolution on the other hand, is not so readily available.

A notable practical example where this triad of correlations is embraced, is in the case of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's (SIDA) use of humanitarian assistance. One of its policy documents states (SIDA, 1999: 1):

Programmes of development cooperation can contribute to preventing armed conflicts before they break out with the aid of targeted development projects, programmes for strengthening democracy and human rights, regional cooperation programmes and supporting communication between hostile parties.

In this chapter the approach is to concentrate First, on conflict resolution in particular its various approaches and how they define the essence of conflict and whether democracy/development can fit anywhere in it. Next we report on the research about the relationship between democracy and development. Finally, we bring together conflict resolution and democracy/development and investigate possible logical correlations. This study does not include an empirical investigation of possible conflict resolution and democracy/development correlations. On the basis of these qualitative conclusions an empirical study can follow.

THE ESSENCE OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Perspectives on, and approaches towards, conflict and conflict resolution can be summarized in the following four categories:

1. One school of thought looks at conflict at the individual and societal/national levels, and assumes that the individual is in both instances the unit of analysis. Biological and physiological conceptions about human nature are complemented by notions of social learning (socialization and cost/benefit calculations regarding conflict). Expectations/rewards dissonance perceptions are another psychological dimension of conflict. All of these are perceptions, psychological constructs and individual experiences. By implication, conflict resolution should respond by changing these perceptions and addressing their causes (Sandole and Van der Merwe, 1993: 7-16).
2. Traditionally, conflict has been treated as competition for interests, often individual interest. Conflict resolution therefore assumed itself in the form of compromises. Power and coercion were often applied to produce the compromise. The task of a mediator was often to offer a compromise which the less powerful party had to accept (Burton, 1987: 7-8).
3. During the Cold War period conflict was not resolved but suppressed or contain(ed.), Coercion and crisis management were often us(ed.), The emphasis was therefore on short-term stability and not on longer-term sustainability (Harris and Reilly 1998: 13).
4. The latest school of thought concentrates on human needs and systemic (state) failure as the main causes of conflict. Identity needs receive most attention as an onto-

logical human need (Burton 1987: 16; Harris and Reilly, 1998: 9-10). Stephen John Stedman (in Deng and Zartman, 1991: 367-369, 373) also identified resource needs, dignity needs, power needs and value needs as basic human needs. When persons are involved in conflict, they also develop security and survival needs. These needs are exacerbated by crises in national governance or systemic failure. This is used as an explanation why intra-state conflicts have become more prevalent than inter-state conflicts. Therefore, the emphasis also moved from solving conflictual relations between states, to resolving relations within states. As a result of the focus on internal, systemic failure, the emphasis in conflict resolution shifted to an institutional approach; in other words, to finding the most appropriate state institutions to resolve the failure. In this respect the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) presents democracy as a normative, instrumentalist framework (Harris and Reilly 1998: 16-17). As already mentioned, SIDA (1999) has a more structuralist approach, and focuses on a combination of development and political structures.

At present conflict resolution is accommodated within two schools, namely a behavioural approach and an institutionalist/structuralist approach. They can be summarized in the following two figures:

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, though no publications could be found in which they are integrated. The most obvious point of contact is between the societal level in the behavioural approach and communal identity in figure 2.

The preferred outcomes of the two approaches do not necessarily overlap. In the behavioural approach, conflict resolution focuses on individuals and their roles in society - especially for the purpose of establishing social harmony between them and their societies at a behavioural level. The structuralist approach emphasises conflict resolution as a restructuring of the political environment but does not prescribe democratic structures as the only option. For Burton it is important to find long-term, sustainable solutions acceptable for all. Though his focus is on political structures, the fact that he identifies problems of communal identity superimposed on unequal distribution, as even more troublesome, means that the structures should also promote fair socio-economic distribution (i.e. another form of structural change). SIDA is quite explicit about such an objective.

The institutionalist approach of IDEA is less concerned about distribution matters, and concentrates on the range of options of democratic institutions available for negotiators and mediators (Harris and Reilly, 1998). For them, conflict resolution is about finding the *most appropriate* of these institutions. Harris and Reilly (1998: 16) used Angola as an example; the 1991 Bicesse peace agreement focused on elections (i.e. a democratic institution) which would lead to a power-sharing government. Thomas Ohlson (1998: 74) disputed the idea that it provided for power-sharing. According to him both parties preferred a winner-takes-all system. The Angolan constitution was unsuitable for power-sharing, because most of the executive powers were concentrated in a single-person President. Therefore the loser in the September 1992 Presidential election, Jonas Savimbi, went back to the bush. In defiance of Savimbi, twelve Unita elected Members of Parliament

took up their seats. In December 1992 a government of national unity was sworn in, with Unita being allotted four of the 27 Ministerial/Vice-Ministerial posts (Ohlson, 1998: 76). Conflict continued because of the zero-sum nature of the Executive Presidency, and the power-sharing government as a democratic institution could not counter it.

In conclusion, conflict resolution does not focus exclusively on democracy and socio-economic development. An important school of thought (that also includes peace education/studies) has a strong behavioural orientation. However, the structuralist and institutionalist approaches are endorsed by many decision-makers. For example, Kofi Annan (in Harris and Reilly, 1998: vii) wrote that more complex conflicts have “obliged the international community to develop new instruments of conflict resolution, many of which relate to the electoral process and, more generally, to the entrenchment of a democratic culture in war-torn societies, with a view to making peace sustainable”. The Brookings Institute Africa Programmes set as its goal “to elucidate what institutions can be devised that will produce enduring peace” (Deng and Zartman, 1991: 369).

The focus now shifts to the research conclusions regarding the relationship between democracy and development.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

The relationship between democracy and development is often presented in terms of causality. At least three options in this respect are possible, namely:

1. Development leading to a strong, high-growth economy, which will enable democratisation—the key examples are the newly-industrialized Pacific Rim and possibly also China;
2. First democratisation and thereafter development—examples like India and some Latin American countries;
3. The two projects running concurrently—most of today’s developing countries are expected to follow this option (look for example at the conditionalities of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

Development, according to Przeworski and others, is about structural transformation, changes in values and ethical approaches (such as nepotism or corruption). Development, as increase in growth, is understood to be improvement in income, productivity, consumption, investment, education, life expectancy, employment, child-birth mortality and similar indicators (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000: 1, 3).

The first option is the school of thought encapsulated by “modernization”, including the “trickle-down” effect of development. The social structure is more complex. Newly mobilized groups (who emerged partly as a result of higher growth and concomitant improved socio-economic development) rise against the incumbent undemocratic regime. Development is essentially about differentiation and specialization, and to separate politics from others. Another variation of modernization is largely influenced by the newly industrialized countries in the Pacific Rim, high growth (i.e. development) depends on a “benevolent autocracy”. Democracy’s freedoms and rights are considered incompatible with high growth.

Seymour Martin Lipset can arguably claim most of the credit for introducing the debate in 1959 about the relationship between the degree of economic development and incidence of democratic regimes. He concluded a strong, positive relationship between the two variables, (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000: 78-79) but he did not conclude anything about a correlation of causality between them. Adam Przeworski and others tested those conclusions and produced the following results:

- a. The degree of economic development in relation to the democratic regime is more important than political legacy, religious or ethno-linguistic fractionalization (diversity) or influences by the international political environment (like the demonstrative effect of “third wave” democratisation as a post-Cold War tendency). But an important qualification is that democratic transitions are less likely in poor and rich countries, and more likely in intermediate-income societies (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, and 2000: 92). (It therefore presumes already a certain degree of development in the state.)
- b. Growth as a factor: Przeworski concluded that regime types do not affect the growth rate (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000: 160). Democracy, therefore, does not produce higher growth rates than others. Freedom House surveyed GDP growth (1990-98) and linked that to their freedom ratings. Their conclusion is that in developed states the highest growth rates are in partly free (not totally free) societies. In developing states there is a direct, positive correlation between growth and freedom (Freedom House, <http://freedomhouse.org>).
- c. In related research but with a slightly different focus, Quinn and Woolley (2001: 653) concluded that economic policies in democracies tend to be risk-avoiding.
- d. Per capita income: Przeworski concluded, First, that a strong positive correlation is present between the average level of per capita income and democratic stability/survival. However, wealthy countries are not so sensitive to a decline in income as poor countries are. (A similar correlation exists between education and democratic survival.) A decline, therefore, in personal income is related to a high probability of democratic decline (however, a decline in income in non-democratic regimes is not a threat to those regimes) (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000: 101, 109). Growth in income is therefore a sensitive variable, though Quinn and Woolley showed that economic volatility is even more sensitive.

Another aspect related to growth, is that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies than in those with high levels of income inequality. Non-democratic regimes are, once again, not affected by it, and their regime stability is not influenced by income inequality. (Moene and Wallerstein 2001: 23-25 concluded that income distribution of most egalitarian societies is characterized by relatively higher spending on income replacement (i.e. unemployment insurance, sickness pay, occupational illness, disability, etc.) Public expenditure on pensions, health care, family benefits and housing does not have the same impact on egalitarianism as income replacement. We can therefore conclude that democracy is more stable in states with relative high levels of income replacement. It can also be inferred that in developing democracies high priority should be placed on job creation and employment security.

From the above-mentioned research results the following conclusions are possible:

- a. High growth (also associated with high volatility) and loss of income (or insufficient income replacement) are not conducive for democratic consolidation and stability. Candidates for high growth are developed and partly free (but not fully free or fully democratic) states, and intermediate-income (i.e.) and free country (Freedom House) or any regime type (Przeworski). Really poor states are therefore not candidates.

Democratisation and consolidation are not compatible with intermediate levels of growth and income, and with sufficient income replacement.

- b. The more egalitarian income distribution is, the more likely is democratic stability. It is partly associated with spending on income replacement. It means that intermediate-income level states with an egalitarian income structure have a good chance to succeed with democratisation and democratic survival. It suggests an optimal situation in which intermediate levels of growth are present, but growth that does not widen the income gap, and that does not result in loss of income or a threat to income.

AFRICAN CASE STUDIES: GROWTH

The correlation between growth and democratisation is the first to be tested by three case studies in Southern Africa. Both South Africa and Mozambique conducted democratisation elections in 1994 after prolonged periods of conflict. Angola reached a peace agreement (Bicesse) in 1991 and held the next year a multiparty election. The inconclusive outcome of the Presidential election introduced a new wave of civil war that only came to an end in 2002. Angola, with its extended conflict and lack of national consensus on democracy, therefore serves as a control case on the other two cases of relatively peaceful democratisation. Their growth rate in terms of per capita GNP and their ranking in the world (1 = lowest GNP in the world) are summarized as follows:

Table 1: Per capita GNP (Average Annual Growth Rate)

Case	1980-92	Ranking	1985-95	Ranking	1998-99	Ranking
South Africa	0, 1%	89	-1, 1%	91	-0, 9%	108
Mozambique	-3, 6	1	3, 6	1	6, 6	2
Angola	n/a	-	-6, 1	33	-37, 4	1

Sources: World Development Report 1994: 162-163;

World Development Report 1997: 214-215;

World Development Report 2000/2001: 274-275.

The figure shows that in the case of South Africa during its period of undemocratic rule it had the 89th lowest per capita GNP in the World Bank database. It improved by two places in the period 1985-95, which included the new, interim constitution (1993) and the 1994 general election. It improved even more (by 17 places) in 1998-99. Mozambique, on the other hand, was the poorest country during its undemocratic period. It improved one place in the five years after its 1994 general election (compared to South Africa's 17

places). Both states experienced relatively successful introductions of multiparty elections and general democratisation. Both have experienced improvements in growth rates since 1994 though the levels of growth differ markedly: in South Africa it was an increase of 0, 2% and in Mozambique of 3, 0%. Mozambique's real growth rate of 6, 6% is high in terms of international standards: the fifth highest after Moldova, Turkmenistan, South Korea and Ireland (World Development Report, 2000/2001: 274-275). The research results therefore would suggest that Mozambique should experience problems with economic volatility, and therefore with democratic stability, while the opposite is true. The fact that its high growth has not yet had a significant overall impact on its economy (i.e. it improved by only one position in the rankings) is a possible explanation for the absence of democratic instability. Compared with South Africa's improvement of seventeen places based on an increase in growth of 0, 2%, it suggests that research should not only look at real per capita GNP growth, but also at the growth in relation to the economy's level of development. It is suggested here for further research that a high growth rate (and high volatility) in relatively low GNP societies might not threaten democratic survival, as in intermediate and high-GNP societies.

Both South Africa and Mozambique experienced increases in growth between 1995 and 1998. The research concludes that a decline is a threat to democratic survival, can therefore not be tested here. Angola's continued undemocratic and violent circumstances have had devastating effects on its growth rate.

AFRICAN CASE STUDIES: INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Research results concluded that the more egalitarian income distribution is, the more likely is democratic durability. We can look at a few cases in Africa, and also using India (an important developing and democratic state) and Switzerland (as a democratic country with the highest per capita GNP in the world) as control cases. The following is a selection of states' income or consumption patterns:

Table 2: Distribution of income or consumption distribution between the quantiles in the populations

State		Lowest 20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	Highest 20%
Morocco	1990-91	6, 6	10, 5	15, 0	21, 7	46, 3
	1998-99	6, 5	10, 6	14, 8	21, 3	46, 6
Algeria	1988	6, 9	11, 0	15, 1	20, 9	46, 1
	1995	7, 0	11, 6	16, 1	22, 7	42, 6
Tanzania	1993	6, 9	10, 9	15, 3	21, 5	45, 4
Uganda	1992-93	6, 8	10, 3	14, 4	20, 4	48, 1
Rwanda	1983-85	9, 7	13, 2	16, 5	21, 6	39, 1
Kenya	1992	3, 4	6, 7	10, 7	17, 0	62, 1
	1994	5, 0	9, 7	14, 2	20, 9	50, 2
South Africa	1993	3, 3	5, 8	9, 8	17, 7	63, 3
	1993-94	2, 9	5, 5	9, 2	17, 7	64, 8
Mozambique	1996-97	6, 5	10, 8	15, 1	21, 1	46, 5
Zambia	1993	3, 9	8, 0	13, 8	23, 8	50, 4
	1996	4, 2	8, 2	12, 8	20, 1	54, 8

Ghana	1992	7, 9	12, 0	16, 1	21, 8	42, 2
	1997	8, 4	12, 2	15, 8	21, 9	41, 7
Control						
India	1992	8, 5	12, 1	15, 8	21, 1	42, 6
	1997	8, 1	11, 6	15, 0	19, 3	46, 1
Switzerland	1982	5, 2	11, 7	16, 4	22, 1	44, 6
	1992	6, 9	12, 7	17, 3	22, 9	40, 3

Sources: World Development Report 1997: 222-223,
World Development Report 2000/2001: 282-283.

From this figure it appears that the median distribution is 6% - 11% - 15% - 22% - 46%. The countries closest to it are, Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, and Ghana to a lesser extent. Switzerland follows the same pattern, and India in 1997 was not far from it. The countries that deviate substantially, are Rwanda (the most egalitarian example listed here), Kenya, Zambia and South Africa. The latter is the most unequal of them all, followed by Kenya (1992). After Rwanda, Ghana appears to be the second most egalitarian example—almost identical to India.

In terms of tendencies, in the democratizing states they are the following in Kenya income/consumption distribution improved most dramatically of all the cases; in Zambia it is a mixed tendency; in Ghana it remained relatively unchanged; and in South Africa the situation worsened slightly, though the time difference between the two sets of data is too short for a conclusive result. In the non-democratic states the tendencies are, in Morocco it remained unchanged and in Algeria it improved slightly.

Conclusions about discernible tendencies are almost impossible, except to say that clear patterns are not visible. In 1983-85 Rwanda was the most egalitarian case, though not democratic. It could not prevent a genocide in 1994. Ghana is the second most egalitarian. Since adopting a new constitution and the Presidential elections in 1992, it has experienced relative democratic durability. On the other hand, in South Africa as the most unequal case (which will probably deteriorate even more), durability of democracy is not yet threatened.

In Zambia, where between 1991 and 2001 a multiparty system was established but electoral manipulation has been rampant, the tendency is mixed; the proportion of the low and high-income groups increased, while the middle shrunk. In Kenya, following more or less the same political pattern, the income distribution improved quite dramatically after the first multiparty election.

On the other hand, the trend in Algeria showed an improvement though it was engaged in a civil war since the aborted election in 1991. The tendency in Morocco, on the other hand, but with exactly the same income distribution as Algeria's, and also engaged in conflict with Western Sahara since the 1970s, is an unchanged distribution pattern.

How egalitarian is the pattern in Africa? In comparison with the most egalitarian societies in the world (the Slovak Republic—most egalitarian, Belarus - second most, Austria, Japan, Finland and Norway) the medians are the following (World Development Report, 2000/2001: 282-283):

Table 3: Comparison of distribution of income or consumption distribution between the quintiles in the populations

	Lowest 20%	21- 40%	41- 60%	61- 80%	Highest 20%
median Africa	6%	11%	15%	22%	46%
median best six, world	10	14	18	22	36
Slovakia (best in the world)	11, 9	15, 8	18, 8	22, 2	31, 4
Rwanda (best in Africa)	9, 7	13, 2	16, 5	21, 6	39, 1

The starkest disparities between Africa and the rest are in the categories of lowest 20% and the highest 20% of the populations. It means that about 10% more income/consumption is concentrated in the highest 20% of the populations in Africa than in other societies. Income/consumption in the lowest 20% is also about five percent less than what it should be. (It is notable that the two most egalitarian societies—Slovak Republic and Belarus—were part of the Eastern bloc and are therefore relatively new democracies.)

All the African cases of democracies used here are relatively young. None of them have regressed into a non-democratic regime. Data from troubled states like Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic were not available to test the research results against them.

So far we have treated development and growth as the independent variables and democratic durability as the dependent variable. In the next section we turn it around, to democracy as the independent variable and conflict resolution as the dependent variable.

INSTRUMENTALIST/INTRINSIC NATURE OF DEMOCRACY

The next step is therefore to look at people's perceptions of, and attitudes towards, democracy. Two broadly speaking variations have been identified, namely:

1. *Intrinsic or procedural*: democracy is valued as an end in itself, and people value its political freedoms and rights;
2. *Instrumentalist or substantive*: democracy is valued as a means towards other ends, mostly as an instrument to alleviate socio-economic conditions. For democracy to be consolidated, it needs to be seen as producing positive socio-economic results. Socio-economic equality is therefore treated as either an integral characteristic of democracy or as one of the most important criteria for democratic performance. The durability of democracy is therefore correlated to socio-economic equality.

An intrinsic perspective can be sustained even in conditions of economic downturn or social upheaval. On the other hand, support for democracy from an instrumentalist perspective is conditional upon acceptable economic and government performance. These perceptions are also followed in academic scholarship; Jon Elster and Claude Ake are examples of those who subscribe to an instrumentalist view; Adam Przeworski and Larry Diamond support the intrinsic view.

The relevance of these perspectives for conflict resolution is the following: should the argument be presented that democracy is the regime form most conducive for sustainable conflict resolution, it implies that the people governed by the democratic dispensa-

tion have to have an instrumentalist perspective of democracy, in other words, the people expect democracy to produce outcomes in other areas (like improved socio-economic conditions) and thereby removing the (socio-economic and related) causes of conflict. Should an intrinsic perspective be the dominant view of the people affected by a conflict, democracy will be a conflict resolution instrument only if the conflict was exclusively about a minimalist notion of democracy, such as about human rights, or when a conflict is about an election for the sake of the election. Przeworski's empirical conclusions support his minimalist or intrinsic view of democracy (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000: 15), which means a limited utility value for conflict resolution.

In order to test these views further in the African context, the following research results can be summarized:

Bratton and Mattes (2001) reported on surveys in Zambia (1993, 1994), Ghana (1999) and South Africa (1995). For Zambians the essence of democracy is competitive elections and their electoral freedom of choice. Ghanaians concentrate on civil liberties and personal freedoms. South Africans, on the other hand, used a more materialistic view (equal access to houses, jobs and decent income). The authors' general conclusions are that Africans are more inclined to use an intrinsic perspective (like individual liberties, political rights) than an instrumentalist view (South Africa is an exception). They qualify their conclusion by saying that Africans tend to include a combination of both elements in their perspectives, but that the balance between them differs across countries. Preference for political goods within the intrinsic view differs also; in Zambia it is for elections; in Ghana it is for freedom of speech (Bratton and Mattes, 2001: 448-455). The applicability of these conclusions for conflict resolution is that perceptions and instrumentalist expectations of democracy are determined by contingent factors and cannot be generalized about. The utility value of democracy for conflict resolution can therefore be determined only after knowing what people's opinions about democracy are in terms of the intrinsic/instrumentalist choice. It, therefore, does not support IDEA's unqualified advocacy of democracy. (Conclusions about SIDA's advocacy of a structuralist approach, including development, are more difficult to make, because we have not looked at the impact of development without democracy, on conflict resolution.) It only partly supports Przeworski's results, which excludes an instrumentalist view.

The investigation can be taken one step further by testing the reverse, namely situations in which there is already a democracy and relative peace, but which experience a gradual decline in trust in democracy and its performance. Can one expect conflict there, in other words, once democracy's durability is questioned, does it create opportunities for conflict, and therefore consolidated democracy is a form of conflict prevention?

Robert Mattes et al. (2000) did a survey on views about democracy amongst South Africans about five years after the 1994 elections, and compared them with the rest of Southern Africa. Their conclusions are the following:

- a. South Africans' assessment of their political institutions and leaders are becoming increasingly pessimistic;
- b. South Africans are less interested in, and participate less in democratic politics, than their neighbours;

- c. South Africans have the greatest awareness of the concept of democracy in Southern Africa; they have a largely positive understanding of the concept; the average South African rejects all the non-democratic alternatives, but with less frequency and strength of opinion than in the rest of the region;
- d. South Africans are less supportive of, and committed to, democracy than their regional neighbours.

Opinions about the South African political system are summarised as follows:

- a. No widespread sense of legitimacy for the political institutions have yet emerged;
- b. Elected institutions enjoy less popular trust than purely state institutions;
- c. Satisfaction with governmental performance has decreased (Mattes, Davids and Africa 2000: ii-iv).

These research conclusions indicate that South Africa's democracy has not yet reached the stage of consolidation ("the only game in town"). Assessments of elected representatives, their institutions and government are increasingly negative. However, support for the concept of democracy and its "pure" institutions (i.e. an intrinsic perspective) is more sustained. Given the fact that a materialist/ instrumentalist view is most prevalent in South Africa, one could anticipate less support for democracy, or passive but not active support.

In respect of conflict (crime excluded), no substantial increases appeared in South Africa in 1994-2000. Therefore, even in a predominantly instrumentalist environment, democracy on its own is not an instrument of conflict prevention. On the basis of one case that is South Africa, it is unscientific to reach a general conclusion or induce it into a theoretical construction. But without including other variables and case observations, a single case can, however, falsify a hypothesis about direct causality between a reduction in democratic trust and conflict.

CONCLUSION

The triad of relationships between democracy, development and conflict resolution is more complex than acknowledged so far by most conflict resolution practitioners and researchers.

The correlations between democracy and components of development have received more systematic and empirical research from researchers. Their overall conclusion is that democratic durability is more sensitive to changes in the indicators of development (like growth, volatility or income distribution) than other non-democratic regimes. Economic development factors are also not a catalyst for democratisation. Democracy can be a viable instrument for sustainable conflict resolution, depending on the contingent perspective on democracy in a particular situation. An instrumentalist perspective would be more conducive to such a role, while an intrinsic perspective is a stabilizing factor when trust in the capacity to produce tangible socio-economic results is declining.

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2

REFLECTIONS ON PRINCIPLES AND VALUES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEBT ISSUES

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo

OBJECTIVES, ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS

Liberalism, one of the most popular Western concepts, has expanded itself in the world in various forms and expressions including liberal democracy and laissez-faire economics and the market. In Africa, these expressions are currently articulated in, for instance, multipartyism and international loan policies, which have become, in the past two decades in most countries, the products of the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the so-called stabilization programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part, which is this introduction, deals with the issues examined in the paper and those related to the topic at large, as well as the foundation of the arguments and analytical perspectives or approaches used. The second part examines the principles and values associated with liberal democracy. The third part discusses the principles and values related to international debt. And the fourth part, the conclusion, addresses the issue of whether the dynamics between liberal democracy and international debt can engender new developmental paradigms in Africa.

This chapter is a reflective essay containing normative and historical arguments. The main objective is not to find or analyze rigid causal relations or correlations between the behaviours and policies of the institutions of liberal democracy and international debt schemes. It is not about developing a cost-benefit analysis, which generally is related to the question of monetary value in liberal economics. Further, such cost-benefit analyses also imply an empirical testing ground of what has been or can be gained over a specific period and what has been spent or lost in the same specific period as a result of concrete “rational” economic activity. That is to say, this chapter is not about an empirical testing analysis of liberal democracy and international debt either. It does not present the econometrics of international debt or any measurements of economic development indicators using quantitative methods to determine whether there is any correlation

between changes in the indicators and changes in different measurements among various social groups.

In adopting liberal democracy en masse, have the African people and states been able to make systematic and conscious efforts towards the understanding of the values associated with this democracy? I am interested in discussing some of the dominant philosophical, social, and political prescriptions, assumptions, and claims associated with the loan schemes, and the implications of the debt issue, in Africa with a focus on the significance of the rise of liberal democracy or multipartism. Obviously, I am interested in the assumptions that the debt issue has been among the key factors that have directly or indirectly helped to impede any consistent local and regional efforts toward mobilizing the human and material resources needed to formulate and actualize a development agenda.

This is the first time since most African countries gained their nominal independence that liberal politics has, in principle, its economic equivalent in Africa without having to deal with fear of competing ideology of institutional socialism or nationalism. I also discuss how and why liberal democracy, despite its massive support and high levels of expectation among various social segments of African society is likely to produce meager positive social results in light of the current marginalisation of Africa and the extreme openness of its markets that is being advocated within the framework of “global apartheid.” Philosophical questions such as the following are essential: What kind of people and societies can be promoted by liberal political theories and systems? How would the values articulated by liberal democracy be supported or not by those who promoted the policies of international debt as necessary?

This is generally a theoretical and reflective work, which also articulates some important supportive empirical illustrations. The reflective arguments and analysis at large are guided and shaped by combined typologies related to historical structuralism, systems analysis, and state-centric perspectives.

How have the ideas and liberal principles, which include “liberty for all, rights of peoples to live free” from coercion and articulated in the Human Rights Declaration of 1948, the Charters of the League of Nations, the United Nation, the Organization of African Unity and the African Union, and adopted in most constitutions, as freedom of expression, religion, movement, etc. been reflected in the functioning of the institutions of liberal democracy and international debt in Africa?

From the 1970s up to the present, the demands for political reform in Africa continue to constitute an agenda in which liberal democracy has been the key issue. The origins of this agenda have been shared partially between the dynamics of the local social forces and their interests, and the interests of, and pressures from, international institutions. These demands are more popularized today than thirty years ago. Indeed, the issues related to political reform, which is one of the components of these demands, should be appreciated and examined from various intellectual angles and philosophical perspectives with the objective of generating a broad understanding of how these reforms have been defined, who the reformers are, and how reforms are embodied in various policy structures and guidelines.

Since the 1990s, the African people and states have adopted liberal democracy or multipartyism as an alternative to military regimes, one-party states, or totalitarian/authoritarian civil regimes. However, asking the following questions is not a superfluous exercise in the context of this chapter: Do African people and the African states fully understand the principles and values of liberal democracy and international debt? Would the principles and values associated with global liberal democracy movements and international debt produce new theories of development in Africa? Or can they contribute to the development of new ways of thinking about Africa? Why am I interested in studying these principles and values associated with such controversial institutions?

The concept of value can be used to infer relative worth or importance. It generally implies a combination of norms, meanings, and the importance of a given social system. It also is often used to denote concepts such as rights, principles, meanings, and their relative benefits, advantages, and desirability. In a classical capitalist sense, value has been generalized as anything that has monetary and material worth. From that perspective, economic valuation of international debt literally means the amount of money borrowed that should be injected into the national economy. Social, economic, and political values are neither fixed nor absolute. In theory, they are created by social agencies and people to support societal political organizations, legitimacy, certain types of order, continuity, and/or to satisfy their needs in a given social context. They are cognitive and historical.

It is argued in this chapter that one of the reasons why we have not been able to make much needed progress in our analysis of the nature of the impact and implications that liberal democracy and international debt issues have had in Africa is that we have not convincingly, forcefully, and rigorously clarified the issues of the values associated with these two phenomena. People and states that do not create their own values (or systems of values) are not likely to have a clear sense of their own direction. In most cases, African people have become ad hoc consumers or sold consumers, depending on the social basis or class of the individuals, without necessarily having a better or a comprehensive understanding of what we have been consuming, why and how we are consuming what is consumed, and what the social and political implications of our consumption, in the long run, would likely be for African societies and for the search for new development paradigms.

There are also epistemological questions that need clarification in the ways these two phenomena are examined. It is obvious that the question of the impact and implications of international debt on public policies and the states efforts in the articulation of the "public good," especially the aspect of distribution of national financial and economic resources, has been pretty well discussed in Africa. The conclusions or observations made on this question have varied from liberal intellectual perspectives to dependency, state-centric, and neo-Marxist perspectives. However, it should be indicated that the discussion has not been exhausted given the level of poverty in Africa and the level of enthusiasm about liberal democracy as reflected in most African political parties and constitutions. Furthermore, what has not been systematically explored is the question of whether a critical discussion specifically on principles and values of liberal democracy is relevant and thus can inform the claims and the assumptions of international debt

issues. Can liberal democracy help us understand the implications of international debt issues? Can liberal democracy provide a philosophical basis and political space to address international debt in Africa in a way that can give the African states and people a chance to be more critical than they have been so far?

As is known and discussed, the polarization of the world by the ideological, military, and power struggles between the Soviet Union and the United States and their allies did not contribute to the development of liberal democracy in Africa. In Africa, on the contrary, these struggles inhibited—by controlling the agencies of social change including the people, in the name of states' ideologies and security—possibilities of any rise and expansion of either centralized democracy or liberal democracy. Wherever these models of democracy were experienced, in most situations, they were used as instruments of control and manipulation. Indeed, in many cases, with other external complicity related to neo-colonial interests, they created and supported the Idi Amins, the Bokassas, the Eyademas, the Mobutus, the Nguemas, and the Sadats. In these cases and many others, states' apparatuses, especially ruling political parties and executive branches of government, essentially served as national intelligence agencies for the superpowers to collect information, to recruit, to intimidate, and to co-opt progressive forces. Both categories of rights, namely, social rights and political rights, which are considered to be the foundation of democracy, were limited and constrained by the dictum of the dominant ideologies. In fact, this international conflict created an undemocratic world, heavily armed and policed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The demands for democracy in Africa have intensified among all social classes since the end of Cold War era in the early 1990s. As Said Adejumobi indicated:

By 1999, three quarters of the countries in Africa had organized national elections mostly on a multiparty basis. The international community has heralded this development as the birth of democracy in Africa. The current tendency is to confuse the form, with the content. Election is largely equated to democracy in Africa (2000: 6).

In many countries, despite weaknesses related to how constitutions have been fashioned or how political parties have been ill-prepared to work, the demand for liberal democracy, in its various forms, has been accepted as part of the newly articulated African political culture. Political protest and the utilization of the courts have become more accepted today than twenty years back. The momentum associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the totalitarian political regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and Africa appeared to create a political space for the continuous struggles for democracy. What are the dominant principles and social values that contemporary liberal democracy has been articulating in world politics? Will the expansion of liberal democracy and the dynamics of transfer of foreign capital through loan schemes create social, institutional, and political conditions that may eradicate poverty?

As we continue to search for new and relevant developmental and social paradigms in Africa, the debates on the principles and values of the global liberal democracy as they are articulated and practised are not an exhaustive or superfluous analytical exercise.

As of 2003, many African states, political parties, and social movements have produced political behaviours, national discourses, and electoral processes and outcomes

that resemble those of liberal democratic dogmas, principles, and institutions. Some countries are in their third Presidential and legislative elections. Although these processes and institutions have produced elected Executive Presidents, Members of the Parliaments and National Assemblies, and other institutionalized positions at various echelons of African political society, in most cases it appears that they have not sufficiently or significantly engendered the needed debates on the implications of international debt on developmental paradigms within a liberal democratic political framework. Thus, it is assumed in this chapter that the routinization, or ritualization, of liberal democracy has not entirely taken its mandate and agenda from local and national conditions and institutions. How have the local political participatory forces and institutions and foreign capital in the form of loans and their supporters interacted or dialogued among themselves in Africa as they attempt to understand the causes of underdevelopment and how to deal with it?

One cannot understand fully the meanings, the functions, and the impact of liberal democracy and its values as projected and/or adopted in Africa without linking them to the values articulated in international political economy and the structures of the state. Foreign debt is a key issue in the functioning of international capitalism. In fact it is argued in this chapter that values derived from the dynamics of international debt and its principles are an essential part of contemporary world capitalism and the African state. That is to say, in discussing the values related to international debt in Africa, we are simultaneously studying the nature of functioning capitalism. Can liberal democracy liberate Africa from the yoke of “liberal imperialism”? The notion of liberal imperialism as developed in the work of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins and cited by Keith Windschuttle is described in this way:

Their two-volume British Imperialism (1993) argued that the seeds of the nineteenth-century empire were sown with the financial revolution that followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This eventually led to the emergence of a class of “gentlemanly capitalists,” or “merchant bankers and merchant principles,” centered on the great financial houses of the City of London. Gentlemanly capitalism, Cain and Hopkins argue, had close ties with the government and the military and helped to promote the expansionist forces of investment, commerce and migration throughout the world. Its main objective was to create an international trading system centered in London and mediated by sterling (1999: 79).

GENERAL ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES

In order to avoid “scientific mysticism”, the arguments advanced in this chapter are shaped and guided by a combination of historical and structural typologies and systems analysis. Structuralism, in this context, is close to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept which implies the existence “within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations” (1990: 122).

To understand these meanings and democratic values, we have to historicize our analysis and contextualize them within the structure of the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP). My perspectives are informed by an epistemological premise that stipulates that truths in the Arts, the Humanities, and the Sciences at large have normalizing and regulating functions. Obviously, they must be in the service of human progress and societal building. That is to say, these truths have correcting sociological and historical capabilities.

The qualitative analysis used in this chapter stipulates that systems, social phenomena, or social institutions or agencies do not function randomly. As Bourdieu stated, "Action is not the mere carrying out of a rule or obedience to a rule. Social agents in archaic societies as well as in ours, are not automata regulated like clocks in accordance with laws which they do not understand" (1990: 9). There is a certain coherent relational logic that is related to the role and the nature of each element within such a system. The world is a complex system with interrelated parts. The system is not just the sum of its elements. In terms of its dynamics, the world is more than what is tangible or what can be seen and touched. In order to understand why a system behaves the way it does, we must ask about the origins of its elements, examine the nature of the relationships among them, and discuss the nature of the interactions between the system itself and other phenomena within or around its broad environment. If one takes one's side of a story historically and structurally, one may be able to construct one's side of the whole.

All the elements of social systems and their sub-systems interact dynamically with one another. Performing to reach their various objectives, the elements are maintained through a complex process of historical configurations. The behaviour of an actor is determined by the dynamics of the sub-systems, the systems, and the environment where one is located. This thinking considers the dynamics of the local conditions as being as structurally energetic as those of the global system. On the basis of the critical theory, which emphasizes the need to join empirical investigation with a critique of reality, there is a need to assess the way in which dominant ideologies are constituted and mediated through specific cultural formations. This way of thinking goes beyond the cybernetics and the logic of functionalist scholarship.

My holistic approach, which is based on "historical perspectivism" and the local dynamics, emphasizes change. Things do not just happen. There are laws—historical laws—that force or pull phenomena toward certain directions. It is important to identify and analyze the nature of these laws. Another element of the discourse is that we cannot change what we do not know or understand. The ultimate objective of knowledge is change. Contradictions, as reflected in identity formations, are not always pathological in all times and places. We have to distinguish between primary contradictions and secondary contradictions. I argue that if contradictions are well studied, they can serve as a foundation for paradigm shift.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: THOUGHT, PRACTICES, AND VALUES

My objective here is not to expand the discussion on the historiography of liberal democracy. Rather, I would like to identify some dominant assumptions, characteristics,

and claims of liberal democracy and examine its general values and principles as articulated and/or perceived by the liberal traditions. The simple classical concept of democracy as a “system of government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” has been popularized in political debates, political analysis, and social movements. The new electoral democracies in Africa continue to produce new Presidents and Members of Parliaments or National Assemblies. Not only have the claims of democracy become global, but also democracy is also being perceived and appreciated itself as a global value. There are high expectations about what these electoral democracies should do. For many people in developing countries, for instance, democracy is the savior. It is perceived either as another dimension of development or as a complementary force to development.

Despite elections, have African democracies produced the governments by, of, and for the people? Other important questions in this context are: What do we mean by democratic values? What is the significance of democratic changes at the local and regional levels, as reflected in the nature of world politics and people’s social conditions? Can we scientifically talk about democratic values that can be used as an experiment in one social laboratory in a given context, and can be carried out and tried in another social space as a restaurant menu with a high level of predictable result in terms of citizens’ behaviours and social outcomes? How have these democratic values incorporated the local and regional claims of women, poor and rich people, separatists, political dissidents, nationalists, and the like in many parts of world politics?

Although African countries, regardless of the ideologies of the emerging political elites, which included socialism, nationalism, accommodationism, and pan-Africanism, won their independence by building or borrowing from the dogmas of liberal democracy and fragile institutions such as chambers or assemblies (unicameral or bicameral Parliaments), in general, the struggle for democracy as an issue of political rights was not a unique movement that differed from the overall strategic struggles for independence. The discourse of self-determination at the international level, which was articulated and promoted by the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, was essentially adopted in many countries as a national liberation objective or as nation-state building dogma. The priorities of most movements and/or political parties that led to political independence in the majority of countries favoured building nation-states and promoting the ideas of constitutional rights and political sovereignty. In the first phase of actualizing liberal democracy, the rights of the nation-state were perceived as more important and comprehensive than the rights of the citizens. It was assumed that state nationalism would later create the conditions for the institutionalization of democracy. Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, composed of a preamble and thirty articles adopted by the Third General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, has always been an important doctrine contributing to the rise of the struggles for democracy.

In the study of liberal democracy, it is necessary to distinguish between intrinsic democratic values and instrumental democratic values. I refer to intrinsic democratic values as substantive values, without which there are neither social justice and equal political participation nor any individual right protection. All the natural rights that can

be actualized only and fully in a social contract—in a society—are part of intrinsic democratic values. These rights are fundamental rights, which are rights to life. Instrumental values are basically embodied in processes or mechanisms associated with elections. Instrumental values articulate the rights that support, promote, and protect fundamental rights. Instrumental values are associated with rights to speak, write, and print with freedom and rights of association. These rights and freedoms give to constituents a role in the system of checks and balances.

In my view, substantive values should be used to define the ends of democracy as central in a democratic discourse. Values should be examined in the way the process works and also in the quality and quantity of the predictable and predicted ends. These sets of rights, freedoms, and values are dialectically related to one another. All these general observations lead to the question of who ought to benefit from the current liberal democratic processes. Obviously and in principle, all the people, the *demos*, should benefit from the democratic processes.

It is important to indicate that one of the difficulties in studying liberal democracy and its values at the global level is that despite the fact that the concept of democracy is considered a global or international desirable end or a good thing in itself among many peoples the world over; no model of democracy can claim universal acceptability. Different regions, sub-regions, and countries have produced their own democratic models. Each democracy among the liberal democratic societies in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, for instance, has its own technical mechanisms and procedures that define its uniqueness and particularities. People's attitudes, expectations, and responses to democratic institutions, and the nature of the democratic institutions and their values in those countries, also all vary from country to country.

Given their influence in the current debates in democratic discourse, it is important to summarize how liberalism has been perceived by two dominant schools of thoughts in Western Political Science, namely, realism and idealism. In Political Science, realists tend to perceive, project, and define the world mainly in the state-centric paradigm while idealists maintain that although the state is vital in the management of the affairs of the world, the establishment of some types of universal institutions with common features is also vital. Idealists argue that in addition to the state as an important actor, there are other actors that should equally participate in the management of the world politics with legitimacy. Although they disagree on certain issues, such wars and immigration, at least in the case of the political history of United States realists and idealists agree on the role of liberalism in its economic and market form as an engine of the United States-guided social progress and expansionism—despite the semantic confusion in the utilization of the expression “liberalism” within American political culture,

Realism, which is also called Power Politics theory, and as it developed within many dimensions of the European-American scholarship, as reflected in the works of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, Hegel, E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, the high priest of *realpolitik*, for instance, is essentially a state-centric phenomenon. States are fundamentally self-interested and competitive phenomena (Newman, 1996: 17). As an irreducible element in international politics, the underlying condition for their development is conflict. In international relations, the state's expan-

sionism is the motive for the interactions among states and nations. It is in the name of the national interests that states interact with one another. It is in the name of those interests that they also take up arms against one another. These so-called national interests are defined as natural and organic. Humanity is secondary to the interests and actions of the actualization of state power. In classical Western scholarship, Aristotle fully discussed the conditions that ought to be conducive to the “immortality” of the state in the *polis* (city-state). In this limited democracy, the citizens’ participation in the *agora* was perceived to be the most important condition for advancing society while promoting “the immortality” of the state—even if women, slaves, and traders were not qualified to be citizens. In this tradition, the state is then perceived as a rational political animal most times, despite contradictions that may emerge from its actions and means. As Ann Kelleher and Laura Klein state:

While the state primacy perspective of the world does not define the superiority of types of systems, it does privilege a specific type of political organization: The state is viewed as the most important unit for both national and international interaction. According to those who hold this perspective, the primary political identity for all groups and individuals should be as citizens of the state of their birth or adoption. The state primacy perspective does not argue for universal similarity in cultures or centralized power between states. In fact, it gives states a tremendous amount of autonomy in deciding the nature of their realms (1999: 41).

Within the state primacy perspective, realists emphasize the sovereignty of the state. No matter how this state was created and whether it is located in the North or the South, as a reflection of human nature, the state has to be a self-centered entity. As David Held wrote:

Modern liberal and liberal democratic theories have constantly sought to justify the sovereignty power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power. The history of this attempt since Thomas Hobbes produced the arguments of balancing might and rights, power and law, duties and rights. On the one hand, states must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis on which trade, commerce, religion and family life can prosper (1993: 18).

What does state primacy mean in a competitive world economy as an element of liberal thought? To be able to discuss how realists define and characterize some elements of liberal democracy, it is necessary to briefly describe the classification of the functions of the government as reflected in the structures of the industrial societies. Without examining the historical configurations of how a given government has been created and what the social forces behind its formation were, realist scholars (known also as functionalists and neo-functionalists) have defined the role of government in a “perfect competitive society” in the following manner:

1. to protect our freedom from the enemies outside our gates,
2. to preserve law and order;
3. to enforce private contracts;
4. to foster competitive markets (Dodd, 1955: 219);

5. to undertake those few public projects such as road construction, that are clearly of general value to the whole society and cannot be readily undertaken under private auspices (Franklin, 1977, p. 47) In short, in the liberal and commercial world described by John Locke and Adam Smith, one of the highest responsibilities of government as an agency of the state is to give people freedom to pursue their needs and wants (Kagan, 1999: 160).

First, it should be noted that the concept of a “perfect competitive society” is ahistorical even in the United States after the Great Depression. Second, I should also mention the idea of government that should function as a balancing wheel through appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. This idea is important for the functioning of any government in the capitalist world as it also relates to another notion that realists, especially mainstream economists, have produced, namely government as a “neutral entity and impartial institution.” In short, the best government should be the government that does not govern or that governs the least. In the United States, for instance, the ideas of “small government” or “take the government off peoples’ back” has been part of the political lexicon of many election campaigns. Despite controversies, the United States qualifies the notion of the strong government paradigm in its militaristic and administrative sense. Contrary to the arguments related to the laissez-faire principle of realists, the United States government, for instance, has significantly and continuously intervened in mobilization of resources and sponsoring development projects including banking systems since the 1940s.

What are the characteristics of liberal democracy from a realist’s perspective? How does a citizen interact with the state? How should a citizen pursue his or her interests? How should his or her interests be protected within the framework of sovereignty of the state?

Citizens as individuals who are legally born in a given country or naturalized individuals who are part of a given society have obligations to society and the state in terms of respecting laws, paying taxes, and maintaining the equilibrium of the society. They also have rights or entitlements in their countries to pursue a good life and happiness as part of the sovereignty principle of the state. From a realist perspective, these individuals are also buyers and sellers, producers and consumers. Within the logic of the self-regulated market or the invisible hand of Adam Smith, buyers and sellers are free to buy and sell whatever they have and wherever they choose to. What is important is the quality of their goods that should allow them to compete effectively with one another. The buyers and sellers (citizens) should be able to participate freely in order to sell and buy their services and labour according to their abilities.

Liberal democracy is the system of governance that, in principle, claims to protect citizens’ rights and the instruments of production (land, machinery, factory buildings, natural resources, and the like) that are privately owned by many individuals. The institutions of state should produce social equilibrium. This democracy is called procedural democracy. As Robert D. Grey, citing Joseph Schumpeter, states:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote (1942). Scholars who adopt this procedural, or elitist, version of democracy tend to be concerned primarily with stability of the system. Once the rules are in place, is the system able to maintain itself without experiencing outbursts of violence or becoming oligarchies? Rule of law and constitutionalism help regulate both government and citizens activity to limit abuses of power and keep the system running (Grey, 1997: 83).

Do the people matter in this type of democracy? The routine of rituals of elections brings the political elite and electors closer for a short period of time. A fresh start can bring new possibilities for the ordinary people. But mass values are articulated through elitist filters through which important issues are selected and elevated from their individualistic origins to the local or national agenda. As Grey indicates:

Central to procedural definitions of democracy is the free and fair competition among political parties for the power to make public decisions. This regular competition for power keeps conflictual groups from engaging in violence, much like individuals in conflict might "settle it" through a coin toss or an arm-wrestling match rather than in a fist fight. Hence, in a procedural democracy, conflicts are legitimate and adverse to public interest (1997: 87).

With its concern for reason, law, and freedom of choice that could only be upheld properly by recognizing the political equality of all mature individuals, this democracy limits in a large extent the power of the state (Held, 1993:18). As Beetham said:

Democracy I take to be a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly—one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise (1993: 56).

As already indicated, it should be emphasized that despite the fact that liberal democracy has become a globally desirable end for many social, economic and political pursuits among many peoples the world over, no model of democracy can claim universal acceptability. However, in a broad sense, for Robert Dahl (1971), liberal democracy can be defined by the following characteristics:

1. Extensive competition among individuals and organized groups;
2. A highly inclusive level of participation in the selection of leaders and policies;
3. A high level of civil and political liberty (with all kinds of freedoms). It is "a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social systems to which it is joined" (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1999: 6). These authors refer to democracy as a political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and that permits the population to influence major decisions by choosing the holders of political offices.

The bastion of contemporary liberalism, the United States, used it as an attempt to recreate the world for the advancement of its own interests. The political, religious, and

mainstream economists like those of the Chicago school have been reviving American liberalism since the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. This revisionism has led to American political and economic expansionism, military invasions, and the support of some notorious dictatorships in the world in many parts of the world, and all this in the name of “liberalism”. In a pragmatic and historical way, Robert Kegan (1999: 159) described this kind of liberalism in this way:

It seems that only the revisionist historians have given full attention to liberalism's role as the engine of unceasing expansion of American power and influence, though only in their crabbed and condemnatory way. Liberalism's spur to individuals to seek to improve and enrich themselves, to seek opportunity and autonomy through their own efforts was a powerful force for expansion, both territorial and commercial. Liberalism's elevation of individual interest over that of the state undermined many of the power traditional justifications for hemming in such aspirations.

INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND ITS VALUES

This section identifies the general claims and principles upon which international debt stands. Although some figures are discussed, this chapter is not intended to systematically address the issues of the quantity or the amount of money borrowed in a comprehensive manner. It deals with the question of why African states continue to borrow money from international financial institutions and what that means in relationship to questions of sovereignty and liberalism.

From the point of view of liberal thought, international debt can be understood and appreciated as part of the principles and the logic of international foreign investments and trade and competitiveness among the actors. The advocates of liberalism also believe in the Keynesian assumptions that a country that spends and borrows enough can eliminate poverty (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1998: 115). Within this framework, international debt should function within the logic of cooperation, interdependence, and exchanges of commodities among nation-states. Borrowing money from another state or institution, is not perceived as a criminal activity of a “criminal” or “failed” state, especially if this money can be used for a claimed or defined developmental goal. No country is self-sufficient when it comes to the amount of resources and diversity of the sources it needs to mobilize for growth, development objectives, or both. The above statement tends to perceive international debt as an ideologically neutral instrument of the international political economy. What values does international debt reflect in relationship to the liberal political doctrine of rights, freedoms, and political participation and also in relationship to poverty and underdevelopment as reflected by African conditions? In the statement below, MacEwan describes this complexity as related to the logic of debt that leads to the discussion of its implications to the borrowers and their people in this way:

There is no way to determine in advance when a debt burden will become unsustainable. The debt process is a bit like building a tower with a set of children's blocks. We cannot tell ahead of time how high we can go, how many blocks we can pile on top of each other,

but we do know that there is a limit. If we keep going higher and higher, at some point the whole structure will come tumbling down. There are, of course, ways to extend the limit. We can widen the base of tower, for example, or construct some support structures. There comes a point, however, where we are devoting all our efforts and resources to shoring up the tower (MacEwan, 1990: 31).

What are the intrinsic and instrumental values associated with international debt as articulated in the loan schemes and the African states? Who gains and loses, and what do they gain or lose? How are the gains and losses defined in the peripheral capitalism? What does international debt do for the African economies and social programmes? What are the importance and social meanings and implications of international debt to specific social classes and to society at large? Although most of these questions will not be systematically addressed in this section, they help, as part of my guidelines, to localize the issue in its historical and structural perspectives without losing sight of the relationship between interests of local political elites and those of international capitalists.

The issue related to international debt in Africa has exploded as a consequence of the expansion of “liberal imperialism”, which implies the conquest of the world by the free market and free trade. As articulated earlier, my analytical perspective in this chapter is that international debt has to be examined as an essential part of the operations and structures of international capitalism. The African debt crisis is, therefore, part of a larger world debt crisis. Although I am not dismissing the local and regional particularities associated with the dynamics of the world economy and colonialism, the implications and the values of African debts should be analyzed through the paradigms of the role of Africa in world capitalism. International debt issues should inform how capitalism works.

Within the context of this chapter, it should be stated that the amount of African international or public debt has been gradually and annually increasing since the 1970s. However, as compared to other countries in the developing world, especially those in South America, Africa's public debt represents only a relatively small percentage of the total public debt of the world. For instance, in 1998, the total public debt of Nigeria represented 3.485 % (\$23bn) of the total public debt of the world while the total public debt of Côte d'Ivoire was 1.608% (\$10bn); that of South Africa was 1.579% (\$10bn); that of Ghana was 0.828% (\$5bn); that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was 1, 330 % (\$8bn); that of Kenya was 0.836 (\$5bn); that of Senegal was 0.487% (\$3bn); and that of Ethiopia was 1.429% (\$9bn). In countries in South America, the percentage of the total public debt was higher than in Africa and Asia. For example, in Brazil it represented 14.707% (\$98bn959), Mexico 13.076% (\$87bn), and Argentina it was 11.413% (\$87bn) of total public world debt. In Asia, for instance, South Korea represented 8.612% (\$57bn), and Indonesia was 9.948% (\$66bn). These trends are not qualitatively very different from those in the 1980s. Values calculated in millions, of debt of countries as a percentage of GDP in 1998 tell another dimension of the story related to the question of foreign loans in African countries. For instance, in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, DRC, Kenya, Senegal, and Ethiopia, these values are 71.1, 116.3, 291.1, 57.9, 44.7, 174.7, and 133.5 respectively. However, as stated earlier, the issue is the availability of resources; to pay back this debt and the origins of loans. On a simple formula, money that one

is paying its debt has to come from some other sources. What are those sources and how are they related directly or indirectly to human conditions? As stated elsewhere, the ability of the African states to pay their loans is also central:

If and when nation-states start to spend between 30 and 40 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to either pay for the principal and/or to service their foreign loans, then international debt becomes part of the world crisis. A country like Mozambique until recently had to save only \$10 million a year on a debt service bill of \$120 million. Before the adoption of the newly defined HIPC guidelines from the G7, since 1996, Zambia, for instance, was spending around 45% of government revenues on debt service alone. What are the social and political consequences of this crisis in HIPC? (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002: 8).

CONCLUSION

In this essay, what I have tried to do is to reflect on the foundations of some of the claims of liberal democracy and international debt. The modes of governance and the economic systems must be evaluated in terms of their performance, the values they transmit, and the degree of the acceptability of these values among social groups in a given society. No matter how scientific we may become it can be generalized that social systems are likely to cease to function if we decide not to believe in them any longer. If the systems have been working poorly, why should we continue to use them? It is absurd and dangerous to continue to entertain the view that liberal democracy and its affiliated economic policies are working when in most cases the results indicate otherwise.

One of the arguments that I have articulated in this chapter is that the successes or failures of the liberal politics and economics that African political elites and their political parties have adopted, willingly or unwillingly, in their countries will depend very much on their abilities, and those of the African people, to understand and appreciate the values related to these complex concepts. It is clear to me that liberal democracy in Africa or liberalism at large has historically supported imperialist plans or imperial expansionist policies in the name of universalism, internationalism, and humanism. Behind “universal humanism”, African forms of liberal democracy have put more emphasis on the electoral democracies than on substantive democratic values. While liberal politics, especially multiparty elections, are flourishing even when the opposition claims otherwise, various types of wars of great magnitude are also competing with this liberal politics, as reflected in civil wars and imperialist wars in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where about four million Congolese were killed between 1998 and 2003. In 2003, there were wars in about twenty African countries. It should be indicated that many advocates of liberal economics in the West have been involved in supporting many aspects of these wars.

Cold War liberalism was essentially an ideology of the alliance of interests between the military power and its bureaucracies and corporate complexes that ruled the world with iron, stick, and the “controlled ‘free-market’ tools”. These institutions are still essentially interested in power, control, and the creation of surplus. The space and op-

tions for dealing with economic democracy, which have been demanded by popular and grassroots movements and progressive forces, are limited and in most cases non-existent in Africa. Is post-Cold War liberalism equal to pre-Cold War liberalism in terms of the power associated with international debt?

Most countries in Africa started accumulating the largest portions of their external debts towards the end of the 1970s at a time when there were no liberal democracies and some camouflaged liberal economics were in place. The peak period in Africa was when the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF's so-called stabilization programmes were fully adopted in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1995, for instance, the World Bank directly or indirectly stood on "the critical path of nearly 75 percent of the capital flow and debt relief to Africa" (Lione, 1995: 8). In the post-Cold War era, African states continue to accumulate debt, even when liberal democracy has become the dominant mode of governance. The state apparatuses have been reorganized to support the major objective of payment of debts. These states have been expected to fully commit themselves to pay back their debts or to renegotiate the payment schedule when electoral democracies have become partially the rule of the game or international practices for better or worse in many parts of the continent, and at a time of increasing and crippling poverty among the majority of the populations. It is my view that the electoral democracies have been supported by the Western powers and global financial institutions partially to avoid possible occurrences of worse-case scenarios such as defaulting or extreme nationalism, or even the cases of social revolution.

International debt is an arm of free trade and markets. It is the major principle of liberalism as supported by the conditionalities imposed and preached by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Paris Club, etc. This liberalism through international debt has created the high level of dependency of African states and economies on the so-called external donors. The policies related to the international debt have literally and figuratively been killing many people as a result of the disengagement of the states from the people, although many states tolerated elections and allowed them to take place. As of 2002, more than 300 million Africans were classified as very poor. And two thirds of these very poor people were extremely poor, living on one dollar or less a day. As stated above, the issue related to African poverty must be addressed beyond political territoriality and so-called national sovereignty:

As long as the structures of the world economy have not been seriously challenged collectively or regionally in Africa by the African political, social, and economic organizations and alliances, the results of the electoral democracies in terms of qualitatively changing people's living standards will matter very little. In fact, the involvement of corporate globalization in the electoral democracies either in directly supporting the elections or in propaganda making in the international media has to worry us because corporate globalization is not philosophically and socially interested in any democracy, development, and people. As stated earlier, its main interests are in power, control, and the surplus accumulation. In short, if electoral democracies framed within the technical dogma of the World Bank and the IMF are not transformed, by the actions of coalitions between popular and social movements, into social democracies, they will not be able to satisfy the demands of social changes that are taking place in most societies in Africa. Corporate

globalization is interested in the existing electoral democracies because these democracies are, in most cases, a façade of real democracies (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002).

Despite differences in the ways liberal democracy has been adopted in many countries, what can be generalized about are its major values as embodied in liberal constitutions, including the notions of accountability, the respect and dignity of the individual and centrality of his or her interest, competition, the emancipation of the citizens from the state, which is considered an exploitative political entity, and domination and control of the environment. Although the cult of individualism is limited in relationship to the rights of others, it can be defined, for instance, as in the United States, constitutionally as almost a “divined space.” Amitai Etzioni stated that “Individualists’ view that autonomy is the core virtue, not to be trumped by any other, mirrors their arguments against social formulation of the good: Individuals should be free to make their own choices (unless they harm other individuals)” (1996: 18).

It is the individuals who have to make assessments at personal levels concerning the successes or failures of liberal democratic practices and ends. Individuals must be able to know what their rights are, how to acquire and use them, and how to effectively promote for their own desired and desirable ends and happiness. Within the same logic of relationship between rights and knowledge, there are some people who ask what the importance of a constitution is for a largely illiterate society? In short, one has to know in order to exploit the system for advancing one’s own interests. Reason and practical education (pragmatism) are used to do just that. Additionally, this exploitation will take place within the frame of competition, which is a valued element of liberal democracy. It is also assumed that the quality of goods or the products will significantly improve among the producers, consumers, and the like if they can compete in the job market, in industrial production, and schools and that society will be the ultimate beneficiary—I should add, “all things being equal”. But in the real world, especially in Africa, “all things are not equal”. The question then becomes: Is constant competition good in itself?

The combination of liberal political thought, especially its liberal democratic practices, and international debt as an extension of free market has not created the social conditions in which the values and aspirations expressed in popular movements in Africa could be actualized, as Said Adejumobi stated:

The democratic aspirations of the African people are not only confined to the arena of political democracy (elections, and granting of civil and political rights) but involve the demand for economic empowerment, better living standards, and adequate social welfare. Indeed, for the majority of the people, democracy is meaningful when it delivers socio-economic goods. In other words, political democracy must be linked to socio-economic development. The deteriorating social welfare and living standards of the people in spite of the vote for democracy are gradually undermining the confidence of the people in the democratic order. As a Nigerian petty trader aptly puts it; “Na democracy we go chop” (2000: 1).

The silence in theory or the incapacity of liberal democracy to articulate economic rights is an issue that Africans should take more seriously than we have done so far.

Yet this silence is partially due to the fact that liberal democracy, at least on its surface, separates politics from economics, which is misleading. Can Africans afford that silence or that separation? This should be debated in liberal democratic forums and party congresses to understand the values that this democracy claims to project in disregarding or in minimizing the very essence of human survival and economics, at least as applied in Africa. Finally, the principles of liberal democracy and those of liberal economic thought as represented by the international loan policies tend to emphasize individualism and the weakening of the states. States and citizens have rights to challenge one another as part of their being and their ethos. Citizens distrust the state government because of its claims of “immortality”. This is why in the case of the United States, for instance, there are checks and balances to minimize the chances of bureaucratic and political corruption, despite the fact that corruption is inherent to the practices of liberal democracy, based on the role of money in the process of buying and selling of votes (political campaigns).

This chapter examined not only the claims of, and assumptions behind, liberal democracy and international debt, but also touched on what kind of societies the advocates of these components of global liberalism would like to create in Africa. It is clear to me that African society at large needs to construct a democracy that is not only functionally participatory and socially relevant, but which is also directly supportive of national economies. This democracy should diminish in practice the degree of tensions between economics and politics, individuals and community, which characterize permanent conflicts in most parts of Africa. Within the existing social conditions, it is possible to have a dialogue between economics and politics if only we have a new model of democracy that can address developmental issues. As Claude Ake rightly said in a conversation reported in the author’s publication:

Democracy requires even development, otherwise it cannot give equal opportunities to all; it cannot incorporate all to articulate their interests to negotiate them. It cannot produce a political community in which all are able to enjoy rights, nor avoid compromising justice. This is why development in this broad sense is an integral part of the process of democratisation (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1998: 124).

Concerning an alternative way of thinking, it is argued that a new mode of governance has to come from a reconceptualization of the African state. A mode of governance built on values and practices related to, and supported by, a welfare state should be able to reconcile individual and collective interests and values. Though the idea of a welfare state, whether it is liberal or social within global liberalization, has become controversial if not a taboo, historically, no state or country has developed or industrialized without establishing some sort of welfare state and institutions as well as being strong and enlightened enough to refuse to adopt policies that lead to the increased impoverishment of its population.

Finally, Africa is capable of governing itself effectively and of producing states from within its own dynamics if the old state apparatuses, laws, and paradigms are dismantled through popular movements, democratic processes, internal and regional alliances of power, and innovative initiatives. In the twenty-first century, we must forcefully ex-

amine how to promote the notion of strong welfare states that can take care of people's needs and be responsible and accountable for their actions (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2002a: 106). As Julius Nyerere said, cited in the author's article "Reconceptualizing the State":

In advocating a strong state, I am not holding a brief for either an overburdened State or a State with a bloated bureaucracy. To advocate a strong state is to advocate a state, which, among other things, has power to act on behalf of the people in accordance with their wishes. And in a market economy, with its law of the jungle, we need a state that has the capacity to intervene on behalf of the weak. No state is really strong unless its government has the full consent of at least the majority of its people; and it is difficult to envision how that consent can be obtained outside democracy. So a call for a strong state is not a call for dictatorships either. Indeed, all dictatorships are basically weak because the means they apply in governance make them inherently unstable (2002a: 109).

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3

HEALING OLD WOUNDS: ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Khabele Matlosa and Allan Mushonga

The past two decades have witnessed far-reaching developments that could arguably be said to be revolutionary in both form and content (Huntington, 1991; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Ake, 1996; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Adejumobi, 1998; Ake, 2000; Luckham et al, 2003). These developments have been marked, in the main, by a deliberate transition from authoritarianism towards democratic governance. Equally significant has been the transformation towards economic liberalization throughout the globe. Thus, the world is undergoing both political liberalization and economic liberalization in tandem. As Luckham et.al argue persuasively, “nearly everywhere, it has been argued, liberal representative democracy has been accepted as the best method of managing political affairs” (2003: 1). This global political sea change towards both liberal democracy and market-propelled economic systems has been given added impetus by the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The Southern African region is no exception to this world-wide political transformation. Internal political dynamics in individual countries have helped drive this process of political transition. Equally important have been the impact of not only the ending of the Cold War, but also the collapse of apartheid in South Africa (Matlosa, 2001). During the Cold War and apartheid, the Southern African region had been enmeshed in protracted conflicts, which had not allowed the regional states to enjoy sustainable development, democratic governance, stability and peace. It was thus anticipated, by many keen observers of the region’s political development, that the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era would bring about the stability and peace so crucial for democratic governance and economic development (see Baregu and Landsberg, 2003; Matlosa, 2003b).

Elections are currently perceived as the central, albeit not the only condition, for both the transition to, and the consolidation of, democracy and stability in the region. In essence, elections are an important, yet not the only, ingredient for democratic practice and culture. If well managed, they are also crucial instruments for conflict management in war-torn societies. Conversely, elections can also accentuate existing conflicts

among belligerent parties. This is not surprising for elections themselves are, by their very nature, conflict-ridden, given that they present a contest over state power (Matlosa, 2001; Lodge et. al, 2002). For elections to add value to democratic governance, stability, peace and reconciliation, clear rules, procedures and systems that bind all the contesting parties are required. Often the debate on elections and conflict tends to focus mainly on the general elections, thereby downplaying other levels of the electoral process more by default than by design. It is worth noting that primary elections within political parties are as (if not more) dissentious as the general elections themselves. These have led to or accelerated intra-party power struggles, faction fighting and splits of parties into fragmented political fiefdoms (Olukoshi, 1998). In essence, primary elections could either stabilize or destabilize the party machinery depending on the degree of the inner-party democracy in each of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) states. On the whole, internal party democracy is weak; hence the fragmentation and relative ineffectiveness of opposition parties throughout the region.

Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that local government elections are as important in Southern Africa as are general elections and, in much the same way, are as conflict-ridden. Whereas much of the conflict around general elections is primarily among political parties, the principal conflict in local government elections revolves around the power struggle between modern and traditional institutions of governance, although inter-party strife also marks local-level conflicts. It is interesting that although many SADC countries have embraced the idea and practice of holding legislative and Presidential election on a fairly regular basis, bar three (namely Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Swaziland), almost all of them exhibit a poor record in terms of regular local government elections. We are as yet not able to proffer a solid and convincing argumentation for this glaring discrepancy or 'democratic deficit' (to borrow Luckham's phrase) save only to note that this is testimony to the level of political centralization of the current systems; itself a relic of the one-party/one-person rule of yesteryear. Devolution of power to local areas in the form of democratic local government is yet to be institutionalized in the SADC region. This still remains one of the major challenges of democratic consolidation in the region and the entire African continent.

CONCEPTUALIZING GOVERNANCE

It appears fairly easy to explain phenomena as we see them happen such as the embrace of democratic culture and practice in the SADC region. It is a little difficult, however, to conceptualize these developments. Explanation of phenomena entails simple narration and description of what is happening while conceptualization transcends narration and description as it seeks to unravel deeper meaning and ramifications of why and how things happen the way they do. Thus a more plausible discussion of problems, progress and prospects for democratic governance, stability and peace in Southern Africa, and the role of elections in this regard, has to grapple with some common understanding of critical concepts. These include the state, government, democracy and democratisation, authoritarianism, conflict and conflict management, and elections and electoral systems.

The concept of the 'state' usually invokes heated debate among social scientists. The state could be perceived as either the territorial entity which is home to a specific people sharing a common culture even if ethnically or racially diverse, or as an institutional entity. This article adopts the latter definition, which conceives of the state as a set of permanent institutions of government comprising decision-making structures (the legislature), decision-enforcing organs (the security establishment) and policy formulating agencies (the bureaucracy) (see Chazan et. al, 1998; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Hall and Ikenberry, 1989; Forest, 1992). The state therefore comprises permanent institutions, which do not change despite periodic elections and changes of government over time. The state is thus crucial for the running of national affairs of countries (Matlosa, 2001).

In contrast, 'government' refers not to institutions, but rather to officers who staff state institutions for the effective and efficient running of national affairs. Unlike state institutions, governments come and go. Governments change over time either through the smooth transition brought about by elections (ballot-propelled changes) or through violent overthrow of regimes by way of military coups (bullet-propelled changes). A simple distinction between a state and a government, therefore, is that (a) the state refers to institutions whereas government denotes people in charge of these institutions; and (b) the state is permanent whereas government is by its very nature temporary and ephemeral. The manner in which state institutions are run defines the extent to which a political system in a given country could be classified as either democratic or authoritarian.

Governance denotes the process by which the state and government machineries are set in motion. The mode of governance determines the manner in which power is exercised in the public realm (Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Hyden et. al, 2000). It simply refers to the method and art of governing a given country. Whereas the state refers to permanent institutions of running national affairs and government refers to officers who staff state institutions, governance defines the modality and process of governing. Governance can be either democratic or authoritarian (Jackson and Jackson, 1997). Democratic governance draws its mandate, legitimacy, credibility and acceptability from consensus and persuasion, whereas authoritarian governance draws its value from threats, coercion and patronage. Elections play a more crucial role in democratic governance in present-day Southern Africa. During the period of one-party and personal rule in the region, when authoritarian governance was the order of the day, elections were insignificant and had a minimal bearing on the political system as a legitimizing factor. The governance process in Southern Africa has undergone a major transformation since the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, moving away from authoritarian rule of civilian and military varieties towards a politics of consensus and persuasion upon which legitimate rule is anchored.

Various authorities have differently defined democracy (see Ake, 1996; Jackson and Jackson, 1997; Ake, 2000; Luckham et. al, 2003). It is not far-fetched to surmise that there are as many definitions of democracy as there are writers on the subject. For this study, democracy is taken to mean a political system that allows all citizens to freely choose their government over time through elections, one that is accountable to the electorate and accords people adequate participation in the running of national affairs. It is a system that is transparent in driving processes of nation-building and economic development, respects fundamental human rights and strives towards a fair distribution

of national resources. Only by meeting the above conditions is a government likely to enjoy both domestic and international legitimacy and credibility, which are needed for its moral title to rule. The three known forms of democracy throughout the world are liberal democracy, social democracy and popular democracy.

According to Jackson and Jackson:

an essential characteristic of democracy ...is the reconciliation of the need for order and stability with a degree of influence for competing political interests. Representatives are elected by a form of majority rule to make legislation, which has the force of law. They are allowed to do so because success in elections accord the winners the legitimacy required to govern. A majority principle is required so that decisions can be taken by the people and their representatives even when division continues to exist (1997: 77).

Authoritarianism, on the other hand, is a concept used to denote a political system which relies upon obedience, coercion and fear as its key legitimating factors to sustain continuity and reproduction of the governing elite. It is no wonder, therefore, that:

Such regimes impose one political group or interest over everyone else. They restrict pluralism and limit public participation, calling for obedience and no dissent... In authoritarian countries, power is organised by the elites through the military, bureaucracy, religious leaders, or similar authorities... Usually little effort is made in such regimes to mobilize the population to political action because the leaders prefer apathy... Parties are frequently banned and opponents imprison(ed.), The threat of state violence is never far behind any significant political activity (Jackson and Jackson, 1997: 81).

Varieties of authoritarianism include (a) mono-party states, (b) military regimes, (c) dynastic or monarchic oligarchies and (d) theocratic regimes.

Part of the limitation of the democratisation project in Southern Africa today has to do with its form and content. A majority of the states are following liberal democracy and in most cases it seems that the dominant party is the preferred party system after the long years of the mono-party system. Under these circumstances, stability has not really taken root. Consequently, democratic governance and sustainable development remain elusive goals and elections make little sense to ordinary voters. What other scholars have observed recently under the current process of political liberalization, is that there is an enormous amount of focus on democratisation of high politics revolving around the state and less focus on democratisation of “deep politics of society” (Luckham et al, 2003: 5). Even under the new democratic dispensation in Southern Africa today, which Mkandawire (1998) aptly terms a “choiceless democracy”, (which we could also qualify as a “voiceless democracy”) evidence abounds that first, both leaders and the electorate have little say in terms of choice of the democratic model in place and second, people vote not so much for real national issues but for individuals or parties on the basis of ‘pork-barrel’ or patronage politics and third, the current democratisation tends to amount to regular circulation and self-reproduction of a small coterie of the elite thereby excluding the larger majority of the poor people who are remembered only during election time.

Although conflicts are inherent in all societies since time immemorial, the concept of ‘conflict’ remains both nebulous and elusive in social Science discourse (Schellenberg,

1982; Ohlson and Stedman, 1994). For this study, the concept is used to denote incompatibility of interests, choices and goals over the distribution of resources, ideological orientation and power among various political actors. Thus three factors are important in defining a conflict situation, namely (a) resource distribution; (b) ideological contestation; and (c) power struggles. Conflict arises from interaction among two or more actors in the political system with incompatible interests, choices and goals wherein the ability of one actor to gain depends to an important degree on some loss on the part of others. Politics, therefore, is a conflict-ridden game. All said and done, conflict, in and of itself, is not necessarily a negative phenomenon as some discourse on peace and security would have us believe. Conflict could also be perceived as part of the social transformation of societies in a positive direction and as such cannot be wished away or detested as it were. It is not conflict that presents a big problem for our societies but what actually does is precisely how best belligerent parties strive to resolve them in a constructive manner. Constructive resolution of conflict turns around political settlement of disputes rather than pursuing a military course of resolution, for the latter naturally leads to conflict escalation rather than its resolution. It is worth noting that following protracted liberation wars that were followed, in some countries such as Angola and Mozambique, by internal wars among parties with external support within the context of the Cold War and apartheid, all the violent conflicts in the region were resolved by way of political settlement involving multi-stakeholder dialogue and negotiation.

It should also be noted that the Electoral Commissions Forum of the SADC countries, established in the early 1990s, has a specific Conflict Resolution Programme, which aims at creating sustainable and effective capacity for member countries to manage election-related conflicts. The specific objectives of this programme are as follows:

1. To facilitate collective exploration by SADC electoral commissions of the nature and manifestation of election-related conflicts, and the systems and capacities required to manage them;
2. To facilitate the design of conflict management systems appropriate to each national context;
3. To develop capacity, through training of designated persons in each country, to manage conflicts;
4. To establish a resource panel of experts that can be drawn upon to assist in conflict – related crisis during elections.

An election refers to a process whereby a people belonging to a particular territorial state and under the authority of a single institutional state, variously referred to as either the electorate or voters, choose their government periodically as a clear expression of representative democracy (Matlosa, 2001). Elections, therefore, are an important ingredient of democracy. However, elections on their own do not guarantee democracy nor are they synonymous with it. As Jackson and Jackson persuasively argue, “without some form of elections, there is no democracy. Citizens have no choice, no say in who will govern them. But it is equally true ... that elections themselves are far from a guarantee of democracy” (Jackson and Jackson, 1997: 366).

Elections serve various functions including political education, recruitment and selection of political leadership, orderly succession of government anchored upon the ballot rather than the bullet, periodic review of the performance of the government and an opportunity for renewal of mandate or replacement of the sitting government by another. They ensure domestic and international legitimacy and credibility of government and, in war-torn societies, are a mechanism for assisting with conflict resolution. Whereas an election is a process, an electoral system refers to a method or the rules of the process (Matlosa, 2003). It is a method that a particular country adopts for choosing national leaders to represent the electorate in the legislature. Its primary *raison d'être* is to match votes with seats in Parliament (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). There are various electoral systems throughout the world and each country adopts a particular model on the basis of its culture, political history, and party organization. The three main types of electoral systems are (a) the single member plurality system, (b) the single member majority system and (c) proportional representation (PR). (Jackson and Jackson, 1997; Reynolds and Reilly, 1997). Different countries variously apply these systems and their application may include a mixture of any two of the three. Evidence suggests in fact that the single-member plurality system is more conflict-inducing and conflict-prone than proportional representation. With the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, almost all the SADC countries that have adopted the First-Past-The-Post electoral system have tended to experience much more profound violent and non-violent conflicts threatening their political systems as they generate instability.

BULLETS VERSUS BALLOTS: ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT

For most of the 1980s, Southern African states steered their political systems away from mono-party and military rule towards multiparty and pluralist political systems (Giliomee and Simkin, 1999; Matlosa, 2003a). Of all the SADC countries, only Angola, Swaziland and the Democratic Republic of Congo have not embraced multiparty rule and regular party-based elections as a vital form of contestation over state power. Despite these three exceptions to the rule, a consensus is emerging within the region that multiparty systems are better political arrangements than single party systems (SAPES/UNDPP/SADC, 1998; Luckham et.al 2003). Currently, the region is faced with the challenge of consolidating the new-found democratic practice and culture as well as institutionalizing the culture of peace and reconciliation after long years of both violent and non-violent conflict. As one writer aptly observes:

Post conflict elections are supposed to transform a violent conflict into a non-violent one: ballots take the place of bullets. They are expected to enable the former warring parties to pursue their conflicting ideologies and programmes in a peaceful fashion. Elections give all factions an opportunity to present their agendas to the citizens, debate with their opponents, and mobilise public opinion to capture political power. Like other elements of the democratic system, elections contribute to the institutionalization of a conflict resolution mechanism in the body politic (emphasis mine) (Kumar, 1998: 7).

Within the current process of political liberalization, multiparty elections have become firmly entrenched in the political system of a majority of Southern African states. Botswana and Mauritius are the longest enduring stable multiparty systems, anchored upon regular elections over the last three decades of political independence and have experienced few, if any, violent conflicts (Matlosa, 2001; Matlosa, 2003a; Molomo, 2003).

The region's recent electoral record and the degree to which elections resolve major conflicts show great variations. On the basis of the 1991 Bicesse Agreement, Angola held its Presidential and Legislative elections in September 1992 in the middle of a major violent conflict. The elections result delivered a victory for the Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In the Presidential race, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA secured 49.67% and Jonas Savimbi of the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (Unita) received 40.07% of the total votes cast. In the National Assembly race, the MPLA won 53% of the votes to Unita's 34.10%. Instead of the electoral process acting as a catalyst in the transition to and consolidation of democratic rule, it accentuated and gave more vigour to the armed conflict (Ottaway, 1998; Matlosa, 1999a). Angola has adopted the proportional representation electoral model, which is highly regarded as enhancing broader participation and thereby contributing to political stability (Mahao, 1997; Matlosa, 1999b). The Angolan situation provides sufficient evidence that in some instances elections alone are insufficient to bring about political stability, reconciliation and peace. As Kumar and Ottaway remind us, there is little doubt that in many instances elections leave a bitter legacy, aggravating existing tensions and cleavages (Kumar and Ottaway, 1998). The Angolan conflict is one of the most protracted and costly conflicts in Africa today and it is highly encouraging, indeed, that since the death of the Unita leader, Jonas Savimbi, in early 2002, considerable progress has been made towards resolving this conflict constructively and there is a likelihood of elections being held soon.

In contrast, Mozambique experienced a smooth political transition based upon the 1992 General Peace Agreement signed in Rome by the belligerent parties (see Lundin, 2003). This culminated in the holding of Presidential and Legislative elections in October 1994, which resulted in some form of a coalition government incorporating the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). This suggests that under certain conditions, elections could be useful in transforming war-torn societies into stable political systems. Furthermore, the Mozambican experience suggests that power sharing is crucial for the credibility of the elections outcome and for sustainable peace in war-torn societies.

Mozambique's fledgeling democracy was given a further boost by the second elections of 1999, which consolidated the country's stability and coalition government. In the Presidential contest, Frelimo's Joachim Chissano won 52.3% and Renamo's Afonso Dhlakama 47.7% of votes cast, thereby ensuring the continuity of the government of national unity in a country slowly recovering from a severe war. In the Legislative contest, Frelimo won, by capturing 48.5% of the votes to Renamo's 38.8%. About 11 minor parties secured far fewer votes in the elections and did not field candidates for the Presidential race. As with the Presidential race, the National Assembly elections outcome further consolidated the government of national unity, so crucial for both political and economic recovery in Mozambique.

Although the major opposition party Renamo complained bitterly about what it perceived as irregularities and fraud in the electoral process, the election outcome was accepted by all parties, thereby according the new government legitimacy and political integrity (Turner et al, 1998; Lundin, 2003). This highlights the importance of acceptance of the election's results by all political players if stability is to prevail in a country, especially in a war-torn one. Like Angola, Mozambique operates a proportional representation electoral system, yet the political effects of the elections on violent conflict in both countries present sharp contrasts. Generally, the proportional representation system lends itself to constructive management of conflicts, especially when violent, as the experience of South Africa since 1994 clearly indicates. Mozambique is preparing for its third election since the peace agreement of 1992. The general election, scheduled for 2004, will be preceded by a local government election in 2003. President Joachim Chissano has already announced publicly that he will not stand for the 2004 election, given that he has served his two terms in office and this again is a positive sign for Mozambique's fledgeling democracy.

In between the polar opposites of Angola and Mozambique lie a mixture of experiences with regard to the degree to which elections accentuate or contain conflicts. Quite obviously, elections have helped in the process of political settlement of the South African conflict. The South African example is instructive as protracted negotiations among belligerent parties, signing of peace accords and establishment of peace panels preceded the 1994 elections (Matlosa, 2001). Although violence is still a major problem in South Africa, relative stability has been achieved and the country's electoral system allows broader representation of political actors in the legislature. In South Africa, therefore, elections contributed to the wider peace and reconciliation process to bring about stability, which still prevails today. Although Namibia's political settlement of its long-drawn war of liberation also involved elections, which turned SWAPO into a ruling party, the international community, especially the United Nations, was heavily involved in the process. This presupposes that in war-torn societies, international assistance is essential as there is usually a lack of institutional, financial and technical capability to hold and run elections (Kumar, 1999). The same was true for the 1992 elections in Angola and in Mozambique in 1994 and 1999.

The Zimbabwean elections of June 2000 also attracted overwhelming international attention and more than 500 international observers and domestic monitors witnessed the electoral process. Given its entrenched political mono-party culture and heavy centralization of power, political liberalization presents a daunting challenge to Zimbabwe. Preparations for the June 2000 elections were marred by sporadic and violent conflicts, which were accelerated by the land invasions, spearheaded by war veterans from February 2000. Dialogue and negotiation among belligerent parties did not mark the road to the Zimbabwean elections and as a result, there was little possibility that they would play a significant role in securing the country's long-lasting stability. In addition, there were no well-defined conflict resolution mechanisms to manage the conflict, leading to counter-productive accusations and counter-accusations regarding its root causes (Makumbe and Compagnon, 1999; Sachikonye, 2000a; Sachikonye, 2000b; Matlosa, 2002; Sachikonye, 2003).

The Zimbabwean elections of 2000 were both interesting and intriguing in many respects. They were interesting, primarily because after years of hegemonic hold on power in a mono-party atmosphere, the ruling Zanu-PF faced a real political challenge from an emergent opposition formation, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It was intriguing because, despite the political violence and intimidation that marked the campaign process, large numbers of ordinary Zimbabweans braved the political turbulence and went to the polls to exercise their democratic right to choose their national leaders. Of the 5.29 million registered voters, 65% turned out at the polls, far above the 32% in the 1996 Presidential elections, or 57% and 54% respectively in the 1995 and 1990 Parliamentary elections. There was a clear ideological divide between the ruling party, which espoused a land reform redistribution programme with a view to deepening the nationalist project of expanding or broadening political liberation into the economic sphere on the one hand, and the opposition which espoused the idea of employment creation and upheld liberal democratic values (Matlosa, 2001; Matlosa, 2003a; Sachikonye, 2003).

The elections outcome was fascinating too. Of the directly elected Parliamentary seats (i.e. 120 seats) Zanu-PF won narrowly by securing 62 seats. The MDC put up an unprecedented political battle against Zanu-PF, long established hegemony and received 57 seats, becoming the first-ever significant opposition. Zanu-Ndonga of Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole secured only one seat. Both Zanu-PF and the MDC face enormous challenges. The MDC has to prove that its electoral support translates into effective oppositional politics rooted in well-defined constituencies. Upsetting a hegemonic force such as Zanu-Pf, albeit no mean task, is one thing, and sustaining the opposition momentum and avoiding internal fragmentation is quite another. Effective and meaningful opposition is a quintessential element of democratic transformation in Zimbabwe. The electoral process was perceived by many international observers as having been transparent, credible and acceptable to the preference of the majority of Zimbabweans, thus giving unequivocal legitimacy to the newly established two-party legislature. The outcome is also conducive for the resolution of major conflicts in Zimbabwe mainly around the land question and the constitutional review process. The former is in an advanced stage (Moyo and Matondi, 2003a; Moyo and Matondi, 2003b) and the latter surely has to be revisited in the post-election period after a pre-election referendum in which a majority of Zimbabweans rejected the draft constitutional amendments (Mandaza, 1999; Mandaza, 2000a; Mandaza, 2000b).

At the time of writing this article in (April 2003), a debate was emerging in Zimbabwe regarding possible inter-party dialogue and negotiation between the ruling ZANU-PF and the main opposition MDC. Apparently, talks about talks had begun behind closed doors although both parties would not come openly on the issue. The Presidents of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki, who is also Chairperson of the African Union), Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, (who had just won a general election in his country), and Malawi's Bakili Muluzi, (who is also the former Chairperson of SADC) visited Zimbabwe during the week of May 5-9, 2003 purportedly to bolster this internal inter-party negotiation process. Although the state-run media tried to down-play the inter-party talks, according to one local authoritative newspaper, talks about talks had begun in earnest and were being framed along the following five points of discussion:

1. Mutual acknowledgement and respect of all parties in the dialogue;
2. Definition of mutually agreed national interest;
3. Formation of a government of national unity;
4. Framing of a new constitution on the basis of improvement of the 2000 constitution review/reform process;
5. The holding of general elections in 2005 under a transitional government (*Sunday Mirror*, 27 April 2003).

All these efforts are yet to bear fruit and on the basis of how the key parties proceed on this new path, it is only fair to surmise that they will either make or break Zimbabwe's already enfeebled political system and the ravaged economy as a whole. Only time will tell.

THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

As has been observed in the previous sections of this chapter, elections serve an important function in the process of democratisation and conflict management. This is more so in a situation where a country has just emerged from armed conflict. Unlike other situations, elections after armed conflict serve particular objectives. First, they compel belligerent parties to bury their hatchets and seek a political settlement of their ideological differences. They remind the warring parties that ballots rather than bullets are a preferred method of contestation for the efficient transfer of state power. Second, they aim to bestow legitimacy and credibility on new democratic governance after a protracted conflict. The worst-case scenario is when one party wins outright, thereby marginalizing the others (as in Lesotho 1993 in and 1998). The best-case scenario is one whereby the election outcome leads to broadly based representation in the legislature, as was the case in South Africa after the 1994 elections. This then compels all parties to commit themselves to building a democracy by transforming the culture of politics of coercion and embracing a politics of consensus (Jackson and Jackson, 1997). Virulent opposition in Parliament is far better than violent opposition in the streets. Third, they serve to give practical meaning and essence to the peace accords and reconciliation programmes, as was the case in Mozambique (1992), Namibia (1994) and South Africa (1994).

The Angolan elections of 1992 failed to deliver stability precisely because belligerent parties, particularly the opposition, did not abide by the Bicesse Accord and various other peace agreements made since the 1985 Lusaka Accord. Even the 1994 Lusaka Protocol failed to deliver peace and stability to Angola until the death of Savimbi in 2002 (Kambudzi, 2003). Although the elections are generally regarded to have been a technical success under the prevailing climate, they are considered to have been an utter political fiasco, as the losing party did not accept the outcome, but rather resorted to the bullet for resolving political differences and settling scores in the contest for state power (Turner et.al, 1998).

Another interesting case of violence-ridden elections over the years is the small mountain kingdom of Lesotho. Although the 1965 pre-independence election did not

really trigger a violent conflict as such, the 1970 election nearly plunged the landlocked nation into a civil war. This was then followed by a military coup in 1986, which dislodged authoritarianism of the civilian type and replaced it with one of a military variety. Following about eight years of military authoritarianism, Lesotho adopted a multi-party political system of the liberal democratic model again in 1993 through a general election that was resoundingly won by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) which had been denied its legitimate victory by the then ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) in the aborted 1970 election. Various types of violent and non-violent conflicts marked Lesotho's young democracy between 1993 and the general election of 1998, which was immediately followed by a much more profound violent conflict in which the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy locked horns in a fierce war with elements of opposition parties. These did not only cause enormous damage to the economy of the labour reserve mountain kingdom, but also witnessed the military intervention into the country by South Africa and Botswana (Makoa, 2003; de Coning, 2003). Given the consensus that emerged following the 1998 election that much of Lesotho's problem stemmed from the nature of the electoral model, the country took a deliberate decision to reform its electoral system away from a pure FPTP system towards the mixed member Proportional system that combined both elements of the FPTP and PR. This system was first put into effect during the May 2002 election and the outcome has been quite impressive as for the first time Lesotho boasts a highly inclusive multiparty Parliament conducive to the general political stability so desirable for economic progress.

There are various preconditions for elections after armed conflict. First, all belligerent parties must commit themselves to peace and reconciliation. To this end a peace accord and a clearly defined reconciliation programmes is required, as both the Mozambican and South African situations vividly illustrate. Second, post-conflict elections must be held only if parties have signed a peace agreement and have devised an achievable reconciliation programmes. This peace and reconciliation programmes must also be accompanied by the signing of a judicial code of conduct for political parties. It is a gamble to hold elections under conditions of violent conflict when parties have not agreed to the peaceful conduct of politics and a process of reconciliation, and have not signed some form of code of conduct (Matlosa, 2001), as the Angolan situation so amply demonstrates. Third, as Kumar and Ottaway (1998) point out, there must exist a capable and functional state system before elections are conducted under conditions of armed conflict. As these authors rightly observe, if the very existence of the state is in doubt, as is the case with failed states such as Somalia, international assistance probably cannot fill the gap, and elections cannot bring political stability or resolve conflicts.

Fourth, international assistance is highly valuable when elections are held in conditions of armed conflict. War-torn countries have severely ravaged economies and a constrained resource and production base from which to finance electoral processes. The involvement of international monitors and observers contributes immensely to the credibility of the elections and the acceptance of their outcomes by the concerned political parties. Moreover, it reduces the probability of large-scale fraud and cheating. Kumar and Ottaway (1998) identify three critical forms of international assistance war-torn countries holding elections:

1. Financial assistance for planning and holding of elections;
2. Technical assistance and expertise in election administration, rules and procedures; and
3. Political assistance in the form of support to political parties, civil organizations, voter education, monitoring and observation.

Fifth, demobilization of troops or warring factions and the integration of the armies into a national army, as well as peacekeeping operations, are vital before elections can be held. This process of demilitarization of politics is crucial for transforming the culture of politics of violence and coercion, and embracing the politics of dialogue and consensus. Although demilitarization and integration of armed formations has been relatively successful in Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, it has not been successful in Lesotho and Angola. This in part explains why elections have not really deepened and consolidated political stability and democratic governance in those countries.

Sixth, prior to elections, which follow violent conflict, returning refugees and displaced persons must be settled and allowed sufficient time to register as voters. Refugees and displaced persons are “often the worst victims of civil wars, and therefore their active participation in elections tends to strengthen the peace process” (Kumar and Ottaway, 1998: 230). This could prove a very difficult and costly task, but a task that is crucial for democracy emerging from the debris of a protracted war (Matlosa, 2001).

Seventh, clearing of landmines and the banning of military supplies from external sources is also an important precondition for elections after armed conflict. This was very important in the cases of Angola and Mozambique, two countries whose belligerent factions received massive amounts of external military supplies and which are also heavily mined (Africa Watch, 1993; Africa Watch, 1994). It is easier to ban the external supply of weapons under conditions of peace, but it is rather difficult and costly to clear landmines. Such mines continue an atrocious war upon an innocent civilian population years after hostilities have ceased and make life miserable for ordinary people in the villages. The fear that landmines instill among rural populations triggers migration to the urban areas with its well-known social ills.

Eighth, elections after violent conflicts must be run and administered by credible, autonomous and competent institutions that are not in any way linked to any of the belligerent parties in a partisan fashion. To this end, the establishment of independent electoral commissions (IECs) is essential. These institutions require sufficient financial, technical and political support, not only from the international donor agencies but also from such institutions as the Electoral Commissions Forum of the SADC countries and the SADC Parliamentary Forum.

Ninth, there is a dire need to provide adequate time for preparations for elections after armed conflict. In fact, all elections require a long time for preparations, but this is more so for elections after violent conflicts. Various important tasks for such elections require a lot of time, such as signing of peace accords, demobilization and integration of troops, settlement of returning refugees and displaced persons, agreement on the electoral model, voter education, voter registration, establishment of an IEC, etc.

Tenth, institutionalization of inner-party democracy is also crucial, so that the democratic practices and cultures within parties will assist them to see the value of dialogue and politics of consensus when dealing with their adversaries. It has been found that in the majority of African states, parties lack internal democracy and this in part accounts for the current disintegration and fragmentation of opposition parties. Although the incumbent rulers work hard to undermine and weaken the opposition and the electoral system, weak opposition parties are also hindered by the 'first past the post' system and internal leadership squabbles, not necessarily based on ideological or policy differences. All these factors have wreaked havoc upon the opposition parties in Southern Africa (Olukoshi, 1998).

Eleventh, there is a need for constitutional reform in countries that have experienced a violent conflict before elections are held, so that belligerent parties engage in dialogue and negotiation around a new social contract regarding the form of state, the form of political system and the form of electoral model they would prefer. This is important for building a minimum programmes that binds the belligerent parties together and is different from a peace agreement. CODESA negotiations achieved this objective for South Africa (Maphai, 1994). Zimbabwe attempted this strategy with its constitutional review, which culminated in a referendum that to the chagrin of the ruling party received a 'No' vote (Makumbe and Compagnon, 2000; Sachikonye, 2000a; Sachikonye, 2000b; Sachikonye, 2003). Lesotho underwent some constitutional reform, which led to the adoption of the mixed member proportional system, and prospects for peace, reconciliation and stability in this country look very bright indeed. Mauritius has undertaken constitutional reform that could witness the adoption of the mixed member proportional system in its forthcoming election in 2005.

It is crucial that the rules of state administration and electoral administration are agreed upon as a basis for all parties to accept the outcome of elections. In this manner, seeing politics as a zero-sum game is likely to be replaced by a view that conceives of it as a positive-sum process. This is important for the tolerance of opposing and divergent views in and multi-racial societies. Tekle reminds us that, "mutual appreciation of opposition views must be accepted and the conviction that losers lose everything while winners take it all can no longer be the norm. It must be recognized that in a democracy winners and losers are partners and not enemies who must destroy each other" (1998: 175).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has investigated the interface between elections and conflict in Southern Africa. The heart of the argument is that although elections may in certain contexts assist to heal old wounds, in others they have, in fact, helped to aggravate the pain of these wounds. It is succinctly evident that elections have combined with complex array of factors, contributed to healing the wounds of old conflicts in, say Namibia (1989), Mozambique (1994) and South Africa (1994). There is abundant evidence pointing to the stark reality that these are in fact some of the countries in which appreciable progress has been made towards nurturing and consolidating democracy, although serious chal-

lenges still remain. We have also discovered that elections have aggravated the pain and intensity of old wounds in countries like Angola (1992), Lesotho (1998) and Zimbabwe (2000 Parliamentary elections; 2002 Presidential elections). It is important to note here that the critical challenge facing the electoral management bodies (EMBs), the political parties and the electorate alike, is exactly how to ensure that an election does not worsen insecurity and instability, but rather adds value to existing institutional mechanisms for the constructive resolution of conflicts. To this end, we have observed that the post-conflict state and Southern Africa need to take concrete steps towards the realization of this important goal. We have identified eleven distinct, albeit intertwined, steps to be followed in order to make sure that elections make a meaningful contribution to peace, reconciliation and stability in the SADC region. These are:

1. Seeking a political settlement to all violent conflicts by belligerent parties;
2. Ensuring legitimacy and credibility of an elected government;
3. Commitment of all belligerents to peaceful engagement with each other before an election can be contemplated;
4. Signing of a binding peace agreement before an election is held;
5. Ensuring that international assistance is secured before an election is held;
6. Taking concrete steps to demobilize troops and integrate armed formations of the warring parties following a conflict;
7. Clearing of landmines and banning of external military supplies to create a conducive environment for the election;
8. The running of elections by a credible and impartial election management body to ensure a level playing field;
9. Provision of adequate time for preparation and holding of elections;
10. Institutionalization of inner-party democracy as a key anchor of national-level democratic dispensation;
11. Institutionalization of constitutional reforms to make sure that electoral models adopted by SADC states do assist in the healing rather than aggravation of old wounds.

Thus, ideally elections do have great potential to heal wounds, although they also do have unintended effects of accentuating the old conflicts. There is no straightforward causal relationship, therefore, between elections and conflict in the SADC region.

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4

THE NEW ROLE OF THE STATE IN AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF NIGERIA

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The role of the state and that of civil society itself in development are complementary. But for the purpose of this chapter, I shall concentrate largely on the role of the state. Albeit there is no agreement within the (Political Science) discipline on the core values constituting the good state and governance (Ibrahim, 1997: 115), the state's new role in Africa's development is being called into question. It is being seriously canvassed for downsizing, especially by donor agencies, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and analysts (and I agree), because of the retarded or very low performance of the African state in the development of society. They are highlighting the devastating effects of colonialism on the African continent, as in Latin America and the Pacific countries. Colonialism unleashed a reign of terror on Africa, disarticulating and halting the indigenous progress that was being steadily made in all spheres of human endeavors. This could be politically, economically, socially, culturally, religiously and humanly, i.e, in terms of respect for human dignity. However, even though colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, globalization, liberalization and market forces have imposed their domination on the less developed countries (LDCs) in like manner, Olowu (1997: 164) rightly points out that, "Africa continues to lag behind the rest of the world in all measures of economic and social progress and the conditions of its people seem to be worsening". He adds that, "African states are centralised, at least formally, whereas their societies are relatively decentralised, and in many cases, dispersed". And Hyden (1995: 260) adds his voice that, "... (there) has been an emergence in Africa of a state centralised in language, laws and aspiration, but inefficient or soft". Briefly, centralism or what Nnoli (2000: 6) rightly describes as "multifaceted" functions of the African state, originated from colonialism. Simply put, the colonialists met the different African nations or pre-colonial states with their traditional leaders, but with the colonialists' long history of development, they had become well established and had enormous powers and wealth with which they easily subdued the indigenous African states. Such was the encounter that set the centralization stage in Africa.

But as already stated above, while the other continents which suffered all forms of deprivation like Africa from colonialism, have continued to make some appreciable progress (with the Asian countries being remarkable to the extent of earning it various names such as Asian Tigers, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) and the Asian miracle), Africa trails them. We can see continued “planlessness” or planning without facts, poor implementation, colossal waste, grand corruption, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of government parastatals, government enterprises, state-owned companies and even the civil service. We cannot see any sign of productive capital accumulation, indigenous manufacturing, construction industries or sustainable development. Yet the state continues to spread its nets to all facets of human endeavor without the society benefiting from it. Hence the current questioning of the role of the African state in development.

Ditto for Nigeria. Before the advent of British rule in Nigeria, the entity that became known as Nigeria from 1st January, 1900, was inhabited by not less than thirty different nations or states. These included Oyo, Egba, Ketu, Jebu, Ekiti, Ife, Ilesha, Daura, Gobir, Kastina, Kano, Zaria, Nupe, Ibo, Ibibio-Efik, Ijaw and Benin. These were indigenous political systems that organized the affairs of their different nations largely on a decentralized basis. The administration of these political systems, even in the so-called centralized states such as the Benin empire, was in practice decentralized because the head of the political system or the paramount ruler, Oba, Alafin, Alake, Obi, Sarki, or by whatever name they were known, in many cases had regional lieutenants to assist them administratively. It was not a case of field administration but one of autonomy. In the case of the Hausa states, Davidson (1967), for example, writes that “they never had a single central government. They did not form a Hausa empire”. In the Ibo areas, there were traditionally segmented states. The lieutenants were also designated by different names, depending on the nation or state concerned. For example, in the Benin Kingdom or empire, they were called *Enigie* (kings) in some areas and *Enoje* (chiefs) in other areas. They were called by different titles such as *Galadima* and *Chiroma* in the Kanem-Borno empire. They took charge of the different regions into which the political system was divided and reported to the paramount ruler as the need arose. In many cases, the regions paid tributes to the paramount ruler, after which they were on their own with hardly any interference from the latter. Payment of a tribute or tax was a sufficient sign of loyalty to the nation or state. Administrative decentralization permeated the political, social and economic fabric of the different nations.

Yet, the respective nations or states were as powerful as they could be. Development was consequent upon the king and the people of the area, not on the centre. No common yardstick existed for cross-sectional measurement or comparison of developments in the empires or kingdoms or states. The different areas were satisfied with their achievements and tribulations technologically, politically, economically, socially, culturally, religiously and humanly.

Even though I have mentioned that several nationalities inhabited Nigeria before the Berlin Conference of 1845 and the naming of the country in 1900 and all the proclamations, and finally amalgamation of South and North of Nigeria in 1914, a few issues were generally common to them, especially because of trans-Saharan trade which brought

so many nationalities together to share their cultures and experiences. The peoples of Nigeria before and during colonization lived honest lives and were hardworking by family or household, rendering assistance to whoever requested. "Welfarism" was hardly practised. Pride, respect for self and authority, much more so for the traditional rulers, prevailed. Bathily (2000: 24 - 25) adds that the ruling class in the primary agrarian state in West Africa derived its powers from its direct participation in the production process and social reproduction, not through violence or a state coercive apparatus. Depending on the nation, there were several social institutions but one that was generally common was the age-group institution. It performed several roles in the society. The society was so well organized that every segment knew its responsibility and did it courageously without coercion. As already stated, the administration was largely decentralized and provided a nation-state's satellite states, provinces, kingdoms or dukedoms paid their royalty and taxes to the paramount head of the empire, there was nothing to worry about. Therefore, as similarly already stated, decentralization and a great deal of autonomy have characterized the Nigerian way of life from history. It is important to highlight these cultural characteristics, so that we might situate traditional cultures (Nabudere, 200: 49) for the purpose of learning from the past to solve the present (Nnoli, 2000) and at least give a sense of pride about African (Nigerian in particular) culture and civilization to Africans in the diaspora (Bray, 1990).

This arrangement was dismantled and disarticulated by the British colonialists who used their superior fire power to subdue Nigerians and imposed their unitary rule on the country. From this initial centralizing administrative system, when things were not that rosy, the British administrators switched over to indirect rule, so that some power, no matter how negligible, could be decentralized, and some resources saved rather than an attempt at administrative centralization. The fledgeling decentralizing approach of the British metamorphosed into full decentralization in 1954 when full regional status was granted to Nigeria. In place of one government, there automatically emerged three regional (East, North and West) and one federal government. It was regarded as a symbol of true federalism in which power; resources, functions, governance and development were decentralized constitutionally and in practice. The federal government was an effective regulator and co-ordinator and well respected by all Nigerians.

Subsisting up to 1965, this situation was destroyed in January 1966 when the military forcibly took power and government in Nigeria. Some kind of contradictory political system could be said to have been presented by the military. This is because while it embarked on the creation of more states in the spirit of the regionalization of 1954 in order to bring development nearer to the people as well as further the promotion of true federalism, the military ruled through the centralized command system, thus making the states in practice mere adjuncts of the federal government. This ideal was promoted by highly placed persons in the corridors of power. For example, Asiodu (1970: 133), one of the super permanent secretaries at the time had this to say on the centralizing tendency of the military government: "In the final analysis, the state military governor belongs to the unified military or police commands as this is still a good check on excessive regionalism". By 1970, Nigeria had twelve states and some of the big powers at the federal level were uncomfortable with what Asiodu called excessive federalism.

If there was still any doubt about the centralizing view and attitude of the state as the only source of provision of economic goods and services to the people, a further statement from Asiodu (1970: 13) is instructive on the matter: "The civil service must have qualified people to handle the planning and management of economic affairs. The civil services in Nigeria are increasingly required to prepare development plans, to appraise and select industrial and agricultural projects, to decide when new roads, harbours, bridges or telecommunication facilities should be constructed and the optimum size of investments in those projects at any given time..."

Then another, if not indeed more powerful, state functionary, Ayida (1979: 217) who was the Secretary to the Federal Military Government and Head of the Federal Civil Service, added his bigger voice, which virtually represented government's intention and attitude on the role of the state. Said he:

It is generally agreed that the country has taken the irreversible decision that the government will occupy the commanding heights of our socio-political and economic life. There are three tiers of government involved in this dominant role. The Federal government, the state governments... local governments and their public corporations and statutory agencies ...

Elucidating further in apparent belittling of the private sector, Ayida (1979: 226) added:

Our recent experience has demonstrated that there will continue to be the need in this country for a vigorous and substantial private sector for some time to come. But the efficiency of the private sector depends on the existence of an efficient public service, not only in terms of the provision of infrastructural services and utilities but also because of the ability of the higher civil service to respond to the urgent needs of industry and commerce in the private sector... We should not follow the example in some countries where the private sector controls and determines the pattern of decision making in the public sector.

The people were alienated by the emasculating federalism and the entronement of centralization. The matter, of course, did not end there. There were no Parliaments to discuss state issues. Orders were passed from the federal government to the states and thence local government for implementation. Even the local governments sometimes received orders directly from the federal government. The civilian regime of 1979-83 could not find its feet before it was overthrown, for ineffectiveness and grand corruption. In addition to the above command structure, the state (federal, state and local governments) gradually took over many functions. As one powerful civil servant (Asiodu, 1970: 174 – 175) whose views were influential at the time said, "the government is the dominant, if not the *sole instrument* of change and progress in a developing country". He continued:

The government must be viewed as a means to an end, only the government can create and maintain the necessary conditions for political stability and sustained economic development. It is the government that must crystallize individual and community self-respect.

The state therefore took on several functions, e.g., agricultural production. There were several slogans by different regimes, including Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and Green Revolution. The state was and is still involved in manufacturing steel, e.g., Aladja Steel Rolling mill, and education (27 universities have been established by the federal government, whereas there are over 37 state universities). The state generates and distributes electricity alone through an agency called National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) which shall be examined in the discussion of privatization and commercialization below. The state also assumed the function of water supply to the people, a matter that it has largely been long abandoned; it is involved in the mass transit system of road transportation, waterways and airways. It is involved in communication with a state company called Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) which shall be discussed below too. The state tried to legislate almost everything during the military regime, that it attempted to legislate on the number of children per couple. This piece of legislation was expected to be part of population policy, but it was not well received by the people and never saw the light of day. It appeared that the state legislators became worried with the song of over-regulation, and deregulation instead started to be song.

Of course, the state has hardly delivered, or done so below average and expectation to the chagrin of the people in the above respects, as will be discussed and analyzed with some examples below. Hence the call for the new state role in Nigeria. The feeling is that no miracle is likely to happen to reverse the poor delivery of performance situation of the state other than its downsizing and the greater involvement of the private sector in development. After all, the government does not have the needed resources to do everything. Strategic areas, e.g. the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), communications, electricity, and road construction can continue to have state participation through commercialization and privatization, and tertiary education through partial government funding. Thus, the state can perform its quota better in the above respects as with the most important task of co-ordination in these and other areas, as discussed below in the theory of co-ordination problems in development.

THE MODERN THEORY OF CO-ORDINATION PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPMENT¹

In its simplified original form, the theory of co-ordination problems in development was particularly concerned with the demand effects associated with industries experiencing increasing returns on investment. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) has argued persuasively that at an early stage of development, the investments of industrializing firms may increase the profitability of other sectors throughout the economy. That simultaneous industrialization of many sectors could be profitable for all of them but no sector would be profitable industrializing alone. As a result of the preferred simultaneous industrialization of many sectors, the market may not succeed in coordinating the activities needed for development.

According to Hoff (2001), who has done a powerful analysis of Rosenstein-Rodan's original theory, in modern terms there could be co-ordination failure where an individual's failure to co-ordinate complementary changes in their actions leads to a state of affairs that is worse for everyone. As a relief, Rosenstein-Rodan had argued that there

could be co-ordination from above when government planned the process of industrialisation. But most modern economists argue that there is no such thing as government co-ordination from above because governments fail like markets in the matter (see Dixit, 1996; Basu, 1997; Hoff, 2001). At the same time, Hoff (2001: 46) adds that:

...a positive development of recent years ... is to try some limited intervention (presumably by government) to harness the spillovers (co-ordination problems) among agents and to try to sequence policy reforms in a way that makes it more likely for good equilibria to emerge.

Fortunately, Hoff's contribution is not the last word on the matter. While she settles for "limited intervention", other economists and writers (e.g. Leibensten, 1954; Myrda, 1957; Krugman, 1995; Ranis, 2001; Soludo, 2001) have added to the intervention areas and problems that may warrant government co-ordination in development. Such additions have left the subject of co-ordination problems in development to being vast, multifaceted and rather comprehensive. The implication is that they are far beyond the co-ordination of the market and as Rosenstein-Rodan has rightly pointed out, there is the obvious need for co-ordination "from above", and that can only be effectively done by government in the interest of the market and, of course, the society.

The list of co-ordination problem areas and issues in the theory from the contributions that have been made to it since Rosenstein-Rodan's blazing trail have become so numerous that only some attempt at enumerating them can be made here. The mere sight of the list would immediately inform one that neither the individual nor the market, except the government with the support of the other two, is the centrepiece in the modern theory of co-ordination problems in development.

A litany of issues which need to be co-ordinated and can contribute to spill-over effects/problems in co-ordination include: technology, decentralization, social, political interactions, information externalities, externalities from innovative behaviour, externalities from rent seekers, externalities from enforcement mechanisms, group reputation effects, agglomeration effects, and knowledge spillovers. Other co-ordination problems include corruption, contract enforcement, property rights and rule of law. There are also globalization, public goods, knowledge, public policy, strong institutions, reforms, increased global co-ordination, significant big push, amendatory transfers, unconditional access to Western markets, and accountability. I may add discipline, rules, transparency, economic, culture, humanistic interventions, training and administrative or institutional reforms.

While the theory was essentially directed to economic situation and hence laden with mathematical equations, it is here being adapted qualitatively to public administration and governance in Nigeria. The number of issues and problem areas listed above as integral to the theory, in my humble view; reflect its appropriateness to explaining the new role of the Nigerian state in development which is multifaceted. The intention here is to call attention to the existence of this theory for testing in public administration and governance in Nigeria and to see how insights from it can help us to understand the new role of the Nigerian state in development. It is also aimed at highlighting, as much as possible; some of the areas in which government's intervention in modern economic theory is needed in

the development process of society. The number of such areas and issues, though I have referred to it as a litany, is actually a tip of the iceberg. As Matsuyawa (1995) puts it, "one response to the modern literature on co-ordination problems has been to emphasize our limited knowledge of the activities that should be co-ordinated, and have the ranges of relying on the state to establish a co-ordination mechanism". Neither the government alone nor market alone can solve it. And Hoff (2001: 170) concludes that the government is better suited to arrest the private sector. But in view of the complexities involved in modern co-ordination and the vast nature of externalities associated with the problem areas, as already stated above, it requires combined efforts with government in the lead, at least, to ensure a human face in the operation of the market.

If the government is to play a principal role in solving the co-ordination problems associated with the said areas and issues, it seems easily logical to argue that it should concern itself with them, so that it can develop the necessary expertise to handle them appropriately to the benefit of all concerned. It seems to me that they constitute a more than adequate set of responsibilities for the government, as the leader with the support of the market and individuals, to handle, in order to make a success of the discharge of them. And it seems to me too that the success in these areas constitutes the foundation for the success in the production, distribution and marketing aspects of the society. As the custodian, the state should not be involved in the manipulation but in the provision of a level playing ground and its regulation for all players. The appropriateness of this theory to the new role of the Nigerian state will unfold more as I progress in this chapter, but in the interim one or two examples on the exceeding importance or central place of the state in co-ordination may suffice here, e.g., privatization and rule of law.

Privatization - Privatization has been vastly opposed in Nigeria as a rip-off of the economy and bestowal of the privatized establishment in the hands of the societal elite or comprados for the multinational corporations. But recent literature has shown that in good polities, which we want Nigeria to be, it may be possible before privatization to pass a legislation that promotes competition since there is less organized resistance in the private sector than in the public. Where this is the case, privatization could lead to lower consumer prices. This is especially so in a situation of well thought out legislation which constitutes deep intervention and not easy to undo or circumvent legislation (Hoff, 2001: 165).

Rule of Law - Provided that the right or adequate environments are recognized and established, even if slowly or gradually, to foster level playing grounds for all to operate in, globalization, market and liberalization ought to be promoted. They can only operate satisfactorily under a system of the rule of law but not the rule-of-state law. While the one embraces everyone in the society, the other relates to the non-ruling class in the society. Failure to finance the legal system or lack of political support can block the application of the rule of law. Only the state can promote the rule of law or the rule-of-state law. But only the former is appropriate for development. Having sketched out the theoretical construct for this chapter, some conceptualization and relevance to the Nigerian situation now follows.

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

The approach adopted here is a combination of a concept clarification, followed by discussion or analysis of the Nigerian experience of it. The rationale is that such an approach facilitates ease of reference, understanding and appreciation of the issues involved. The major concept discussed in this chapter is the “strong state”, which informs the attributive concepts that, but for space constraints, ought to be taken the Nigerian situation. The literature on the new role of the contemporary state seems to have taken the definition of a strong state for granted. The definition of a strong state proposed in this chapter is one in which the following attributive concepts or issues are allowed to rear their positive heads; They include, in the main, decentralization, downsizing, privatization and commercialization, rules, rule of law, minimal corruption, democracy, accountability, lobbying and consensus building. Their opposite constitutes the weak state. The discussion of the following attributive concepts of the strong state and the Nigerian experience of each of them only follows in this chapter for space constraints; decentralization, downsizing, privatization and commercialization, retrenchment, and minimal corruption.

DECENTRALIZATION

The decentralization concept as the literature has revealed is a difficult and complex one to define and therefore understand because of its varied aspects, which must be brought to bear on its conceptual adequacy. In this regard, Bird (1995) observes that, “decentralization is a slippery term”. Olowu (1997: 165) has however virtually eliminated our problems as he presents a rather comprehensive definition of decentralization as a four-pronged concept, with political, economic, administrative and financial aspects.

According to him, political decentralization is the opening up of the political space to accommodate civil and political liberties, the existence of genuine institutional pluralism and political competition through fair and free elections. He says it also admits the strengthening of institutions, such as the legislature and the courts, for enhancing vertical and horizontal decentralization, promoting the separation of powers and accountability. Economic decentralization is the reduction of state dominance in the economic domain, the stimulation of economic pluralism through such initiatives as deregulation, privatization, and support of private sector and informal sector growth. This also includes liberalization. Administrative decentralization refers to the strengthening of field administrative units, while financial decentralization concerns mainly the transfer of “financial resources from the central government to autonomous local agencies... to enable the decentralized agencies to undertake responsibilities already transferred to them”. It may also involve financial deregulation. Very importantly, Olowu (1997) points out that, “ideally, all these forms of decentralization should accompany a genuine process of democratisation.”

In sum, Olowu presents some equations from the four-prong paradigm he presented above. According to him decentralization is ideally realizable where it occurs on all the above four dimensions, a situation which is not the experience of African states,

including Nigeria. On the other hand, where there is political and economic decentralization, there can still be substantial state decentralization as they can force through administrative/institutional and financial decentralization or neutralise centralization in them. Also, state decentralization can take place even if only economic and financial decentralization have taken place, as in the NICs. But state decentralization cannot take place where there is only administrative and financial decentralization or political and administrative decentralization.

The Nigerian experience in decentralization has been short in many respects of the paradigm presented by Olowu, which I have adopted. Except in the brief post-colonial periods of 1960-65 and 1979-83, Nigeria has not enjoyed democratic reforms. Even the two said periods were experimental, fragile and marred by crises. Then, the military regimes were anathema to democracy, so one of the vital, if not indeed the most important, elements in the state decentralization process being missing, meant that there was no basis to talk of real decentralization.

Unexpectedly, the current civilian dispensation from 1999 has continued some of the unfortunate experiences of both the past civilian and military regimes in such a way that real decentralization is not on stage. For example, the country's constitution regards the vital resources of the country, e.g. mineral wealth, as belonging to the federal government, with inferior or subordinate status given to the state and area of location of the mineral resource (see e.g. Nigeria, 1999b: s.162(2)). Another example is that the federal government appropriates funds directly to the local governments, not in the spirit of co-operative federalism, but as statutory allocation from the federation account. Yet local governments are expected to be under the control of the state governments (see Nigeria, (1999b: s. 7(1)) or at least they are constitutionally recognized as belonging to the state.²

It might appear paradoxical for one to see an appeal between a decentralised and strong state, which I am arguing should be established in Nigeria. But it is not. When I talk of a strong state to be established through decentralization, I really mean the entrenchment of an autonomous federal-state structure. In this connection, one has in mind full autonomy for the states from the federal government as provided for in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, subject to other germane amendments that are necessary for better administration of the state. The state is here conceptualized as federal-state-local governments-parastatals, institutions and departments as the constituents of the administrative or governance structure. It will be observed that the state enterprises and other commercial apparatus of the state are eliminated from the constituents because those are to be privatized outright. Along with states' autonomy in Nigeria must be added their full power over the local governments, again as provided for in the 1999 Nigerian constitution. Of course, the states would be required to administer the local governments as legal entities. All the above means that I am from the onset saying that the Nigerian state should be constituted and espoused as in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in extent, scope, structure and administration. The country should therefore be taken as given without prejudice to necessary or fundamental amendments to be made, such as limiting political office holders to one term of five years only, in order to reduce the incumbency factor and provide a more level playing ground for political office aspirants.

To be precise, I mean that there should be one federal state, thirty states, a federal capital territory, 774 local governments and six Abuja area councils, subject to necessary or fundamental amendments. New states, local governments and area councils could, of course, continue to be created within the existing given states, local governments and areas councils' administrative structures. This implies that any new creations should be in the interest of the administrative convenience of the area within the existing structure as indicated above. Funding of such new creations would be taken care of by the already constitutionally recognized states, local governments and area councils' administrative structures.

Although the British administration was, in my opinion, wrong to have rejected any request for the creation of more regional governments beyond the three created in 1954, for their well considered reasons, (see Colonial Office, 1958), I believe that Nigeria should by now forget about creating more constitutional states, local governments, and area councils, just as the Americans, for example, have put such a matter behind them. It is too political and could disintegrate the country. Whatever has a beginning must have an end.

Perhaps, for the purpose of clarity, it should be repeated here that an autonomous federal-state administrative structure will offer each government arm the opportunity to concentrate fully on its responsibilities much more efficiently and effectively than hitherto, offer the opportunity for mistakes to be made and corrected in the spirit of going through a learning process and maturing, offer Nigerians knowledge of functional responsibilities of the different levels of government and hence be in a position to praise, blame and make demands on them appropriately. All this is without prejudice to other necessary amendments as discussed in Olowu's comprehensive conceptualization of decentralization and the promotion of competitive and co-operative federalism in Nigeria.

DOWNSIZING THE STATE

The Nigeria state is being recommended for downsizing in view of the experience that the country has had as reviewed in previous sections of this chapter. But what do I mean by downsizing and what does it entail? A slight preamble before delving into these is in order here.

Even though it is often argued that the MDCs face different situations from the LDCs such as Nigeria, and many obstacles are placed in the way of the latter, I think the latter can and should still, as much as possible, learn from the former. Such experience is helpful if properly harnessed. Indeed, Nabudere (2000) and Tandon (2000), for instance, inform us that one of the secrets of the Asian NICs' development strategies is that they copied and adapted the technological advancements of the MDCs, using the same to their advantage. Africa, on the other hand, was not smart enough. On downsizing, the opportunity is not over for Africa and in particular Nigeria. The MDCs have downsized their states from the 1970s (Nabudere, 1997: 33) and they became largely stronger. Nigeria has tried the centralized state system with all its negative trappings,

especially its unprecedented corruption and creeping ineffectiveness moreso in the civilian regime that was installed in 1999. The experience from Nigerian history is that the worst is yet to come with state centralization or too many functions being performed by the state. This informs my suggestion that Nigeria should be smart to learn the tricks of the successful downsizing by the MDCs, for example, Britain and Japan and some of the LDCs, e.g. Argentina, and adapt from their experience. After all, state downsizing seems to have come to stay in view of its logical relationship with globalization, market forces, liberalization, good governance practice and the fact that donor agencies now tighten their fists with grants and aids.

Several conceptions of downsizing have been well documented by many scholars and writers (see e.g. Low and Longdale, 1976; Beckman, 1992; Nabudere, 1997). In summary form, they insist that downsizing boils down to the second civilization of African economies, privatization, liberalization, adjustments, restructuring of the African state to make it supportive of the World Bank's long-term strategy for the liberation of the market. Also, it includes the breakdown of the national frontiers in terms of financial movement and trade flows. It is a downsized state's role in economic management to release the economic potential of the people and to liberate the market forces, to empower the civil society and free it from state shackles. The downsized state is expected to have strong leaders and active informal sector or NGOs which are falsely regarded to represent the grassroots whereas they actually represent the multilateral organizations and international capital from which they obtain their sustenance. All this is the view of downsizing the state as expressed by some writers and scholars. To be sure, not all of these are objectionable as will be analysed below.

By not downsizing, the Nigerian state is involved in all sectors of the economy: agriculture, industry, commerce, mining, manufacture, provision of infrastructural facilities, housing, all forms of services, including communication, social services including health and education, electricity generation and distribution, logistics support, law and order maintenance, protection of territorial integrity of the nation, culture, integrated development, governance, building and promotion of an army of public political and administrative institutions, employment creation, and private and public sector regulation. In the process it involved kleptocracy, colossal or stupendous corruption, etc. This involvement is basically of two parts: actual activities, including policy formulation and implementation on the one hand, and co-ordination. State overburden as has been highlighted above surely prevents its ability to implement rules, thus allowing for very high level of indiscipline, violence, assassinations, intimidation of innocent and law abiding people, insecurity, alienation, distrust, low investment, capital flight, brain drain, and growth without sustainable development.

Downsizing therefore, unlike what some writers (e.g. Nabudere, 1997: 34) state about it, includes state-directed development in the form of providing the enabling environment which includes representative democracy, political, economic, social and cultural stability, adequate laws and rules, rule of law, not rule-of-state law, and a reliable and independent judicial system. It also includes liberalization, privatization, market (competition) operations and legitimation of the state through good governance in the spirit of the "second independence" (Nnoli, 2000: 12) of Africa, in which the economic as well as the

political well-being of the people is paramount. There is also included transparency and positive result-oriented, selfless leadership. However, in the face of the largely failed centralization experiment in Nigeria, foisted on the people by the military regime from 1966, downsizing the state, with all its positive trappings, offers a rather attractive alternative.

NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

After the government's illusion about Nigeria's wealth expressed in the famous comic statement in the early 1970s by the Gowon administration that money was not Nigeria's problem but how to spend it, state downsizing has taken centre stage. Nigeria's bad planning experience, poor implementation, and the downturn in the world economy in the late 1970s and especially from the early 1980s, hit the country hard in the face in several ways. Let us consider some of them briefly.

Since the late 1980s, the Naira (Nigeria's local currency) has been witnessing a downward spiral as Table 1 shows.

Table 1 shows the value of the Naira in relation to the US Dollar and the British Pound Sterling in the 1970s and up to the mid-1980s as being generally strong. Its value started to decline in a rather disturbing manner in the second half of the 1980s, while steep downward plunge emerged from 1990. The situation worsened by each from then until 1995 when the value of the Naira took an unprecedented downward plunge in relation to the two currencies: US \$1 to N 81.0218 and 1 Pound Sterling to N 128.1551 respectively. As at 1999, it was US \$1 to N 92.9901 and 1 Pound Sterling to N 148.0392 respectively. The unofficial rates have continued to be appreciably higher than the official rates. While the government/state might not be held solely responsible for the situation, it surely takes vicarious responsibility for it. It is the logical outcome of a weak state, especially a corrupt state with other primordial attributes such as patronage, unaccountability and lack of transparency which have progressively characterized the Nigerian State.

It is in an attempt to grapple with the above situation that Nigeria has had to downsize the state in some respects such as through the structural adjustment programmes (SAP), privatization and commercialization, personnel retrenchment and university autonomy to mention a few. In all these, it must be stated *ab initio* that they have been driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on behalf of themselves and other donor agencies. A brief statement about each of them.

Table 1: Official Average Naira Exchange Rates per US Dollar/UK Pound Sterling, 1970-99

Year	US Dollar	UK Pound Sterling
1970	0.7143	1.7114
1971	0.6955	1.7156
1972	0.6579	1.6289
1973	0.6579	1.6289
1974	0.6299	1.4795
1975	0.6159	1.3618
1976	0.6265	1.1317

1977	0.6466	1.1671
1978	1.6060	1.2238
1979	0.5957	1.2628
1980	0.5464	1.2647
1981	0.6100	1.2495
1982	0.6729	1.1734
1983	0.7241	1.1216
1984	0.7649	1.0765
1985	0.8938	1.1999
1986	2.6206	2.5554
1987	4.0179	6.5929
1988	4.5367	8.0895
1989	7.3916	12.0695
1990	8.0378	16.2419
1991	9.9095	17.4955
1992	17.2984	27.8684
1993	22.3268	33.2522
1994	21.8861	33.4252
1995	21.8861	Afem rates began in January 1995 as Dual Exchange Rates as follows:
		US Dollar Pound Sterling
		34.5240 81.0228
		128.1661
1996	21.8861	34.1229 81.2528 126.4165
1997	21.8861	35.7698 81.6494 133.7389
1998	21.8860	36.6368 85.5700 143.6164
1999 June	92.9901	148.9392 92.9901 148.9392

Source: Aluko (1999); Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2000)

(a) Saps and Downsizing the State

The SAP was foisted on Nigerians in 1986 during the Babangida administration after it had been rejected by a referendum in 1985. It was expected to last for about three years (1986-89) but as some writers have argued; its impact is still being felt. Some of the attributes of this impact are free market, or liberalization of the economy in certain respects, subject to the regime of import substitution on products such as poultry, textiles and masonry. But the inflation that accompanied the SAP as Table 1 would inform, has been a thorn in the flesh, leading to capital flight and therefore poor performance of infant industries. The inflation occasioned in the main by the naira exchange rate to the currencies of Nigeria's major trading partners (USA and the UK, has had a titanic effect on the capacity utilization of the infant industries, as indicated by Table 2.

Table 2: Average Capacity Utilization of Some Manufacturing Industries in Nigeria, 1975- 2000
(Selected Years) (in Percentages)

	1975	1978	1982	1986	1990	1992	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Meat and Dairy Products	n.a	n.a	73.7	33.1	24.1	29.3	30.6	21.3	37.1	39.4	41.3	42.8
Sugar, Cocoa, Confectionery	n.a	67.8	62.3	32.9	42.6	35.5	18.7	27.8	35.5	30.8	32.0	30.9
Textiles	79.7	80.1	73.6	41.3	52.2	44.3	38.2	46.5	50.0	33.4	20.2	21.4
Leather Products	77.2	72.0	71.8	33.1	53.0	51.2	25.6	29.1	44.0	38.7	39.2	38.2
Paper Manufacturing and Products	58.7	65.1	55.8	28.3	34.1	25.2	27.3	29.0	30.3	27.9	27.0	24.3
Plastic Products	69.8	71.0	53.0	43.8	49.5	38.4	27.6	31.1	40.5	40.1	41.2	42.3

As Table 2 indicates, the capacity utilization of some of Nigerian's infant industries varied markedly between the fairly high percentages obtained in the 1970s to 1980s and the generally very low percentages of the 1990s to 2000. They have generally been on the average of 35%. Albeit both public and private sector infant industries are involved, it is a situation that should pose serious concern to the state. It is one that should dedicate its attention to acting as a facilitator and regulator rather than getting involved in the production of some of the products, such as sugar as paper. Essien (2001: 33-34) puts it more forcefully and rather comprehensively. He insists that the, "government is a critical agent that provides the key inputs and establishes rules". He adds that public policies must be right on a range of issues, including exchange rate, trade, domestic prices, external debt management, and others, "that would ensure political stability, minimum corruption, and promote good governance", advising that the current efforts at openness, liberalization and market forces should be sustained. The Nigerian masses bear the brunt of the adverse situation especially since the 1990s as depicted by Table 2.

(b) Privatization and Commercialization

Privatization and commercialization are close terms but nevertheless different. The one, in simple terms, has to do with the transfer of ownership structure from the state to private ownership, while the other fosters market behaviour in terms of profitability of a state public enterprise or parastatal company. Regarding the former, what I have said is very simplistic, as already stated. It is absolutely important that care must be taken to ensure that the state is not turned over to friends and cronies of the political leadership or ruling class for the purpose of earning "kick backs" in the name of privatization (Stiglitz, 2000: 13). He adds that:

... if privatization is conducted in ways that are widely viewed as illegitimate and an environment that lacks the necessary institutional infrastructure, the long-run prospects of creating a market economy may actually be undermined (and this may) contribute to the weakening of the state... through corruption and regulatory capture.

In standard neo-classical theory, privatization and competition must go together. This is the only assured way that the true meaning of state downsizing through privatization can be achieved and its benefits derived for society. What has been the Nigerian experience?

The Nigerian state downsizing efforts through privatization and commercialization assumed more seriousness in 1986 following the proclamation of the SAP, but because the military regime was weak, as it was driven by illegality, arbitrariness, force and corruption, not much was achieved. In all, the military regime would be best remembered for making decrees on privatization and commercialization, including the privatization and commercialization Decree No. 25 of July 1988; the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC), 1988; the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree, No. 78, of 1993; and Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Decree, No. 28, of 1999. The 1993 Decree was bogus as it did not actually address privatization and commercialization. This lapse was corrected by the 1999 decree which was promulgated on 10 May 1999, some fifteen days before the end of the military regime headed by General Abdulsalami Abubakar (rtd.) which handed over to a democratically elected civilian regime headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May, 1999. The Decree was backdated and made effective from 31 December 1998. Retrospective laws are usually suspect and not the best.

However, different regimes have been listing the state owned enterprises (SOEs) for privatization and commercialization in Nigeria. While Babangida listed 145 in 1988, Abubakar reviewed only 84 federal government enterprises and parastatal companies and categorized them as in Table 3; the succeeding civilian regime headed by Obasanjo reviewed all federal government parastatals, institutions and agencies totalling 406, and categorized them as in Table 4.

Table 3: Federal government Public Enterprises Reviewed by Military Regime, 1999

Enterprises to be fully privatized	15
Enterprises to be partially privatized	36
Enterprises to be fully commercialized	9
Enterprises to be partially commercialized	24
Total	84

Source: Nigeria (1999)

Table 4: Federal government Parastatals, Institutions and Agencies Reviewed by Civilian Regime, 2000

Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for full government funding	119
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for partial government funding	117
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for commercialization	48
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for privatization	60
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for abolition	15
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for merging	13
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for divestment	16
Parastatals/Institutions/Agencies for self-sustenance	18
Total	406

Source: Nigeria (2000a)

The difference between Tables 3 and 4 is quite clear. As against 15 enterprises that were to be privatized and from which the state was to divest itself under the military regime in 1998, the civilian regime from 1999 has earmarked a total of 109 enterprises for privatization, abolition, divestment, and self-sustenance from which the state would divest itself. This could significantly enhance the state downsizing exercise.

Being a stronger regime than a military regime, the civilian regime responsible for Table 4 has demonstrated its thoroughness, sincerity of purpose and determination to pursue privatization and commercialization for the purpose of downsizing the state in the interest of the society with the hope of increased benefits from the exercise. In spite of the strong reservations that some people might have against privatization and commercialization, the foregoing is stated by the writer because I believe in privatization and commercialization of public enterprises, parastatals, institutions and agencies as applicable. I see it as the only sure way to avoid waste, reduce unprecedented corruption and free the state from several things in order to be able to concentrate largely on multidimensional issues yearning for effective co-ordination as the theory of the problem of co-ordination in development reviewed above informs. This thoroughness of the present civilian regime is a healthy one and a right step in the right direction. My belief and support is subject to the objective, effective and profitable handling of the matter to the clear and unequivocal benefit of the society. Herein lies the big question which shall be addressed later: can the Nigerian government handle the matter faithfully to the benefit of the Nigerian people as Stiglitz, referred to above, had queried?

In all, before I get to the above big question, the state since 1999 seems to have been progressing logically on this vexed matter in several respects. It has defined privatization for the Nigerian people as “the process of changing the ownership structure of government companies (Public Enterprises) to private ownership through the sale of shares of such companies to individuals who will manage the companies efficiently and profitably” (Nigeria, n.d.: 1). The definition, however, falls short of the provision of Section 12 of the same document where it is stated that individuals or companies can purchase shares in companies being privatized or commercialized, provided it is not “more than one percent” (Nigeria, n.d.: 6).

Rationalization- The government has rationalized privatization and commercialization: the avoidance of waste of resources which it admits has been rampant, attraction of foreign investors, new technology and more money for government, improvement in the quality of service for competitive prices, rather than monopoly prices by government enterprises even for services not rendered, as in the case of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) which has been nicknamed “Never Expect Power Always”. Yet it, nevertheless, charges customers its usual bills and so on.

Some of the commitment activities undertaken by government so far include the setting up of a council on privatization called the National Council on Privatization (NCP), promulgation of enabling legislation called Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act, 1999, and provision of guidelines such as that no individual or company can buy more than one percent shares in any company. Government has also assured the people that privatization has been undertaken by some MDCs such as the USA, Britain and France, as well as the LDCs such as Chile and Ghana and they are

better for it. Nigeria, therefore, stands to gain, the government insists, as more money will be at its disposal from the better run, profit-making enterprises. On retrenchment which is another vexed issue in the exercise, the government has sincerely informed the people that the ownership structure of the privatized and commercialized companies would decide, but that there would definitely be some personnel lay-offs, in the short-run, until the companies get more firmly established and are able to expand and increase their employment ratio. Thenceforth, and in the long-run, more personnel would be employed. The government seems to have well-couched advertisements and jingles on privatization, doing some good work to convince the people of its gains. Political will is vitally needed to carry it through beneficially.

Prospects and Problems of Privatization in Nigeria - I shall attempt to answer the big question asked earlier when I discuss the problems with privatisation below. In spite of the running battle between the government and some professional groups, trade unions, individuals and newspapers, such as Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) workers and PEGASON over protests and strike actions against privatization and commercialization of some public enterprises, the government has gone ahead to make some in-roads in the exercise. For example, it has succeeded in bringing private marketers to the oil industry who have tried to hike oil prices to market level. They forced the pump price of petrol to move up by about 19% before they started business in 2002. Their presence has reduced government's involvement considerably in the downstream sector of the oil industry in Nigeria. The Nigerian Telecommunication Limited (NITEL) has been put on a privatization course with the incorporation of GSM. Like the oil marketers, GSM is operated by private individuals and companies in addition to the government's M-TEL and NITEL which are generally on a commercial basis. The federal government is seriously concerned to privatize the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) soon but the logistics seem to be proving very problematic.

NEPA was created in 1972 through the merger of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the Kainji Dam Authority. It is a 100 percent equity holding public enterprise by the federal government of Nigeria and is charged with generating, transmitting, distributing and selling electricity in and outside Nigeria. It is supervised and controlled by the Ministry of Mines, Power and Steel in all its activities, including personnel recruitment and funds project approval with slight modifications now that privatization is around the corner. In 1988, its installed capacity was 3641.70mw while available capacity was 2,892.70mw. NEPA recorded deficits ranging from N58,633 million in 1985 to N711,279 million in 1988 (Rasheed, Beyene and Otobo, 1994: 17-18).

However, apparently because of persistent criticisms of its operations for inefficiency, consequent upon intermittent electricity shortages among the Nigerian public, NEPA has started to dole out what amounts to questionable statistics about its performance. They indicate that its consumers have been consistently unable to consume its electricity generation as Table 5 illustrates.

Table 5: Electricity Consumed as Percentage of Total Units Generated (in Nigeria), 1994-1998

Year	Total Units Produced ('000 KWH)	Residential Consumption %	Commercial and Industrial Consumption %	Street Lighting %	Total %
1994	14, 656, 201	31.27	30.32	0.23	61.89
1995	15, 845, 038	31.15	30.63	0.20	61.97
1996	16, 118, 740	32.84	30.42	0.20	63.51
1997	15, 493, 120	35.65	31.94	0.21	67.79
1998	16, 382, 888	34.40	30.10	0.10	68.60

Source: Nigeria (1999: 398)

The statistics in Table 5 especially column 6, showing the percentage or total kWh consumed out of the total units of kWh produced, as in column 2 are confounding. They indicate that only about 65 percent of electricity produced is consumed in Nigeria. It is paradoxical especially in view of the fact of intermittent electricity failures in Nigeria and the well known or over-flogged explanation by NEPA that in the dry season, which is worse than the rainy season, as water level recede in the Kainji Dam, reduced electricity can only be generated. And there is constant rationing of electricity. In 2001 and 2002 it was eight hours per day of rationing per zone of consumers. Even with the boosting of NEPA's infrastructural facilities by the Obasanjo administration since 1999, the experience has been that electricity supply to consumers has, paradoxically, worsened. In spite of all this, there are some selfish people benefiting from the public enterprises despite the suffering of the majority. They are seriously against privatization.

As would probably be inferred from the above discussion on prospects vis-a-vis the number of enterprises, parastatals, etc. that are to be privatized by the Nigerian federal government, what has been done so far is a tip of the iceberg, but it has also resulted in downsizing the state of some of its operational functions.

As has already been stated, the government is having a running battle with various interest groups on privatization and commercialization in Nigeria because "Nigeria is not for sale" (ASUU, 2002). The IMF and World Bank are principally fingered in the matter. Privatization is regarded by many as recolonisation of Nigeria because it is the foreign conglomerates, their compradors and the government cronies that are suspected to be the potential buyers of the public enterprises to be privatized.

This writer is not convinced that agitation against privatization and commercialization of public enterprises is for its own sake. Although ASUU (2002) has argued that the enterprises are not working because the government does not want them to work, the matter seems more complicated than that. Even that argument is strong enough to let them go to private hands for better management to serve as a source of stable financial resources to the government for development of the society. Hence the big question asked earlier. Are we sure that the government will actually use the resources from privatization for societal development? Are we sure that the privatization exercise will be objectively, faithfully and profitably pursued in societal interest? Who is to ensure that the society benefits from the exercise, in the face of the helplessness of Nigerians in vot-

ing for but not choosing their leaders who therefore become their rulers instead? Who can put the due pressure on the Nigerian political elite to be results and societal-oriented in the face of the collaboration of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), i.e. the IMF and World Bank, turning their eyes away from massive corruption by the political leadership, some of whom are individually as rich as, or even richer than, the state? Instead of this focus, are the IFIs not collaborating with the state to oppress, marginalise, defraud, impoverish the Nigerian masses and the middle class, especially the workers, by insisting that their emoluments, working conditions and environments be barely paltry, while the politicians have only the problem of how to spend their money, not how to get it? How can Nigerians be sure of the best being their lot from the privatization exercise, when the huge external and internal debt burden that Nigeria is plunged into results from private or personal incorporation of endogenous and exogenous loans supposedly for development obtained by the state? After all, it can be said without much contradiction that what Nigerians want really is quality service at competitive prices. This is not to say the writer is asking the government to increase prices of goods and services but as Nigeria (n.d.: 2) rightly pointed out, some government monopolistic "high charges" are paid by the public for "poor services" rendered. It is better to pay a little more for "a thing of beauty which is popularly regarded as a joy for ever" than pay a low price for a sub-standard, shameful product/service. For emphasis, I repeat that if a quality product/service can be matched with competitive price, Nigerians will be prepared to buy, but they are not sure of it from privatization. They think privatization is to enrich the multinationals (judging from the colonial, neocolonial and imperialist experience), their compradors, political and bureaucratic elites.

If therefore the IFIs and other donor agencies can join hands with the middle class to ask the political elite/leadership about colossal corruption, the suffering masses, the toiling middle class, ensuring that privatization is beneficial to Nigerians, i.e. they are the equitable beneficiaries of the privatized companies, things would be a lot better. It is the political leadership, with Janus-Face that lies to the IFIs about its interaction with, and the interest of, the Nigerian people and lies also to the people about its interaction with IFIs. It is the common enemy. The IFIs, no doubt, wield a tremendous influence on the political elite in Nigeria. Any alibi by the IFIs of sovereignty of a nation in this matter is hardly relevant in the present day circumstance and meaning of liberalization, market forces, globalization and "villagization" of the world, unless, as generally believed, all of these are a front for "the recolonisation of the country" (ASUU, 2002: 5). Therefore, when I say I support privatization, it is only for the reason of the avowed benefits that would accrue to the society from the exercise including state downsizing. When some people kick against privatization in Nigeria, it is because of the negative aspect they infer in the whole exercise. So, the two interests converge. I like the positive side of privatization and they hate its negative side. Only a strong state, in collaboration with the IFIs, can bring about the positive side of privatization in Nigeria, including downsizing the state to enhance its co-ordination effectiveness which is more important than pretending to be a jack of all trades but master of none.

(c) Retrenchment Attribute of Downsizing

Retrenchment of personnel is an attribute of downsizing and rightsizing government (Ntukamazina, 2000: 530). The former precede the latter, but for downsizing and rightsizing to achieve the desired results, very careful planning is needed. Retrenchment for downsizing purpose simply means the removal of some staff from their positions for various reasons with less pain, while rightsizing refers to “getting the optimum size of staff with requisite skills for streamlined posts and vacancies” (Ntukamazina, 2000: 530).

The general purpose of downsizing the state through retrenchment of personnel, if properly pursued, is for both economic and social reasons. Market forces demand that public bureaucracies should not be overstaffed with personnel, thus creating underemployment. Rather, there should be optimum employment of an employee for optimum pay that is competitive, worthy that can meet his physiological needs adequately and will encourage him to put in his best in the work-place as in the Asian economies (World Bank, 1993). Socially, downsizing is expected to enable an employee to earn a salary to encounter satisfactorily his social needs in associations, organisations, cultural circles and to talk about it freely if he wishes, happily without shame. Therefore, retrenchment as an attribute of state downsizing is expected to be beneficial to both the state, society and the individual employee, without prejudice to those removed from service who might suffer the pinch of retrenchment. Very careful planning in some public bureaucracies, such as Jamaica and Argentina, has greatly reduced the pain of retrenchment. In fact, in Argentina, successful planning resulted in a staggering number of staff willing to leave the service, to the extent that “retirement was refused to more than 6, 000 agents (personnel) for service reasons” (Fontdevila, 1994: 111), that is, because of their specialized training which is hard to replace.

In Nigeria, retirement as an attribute of downsizing has not really been pursued, again because of the weak nature of the state. I have emphasized earlier that the military government is a weak administration because it has only “fibrous roots” for its legitimacy, hence it is coercive and instils fear and intimidation in people. It is extremely commanding and arbitrary or operates “with a heavy dose of arbitrariness” (Otobo, 1999) in the use of patronage which offends the sensibility of the vast majority of the people because of their political exclusion.

The retrenchment that the various military regimes in Nigeria have carried out has been unassociated with civil service reforms. They have been rather unplanned, sudden, without consultation with stakeholders, e.g. trade unions, vindictive and in bad taste. The aftermath of all of them has been a common overt, almost daily expression of insecurity of tenure by the public servants to the detriment of their job, the state, society and themselves. They no longer put in their best, nor enjoy their jobs. They have been largely alienated by the retrenchment exercises. In fact, they do not call them retrenchment but the “civil service purge of 1975”, or the civil service pruning of 1984, etc. There have been other retrenchment exercises such as in 1996. But none of them was linked to major civil/public service reform in Nigeria, e.g. Udoji 1974 public service reform and the 1988 civil service reform. To cover up the weakness or arbitrariness in some of the retrenchment exercises, the military imposed the “ouster clause” to preclude any judicial litigation on the matter (Nigeria, 1984; Davies, 1987).

The civilian regime in Nigeria has not fared much better, perhaps worse, than the military regime, except at the federal level, on this matter. The civilian regime, rather than the democratic regime, that took office in 1999, at the state level, has made retrenchment not an issue for downsizing the state but as a punitive measure against public servants for displaying a desire for de-bureaucratization and negative flexibility. In virtually all the thirty states of the federation, at the behest of the IFIs, in the main, the state governments arbitrarily removed public servants, including teachers from service. Like was done in 1975, which exercise still leaves a sour taste in civil servants' mouths, some public servants were arbitrarily retrenched in the 2002 exercise. A common-yard stick of a cut-off year, say twenty- eight or thirty-one years in service was determined arbitrarily by the different state governments for the removal of public servants from service. This was irrespective of their competence, expertise, productivity, skill, training, loyalty, effectiveness and efficiency. Indications of lack of planning of the 2002 retrenchment exercise include the fact that it did not lead to any increase in public servants' salaries and those retrenched could not even be paid their retrenchment benefits (gratuity and pension).

Only a weak state operates arbitrarily; a strong state, on the other hand, is consistent, predictable, logical, explanatory, transparent, rule-driven and respectful of people's sensibilities. It can only be hoped that retrenchment as an attribute of state downsizing can be utilized as in some other LDCs, e.g. Argentina, Jamaica and Tanzania (see e.g. Slyfield and Morgan, 1994; Fontdevila, 1994; Ntukamazina, 2000; Kiragu, 2000).

(d) Minimal Corruption in the Polity


Granted corruption is world pervasive, and as intense in capitalist and socialist countries alike (the revelations about corruption in Russia being instructive; see de Asis, 2000. It is certainly more deeply rooted and devastating in the LDCs, especially Africa, than in the MDCs. Generally, corruption simply means the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral depravity (Otite, 1986: 12). Although various types of corruption have been identified (political, economic, bureaucratic, judicial and moral), in this chapter, the basic concern is with corruption in government, which is defined variously by different writers. One source defined it as the abuse of public power and authority for private or other group gains (United Nations, 1990). It may be conceptualized as an unethical and illegal act or inaction of a public officer exhibited to obtain advantage in cash or kind. Its forms or manifestations vary, in some cases, from one country to another. Some of them are bribes, gratification, office used for pecuniary advantage, ill advice for pecuniary advantage, violation of procedure for personal interests, etc. (Nigeria, 2000; Khan, on-line).

Although some (e.g. Otite, 1986: 16-17) have argued that corruption has some basic merits or positive sides (e.g., the redistribution of state resources and willingness to take risk), these so-called merits are dubious. They are also disproportionately smaller than the demerits, of the ratio of 1:10; such that they can very easily be discountenanced by the wave of the hand. Corruption therefore only stagnates societal development, especially where it is "grand corruption" (World Bank, 2001: XIII; Nigeria, 2000). Grand corrup-

tion is a sign of the weakness of a state, a state that cannot formulate adequate rules nor implement them. It is a state that cannot particularly have the courage to bring offenders or culprits to book to prevent recurrence, or act as a deterrent to others. It is possible for the state to do these and other positive things. Julius Nyerere (Tanzanian ex-President) cited in World Bank (2001) answers succinctly in the affirmative, “It can be done, play your part. What is needed is national resolve to proceed. ...” In our context corruption can be reduced to the minimum. Once the process has begun on known or established basic principles, solid ground rules and rule of law, it can be done. It has been done in the MDCs along these lines. If we argue that we are the same human beings, then we can do it, and we should strive to do it – reduce corruption or “petty corruption” to an acceptable level (World Bank, 2001) that can accommodate, or not hinder development.

In spite of poverty that is usually highlighted as the greatest cause of corruption in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, corruption can be reduced through the following paradigm:

Figure 1: A Simplified Model for Attacking Corruption in Nigeria



Source: Author's Construction, 2003.

This model proposes that the leadership at whatever level in the polity, especially at the federal government or state level must resolve and show the will to fight corruption through immortalized personal example. A leader should also show a good example in other governance areas: appropriate consultations for participatory governance, equitable resource distribution and monitoring, accountability, transparency, etc. Appropriate sanctions and incentives should be given as and when due. The followers will largely, if not indeed virtually, reciprocate. The process must be symbolic.

In Nigeria, corruption has existed almost since the creation of the country under what is generally regarded as “petty corruption”, but “grand corruption” is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating historically to the early 1970s. That immediately implies that grand corruption is a product of a weak state or governance associated with the military regime in Nigeria. Grand corruption in Nigeria can be traced to the civil war prosecuted between 1967 and 1970. It was a war the federal government was prepared to win at all costs, in order to keep Nigeria united. The slogan was GOWON (go on with one Nigeria, or to keep Nigeria one was a task that must be done). The implication of this slogan was that the federal government pumped a lot of money into the war efforts. In fact, it is

fair to say that an accurate record was not kept of the cost of prosecuting the war. The Federal Commissioner for Finance at the time was the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo who kept on asking how many soldiers died in the different units of the Nigerian army from time to time, so that military financial allocations could be adjusted reasonably. He kept receiving the same reply that no soldier had died in the war. He could not believe it and styled it correctly as exceeding corruption, and resigned from General Gowon's cabinet on account of this. Grand corruption in Gowon's regime has been described by Osoba (2000: 477) in a different way. As he puts it, the Ministry of Defence with the connivance, if not the active support of the government, consistently ignored the Auditor-General's queries concerning the vast unauthorized and illegal expenditures during each year of Gowon's nine years of dictatorship.

Having served as conduits to the soldiers, the civil servants decided to get involved as participants. They did it better than the soldier, and the corruption and other vices in the civil service started to stink. Hence, the public service retrenchment of 1975 in which an estimated 11, 000 public servants lost their jobs (Davies, 1987: 45). Since then, corruption has waxed stronger in the Nigerian government because of the weak state system, and the masses have lost as a result. Corruption did not only continue unabated, but it, in fact, became deeply entrenched with each successive regime, except perhaps the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime (1975-1979) which also fulfilled its promise to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government in 1979.

The Shehu Shagari government (October 1979 - December 1983) witnessed a very high level of corruption, in fact, of very disturbing proportion. There was no doubt that the regime was aware of it, resulting in the introduction of an "ethical revolution" (Ola and Offiong, 1999: 94). It did not however help matters as "squandermania and corruption and indiscipline" profoundly formed the basis for the government's overthrow by Brigadier M. Buhari's regime in 1983 (Akpekpe and Aghahowa, 1996: 245). In fact this reason and high inflation, among others, led to its overthrow by Buhari. Although Buhari's regime was also very corrupt, it was too short-lived (1984-1985) to be fully addressed on this vice. The Babangida and Abacha regimes (1985- 98) could be said to have really witnessed grand corruption. A lot has been written on these two regimes, including e.g. Ibrahim (1997), Osoba (2000) and Adejumo (1997). What I would like to add here is that these leaders and their cronies became so corrupt and rich that they were stronger individually than, at least, some of the state governments in Nigeria. On the death of Abacha early in 1998, millions of hard currency were recovered from his residence and house, from his son, s as well as from General Useni's (rtd.), in what has rightly been described as primitive accumulation. The last military regime of Abdusalami Abubakar that handed over power to the Obasanjo regime in 1999 has been alleged to have extended Nigerian government corruption to looting the country's foreign reserves. Information has it that Abubakar was involved in awarding spurious contracts in hard currency up to US \$ 639.62 billion within eleven months (Christopher Kolade Panel Report of 1999 cited in Ajayi, 2001: 16).

Obasanjo, on being sworn to power, declared that fighting corruption would be a task he would best be remembered for. But his regime has also been corrupt although he has actually been putting out some measures whose effectiveness, mirroring their effective-

ness of the state, has been problematic. Before an examination of the effectiveness, a short discussion of some of the effects of corruption on the Nigerian public service is in order.

Some of these have actually been mentioned in passing in the course of this chapter. They include: inability to promote a rich bureaucracy, incessant strikes, societal inequity (hence deep-seated poverty), lack of development, low salary of public servants, etc. Some, if not indeed all, of these effects are clear and do not need much emphasis here. Only a few of them are elaborated upon briefly below.

The absence of rich bureaucracy in Nigeria reveals that the state does not have adequate resources to operate. Its capacity building with respect to institution, infrastructure, personnel, training and development, equipment, retooling, remuneration, incentives, etc. is weak. Its performance therefore is low. The Nigerian government, especially the civilian regime of Obasanjo, thinks that the remuneration it has approved for federal public servants is so monumental that they should always catch a cold at the mention of his name and that during his regime they should never ask for any further increase in remuneration. The Obasanjo government forgets the inflation rate (see Table 6).

It forgets that the "fiscal inflation" rate is radically different from "money inflation" rate which the consumer or public servant faces. This is not to say that the government is not trying its best to combat inflation as Table 6 shows (one-digit inflation rate since 1999), but the money inflation rate, which is what the public servant/consumer faces in the market, presents rapid, constant and soaring prices that destabilize public servants and frustrate meaningful planning. Table 7 confirms the fact that the public servant in Nigeria is not comfortable as his salary is well below what other sector workers earn.

The Obasanjo administration forgets that public servants have a reference point in other sectors' remunerations as comparatively compiled by the CBN as Table 7, for example, indicates. The political executive does not realise that the public servants know the grand corruption by the political elite and that they also know the price of petroleum products budgeted for at between US \$14 and US \$19 dollars per barrel, rising fortunately to above US \$30 dollars almost throughout the year. If the extra earnings not budgeted for were to be invested, employment would be created, production would increase, foreign exchange would rise, Naira value would increase, inflation rate would decrease substantially, and the salary earned would exceed purchasing power. This may appear simplistic but it is realistic. But public servants know that the reverse is the case, hence their agitation for salary and wage increases. They know they are not responsible for inflation in the Nigerian economy, but the extravagant political elites, in the main are responsible.

Table 6: Inflation Rate (percent), 1990-2000.

1990	7.5
1991	13.0
1992	44.5
1993	57.2
1994	57.0
1995	72.8
1996	29.3

1997	8.5
1998	10.0
1999	6.6
2000	6.9

Source: CBN (2000: 150)

Table 7: Average Minimum Wages and Salaries in Major Sectors of the Nigerian Economy (1992-99) (N/Annum)

	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Building and Construction	Financial Institutions	Ministries and Departments	Transport and Communication	Trading and Business Services.	Mining and Quarrying
1992 JNR	3,700	2,400	6,003	6,530	1,408	3,027	3,195	9,620
SNR	7,371	8,281	19,945	15,142	6,632	7,275	14,168	19,203
1993 JNR	5,096	3,692	6,525	8,244	1,977	3,187	4,971	10,689
SNR	9,211	12,389	21,674	19,200	11,787	7,658	19,247	21,336
1994 JNR	3,869	3,840	7,076	4,245	2,397	3,353	5,000	11,252
SNR	9,696	11,885	23,559	13,532	5,780	8,062	13,667	21,552
1995 JNR	5,365	3,900	7,385	8,222	2,500	3,753	6,966	22,149
SNR	12,721	15,952	24,799	15,779	7,929	10,150	18,000	33,804
1996 JNR	5,798	4,450	6,869	8,780	2,668	4,646	6,983	23,649
SNR	13,038	16,437	25,363	26,242	8,065	14,085	15,900	51,302
1997 JNR	6,231	5,000	6,741	9,338	3,837	5,540	7,000	25,150
SNR	13,355	16,423	25,928	36,706	8,200	18,019	13,800	68,800
1998 JNR	8,801	5,184	7,774	14,911	5,996	9,061	7,200	30,110
SNR	13,904	23,846	27,555	40,972	10,379	15,797	15,492	100,850
1999 JNR	12,431	5,375	8,965	23,810	9,370	14,820	7,406	36,048
SNR	14,476	33,601	29,284	45,730	13,137	13,849	17,392	147,568

JNR = Junior Staff, SNR = Senior Staff, Source: Adapted from CBN (2000: 168).

Now, back to Obasanjo's efforts at combating corruption. His regime is singled out for a brief review or highlighting of anti-corruption efforts because it would appear that he has actively done more on the matter. Other regimes had tried their hand at combating corruption through several strategies like the use of the criminal and that they also know the price of petroleum products budgeted for at between US \$14 and US \$19 dollars per barrel rising fortunately to above US \$30 dollars almost throughout the 1979 constitution demanded; and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, 1979. Other strategies have included the use of police, Special Tribunal (miscellaneous offences) Decree, No. 20 of 1984, Public Officer, Special Provision Decree No. 17, 1984, War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAI-C); inclusion of whistle blowing in the 1988 civil service reforms and the Criminal Justice (miscellaneous provisions) Decree 1996. As already stated, they did not achieve much perhaps because as Ola and Offiong (1999: 53) opine, even through regarding only Decree No. 38 of 1975, the measures were merely aimed at

“warning public officers of the danger of being involved in any form of corrupt practices in the course of their official duties”.

On the other hand, since 1999, the Obasanjo regime has got the National Assembly (NA) to pass a bill into law on this matter – Anti-corruption Act 2000 (Nigeria, 2000b) with Justice Mustapha Akanbi as Chairman. The law defines various forms of corruption, prohibits and specifies punishments for various forms of corrupt practices and other related offences, Obasanjo the set up an Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC for short) in 2001 to join hands with other existing bodies to fight the corruption monster in Nigeria. It is to his credit that he has joined other groups to condemn the NA for its unpopular amendments to the Act (see, e.g., Vanguard, 2003 b., Guardian, 2003).

That is where the credit ends because there is much evidence to buttress the view that the government has been rather lax on the matter. It will require another article to fully review and discuss the government’s weaknesses on the matter. Interestingly, quite a lot has been written on corruption in Obasanjo’s government. Some of the references are to be sourced from papers presented at the IPSA, RC4, Mid Term conference held in Abuja, Nigeria, 14-17 October, 2001 (see, e.g, Ajayi, 2001; Momoh and Aderemi, 2001; Olayiwola, 2001; Ojo, 2001; Okoye, 2001; Jibo and Okoosi-Simbine, 2001).

One of the key issues that has tended to make people doubt Obasanjo’s sincerity in combating corruption in the Nigerian public service was his vow to recover billions of Naira stolen from Nigeria by public officers (both military and civilians) and kept in foreign accounts (*Punch*, 2001). By the end of 200 he had not achieved any significant success. On the other hand, the government could not account for the billions of Naira purportedly seized from Abacha. There are the staggering revelations by the Christopher Kolade Panel set up by Obasanjo in 1999 to review all appointments, contracts, licences, approvals and awards made by previous regimes since 1966. It indicted some people, including Rtd. General Abubakar over staggering contracts awarded in foreign currency, already referred to above. Obasanjo did not do anything about it. The *Punch* (2001) reported that the Senate was poised to probe Abudulsami Abukakar and others over looted national treasury but nothing happened. There is strong evidence of wide-spread financial impropriety against Abubakar, which the Obasanjo regime ought to deal with. The Anti-corruption Commission, Nigerians have been told, has received several hundreds of corrupt petitions; some 300 in 2001 (Ajayi, 2001). Up to 2003, nothing substantial has been heard about them. The so-called successes alleged to have been made by Obasanjo since 1999 are actually encouragement of corruption. The *Tribune* (1999) reported that Obasanjo sacked his nephew (Dr. Julius Makanjuola) over a 400 million corruption scandal involving ministers and some board members. But they were not prosecuted. Some politicians and bureaucrats have been reported to have returned their loot but they were neither prosecuted nor was there any information as to any form of punishment meted out to them. Hence Okadigbo, former second Senate President, could say that he would return, at his convenience, the N12 million he over-spent in furnishing the Senate President’s residence. There was the issue of the Kuta Panel report. It was set up by the Senate in 2001. It found many Senators guilty of corruption. Obasanjo wanted to take action on it but the Senate threatened to impeach him and he dropped the matter. Was he strong enough to handle it? No!

The sketch that has been made above reasonably proves a point – the weakness of the state or government of the Obasanjo regime as well as the weakness of the previous regimes before it. There is the feeling that the Obasanjo regime was determined to promote a strong Nigerian state if only for the vibrant address, a focused and bold one, he gave during his inauguration on 29 May, 1999. He was still relatively focused, in control, and constitutionally guided up to 2000 but towards the end of that year, and especially from 2001, he started to lose his grip. Apart from the corruptive nature of power itself, there is the perception of the corruptive influence of his second term bid which rendered him substantially powerless, unable to remain focused, and hence his occasional unconstitutional acts.

As a result of all these, grave concern has been expressed in the Nigerian media that, given the peculiar circumstance of this country, political office holders should serve only one term in office and relinquish power thereafter. The suggestion, it is hoped, will reduce significantly the issue of the fusion between the state and the incumbent Head of State or Governor or other political office holders, such that when electioneering campaigns start, the state virtually comes to a halt as all forces are mobilized by the incumbent political office holder to secure a second term of office. This is usually subsequent to the huge amounts of state money that would have already been corruptly appropriated away previously towards the campaign efforts. In spite of the control of the party, the situation will not be as witnessed during the 2003 electioneering campaign if the incumbent political office holder is not a candidate but a financier or merely uses his position to assist a co-party candidate to campaign for his election. No doubt the state will continue to function, the effectiveness of the government might even be better as the experience from the one-term of office of vice-chancellors in Nigerian universities tends to indicate. This is without prejudice to the more complex nature of state governance as compared with the university system. The suggestion and the other issues discussed above, e.g. downsizing, might contribute significantly to the new strong state project that I desire, and indeed others desire, for Nigeria as they would lead to minimal corruption.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to argue that a strong Nigerian state is the better alternative (to the weak state) that can lead the country to the pedestal of growth and development in the 21st century. I have done this simply by reviewing the historical antecedents of the Nigerian state in its encounter with the issue of growth and development from colonial times until the year 2003. The discussion has revealed that Nigeria has largely been a centrist state, especially from the time of the military incursion into politics and governance from 1966. Built largely on the principle of centralization, the Nigerian state (federal, state, local government, government enterprises, parastatals and government-owned companies) has tended to overload its power relations, functional responsibilities and financial base to the effect of inefficiency, and ineffectiveness with state grand corruption being largely the lot of the people. Under the centralization principle, Nigerians have suffered greatly such that yearly increases in the number of persons living below poverty the line, rather than above it, have not recovered. Over 60% of Nigerians now live below the poverty line as against 28% in 1980 (Aluko, 1996).

Without meaning to blame our leaders, because they have had to cope with several constraints, including neocolonialism, imperialism, international capital and now globalization, it is my belief that the time is now ripe to try another approach to the centralist principle of governance in Nigeria. It is the restructuring of the Nigerian polity. This is downsizing of the state, so that as many functions as possible with corresponding power relations and finances that can be better handled at the private sector level to the benefit of the society be consigned to that sector. This stand is also predicated on the fact of the poor performance of the centralist Nigerian state, centralized in economy; from production, through distribution of goods and services, plus regulatory functions of both the public and private sectors respectively. The state's wide ranging involvement has similarly spanned a long period – over four decades since independence, with ineptitude, ineffectiveness and grand corruption to show for it all. The all time low exchange rate since the 1990s, low capacity utilization and low public employees' salaries and wages as in Tables 1, 6 and 7 attest to the stated poor performance. This is why I disagree with Aluko (1996) who, himself, points out the poor performance of the Nigerian state in a critical analysis, but turns round to argue that the state should not be downsized, i.e. no privatization. For him, it should continue to go “deeper into original sin”, a phrase used by Ake (2000), in analyzing the poverty of Africa's public services. It is simply paradoxical. (But following my recommendation, the state will be relieved considerably to face the onerous, more challenging and more rewarding task of co-ordination of the society as the theory of co-ordination problems in development reviewed above has revealed.

In this wise, some issues which I feel constitute the attributes of a strong state were highlighted in the chapter. They include decentralization, downsizing, availability of rules, rule of law, minimal/petty corruption, liberal democracy, accountability, transparency, lobbying and consensus-building politics. Due to space constraints, only decentralization, downsizing with its various attributes, and minimal corruption issues could be analyzed theoretically, followed by an examination of the Nigerian experience of each of them in the chapter.

Decentralization, as has been discussed, actually means downsizing the state at the federal level in some respects and the transfer of some matter, therefore, to the states and local governments as well as the private sector *mutatis mutandis*. Downsizing will free the state to coordinate better, which function has become overarching in contemporary politics. My analysis shows that downsizing will result in a relatively smaller work force that will be well paid but work in a rich public bureaucracy adequately equipped and retooled. Minimal/petty corruption will leave the state with adequate financial resources for development projects. These and the other issues briefly mentioned in this chapter can be used to involve and galvanize the people into the new Nigerian state project.

The analysis of the above issues in this chapter has revealed that in none of them has the Nigerian state done really well to positively affect people's lives. This informs the basis of the recommendation for the strong state project that has been made in this chapter. Of course, the strong state has been analyzed as one in which things are done properly and everybody has a place and stake in it. The MDCs and some LDCs operate the strong state to their advantage. Participation and involvement are some of the attributes of good team players; many more Nigerians want to participate and be involved in a new Nigerian state project through allocation of more functions, power and re-

sources, which have been centralized, corrupted and have largely failed the nation. The country since the military regime has been run as a weak state, hence the problems of growth and development; only a U-turn to a strong state promises a better future.

NOTES

1. The modern theory of co-ordination problems in development used in this chapter draws heavily from Hoff (2001).
2. See also S.7 and First and Second Schedules for lesser issues such as banks, commercial and industrial monopolies, construction and maintenance of roads, mine and minerals, etc. that are under the exclusive list of federal government functions.

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5

RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: WHAT ABOUT THE 'OVERLOADED' GOVERNMENT?

Adekunle Amuwo

In several contemporary polities the notion of 'overloaded government' may mean either of two not unrelated things. One, it may be consequent upon the accumulation of functions by governments without adequate attention being paid to funding. In the Australian typology, Scanlon (2000) shows that this idea stems from a history of 'policy incrementalism' whereby "successive governments motivated by social-democratic objective for a just society, steadily add tiers of responsibilities to the state without adequately addressing how these would be funded". Two, it may mean a political or ideological drive to draw attention to the significance of a minimalist (or 'offloaded') by underlining the excesses and frailties of a maximalist (or 'overloaded') government. More often than not, when governments—particularly developing and undeveloped ones—accumulate too many public functions they become more easily susceptible to the vices than the virtues of a developmental state. Efficiency, effectiveness and capability are lost in the labyrinth of political and economic informalism.

It would seem that several African governments and peoples—the latter much more than the former—are becoming more desperate in resolving developmental crisis—the one engendered by the tripartite alliance amongst imperialism ('globalization'), bad politics and inept governments. The reality on the ground, notwithstanding a decade or so of different hues of electoral/liberal democracy is that perhaps the 'African condition' has never been worse. Hyden (2000: 23) notes that, "today, African countries are generally not only falling behind others, but also finding it hard to hang on to the remaining few threads of modernity that link them to the rest of the world". Trapped between the demands of a politico-ideological commitment to a people just emerging from several decades of ruinous politics (with its 'dependent economic development' and its devastating impact on the masses) and the technocratic imperatives of economic structural adjustment programmes/good governance of the donor community, many emerging 'democracies' in sub-Saharan Africa have had to choose between their people and their 'development partners' in the West. The call to choose has sometimes been a difficult

beckoning. It would seem that whilst the hearts of many newly elected political leaders are with their people, their heads are with the donors.

Yet the dividends of democracy have yet to become significant. They are still being eagerly awaited by Africa's long-suffering peoples. That is to say, in terms of putting in place a gradual, but sure *welfare state* capable of supplanting the inherited *warfare state*. This is the war of state or class elites against the people as well as the war of globalization against the national interests of weak African states. Mazrui (1997: 132) has argued that, "at bottom, democracy is a system for selecting one's rulers; humane governance is a system for treating citizens". On account of their weakness, having, respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, lost economic and political sovereignty, African states are often in quandary about how to respond to the antinomies of *productive economy* and *distributive justice*.

The major *problematique* this chapter proposes to elabourate upon is that since neither reducing the size of the state nor a big government is a sufficient condition for the delivery of democratic dividends, there is a need for a legitimate domestic governance system anchored on a developmental state and a developmental political elite. We assume that the latter would be well positioned to pursue social and economic policies as a function of well thought out public goals and societal needs. The 'bigness' or 'smallness' of government will then be a function of what ends or goals a government is pursuing: If social purposes are being pursued efficiently, the economic cost—and therefore question of 'big' or 'wasteful' government—will not so much arise as when narrow, sectoral, class and group interests are being pursued at the expense of more expansive social interests or the public good.

I will interrogate this *problematique* within the context of the theoretical antinomies of the culturalist and the anti-culturalist explanations of democratic development in the post-modern era. The culturalist explanation argues that what differentiates societies are not so much institutions as the character of civil societies, social and moral habits that underlie institutions (Fukuyama, 1995). The approach privileges how culture, religion and tradition make different classes and segments of society look at government differently and with what consequences. The anti-culturalist framework of analysis, typified by Norton (in Quandt, 1995) rejects culturalist arguments for the paucity of democracy and underlines, instead, the weakness of civil society where authoritarian governments have taken root. The major argument of the latter perspective is that "until political groupings that transcend family, tribe or clan are allowed to develop, pluralistic politics of the sort that supports democracy cannot thrive" (Quandt, 1995).

I seek to analyze the foregoing thesis in terms of long-term structural continuities in emerging democracies responsible for either effectively hindering fundamental reforms or considerable slowing them down. These structural factors include symbiotic partnerships between conservative political, military and business elites; ethno-religious, regional and geographic cleavages. These are often politicized and exacerbated by scarce financial and material resources that all too often render government ineffectual and democracy 'virtual' or merely pro-forma. Within this context government will be torn between the interests of the conservative, *hawkish* wing of its allies interested in the *status quo* and the demands of its liberal, *dovish* wing that are sometimes populist, if not popular. Much of what follows is implicit/structural analysis. It would be principally

concerned to show why minimalist governments that are developmental and efficient have yet to emerge in much of Africa. We will be interested in, amongst other things, the extent to which political culture and globalization are potent explicatory factors. Finally, we propose as a way out of what is a veritable nightmare experience for African peoples an interactive political schema at once from 'above' and 'below', capable of laying the initial building blocks for a developmental state in much of Africa.

ON THE NOTION OF DEVELOPMENT: BETWEEN MAXIMAL AND MINIMAL GOVERNMENTS

Whilst the notion of a minimalist state or government has, almost everywhere, become a global fad, this has not always been the case. Nor has it been always reasonable to so say and to so act. In other words the theory of the lean state or minimalist government—often rendered as “the government which governs least, governs best” or in its correlate form that “government cannot be activist without doing more harm than good” (Ake, 2000: 25)—is one thing; the reality on the ground is another. To be sure, as Ake (2000: 9ff) has shown, the rejection of the idea of democracy as popular power in post-revolutionary, post-1789 France facilitated the process of reducing liberal democracy to its crude individualism and the concomitant negation of the collectivity. Progressively, the founders of the American Republic would redefine popular or participatory democracy as representative democracy. The leitmotif was to preserve the wealth and political opportunities of capitalists and their class allies. Thomas Hobbes' theory of limited government had the effect, perhaps unintended, of “reproducing the laissez-faire of competitive capitalism in the political sphere” (Ake, 2000: 13). Similarly, John Locke's political treatise was largely concerned to preserve private property. Invariably, only citizens who had primitively accumulated private property and their acolytes who aspired to private property showed an interest in political society as well as laid any meaningful claim to political participation (Ake, 2000: 16).

The state itself would gradually appropriate the sovereignty of the people ostensibly in the name of the people but with the aim of using the state more in the service of capital and capitalists and less in the interest of labour and labourers. Within the context of the so-called 'end of history/end of ideology' debate, contemporary globalization has tended to further vitiate the salutary public role of the state in many an African country. We will return to this important theme later in this essay, but suffice to say for now that the state *qua* state has become so much involved in what was supposed to be an essentially market driven, though politically induced globalization process that the latter has also become state facilitated and state intermediated. In a fundamental sense, the role of the state is changing. Not only has its status changed from that of a caretaker to one that caters to the needs of the market or private sector, it has also become a major benefactor for the market rather than its regulator in the public interest. To all appearances, the state does that for purposes of enlightened self-interest. It has been argued that by overseeing and mediating the market, the state would ensure its own relevance “in a world where the primacy of the market is increasingly overshadowing the importance of the regulatory roles of the state” (see Judt, 1997: 115).

Yet, development is an eminently political enterprise. Leftwich (1996: 18) has emphasized the primacy of politics and the character of the state in development. In concrete terms, to achieve both development and “enduring democracy” term so bastardized by vacillating military-civilian transiting governments in Nigeria and in some other parts of Africa it is necessary to have a politics capable of “balancing the diverse and distinctive demands of very different interest groups”. In the end, “everything will depend on politics and the capacity of the state both to broker these demands and, where necessary, rise above them” (Leftwich, 1996: 19). Following Przeworski, Leftwich (1996: 19) contends that development would be informed, amongst others, by the following factors: internal stability; relative autonomy of the state; sound infrastructure and competent administration; low levels of corruption; a critical minimum degree of consensus between groups and regions about the objectives of growth and the rules of the game for achieving it; an increasing degree of regional and social equality in the distribution of the costs and benefits of that growth, etc. The point to emphasize here is that the delivery of the foregoing will be a function of the state, its character, competence and commitment. It is also, by the same token, a consequence of the politics that establishes and sustains the state (Leftwich, 1996: 20).

Now, governments are nothing but a function of the development they pursue. We find Sklar's explication of the notion/process of development quite instructive. For him, development is a complex goal pursued by national communities whose specific content of related values vary from one country to the other (Sklar, 1996: 26). When politics is such that a relatively few number of people could enjoy wealth and political advantages incongruent with democratic principles, the tendency is for democracy to be devalued and political clientelism inaugurated. Unlike what the controversial, if interesting, thesis of Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggests, there is nothing fatalistic about this phenomenon. The examples of Benin Republic and South Africa, not to mention the perhaps more advanced cases of Botswana and Mauritius, show somewhat clearly that democracy, however articulated, is an evolutionary political and economic ideal and process that comes in bits and parts. Progressively, as electoral democracies consolidate, constitutionalism and a civic culture gradually emerge to make government and governance predictable and development a reality. The result would be developmental democracy which has been explicated as combining “a reasonable measure of social justice, defined as fairness in the distribution of wealth, with economic and political freedom, neither of which has ever been secure in the midst of deprivation, misery and poverty” (Sklar, 1996: 37).

But this comes sometimes at great social costs. In political systems where the rules of the political game are honored more in the breach than in the observance particularly in formal electoral democracies, the price may be so high as to negate the basic or salient elements of both democracy and development. In other words, governments, particularly central or national governments, may be so overloaded or maximized to the extent that delivery of key social services, let alone a fair or just distribution, will be hampered. Hapless citizens will see little more than a large state or a big government that is everywhere present and is seemingly active and activist, but is neither efficient nor effective in relation to the public clientele. What the notion of overloaded government does is, following Scanlon (2001: 483), to put into bold relief two critical issues

as far as public policy is concerned. One, however crucially important institutions are, the concept of 'overloaded government' directs attention away from institutions and structures of governments to the practices or praxes of governments. In other words, the concern is not so much with the *how* of public bureaucracies as with their *what*. As Scanlon (2001: 485) puts it, emphasis is on "the outcomes of governmental actions with, relatively speaking, a lack of concern with the institutions through which such outcomes are achieved". The other concern relates to the inertia of governance or regime rules. If governance involves the management of the interaction of the market, the state and the civil society as well as the strategy by which rulers and the ruled, government and the governed, the power structures of the day and the civil society interrelate to produce a civic public realm (Elsenhans, 2001: 35; Rakodi, 2001: 344), democracy has to be the intervening variable in order that development may be a possibility. Where democratic structures of accountability and responsibility of the state to civil society organizations are either non-existent or weak, non-state actors would be hard put to it to ensure a vital essence of the art of governance as "limiting the amount of surplus to be dealt with as rent" (Elsenhans, 2001: 42).

Within this context, it matters little whether government is maximalist or minimalist. There is hardly any connection between the size of government and its efficiency/effectiveness, nor for that matter between the activities of public bureaucracies and the satisfaction of the basic needs of the citizens. If the historiography of overloaded governments is anything to go by, there has been little to choose between democracies and non-democracies. In the latter, it has been argued that their overloaded governments are often a function of state-driven patron-client relations; the over-pricing and intricacies of politics and the realities of power as well as an over-centralized state akin to centrally planned communist economies. In highly centralized polities, both civil and uncivil societies tend to be unstable, unsteady and fragmentary. In the event, "the state is often the only means by which some measure of coherence and stability can be guaranteed" (Judt, 1997: 108). Democracies are expected, at least in theory, to entail some form of redistributive reforms and just/fair governance, good government, low corruption and improvement in the social deficit such that government does not become unnecessarily overloaded. When these defining characteristics do not add up, it is often because hitherto existing system dysfunctionalities have yet to be overcome. Resende, Santos and Zenteno (2001: 208) have suggested that in the Brazilian typology, political and institutional infirmities such as weak political parties, 'personalism', and 'clientelism' were responsible. In the US, it has been suggested that the democratic surge of the 1960s resulted in a political system overloaded with demands. The system was also described as ungovernable. For Waddell (2001: 120), "the 1960s produced a substantial increase in governmental activity and a substantial decrease in governmental authority." This is a problematic issue particularly in relation to the pertinent social or existential question. "The social question if left unaddressed", writes Judt (1997: 117), "does not just wither away. It goes instead in search of more radical answers."

In the global African context, what economic structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s purported to do was to 'downsize' the state with a view to making it more efficient/effective, less costly and more responsive to the clientele. This social desideratum as it was then presented was anchored on the argument that "a state that is effective, efficient and capable is required to guarantee public security and the rule of law, necessary conditions for both economic development and democratisation" (Carlos, 2001: 164). Macro-economic reforms were intended to engender an enterprise culture or market logic in government operations. The consumerist logic was also expected to reign supreme in the public bureaucracy. Neither in Africa nor in developed democracies where this reform logic has had some success has the state completely surrendered its welfare functions to market forces. That is to say that governments have neither wholly overloaded nor totally offloaded particularly on basic and critical issues of human resources development. To be sure, the rationale of the market is used by governments as a way of limiting the scope and responsibilities of the state. A major kernel of the Labour Party's so-called 'Third Way' ostensibly as a *riposte* to the big government phenomenon created by the 'social democracy objective for a just society' has been less of politics in development and more of 'managerialism' and technocracy. Specifically, this means, in the words of Scanlon (2001: 490), "a more limited, 'technocratic' conception of government, restricted to the achievement of clearly defined programmes targets and measurable outcomes, with relatively less emphasis on explicit 'value' considerations". Furthermore, "more substantive and explicitly 'political' concerns were reconceptualized and recalibrated to fit an ostensibly 'non-political', pragmatic and instrumentally focused approach to government as administration".

What this reconceptualization has done to the poor in North America and much of Western and Eastern Europe is the exacerbation of the phenomenon of poverty. Old and new poor, which has nothing to do with genealogical age, has risen astronomically in those climes. Whether it was in Hawke's Australia where technocratic concern for more effective administration led to the shrinking of the state and government or in Reagan and Thatcher's US and UK, where the drive to reduce the size of the state was a function of ideological commitment, the result has been the same: "limiting government...so as to ensure its effectiveness in changed social and economic conditions" (Scanlon, 2001: 492). But how to reconcile the logic of the welfare state with the logic of the market in so far as both have differing and, perforce, contradictory, consequences? Proponents of this development paradigm have strongly canvassed the need for a strong role for the community in government. Some have gone as far as advocating the repositioning of the community as a vehicle of governanc. Others, by defining the community as a 'moral space' have made a case for the reinvention of government. In what looks like an awkward policy suggestion and demarche for developed democracies where the notion of 'community' is more often than not conspicuous by its absence, Rose (in Scanlon, 2001: 495) defines the community as a "moral field binding persons into durable relations". He also conceives of it as "a space of emotional relationship, through which individual identities are constructed through their bonds to microcultures of values and meanings". The submission is that "it is through the political objectification and instrumentalization of this community and its 'culture' that government is to be reinvented". Within this

ambit, it would not be enough to stipulate that a minimalist government responsive and responsible to the needs of the state, the civil society and the market is a *sine qua non* for development. A new political culture would also be required. Scanlon's argument (2001: 495) in this respect appears flawed and falls short of a sufficient condition. For him, the required political culture change is "not so much of the government bureaucracy or the businesses that work for government but of key segments of the public".

CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

The importance of culture to development or non-development/ underdevelopment can hardly be overemphasized. Space would not permit a detailed elaboration or exegesis of contemporary literature on this important subject. Suffice it to first take a global look at the linkage between culture and development before some detailed consideration of the African experience. The former task is largely informed by the 1995 essay of the Japanese-American historian, Francis Fukuyama. He was principally concerned to explicate differences in the industrial structure of leading economies in the world. Differences, for him, were due not to the level of development in each state but to an important cultural characteristic, namely, 'social capital'. By the latter he meant that "component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations" (Fukuyama, 1995: 90). In elaborating this thesis, Fukuyama made the following arguments.

One, that all economic activities are undergirded by 'a high degree of social cooperation' and 'a prior sense of moral community'. The latter is "an unwritten set of ethical rules or norms that serve as the basis of social trust" (Ibid). It would seem that this kind of moral community that is so much pilloried in Africa represents an indispensable and inevitable foundation of development in developed economies. Moral communities are also conceived as the product not of rational choice but of non-rational habit. Two, there is the important point that whilst family and kinship ties are important they have to be surpassed and invariably overcome by less emotional and more communal values for development to be on the public agenda. "In many cultures," Fukuyama (1995: 91) writes, "there is something of a tradeoff between the strength of family ties and the strength of non-kinship bonds... If familism is not accompanied by the strong emphasis on education and work in Confucian and Jewish cultures...then it can lead to a stifling morass of nepotism and inbred stagnation". He cites the example of China where, as in much of Africa, kinship ties and a deficit of trust continue to act as a constraint to the creation of "appropriate organizations to meet the needs of 21st century business" (Fukuyama, 1995: 98). Furthermore, Fukuyama (1995: 96) stresses the importance of functional and viable mechanisms and institutions in the state to ensure that public management and administration is not unduly emptied of the virtues of public good and that party and partisan politics does not desecrate the altar of market efficiency and social welfare. Related to this is the argument that where robust and efficient private sectors are absent or weak, as in China, Italy and France (in contradistinction to the US, Japan and Germany), nothing stops the state from performing such functions. There is however the caveat of culture:

“the ability to manage state-owned corporations or to distribute subsidies effectively is also very much dependent on culture” (Fukuyama, 1995: 102).

Fourth, in view of China's largely underdeveloped political economy, comparable in several respects with the African typology, it is posited that she needs certain basic political requisites for development. These include: political stability; basic legitimacy of her political institutions; a competent state structure capable of withstanding both excessive corruption and outside political influence (Ibid: p. 100). Fifth, the need for particularistic identities of a given people in Fukuyama's argument (Ibid: 103) seems to be that in view of the contemporary limit of social engineering (no thanks to the rapid recasting of the global hamlet in the image of the West) each state and more so people in search of development would have to do so as endogenously as possible to be meaningful. Thus, in so far as “the most important factors affecting the real quality of life...lie safely beyond what national governments can affect in positive ways...the character of civil society and its intermediate associations, rooted as it is in non-rational factors like culture, religion, tradition and other pre-modern sources will be key to the success of modern societies in a global economy”.

Expressed differently, the so-called global model of democracy is nothing but a myth. To all intents and purposes, it is “a very specific and far from universal form of political culture” (Binsbergen, 1995: 28). It is a particular form of political organization or arrangement that places a high premium on active, if not activist citizenship. The latter is not defined only in terms of mobilizing and being mobilized for electoral contests, but rather a citizenship that militates for responsible governments and a just state.

Over the years, as already remarked, the creation of a civic culture and a constitutional state has been such that political participation as known in much of the developing world has receded in developed democracies. Having established a fairly predictable and well-functioning political economy notwithstanding many outstanding class-based issues the resultant political culture does make politics and the struggle for political office a life and death matter. Whilst the struggle for democracy remains essentially a struggle for power (Leftwich, 1996: 10-11), the contest is fiercer in developing economies. This is principally because in such countries the state remains the most important source of wealth and primitive accumulation. It is in this sense that Lipset's 1963 argument (in Torres, 1995: 42) that too much or high participation in politics is not good for democracy makes eminent sense. For Lipset, “an increase in the level of participation may reflect the decline of social cohesion and the breakdown of the democratic system; whereas a stable democracy rests on the general belief that the outcome of an election will not make too great a difference in society”. One may add that this principle equally applies to the development agenda.

The experience of sub-Saharan Africa has been remarkably *sui generis* in this respect. To begin with, democratic development in Africa cannot, by any stretch of the wild imagination, be a function of liberal democracy. Ake (2000: 30-31) has made the point forcefully that whilst liberal democracy is the happy offspring of industrial capitalism, contemporary Africa remains essentially pre-capitalist and pre-industrial, notwithstanding some trappings of modernization and modernity. The result is that Africa is communal and “it is communalism which defines the people's perception of

self-interest; their freedom and their location in the social whole". This should not be taken to mean that there is no sense of individual rights or civil liberties. What this suggests, on the contrary, is that the predominant value is one of collective solidarity rooted in particularistic cultures, political 'big-manism' or the hegemony of the local notable during and between electoral consultations. The logic of collective solidarity also sits well with centralized politics; the phenomenon of political leaders as political foxes and political lions in the Machiavellian sense as well as the phenomenon of dominant party democracy. Since 1998, South Africa seems to be moving in this direction. It is a reality that Nigerians may begin to confront with the so-called 'landslide' electoral victory of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) during the Presidential, gubernatorial and National Assembly elections of April and May 2003.

If one defines political culture, following Torres (1995: 37) as "the aggregate expression of people's priorities, tolerance and values concerning national integration and the legitimacy of a political system", one is confronted in much of Africa with a certain political culture that is hardly facilitative of development. For all its negativity, this may not be the main problem. The latter may be the fact that there is a growing hiatus between political formalism and political praxis, that is to say between a formally structured political system and political economy that has all the formal trappings for success, but is in reality bereft of redeeming features because of system informalism. Chabal and Daloz (1999: 94-5, 121) have underlined the negativity of African politics to the continent's development. After noting that the continent's politics is too informalized, its public-sector corruption too routinized and the fact that development has been primarily hindered by "the weight, inefficiency and corruption of the state", they sought explanations in Africa's culture. Whilst denying culturalist explanations for the continent's lack of appreciable development, their analysis betrays that standpoint. Chabal and Daloz (125, 128, 135, 161) sought varied cultural elements to explain not only why Africa is not developed but why Africa, as presently constituted culturally cannot develop. These elements include the mentalities of Africans; their notion of fatalism or predestined outcome; the primacy of the collective over the individual; the dominance of the short-term view; the imperative of the micro as opposed to the macro, etc. Their verdict is that "the informal has always been predominant in Africa". They continue, "we do not think ...that it is realistic to suggest that such informal practices will diminish in the foreseeable future or, more crucially, that there is on the continent any aspiration to do away with them" (Ibid: 135).

Furthermore, in view of the persistent dilemma of the continent's political leaders who are torn between an ineffectual public sector logic of delivery and a moral order that is "a veritable fountain of imperatival injunctions", to paraphrase Professor B.J. Dudley the one of accumulation or economic growth, the other of legitimation or wealth and power distribution and the nearly structural tendency of privileging the latter over the former, Chabal and Daloz (Ibid: 125) submit that "development as (the West) conceives it might in effect not be the priority for a majority of Africans". They aver that the continent may be heading in a distinctly 'non-Western' direction, that of "modernity without development". The co-authors miss the point by conflating the political practices of political leaders with those of the followers. The latter are often victims, not facilitators or

net beneficiaries, of what Hahn (in Lal, 1998, online) refers to as an equilibrium state. The latter, for him, is one "where self-seeking agents learn nothing new so that their behaviour is routinized". If Africa's social structures have created power bases for visionless leaders and rulers alike who rather than promote development hinder it, nothing suggests that the hapless army of followers is happy with the phenomenon, even if they often appear supportive of such rulers. They would, naturally, prefer a political system that treats them as citizens entitled to basic and fundamental rights to one that gives occasional relief handouts according to the whims of local notables and big men and women. To be sure, the decline of formal politics in Africa expressed in the relationship between the state and the citizen, with the political party as the interlocutor (Calland, 2002: 22-23) does not suggest that Africa's political culture is wholly hostile to democracy. What it simply shows is that a particular type of state privatized by a particular set of rulers is antithetical to democracy in so far as the latter has refused to comply with the principles of good government. But certainly not so the mass of the people. To all appearances, if Africa remains a benevolent society, it is largely because of the goodness of the individuals. This has hardly been the result of sound governments or, for that matter, the fairness of laws.

The reality on the ground is a mixed bag though it would seem that the pluses are less than the negative. To begin with, on account of the preponderance of the state in the matrix of policy-making and informalized spoils of office in a failing or failed or thriving state, it matters little two things are important: As Lodge (1999: 24) suggests for post-apartheid South Africa, the proximity to or distance from political leadership is a crucial determinant in influencing the allocation of public resources. So also is the logic of a political culture historically shaped by patron-client relations. Lodge also documents evidence of patrimonialism, regionalism and corruption of the Bantustans and the National Party era as rearing their ugly heads and showing their tentacles in the imposition of leaders on the regions and provinces by the national leadership and in capital projects such as low-cost houses. Also contributing to a timid political culture is a political opposition that does not set much store by principles but rather one steeped in opportunism that wants to be in power at all costs. When combined with a weak civil society, however robust it sometimes appears during crisis periods, we get a picture of otherwise pertinent sites of social action that, in the manner of leaders of the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), "prefer access and influence rather than opposition and exclusion" (Lodge, 1999: 71).

A significant explicatory schema here is that political opposition groups and civil society organizations are often constrained in their contribution towards emancipatory politics by the lack of economic development and by the authoritarian character of political structures (Holm, 1996: 103-4). Similarly, Lal (1998, online) underlines the importance of a culturalist explanation of democratic development. For him, this is explained by, "the political habits of different cultures which have been formed as much by the geography of the territory where the relevant culture was formed than any ideology". By the same token, whilst the importance of the relative size and density of organization of the working class as a key factor in the persistence and growth of democracy cannot be overemphasized, when coopted to power or its leadership assuaged or massively

infiltrated by the state, large sums of money meant for development and welfare tend to end up in private pockets. Lodge (1999: 76-77) argues that whilst COSATU has not wearied in defending South African workers' social interests and the union's political autonomy, there is some evidence of corruption in their ranks. More significantly, given their understandable focus on the work place, trade unions tend to suffer from a limited vision. In consequence, they are often poor defenders of civil liberties of the generality of the populace.

In South Africa and Nigeria, the respective periods of apartheid and militarism had furnished a veritable furnace of affliction and a viable training ground for civil society organizations to achieve what Lodge (Ibid: 79) calls "cultural renaissance" and "social mobilization". Some social capital was built up which ensuing democratic governments can only ignore at their peril. But, again, there are limits; it is always a hard act to fight an elected government after a long period in the wilderness of authoritarian government. For one, it will not be an easy task to replenish the social capital already in place. For another, post-apartheid and post-military governments will have to go beyond the celebration of the heroes and heroines of the struggle against autocracy to "involve the majority of...citizens in the active exercise of their civic responsibilities".

There is also the problem of a benign political followership. In a fundamental sense, many Africans tend to suffer actions of foolish government gladly. Often unable to sift between cheap political propaganda and political truth, ordinary folks (as well as, rather lamentably, the fairly well-educated) tend to be uncritical and undemanding of high standards of accountability, responsiveness and transparency from governments. It would seem that this toleration of governments perverse ways is the aggregate of a wholly negative practice of political impunity by officeholders gone unpunished over the years. Stagnant industrialization, rapid urbanization and declining educational standards have also been contributory factors (White, 1996: 217). Moreover, authoritarian political cultures thrive well in materially impoverished societies. This is because in poor polities, "the bulk of the population...play a marginal or largely passive role in the politics" (Kitching in White, 1996: 218).

For the politically ambitious, there is no reason to condemn such political practice as they are likely to replicate the same behavioural pattern whenever they are lucky enough to get to power. It has been argued, for instance, that one of the reasons why the military persisted for long in power in Nigeria is because of the contagious effect of elites' attitude to democracy on the mass of the people. Invariably, the two groups end up being "mutually reflective and mutually reinforcing". This is because "authoritarian leaders would not survive without some measure of popular support from a non-democratic thinking public; but these same leaders promote the idea that democratic politics is undesirable, unworkable and un-African" (Clark, 1996: 10-11).

There are positive attributes in the political culture of some African countries. The South African example is a case in point. One, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, before it was abandoned in favour of the Growth, Equity and Redistribution (GEAR) programmes, was credited to have sought active, if not activist, citizens who, because they were affected by development projects, would participate in the planning. The lesson was that "development is not just about the delivery of goods

to a passive citizenry" (Lodge, 1999: 27). Two, there is the phenomenon of gradual, if slow, consolidation of a post-authoritarian political culture that may eventually be tolerant of diversity. It would seem that Benin Republic, thanks to three successive and successful Presidential elections (1991, 1996 and 2001) in which both losers and winners respected the verdict of the Constitutional Court, is well on its way to what amounts to a constitutional democracy (Amuwo, forthcoming). But the transition is often problematic. As Lodge (1999: 116-7) indicates in respect of South Africa (and this also applies to virtually all post-guerilla governments in the Southern African sub-region) the *esprit de corps*, organizational cohesion and unity of exile politicians hardly sits well with the values of political pluralism and ideological contestation that befit the business of government. Respect for diversity and plurality of ideas and opinions is a *sine qua non* for stability and development. Ejobowah (1997: 155) has made the point that stability of deeply divided political systems is hinged on valuing diversity as well as nurturing the different identities in the political community. Furthermore, some elected governments gradually become accountable partly as a result of personal income taxation.

If this phenomenon is the exception rather than the rule in much of Africa it is partly because of the negative fall-outs of crass exploitation by multinational capitalism disguised as benign globalization. Whatever else the latter is, it has tended to erode the capacity of non-capitalist/developing states to perform key and critical social and economic functions for citizens. Adams (1997: 178) has argued, in this respect that, "the World Bank's single most destructive accomplishment has perhaps been to free Third World governments from the need to deal with their own people, thereby undermining the growth of democratic institutions and legitimate tax regimes throughout the Third World". Judson (2001: 67) also makes a similar point about how the processes of economic globalization are empowering capital to limit and dictate the policy agendas of states. This 'freedom' has permitted several African governments, including 'democratically elected' autocracies, to have over-bloated or plethoric bureaucracies without adequate administration of national territories; to have year in year out, good year, bad year huge budgetary outlays for human resources development but with little or nothing to show for them. Governments are not only overloaded, they are heavy spenders. Yet the people get only insignificant dividends of democracy and development. It is the same story when the state announces a policy of offloading/rightsizing/downsizing. Fatter public spendings are recorded for still leaner social development returns for the people. Briefly, what does globalization have to do with this phenomenon?

GLOBALIZING AFRICA'S DEGLOBALIZATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT?

There is little doubt that, historically, Africa has been a victim of globalization much in the same way that Africans suffer from the hiatus between two logics: that of globalization and that of domesticity of development. Mazrui (online) has argued that "each step in Africa's contribution to the development of "every stage of Africa's contribution to globalization was also a stage in its own marginalisation...Imperialism and gunboat diplomacy made colonized Africa part of world-wide empires. But colonized people

are inevitably marginalized people.” The point to underline here is that contemporary globalization has done little more than exacerbate the continent’s peripheral role in the global political economy. It has done so by abysmally failing Africa precisely at the point where the promise of development was loudest, namely, that the power of the markets would be harnessed in the social interest (Helleiner, 2001: 247).

The promise was that globalization was a “decentralized”, heterogenous and networked world” that would result neither in anarchy nor in world government. Rather, it would engender what Ikenberry (2001: 139) refers to as “networked minimalism”. that is to say, non-hierarchical arrays of governmental units, private firms and NGOs focused on specific problems. But what Africa has been confronted with is a long shot from a putative promised land. In a fundamental sense, globalization has negatively affected the continent’s state-building efforts, much in the same way as bad political leaderships have severely hampered the drive towards nation building. The two processes have been mutually reinforcing. Some of the elements of state incapacitation have included the following:

One, Africa has largely remained a continent of ‘rule-takers’, not ‘rule-makers’. It has been contended, for instance, that when she signed the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), she either had an insufficient appreciation of its implications or expected more profound changes in the protectionist practice of developed economies (Helleiner, 2001: 255). Neither of the two has materialized. Furthermore, having been hedged in on every side, the continent has “increasingly lost the authority to determine both the direction of social development or the content of social policy”. Their status is hardly better than that of “peripheral Bantustans of globalization” (Manji and O’Coill, 2002: 580-1). By the same token, globalization does not make (adequate) funds available for human resources development purposes. The result has been the intensification of the debt peonage on the continent, save for minor and insignificant pockets. Poku (2002: 539, 542) has shown the unsustainability of Africa’s debts. For example, Ethiopia used the equivalent of 45% of her \$783 million in export earnings in 1996 on debt repayments. Similarly, Zambia spent \$123 million in debt service repayments, a figure representing about 69% of the funds budgeted for the social sectors. For Poku, (Ibid.) “no nation can develop without educated and healthy citizens, no matter how faithfully it may meet its debt servicing requirements”. The US has, within this context, posed the most serious problem to global prosperity. Regarded as a Heavily Indebted Prosperous Country (HIPC), the US’s deficit as well as the high living standards of her citizens are being financed by poor countries (Greenhill and Pettifor, n.d). The US, for all her wealth, has the weakest aid performance record in the OECD (0.1% of GNP, of which 30% goes to the Middle East). Nor have the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO become development institutions, let alone delivering on development for all.

Rather than admit that proposed development parameters have failed, the West has sought, in a manner reminiscent of the colonial era, to blame the victims for their unpreparedness for development (Manji and O’Coill, 2002: 574). The implicit linkage between culture and development here comes into bold relief.

CONCLUSION

To avoid both an overloaded ('big') and an offloaded ('lean') government/state that would, at best, have no more than a nuisance value or, at worst, would be worse than useless, there is the need for a developmental state. According to Leftwich (1996:284), developmental states are those states "whose internal politics and external relations have served to concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competence and capacity at the center to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both". Such states are said to be characterized by strongly nationalistic and relatively uncorrupt developmental elites; 'embedded autonomy' of the state in relation to society with state and market pulling in the same direction the former as the senior partner being actively involved in steering the market towards public-friendly ends; powerful, efficient and insulated public bureaucracies possessing the authority to manage and direct macro social and economic development; a weak civil society, often proposed almost as a condition for the emergence and consolidation of developmental states. The civil society is, however, expected to become progressively active as development becomes consolidated.

A further characteristic of developmental states is particularly instructive for several African states: the salience of dominant party rule, whether it is in Malaysia, Singapore, Botswana or Japan. We turn again to Leftwich (1996: 291) who has underscored the importance of dominant party rule in developmental states. For him:

None of the common features of all developmental states...would have been possible without (the) central condition of long-term dominant party rule. With it, their developmental elites would have been divided or paralysed; relative state autonomy would have been impossible and the badgering demands of special interests would have come to predominate; bureaucratic continuity and capacity would have been compromised; and either local or foreign economic interests or both would soon have become entrenched in ways that would have been unlikely to serve national developmental goals.

There is no escaping the developmental state in Africa. The continent has to take the 'exceptional path' where, consequent upon the interaction between development and local traditions, a political elite committed to development promotes the latter (Holm, 1996: 111). But much of Africa's experience with dominant party rule between the 1960s and the early 1990s was hardly edifying. Repressive governments were, much of the time, unbundled on hapless Africans as political elites claimed to be tackling the crisis of national identity and national integration. The creation of a central and centralized political order was perhaps initially tolerated, if not entirely justifiable. That praxis was intended to stifle latent and manifest fissiparous tendencies in the polity. But it encouraged many of the post-colonial political inheritance elite to have an unwarranted iron-fisted grip on power and political institutions, in the name of forging political cohesion (Austin, 2001: 501). In the absence of a civic culture and viable political institutions that could limit power and its excesses, dominant politicians and political parties ended up retrenching the state and its resources into private hands, clannish clubs and ethnic

nationalities. Ake (2000: 37) is right to underline the fact that “instead of being a public force, the state in Africa tends to be privatized by the ruling elite”.

In respect of the global economy, Africa's largely non-developmental elites for they were and are such did little to stem the stifling and suffocation of local industries by global capitalism. They did not follow the Asiatic route. Yet, there is an important lesson to learn: Africa's political leaders would need to do like the Asian tigers that permitted foreign capital but disallowed direct investment by foreign MNCs. The broad objective was “to give native businesses a chance to ramp up to global standards” (Fukuyama, 1995: 97). On account of being ‘un-Asiatic’, African governments were big but, generally speaking, neither democracy nor development was achieved.

The way out for Africa is a strong and visionary political leadership capable of exploiting the continent's immense resources and other potentialities for development. The latter would have to be anchored on salient local traditions and values with a view to making people productive and ensuring real and sustained economic growth (Subramaniam, 2001: 68). This would require, to appropriate Helleiner's (2001: 260) proposition for ‘civilizing’ the global economy, a constructive mix of political statesmanship from above and a supportive political pressure from below. The latter would, of necessity, come mainly from fairly autonomous and insulated civil society organizations and groups. After all, civil society is, everywhere, the social conscience of democracy. If it is true that the language of the demand for a second independence in Africa revolves around the survival of the mass of the people (Ake, 2000: 31), there is room for optimism that civil society would yet triumph over the numerous democracy and development reversals and backslides witnessed in the last several decades. But civil society organizations and ordinary folks mainly in the rural communities would have to get tired and weary of the present wretched *status quo* and find their voices with the intent of mobilizing “private energies for the public good” (Joseph, online).

Within this context, perhaps the optimism of Leftwich (1996: 292) about the ANC government in South Africa is not entirely misplaced. He outlines the post-apartheid government's main tasks as consisting of state building to correct past inequalities and inequities; promotion and sustenance of economic growth needed to fund restructuring of the political economy and raise the level of human welfare indices and maintain democratic rule. These are by no means easy tasks. But, for Leftwich, the foregoing can be achieved provided the ANC government is “regularly re-elected with substantial majorities in open competition over the next 25 years”. The argument seems to be that time and space would be enough for the dominant party to “establish the kind of democratic developmental state which alone stands a fair chance of achieving these goals”. For him, the alternative to this scenario is unenviable and unviable: endemic instability and insecurity capable of attenuating both democracy and development.

The foregoing applies to as many African states as are in a state of disrepair or which amounts to saying the same thing or are at once non-democratic and non-developmental. After all, Africanists as pessimistic as Chabal and Daloz (1999: 162) do not foreclose change on the continent even though they see little prospect for political institutionalization. They nonetheless canvass the view that change, “would have to be driven by popular will”.

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6

NATURAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION, AGITATION FOR RESOURCE CONTROL RIGHT AND THE PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION/HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The building of the entity called Nigeria today began on May 1, 1906 when the colonies and protectorates of Lagos and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated by Sir Walter Egerton. The second phase was the amalgamation (based on the Selbourne Committee's recommendation) of the Southern and Northern Colonies and Protectorates on January 1, 1914 by Frederick Lugard to form what is known as Nigeria today. Before this period, inhabitants were scattered all over the place in different tribes and kingdoms existing under traditional political and administrative institutions through which their affairs were conducted and regulated. These traditional politico-administrative systems and institutions varied from one part of the country to another because of well over 400 ethnic groups (Kirk-Greene, 1967) that are inhabiting the land area. The three dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West, Ibo in the East and the Edo in the Mid-west. The diverse nature of these ethnic groups has always been a curse for Nigeria because the relationship has always been a thorny one, the foundation of which was built on the said amalgamation(s). This relationship is being traced to the amalgamation partly because of the irreconcilable differences in vision, religion, ethnic traits, culture, resource-endowment, character, linguistic and development of the ethnic groups. The second reason can be seen in the fact that the hallmark of such co-existence is the idea of a treaty and unfortunately the Nigerian state was built without one.

As a result of the amalgamation, the North and the South were divided into Provinces to facilitate the administration of the country, each under a Provincial Resident. He was acting then as mere representative of a higher authority. Thus, between 1914 and 1946, one could say that a unitary system of administration was in force in Nigeria. This was the situation until the 1946 Constitution (otherwise called the Richard Constitution) was drawn up regionalizing the country into Western, Northern and Eastern regions

for administrative convenience. The earlier governors merely zoned Nigeria into three, namely the Northern, Western, and Eastern provinces but did not constitute them into regional governments. The Nigerian nationalists picked some holes in the constitution which led to the Ibadan General Conference of 1950 as inaugurated by Sir John Macpherson who succeeded Governor Richards in 1948. The conference consisted of representatives of many sections and interests in the country to deliberate on the type of government they wanted. This led to the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 retaining the regional governments and creating Regional Houses of Assembly to work with the Regional Executive Councils made up of the Lieutenant-Governors and their top officials. One of the serious defects in the constitution was in frequent frictions between the Governors and the elected members of the House of Assembly. This also led to the 1953 London Constitutional Conference as attended by top Nigerian political functionaries and the British government. The conference formed the foundation for drawing up the 1954 Constitution, establishing a federal system of government, with the three regions forming the units of the federation. Olisa *et al* (1991) listed the principal provisions of the constitution as including:

- a. A federal system of government with the three regions forming the units of the federation.
- b. Matters on which the central and regional governments could legislate on were classified into three: an exclusive legislative list, a concurrent legislative list, and a residual legislative list. The exclusive list was for the federal government only, the concurrent list for both federal and regional governments and the residual list was only for the regions.
- c. Membership of the central legislature (i.e. House of Representatives) was increased from 148 to 184 and members were now to be elected directly by voters and not on the floor of the regional House of Assembly.
- d. Three regional premiers were created.
- e. Regional public services, regional judiciaries and regional marketing boards were created.
- f. The Central Chief Executive was designated Governor-General while the former regional lieutenant-governors became governors.
- g. Lagos was separated from the former Western Region and renamed Federal Capital Territory.
- h. The two Cameroons, i.e. Northern and Southern, still remained part of Nigeria but as a semi-federal territory.

In addition to all above, it was decided at the Constitutional Conference that any of the regions could be given self-government in 1956 if so requested for it. By 1957, the Western and Eastern Regions had become self-governing at their request. The Northern Region on the other hand wanted self-government in 1959.

There was a series of constitutional modifications before Nigeria finally gained her independence on October 1, 1960. Since this time, because of the ethnic diversity, Nigeria has been battling with a lot of constitutional and political problems. The struggle for power and the issue of ethnic rivalry were among other compelling problems

that led to the fall of the republics put in place after independence. While some ethnic nationals complain of unjust neglect and discrimination by the federal government, others complain of marginalisation in the areas of appointment of people to federal positions, distribution of political institutions, location of basic infrastructure, exploitation of natural resources, non-true federalism (being practised) denying ethnic groups (or states) enough political space to feel free, unique and important in the evolution of truly cooperative federalism, and lastly the share of the Central Pool Account (popularly called the Federation Account) and tax jurisdiction to mention a few. All these and some others summed together led to calls for a fundamental restructuring of Nigeria and the restoration of true federal principles to curb the attendant conflicts, and of late the agitation for resource control rights.

NATURAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND AGITATION FOR RESOURCE CONTROL RIGHTS

The word “resource” can simply be interpreted to mean the wealth, supplies of goods, raw materials, minerals, etc., which a person or a country has or can use for development or production (Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 1962: 838). Resources can be classified broadly into human and natural resources. Going by the areas of interest, our concern shall be with the latter. In a narrower sense, natural resources can be defined as all those things available to man as “gifts of nature”. Natural resources are either renewable or non-renewable but include mineral resources, water resources, agricultural resources, forest resources, and atmospheric resources. According to Barlowe (1978: 228) resources, or what he referred to as land resources, can be classified based on the relative renewability of the resource, thereby obtaining three principal resources: fund resources, flow resources, and a composite group of resources that has some characteristics of both fund and flow resources. The fund (or stock) resources which Barlowe described as including resources like metals, mineral fuels, coal, stone, and so on, are the most relevant to this work. The total supply of these resources is relatively fixed and non-renewable/non-replaceable. The concept of flow resources applies to resources such as precipitation, the water in streams and lakes, sunlight, wind, tides, and climate, the flow of which continues whether or not the resources are used. These are said to be renewable, but must be used as they become available; and failure to do so amounts to permanent loss of the value they could have had. Under the composite group of resources are subclasses like biological resources, soil resources and man-made improvements such as buildings, reservoirs, or highways. All the links between economic activity and the natural environment involve the use of natural resources. At another instance Barlowe described natural resources as productive assets which support economic development and sustain human populations.

In terms of mineral resources potential, Nigeria is one of the richest countries in Africa with known deposits of tin, columbite, tantalite, wolfram, gold, lead-zinc, limestone, kaolin, clay, shale, marble, radio-active minerals, barytes, cassiterite, coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and hydro-electric power (Aluko, 1971). Many of these are classified and assessed state-by-state as presented in the appendix to this chapter.

The abundance of these and many others, especially petroleum, has become a double-edged sword being the mainstay of the Nigerian economy on one hand, and source of ethnic conflicts as well as environmental problems on the other hand. No doubt, on the one hand, it provides the necessary resources for the country, while on the other hand it is creating social, political and environmental problems. As it is causing environmental problems for the oil-producing communities, the country has not witnessed peace for decades especially in the struggle for economic power among the constituent units derivable from the control of petroleum resources between the producing communities on the one hand and the state/federal government and the non-producing areas on the other hand. These and many others have led to the agitation for resource control rights by the Southern states, as spearheaded by their governors.

In the Nigerian context, the term “resource control” means the right of a community to a measure of control of its natural resources, the usage relating mostly to crude oil. Resource control is all about the demand by the littoral states and other Southern states of Nigeria (where the nation’s resources are derived) to be allowed to be controlling/managing the revenue accruing from the oil and other natural resources in line with the tenets of true federalism. By this, each state would have full control of its resources and contribute an agreed percentage towards the maintenance of common services of the government at the centre, as was the case was in the first republic and as is being practised in places like Canada, Switzerland, France, and even the United States of America from whom Nigeria copied her system of governance.

The agitation has become a major subject of debate today, especially since the Supreme Court’s judgement on the politicised on-shore/ off-shore dichotomy. The standing points of the Northern and Southern regions on the subject of resource control have been different. While the Southerners, as represented by their 17 governors, are agitating for its enforcement, the Northerners, also as represented by their governors, have strongly opposed the move. While the Southerners’ agitation is guided by their realization of the need to practise true federalism (granting autonomy to constituent units, fiscal inclusive), they are also of the view that the practice of a highly centralized fiscal federalism is a feature of the military that has been enforced over the years by military coercion, which is not relevant in a democratic set-up. That the core oil-producing areas are the least developed part of the country is yet another reason. On the other hand, the Northerners believe it will be a move towards disintegrating Nigeria. By this, they differ in their definition of true federalism. They are of the belief that the two regions are interdependent and complementary, especially as they have also contributed immensely to the economic base of the country when the economy was agrarian in nature. On the whole, the move was described as unconstitutional as it could result in breaking up the country as some federating units could become so powerful as to declared independence for themselves, thereby threatening the peace and stability of the country.

Using Dunmoye (2002: 51) as guide, the clamour for resource control can be said to be traceable to:

- a. the injustice and inequality that characterize the distribution of natural resources, particularly oil revenue;

- b. the jettisoning of derivation as a fundamental principle of revenue allocation which reduced the amount of funds going to the pauperized oil-producing areas as of right;
- c. the lack of infrastructural development in Nigeria at large, but in the oil-producing areas in particular;
- d. the introduction of the islamic judicial system by a few Northern states, which was seen by the Southern states as a major test for the federal constitution (Demand for resource control is, therefore, an indirect constitutional-cum-economic response to the introduction of shari'ahh);
- e. the systematic destruction of the ecosystem in the oil-producing areas which led to environmental degradation, pollution, acid rain and the attendant unemployment and mass poverty;
- f. failure of the multinational oil companies to contribute to the social and economic development of the oil-producing states;
- g. the activities of ethnic militants made up of unemployed youths in the oil-producing communities who are exerting pressure on their political and traditional leaders, thus necessitating political action;
- h. the new democratic dispensation which allows for overt airing of grievances which were violently suppressed under military rule;
- i. the election of 2003, with the demand for resource control as an instrument of political mobilization in the oil-producing South-South geo-political zone.

All these factors above (combined) were said to have made the agitation controversial and constitutional. The neglect of the oil-producing areas as well as the near jettisoning of the derivation principle in revenue sharing are said to be tantamount to acute injustice.

These stand points have put the federal government in a dilemma. The agitation for resource control rights created dangerous dimensions for the survival of the nation, more so as the division is primarily along geo-ethnic lines. This led the federal government to institute a suit at the Supreme Court, joining all the states of the federation as defendants for the interpretation of section 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Several issues were raised both by the plaintiff and the defendants, especially the eight littoral states (i.e states bounded by the sea) of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers as to the Southern (or seaward) boundary of each of these states. Counter-claims were also raised by some states which led to the following among other issues:

- whether it is lawful for federal government to make first charges before sharing the balance;
- whether it is lawful for the federal government to appropriate 1% of the Federation Account to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT);
- whether it is lawful for the allocation intended for local governments or for the purposes of primary education to be paid to any person or authority other than the state government;

- what the procedure is for making provision for the formula for distributing the amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account pursuant to section 162 of the constitution.

The judgement of the Supreme Court further complicated the problems of the Nigerian federation. Though the federal government was the plaintiff in the resource control suit, its prayers were granted by the Supreme Court declaring it as the rightful owner of the resources in littoral waters, through its on-shore/off-shore dichotomy, the federal government on the whole is the greatest loser. The two areas that come to mind here include outlawing of the 1% it had been unilaterally allocating to the FCT and the power to make first charges from the Federation Account. Apart from these, the judgement with respect to the on-shore/off-shore dichotomy further worsened the fragile relationship between the oil-producing states and the federal/non-oil-producing states. The danger of the judgement for the Nigerian Federation was thereafter realized and a political solution to the problem was conceived by the federal government. This was capped with a bill sponsored by the legislative houses to abrogate the on-shore/off-shore dichotomy. The bill was speedily passed by the houses abrogating the dichotomy. Months after passing the bill, the President is yet to append his signature to become operational (the situation as at April 2003).

GRANTING RESOURCE CONTROL RIGHTS AND THE PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

The concern of this section is to support the granting of resource control rights to the constituent units within the Nigerian federation.

The Nigerian federation is made up of over 400 ethnic groups and at the time when the Nigerian federation was designed via the 1954 Constitution, it was a baby of necessity. This is so because a federation is usually viewed as a form of governmental institutional structure deliberately designed to cope with the twin but difficult tasks of maintaining unity while also preserving diversity (Jinadu, 1979: 15). The federal model is particularly appropriate to countries with diverse cultures (and religions, ethnic traits, vision, resource-endowment, character and so on), like Nigeria, and one of its essential elements is that it institutionalizes social divisions by creating mechanisms for the articulation of such diversity in the hope of forging unity through diversity (Olowu, 1995).

Simply put, federalism is the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinated and independent (Wheare, 1963: 10). Wheare listed the following as attributes of federalism: the division of powers among the levels of government; a written constitution showing this division; each component of government must be independent within its own sphere of competence; the constitution is not amendable by one level of government alone; and lastly, the existence of a Supreme Court to act as an umpire. Although out of about (22) federations in the world, none can be said to have conformed completely to Kenneth Wheare's model, one can deduce from the foregoing that non-centralization of powers, be it political, admin-

istrative or fiscal, goes with a federal system of government. Political federalism is concerned with the division of powers among the tiers of government where the tiers are each within a sphere, coordinated and interdependent (Oates, 1972: 16; Asobie, 1998: 15). On the other hand, administrative federalism has to do with the delegation of functions to lower levels of government. The third form, which is the most relevant to this work, is fiscal federalism, also referred to as intergovernmental fiscal relations between and among the units of government in a federal system. In the words of Oates (1972: 16-20) and Tanzi (1995: 297), fiscal federalism is about the allocation of government spending and resources to the tiers of government. It is all about fiscal decentralization which occurs when lower levels of government have statutory powers to raise (some) taxes and carry out spending activities within specified legal criteria, to prevent vitiating a viable federation.

If this non-centralization feature of federalism is anything to go by, the posture of the Nigerian government(s) by which powers including its fiscal allies and the control of natural resources (situated in the states/communities), are centralised to the federal level attracts attention. This centralization, which began on January 15, 1966 at the termination of the first republic, resulted in excess liquidity at the centre, which has in turn kindled a thirst for power and influence among the regional blocs and power caucuses.

DECENTRALIZING THE CONTROL OF NATURE RESOURCES

To this point, we have successfully introduced the theme of this work. An attempt shall be made from this point to justify the need to grant the control of natural resources to the constituent units where they are located. As Dunmoye (2002) has rightly said, there is no gainsaying the fact that the oil-producing states have the constitutional right to demand resource control. It is a political as well as a constitutional issue, he added. It is also of situation whereby the Nigerian fragile federation is finding itself in a level field for re-examination. Since 1966, the kind of federalism we have been practising in Nigeria has been unitary in nature; with the federal government holding other units as mere vassals with virtually no power for self-determination. The decentralization of control over natural resources will solve this problem.

The Nigerian economy has been monolithic in nature despite the varieties of natural resources that are found across the country (see appendix). The sustainability of Nigeria is in danger by depending on one product (oil) to sustain her economy as this oil is not inexhaustible. Even though it is now being depended upon solely is because of its importance in the world economy. Also, because it is assuming such a position in the world economy today does not mean it will continue to be so, even as the developed countries improve upon their technology almost every day. This reminds us of a point in the history of Nigeria when it was tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnut, oil palm and rubber, today it is crude oil, and only God knows what it will be tomorrow upon which Nigeria will be sustained. Granting control of resources to the constituent units will mean encouraging each unit to exploit and develop the resources in each area. It will mean diversifying the economy, which world bodies like World Bank have been suggesting to Nigeria as a

solution to her economic problem. The present arrangement under which the future of the country is tied to “petrodollar” revenue is not healthy.

Apart from this, the very day the control of resources is granted to the constituent units means the beginning of true federalism in Nigeria as agreed upon in 1954. The present control pattern is not in line with what the agreement says as the federal government is arrogating too much power to itself. In a nutshell, federalism will be one of the principal winners the very day such control is granted. Nigeria’s bastardized federalism has worsened its affliction with the “Dutch disease” a condition in which a country that is rich resource wise has continued to be lazy and imprudent.

Granting the right to control resources to the constituent units is a move towards ensuring economic viability of most of the units under the two lower tiers. The present intergovernmental fiscal relations, otherwise known as fiscal federalism, have always been in favour of the federal government, especially since 1970 when Decree Number 13 was promulgated. In other words, the lower tiers of government have been experiencing both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances as well as fiscal mismatch between their expenditure responsibilities and their revenue-raising capabilities (Ashwe, 1986: 82). These combined have been threatening the economic viability of the state and local governments which only decentralized rights to control resources can solve. The present arrangement whereby the two lower levels of government are depending only on the revenue allocated to them from the Federation Account is unhealthy. This is apart from the fact that what they receive from the said Federation Account is grossly inadequate to match their constitutionally assigned responsibilities. This is the reason why it has been difficult to arrive at an acceptable revenue sharing formula. To date, 19 attempts have been made in the history of Nigeria to evolve a formula acceptable to all but to no avail especially since the federal government has, especially from 1970, been placing enormous resources at its disposal under the guise of national unity. To worsen the situation, the military government introduced in 1989 what is known as “first charges”, meaning a portion of the Federation Account is first deducted before sharing the balance with the other levels. Closely related to this is tax assignment or tax jurisdiction which is basically about the level of government that should tax what and how. This has three main attributes, namely power to legislate and set rates, the power of administration, and the right to revenue collected. In the words of Olowononi (1994:194) the major revenue heads account for about 80 percent of total national recurrent revenues falling under the legislative and administrative jurisdiction of the federal government while the less productive and less buoyant sources are devolved to the fiscal jurisdiction of state and local governments. These two, i.e revenue sharing and tax assignment/jurisdiction, are major sources of conflict and the basis (partly) for the recent agitation of some federating units for resource control.

The growth of the activities of ethnic militants and ethnic conflicts is no news in the history of Nigeria today. The growth is traceable to their disaffection with the practice of federalism and its corollary, fiscal federalism, in Nigeria as well as the systematic destruction of the ecosystem in the oil-producing areas which led to environmental degradation, pollution, and other related problems. The present democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo was shaken to its marrow by the militants’ activities on

assumption of office in 1999 which led to passing into law the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Bill during the year 2000. The multi-national oil companies also bear the brunt of the militants' activities, meaning a threat to the Nigerian economy. The agitation, by implication, concerns financial autonomy, which can only be tackled by granting control rights over resources to the constituent units. This is even more the case because the federal government has failed as a state in addressing infrastructural development in Nigeria at large and in the oil-producing communities in particular.

In the political sphere, the stability of the political entity called Nigeria is being threatened because of the centre that is too powerful politically and economically. This is so because of the ethnic groups that are always desperate to enthrone their kinsmen as President. This situation is understandable, the direction of the flow of national wealth is often dictated by the way of political power. In order to enjoy the national cake often depends on the power base. Granting resource control rights to the units is a step towards reducing the 'mad rush' as it will mean a weaker centre, granting the units freedom to develop at their pace rather than existing at the mercy of the federal government. This will be a way out as a section of the country is working towards jettisoning the rotational system along the six geo-political zones.

So far, we have been able to justify the need to permit the constituent (lower) units to exploit and develop the natural resources in their areas and contribute an agreed percentage of the revenue so generated to the federal government.

In the alternative, the federal government must take the following steps:

- a. The pre-military era of 1966 when the derivation principle was prominent in revenue sharing must be returned to. This is necessary as the agitation for resource control rights is an indirect way of demanding an enhanced derivation principle. This should not be controversial at all as it seems to be the best of all the principles for now because there is no region that is not blessed with at least one natural resource or the other if only the units will be willing to exploit them.
- b. The agitation for resource control is a response to the failure of the state or federal government in providing and developing social infrastructure. The state should wake up to its legitimate social role by embarking on infrastructural development (fairly distributed) and people-oriented policies and programmes.
- c. There is a need to re-examine the fiscal relations among the tiers of government, especially that is highly centralized as can be seen in the share of Federation Account, assignment of tax jurisdiction and the combination of these that affects (negatively) both the revenue and expenditure structures of the two lower levels. The present arrangement is lopsided and is likely to threaten the viability of many states. The revenue formula must be revised to give the deserved attention to the oil-producing states. A situation whereby everything is being done by a section of the country to eliminate "derivation" as a factor for sharing revenue only to encourage the use of more controversial factors like population and land mass is highly disheartening and unhealthy.
- d. From (c) above, there is a need to stop forthwith the practice of deducting "first charges", which the military introduced in 1989 by which the federal military government unilaterally allocates a substantial portion to itself for purposes described

as national projects before the rest of the revenues are paid into the distributable pool (Federation Account). Such deductions have been described in many quarters as abuse of office in a federation. The Supreme Court judgement on resource control also outlawed the act.

- e. Also, from (c) above, buying the ideas of Osagie in one of his presentations in 1992 the content of the Federation Account needs to be reviewed because there are still many leakages. For example, (i) gas production and exports should be accounted for separately from the sale of crude oil, (ii) the surpluses recorded by the CBN and other parastatals like NNPC, NITEL, NEPA, etc, and dividends accruing from public sector investments should be paid into the Federation Account, and lastly (iii) the Federation Account should be properly credited when the federal government uses crude oil to pay for capital projects executed by foreign contractors (common to military regimes).
- f. Also from (c) above, there is a need to revisit the revenue sharing (horizontal) principles like the present equality (40%), 30%, landmass (10%), level of social development (10%) and internal revenue effort (10%). The belief in many quarters is that the principle of equality of states is meaningless except as a political or legal concept. This is so because the states are not equal in any economic sense (Philips, 1975 and 1980). To use a principle that does not have any sound economic jurisdiction and to attach a weight of 40 percent to it seems to be the greatest flaw of the existing revenue-sharing scheme (Ashwe, 1986). The emphasis on population is the most important and controversial issue, resulting from complaints that population census figures were manipulated in favour of some states. In the case of the landmass and terrain principle the complaint is that the principle undermines the interest of the states with a small landmass. The thinking in many quarters is that this criterion makes no sense and is politically motivated. The main complaint about the use of social development effort as a factor is that the weight assigned to it is on the low side. Apart from this, the suggestion is that the criterion should be taken as proxy for direct enrolment in educational institutions. It was added that other proxies for social development factor such as health and water should not be entertained as states are normally expected to provide for these amenities from all their revenue sources including internally generated revenue. Lastly, the weight of 10 percent attached to internal revenue effort is on the low side if the government is serious about encouraging the lower levels of government to improve their revenue drive.
- g. There is a need for the federal government to provide financial support to the lower levels in the area of education. It is well known that education (primary and secondary) is one of the largest areas of expenditure by both the state and local governments, especially in the Southern part of the country. Federal support for education is a way of reducing the expenditure responsibilities of the lower levels of government, which will mean a healthier fiscal arrangement. Apart from the fact that the present poor quality of education will be reversed, the lower levels of government will be enabled to provide other essential services.
- h. The federal government must mandate the multi-national oil companies to fulfil their social responsibilities and include the disclosure of such social undertakings

during the year in their annual reports (Adesopo, 2001: 197). This will encourage them to contribute to the social and economic development of the oil-producing states/communities, which in a way will pacify the militants pressuring their governors for resource control rights. This step will also cause the companies to be concerned about the environmental implications of their operations. More often than not, the oil spillages being experienced are due to carelessness on the part of the companies which have resulted in the destruction of crops, trees and fish, and attendant mass poverty. There is a need for the oil-producing companies to adopt the safest means of exploiting and producing oil and gas. This may have to be enforced by entrenching it in the constitution or the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) could be amended accordingly as is being practised in many other countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries (Gray *et al*, 1996:169). In addition, the oil-producing companies must form the habit of ploughing back a certain percentage of their earnings for development of the areas in operation for the peace and growth of their business. Due to mass poverty among the hosting communities, the companies must float fund credit schemes to encourage and provide support for financing indigenous entrepreneurs operating in the area.

- i. There is a need for the federal government to outlaw the existence of the shari'ah judicial system alongside the Nigerian constitution. This is necessary as the demand of the Southern governors for resource control rights was (partly) developed in their quest to balance the demand and subsequent introduction of shari'ah in some Northern states.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made to justify the need to grant resource control rights to the lower constituent units mainly because of the varieties of natural resources found across the length and breath of Nigeria and such other related factors mentioned. In addition to these, alternative solutions were offered. On the whole, there is need for institutional solution to these problems which entails the convocation of a National sovereign conference to discuss the state of the nation, especially as it generally affects the practice of federalism in Nigeria.

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APPENDIX

State by state assessment of Nigeria's natural resources

State	Solid Minerals	Agric./Agro Allied	Oil and Gas	Industrial Potentials
Abia	Brine, Iron ore, Lignite Kaolin, Clay	Cowpeas, Soyabeans, Rice, Maize, Cassava, Oil Palm, Cocoa, Rubber, Fruits	Petroleum and Gas	Ceramics, Cosmetic Plastic, Petroleum and Gas Industries
Abuja	Marble, Kaolin, Clay, Tin, Lead, Zinc	Yam, Cassava, Maize Beans and Fruits	-	Food Processing and Manufact. industries
Adamawa	Barytes, Salt, Marble, Calciumlaterites, Gypsum, Clay	Guinea-Corn, Cheese, Sugarcane, Yam, Cassava, Maize, Millet, Milk, Rice, Cotton, Groundnuts	-	Agricultural processing industries
Akwa Ibom	Clay, Glass, Sand beutonite	Coconut, Cocoa, Rubber, Raffia palm, Coffee, Oil Palm	Natural gas and Crude oil	Agricultural processing, Oil and Gas industries
Anambra	Kaolin, Limestone, Marble	Rice, Yam, Cassava	Crude oil reserve	Oil and Gas industries
Bauchi	Limestone, Columbite, Iron ore, Tin, Kaolin	Sugarcane, Maize, Rice Groundnuts, Millet, Guinea corn, Cotton,	Crude oil (under survey)	Limestone, Ceramic industry
Bayelsa	-	Plantain, Banana, Cassava, Yam, Cocoyam	Crude oil and gas	Oil and Petrochemical

Benue	Tin, Columbite, Kaolin, Gypsum	Yam, Rice, Maize, Millet, Sorghum and Fruits	-	Food canning/Cement
Borno	Gypsum, Iron ore, Clay, Feldspar, Limestone	Millet, Wheat, Arabic gum, Hides and Skins	-	Soda ash, Leather industries
Cross River	Limestone, Baryte, Uranium, Bentonite	Rubber, Cocoa, Oil Palm, Cassava, rice, fruits	-	Agric and Fishing
Delta	Lignite, Gypsum, Tar, Sand, Silica	Palm oil, Kernel, Rubber, Cassava and Timber	Crude Oil and Gas	Petrochemical, Oil and Wood processing
Ebonyi	Salt, Limestone, Lead, Zinc, Gypsum	Yam, Rice, Cassava, Maize, Soyabeans	-	Mining, food Processing
Edo	Gypsum, Tar sand, Lignite, Marble	Cassava, Yam, Gari, Plantain, Rubber	Oil and Gas reserve	Oil and Gas Industries, Cement, Food and Rubber processing
Ekiti	Tantalite, Quarta, Kaolin, Sand, Clay, Gold, Feldspar	Cocoa, Timber, Palm produce	-	Food and Canning, wood processing
Enugu	Coal, Clay, Limestone, Silica, Iron ore, Lead	Oil Palm, Cassava, Rice, Maize, Yam	-	Ceramic, Pottery, Mining
Gombe	Gypsum, Columbite, Lead, Zinc, Tin, Iron ore, Clay	Maize, Beans, Groundnuts, Millet, Cotton, Rice, Sugarcane	-	Cotton, Cement work
Simo	Limestone, Lead, Clay, Zinc, Ore, Kaolin	Oil palm, Cassava, Cashew	Crude oil	Food processing, Oil and Gas Industry
Jigawa	Kaolin, Tourmaline, Copper, Iron ore, Clay	Groundnut, Cassava, Wheat, Millet	-	Agro and Food based, Mining, Limestone work
Kaduna	Gold, Gemstone, Talc, Zinc, Clay, Iron ore	Wheat, Millet, Rice, Beans, Potatoes	-	Food processing, Fertilizer industries
Kano	Tin, Zinc, Lead, Clay, Copper, Kaolin	Onions, Groundnut, Rice, Maize, Wheat	-	Food processing
Katsina	Marble, Kaolin, Feldspar, Iron ore	Guinea Corn, rice, Groundnut, Millet, Wheat, Maize, Cotton	-	Flourmill, meat processing
Kebbi	Kaolin, Salt, Clay, Limestone, Iron ore	Millet, Guinea corn, Maize, Ginger, Bears fruits	-	Groundnut mills, leather industries
Kogi	Limestone, Clay, Gold, Iron ore, Coal Marble	Yam, Cassava, Rice, Maize, Coffee, Cashew	-	Ore mining, Cement industries
Kwara	Iron ore, Marble, Clay, Limestone, Feldspar	Yam, Cassava, Maize	-	Mining, Food processing
Lagos	Iron ore, Marble, Clay, Limestone, Feldspar	Fish, Coconut	Crude oil	Food processing, Oil and Gas, Paper mill
Nasarawa	Iron ore, Marble, Coal, Lead, Zinc Tin	Rice, Yam, Maize, Cotton	-	Agro Allied industries
Niger	Glass, Gold, Iron ore	Corn, Rice, Yam	-	Energy, Mining
Ogun	Limestone, Chalk, Clay, Kaolin, Phosphate, Tar Sand	Rice, Maize, Beans, Palm produce, Cocoa, Rubber	-	Food processing, Mining
Ondo	Bitumen, Limestone, Kaolin, Iron ore	Timber, Palm produce, Cocoa, Kolanut	Crude oil	Oil and Gas, Wood, Food processing
Osun	Gold, Clay, Kaolin, Limestone, Granite	Cocoa, Kolanut, Rice, Maize	-	Food processing

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Oyo	Dolomite, Kaolin, Marble, Iron ore, Clay, Gemstone	Cocoa, Palm produce, Kolanut, Cashew, Maize, Cassava	-	Mining, Food processing
Rivers	Silica, Sand, Clay	Palm oil, Fish, Cassava, Fruits	Crude oil and Natural gas	Oil industries, Petrochemicals, Glass works
Sokoto	Kaolin, Gypsum, Salt, Marble, Limestone, Gold	Rice, Wheat, Millet, Groundnut	-	Food processing, Cement industry
Taraba	Baryte, Bauxite, Iron ore	Rice, Guinea Corn, Yam, Cassava, Fruits	-	Food Processing, Canning,
Yobe	Arabic Gum, Gypsum, Limestone, Clay, Kaolin	Cotton, Groundnut, Millet, Maize	-	Food processing
Zamfara	Gold, Mica	Rice Maize, Guinea Corn	-	Food processing

Source: *The Week*, April 30, 2001, p. 13.

7

OIL AND THE POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Dauda S. Garuba

Where there is money, there is politics. Indeed, one of the causes of our present problems in Nigeria today is how and who should control the money accruing from our mineral resources. The Federal government would want to keep a good slice of the royalty and concession tax in order to maintain a strong financial position. Naturally, the states, especially those from which oil is being extracted, want an equally large share for internal development (David Ejoor, 1989).

We in South-South, in line with the principle of federalism, want to control our resources. We are fed up with producing the wealth, suffering the environmental hazards and then being given peanuts for our troubles” (Chris Ekpennyong, 2001).

If the demand for social justice and fairness by the South-South is indeed a threat to the unity of Nigeria, it simply means the foundation of that unity is faulty and needs serious restructuring (Ita Awak, 2001).

The debate about ownership, exploitation and management of natural resources, apart from being a frontal one in Africa, has been the basis for recurring confrontations between governments of many states and the people and/or communities from where such natural resources are exploited. Angola, DR Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, among others, ably exemplify countries where the struggle to exercise control over mineral resources has resulted in total breakdown of law and order. Also, natural resources are Nigeria’s most important source of national and international power. The issue about their governance, though often played down for certain political interests and ethnic reasons, is a defining factor in the country’s tortuous march to nationhood (Evoh, 2001: 20). From a modest daily earning of less than 25, 000 pounds from its production capacity of 5, 000 barrel per day in 1958, Nigeria today earns almost 1 trillion Naira annually from crude oil. And with Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) yielding almost \$900 million in the first experimental year, it would seem the sky is the country’s limit (Chukwu, 2002: 24).

However, an objective analysis of the present condition of the country reveals that oil is the incubus that Nigerian economy and state have had to carry in the last couple of decades (Anyia, 2002). In spite of the prime place of the mineral resource in the country’s

life, there is a clear poverty of definition and enforcement of institutional arrangements regulating its governance/ management in line with any known principles of federalism, owing to the deliberate and avaricious centralization of collection and disbursement of money accruing from it. The way and manner past governments, military and civilian alike, have handled matters relating to oil revealed that it is not only essentially unchecked in law (Evoh, 2001: 20), but it also signaled all forms of injustice against the people in whose lands the mineral is extracted. It is therefore not surprising that these aggrieved oil-producing communities and states are cashing in on the new political liberty ushered in by multi-party politics in Nigeria to demand public participation in this forcibly controlled, exploited and expropriated resource by imperialist predators and their local agents.

It is against the backdrop of the foregoing and the resistance it attracts from the Nigerian state, heavily dominated by some bourgeois ethno-class elements of the Hausa-Fulani in the North, Igbo in the South-East, Yoruba in the South-West and a co-opted select few others from oil minority areas, that this chapter examines the diversity of interests in the politics of oil in Nigeria with a view to showing how the crisis provoked by the situation impedes on the country's vision for development. The chapter also identifies and proffers the institutional requirements for the resolution of the crisis, to enable the country to grapple with the intractability problem.

Among the numerous questions the chapter addresses are: What is the nature and dynamics of the politics of oil in Nigeria? What is the diversity of interests, with particular respect to its ethnic and class character? How do they shape, or are they shaped by, the 'resource control' agitation? How does the agitation resonate with the aberration or unresolved questions in the Nigerian federalism? To what extent is underdevelopment brought about by the negative impact of oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta responsible for the claim of domination by the people in the Nigerian equation? Do not the indigenous 'owners' of oil-producing areas deserve a stronger say in how the mineral in their lands is managed? How genuine or palliative is the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (and by retrospection, its predecessors) to the real issues involved in the 'resource control' agitation? What are the institutional requirements for a peaceful resolution of the crises thrown up by the agitation for effective realization of a truly just and democratic Nigeria?

OIL AND POLITICS: SOME STATEMENTS OF CONNECTION

Ordinarily, oil and politics would appear to be unrelated and strange bedfellows, given that one is a mineral resource and the other a Science or art of government. But the nexus between both terms today started in far away Titusville in Pennsylvania, USA, in 1859 when Colonel Edward L. Drake drilled the first successful oil well that yielded production capacity of 30 barrels per day. Though oil had been produced from hand-dug wells in many countries prior to this time, Drake initiated a process in which oil was to become (in the face of fast-growing industrialization and a quest to get things done quickly) a big business regulated by naked politics the world over. Feyide (1986) puts the place of oil in world politics succinctly:

Oil is a raw material as well as a convenient and effective source of energy. All over the world the lives of people are affected and the destiny of nations are probably determined, by the results of oil industry operations. Oil keeps the factories of the industrialized countries working and provides the revenue, which enables oil exporters to execute national economic development plans. Those developing countries that have no oil are faced with a grim struggle for survival: if they lose they are relegated to the "fourth world". The march of progress would be retarded and life itself could become unbearable if the world was deprived of oil. That is why oil has become the concern of governments, a vital ingredient of their policies and a crucial factor in their political and diplomatic strategies...

...Inspired by sensational disclosures and revelations of the alleged machinations in the corridors and inner chambers of oil empires, oil has been given the image of a big business ruled by naked politics and dominated by ruthless men who are sensitive to nothing except their profit. (Feyide, 1986: 7)

If oil played such a pivotal role (which, of course, it does) in the politics of, and among, nations, it would be least imagined how much such politics will be reflected in the life of Nigeria, whose dependence on the mineral resource for survival has progressed from an "initial regulatory role to direct involvement in the upstream and downstream sector", through acquisition of equity interest and signing of joint venture agreements with oil multinationals, plus enlisting as OPEC's 11th member state (Garuba, 2002). This, coupled with the international oil crisis provoked by the Arab-Israeli War in the early 1970s, which resulted in an unprecedented boom for Nigeria, precipitated a situation in which oil became absorbed into a political ideology and an integral part of the resulting economic arrangements in the country.

THE STATE-OIL LINKAGE: AN INSIGHT

The linkage between the state and oil in Nigeria is rooted on the significant status the latter occupies in the country's political economy. Barely a decade after the country's independence, oil displaced agriculture from its top revenue yielding position to the point of now accounting for over 85% of national revenue and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. And given that economic development is a function of the economic surplus produced in a certain society, the size of the surplus and how the surplus is deployed, oil has since become the root of corruption, privatization of public resources and prebendal behaviour among military and civilian 'leaders' alike in Nigeria (Garuba, 2002; Omoruyi, 2001; Mkandawire and Bourenane, 1999; Okowa, 1994).

Darah and the duo of Turner and Badru capture, aptly, the reckless state oil has driven Nigerians to when they posit in their separate works that the quest to control oil business instigates coups, prolonged military dictatorship, creation of states and local government councils (most of which are unviable, economically), political ambitions, rigging of elections and the big power Nigeria has wielded in international relations, including its diplomatic and military forays into a frontline position in the African liberation struggles (Darah, 2001; Turner and Badru, 1985: 11).

It is perhaps in view of the above that the linkage between the Nigerian state and oil has, quite often, been described in the context in which the former is excluded from

oil exploration and production, and reduced to a mere collector of rents (International IDEA, 2001: 243; Obi, 1999: 12; Mkandawire and Bourenane, 1999). But beyond this broad description are often neglected social processes and cleavages within the state. “The capacity of the states to exercise control over resources and people ... is ... dependent on the concrete interests they reflect and manage (Chazan *et al.*, 1992: 41; also see Migdal, 1994).

These contents define the Nigerian state as an entity concerned with what Wilkens described as the provision of “primary mechanisms for securing specific social, economic and political orders in particular demographic domains”, as well as “a site of conflict between these conflicting social forces, rather than the coherent and homogeneous representatives of nations as collective entities” (see Obi, 1999: 12; International IDEA, 2001: 243). This scenario provides the leeway for any objective analysis of the linkage between state and oil in Nigeria. It demands that the Nigerian state be viewed both as a contested terrain and as a mediator of group conflicts (Obi, 1999: 12; International IDEA, 2001: 243). By this, it does not matter if the lines of division within and among the contending social forces are defined by ethnic, religious or class identity, destiny and interest, or whether they are a coalition or alliances that transcend these classes; as would be seen later in this chapter.

Notwithstanding, it suffices to observe that the conflicts precipitated by the situation have broadly pitched the oil minority groups in the Niger Delta against the hegemonic majority ethnic groups (i.e. Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) who have been accused of masterminding the deliberate and avaricious centralization of the collection and disbursement of oil revenues in the federal government to the disadvantage of the former, through successive ‘obnoxious’ laws (Obi, 1999: 13; International IDEA, 2001: 246); obnoxious depending on the side of the divide one belongs to in the entire discourse.

With the oil boom, Nigeria was reconstructed into a strong ‘rentier’ state with the sole function to deliver ‘stability’ or law and order such as is required for the uninterrupted flow of oil (Turner, 1999: 4). It is the determination by the majority ethnic groups-dominated federal government to deliver its side of the ‘pact’ and the corresponding all-out resistance by the marginalized oil minorities that is the real politics of oil in Nigeria. The result is that, rather than play its supposed role as the guarantor of the collective interest of the people, the oil-producing Niger Delta inclusive, the Nigerian state, under the effective domination of some ethno-class elements, has become an instrument for pursuing private interests, especially on oil matters. (International IDEA, 2001: 243). This, it does via the use of the bogey of ‘national security’, to dispense violence against oil minorities, while explaining away its actions along certain selfish interests. This irresponsible mark of intervention of the Nigerian state in the quest for self-determination by people of the Niger Delta has, instead of cowing the latter, re-invigorated their efforts at agitating for restructuring of the country to allow for what has become popularized in political parlance as ‘resource control’.

WHO OWNS OIL?: AN INQUIRY INTO FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION

The debate about local control over local natural resources has thrown up the question of who ought to own oil in a supposed federal political system. The question arises because of the peculiarity of Nigeria's federal system, which was developed under an external colonial order (1954-1960) and continued under a geo-ethno-military internal colonial order (1960 to date) (Omoruyi, 2001: 8). A brief statement on federalism will help our analysis.

As common to all concepts in Social Science, there is no universal definition of the normative political philosophy known as federalism; given its varied, diversified, dynamic and changing character. More intriguing is that different writers on the system of government place different emphases on different aspects of the system. For instance, while some see federalism as a product of political, economic and social forces by making the constitutional federal structure the dependent variable, others stress legalistic and juridical aspects by taking the constitution as the independent variable and social outcomes as the dependent variables. Also, some emphasize the party system under federalism, while others bother themselves with inter-governmental institutions for structuring political and social interaction (Oronsaye and Imhanlahimhin, 1996: 2).

Whatever the differing approaches in the conceptualization and practice of this non-mutually exclusive and inexhaustive political philosophy, the fact remains that federalism is "a descriptive catch-all term for all political organizations that combine what Daniel Elazar called 'shared rule and self-rule'" (O'Leary, 2001: 277). It is a form of political arrangement in a country whereby powers are shared constitutionally between at least two units of government – central and component – to enable them to function separately and independently without undue interference. Certain empirical elements, which are apparent and automatically implied in federalism, are: a codified and written constitution, bicameral legislature and Supreme Court. Other additional characteristics identified by Nwabueze are that the power-sharing arrangement in a federal system should not place the preponderance of power in the hands of either the central or component governments to the extent that one can bend the will of the others under it; it presupposes that each level or unit of government must be allowed powers and resources sufficient to support the structure of a functioning government that can stand its own. It also means that from the autonomy of each government and the plenary character of powers within its area of constitutional jurisdiction, flows the doctrine that the powers are not to be interfered with by other governments, acting within their own power (Sagay, 2001). Wheare sums this up in a sentence, "the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of a federal system is that neither the central nor the regional governments are subordinate to each other, but rather, the two are co-ordinate and independent" (Wheare, 1963). Elazar calls this the 'covenantal' character of federations – the authority of each government is derived from the constitution rather than from another government (O'Leary, 2001: 277).

The above theoretical survey on federalism, apart from pointing out a peculiarity in the Nigerian system, deepens and widens the debate about the legitimacy of the constitutionality of the question of who owns oil resources in Nigeria.

The legitimacy of the present 1999 Constitution, like several others before it, is undermined by the process that produced it – absence of wide-ranging consultation with the populace, which was further compounded by its amendments by its military authors under the vague and pretentious reason of “public interest ... of the people of Nigeria” (see the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Promulgation] Decree 1999).

As a sum total of fundamental rules and laws designed to regulate society and government, a constitution means much more than a mere social contract or a ground-norm; it represents the expression of the general will of a society, as reflected in its history, fears, concerns, and visions. By this, it is meant, a constitution must express the mind of the greater majority of those whose affairs it regulates– irrespective of their political and ideological leaning – and take into due cognizance the fears and concerns of the minority and other thorny issues of the “national question” which, though not always exhaustively defined and operationalized in the case of Nigeria, is reflective of national unity, local autonomy and self-determination, revenue allocation and other national resources, rewards, opportunities and power; enforcement of fundamental human rights (be they life, environmental, civic and socio-economic); and resolution of the state, ethnic and religious relationship (Eteng, 1998: 121-122); Nnamani, 2002; Enahoro, 2002).

The absence of any modicum of consensus embodying a measure of agreement on all these issues in Nigeria’s constitution is best captured by Ekeh (2001) as a “breakdown in Nigeria’s national consensus”. It is in this context that the question of who owns oil has remained an albatross.

The politics of who owns oil has its root in the Mineral Ordinance enacted by the colonial government in Nigeria in 1946, Section 1 of which read:

The entire property and control of all minerals and mineral oil, in, under, or upon any land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the Crown. (see Omoruyi, 2001: 12; Odje, 2001)

This ordinance, which provided for compensation for economic crops on any land where oil is found, granted the right of ownership and control of the mineral to “Her Majesty” or “Her Heir” or “Her Successor” which by rule of succession in international law rests in the federal government of Nigeria since independence on October 1, 1960.

The carry-over from this provision of the 1946 Act has been successfully effected in a somewhat internal colonial order by the successors of the Nigerian state at independence, through such variously enacted laws and decrees as the Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969, Off-Shore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 of 1971, Land Use Decree of 1978, Sections 40(3), 42(3) and 44(3) of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions respectively, Title Land (Vesting) Decree No. 52 of 1993 and National Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997.

None of the above laws and decrees is more legally contentious than the alleged illogicality depicted in the Petroleum Decree of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1978. While the provisions of the former merely recast the 1946 Mineral Ordinance by vesting the ownership and control of all minerals, especially hydrocarbon (oil and gas) “in, under or upon the land and territorial waters of Nigeria” in the federal government, the

latter vests the ownership of all lands in the respective states' governments. The rationale for ceding the right of ownership of land to one level of government and that of minerals to another has been justified on the basis that the owner of land ought to be the owner of whatever is "in, under and upon the land". Far more complicated is the resolve by elements of oil communities (e.g. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, MOSOP) to juxtapose mineral rents and royalties as resources belonging exclusively to the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta who are the landlords (*The Guardian*, 17 March, 1993: 9).

Despite this, the Pius Okigbo Commission on Revenue Allocation had earlier drawn attention to the unambiguousness of the constitution on the matter when it observed that:

The owners of the minerals on which royalties are levied are indisputably ... the Government of the Federation. It follows that the payment of a part or the whole of the revenues from this source to the state (or community) where the mineral is produced does not derive from a legal right but from political or other considerations. To transform this political act into a legal claim of right as the producing states seem to want is to do violence to reality (FRN, 1980: 93).

The listing of mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and gas, in the exclusive legislative list in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, apart from leaving out much less than desired, raised a fundamental question about the morality and rationale for retaining an expropriating law of a colonial regime such as the 1946 Act in a supposed independent country constituted by autonomous regions/states. But as events designed in the spirit of fiscal federalism would have it, what oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta lost by this expropriation was regained by the choice of and strict adherence to the derivation principle in the revenue allocation formula enunciated in the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, which takes into account several factors, including proceeds from mineral exploitation (Sagay, 2001).

Even at that, the political Bureau Report of 1987 observed that the issue of derivation has been controversial as well as contentious from time immemorial, as "none of the formula evolved at various times by a commission or by decree under different regimes since 1964 has gained general acceptability among the component units of the country" (FGN, 1987; also see Dafinone, 2001: 30; Ekweme, 2002). The *National Concord* of 11 December 1992 (B2) aptly captures this distortion when it had it that:

...there have been disheartening contradictions and inconsistencies in Nigeria, a nation that recognized 100 percent derivation as the basis for revenue allocation in 1950, but reduced to 50 percent at independence in 1960; to 45 percent in 1970; 20 percent in 1975; 1.5 percent in 1982 and 3 percent in 1992 as crude oil...became the main source of national revenue (National Concord, 11 December 1992: B2).

The fraud and inconsistency the principle of derivation reveals as oil replaced agricultural exports as the principal source of government revenues and foreign exchange earnings in Nigeria is manifested in two ways: first is the reliance of oil-producing states on the federal government to calculate their share of royalties accruing from the min-

eral; an exercise which, because of its peculiar complexities, is difficult to challenge, even when the former are cheated. Ejoor reproduced a letter he once wrote to General Yakubu Gowon (Nigeria's Head of State for 1966-1976) in which he wondered why the federal government could afford to keep oil-producing states in the dark on such an important matter as the issue of the calculation of derivation revenue from oil, which is embodied in the Constitution (Ejoor, 1989: 141). Secondly, the fraud around the principle of derivation is also manifested in the failure of the constitution to define natural resources in specific terms to, apart from oil and gas, include cocoa, hide and skin, rubber, cattle-grazing grounds, ports, dams for electricity, fisheries, timber and other forest and biodiversity produce. This exclusion has not only pointed to the flaws or contradictions that make Nigeria's federalism a peculiar and notoriously unjust system, it has also spawned and deepened the contest and conflicts over the formula for revenue allocation (as camouflaged in a legal caricature known as the federal constitution) and the agitation for 'resource control' along a strictly ethnic and ethno-class direction.

'RESOURCE CONTROL': THE POLITICS, POLARIZATION AND INTERFACE

'Resource control' is about the most central of the emerging concepts and issues in a democratic Nigeria. Though nobody has given the term any official definition as it has come to mean different things to different people and institutions, depending on the side of the polarized divide one belongs, it is nevertheless a recent coinage by the governors of the Niger Delta states (and by extension their colleagues in other parts of Southern Nigeria) to call for state control of revenue-yielding resources in their respective domains. In a communiqué released at the end of its third summit in Benin City, the capital of Edo State, on March 27, 2001, the Forum of the Governors of Southern Nigeria defined 'resource control' as "the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the federating units express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and make agreed contribution towards the maintenance of common services of the sovereign nation-state to which they belong. In the case of Nigeria, the federating units are the 36 states and the sovereign nation is the Federal Republic of Nigeria" (Esajare, 2001: 17). This definition is premised on the assumption that the issue of federating units is a settled one, and that states and local governments as the other units of governance in a federation should be the main catalysts of development, while it will serve the federal government well to remain as an agent of the country's sovereignty, serviced by agreed contributions from the federating units.

Other advocates of the concept of 'resource control' differ a bit from the above definition, in that they recognize individual, family and communal ownership of land and the resources found therefrom (see Dafinone, 2001: 30; Odebala, 2001: 29; ERA, 2002: 5). To them, 'resource control' is a call that areas where natural resources are exploited should enjoy the benefit of such resources with the owners paying royalties to the federal or state government, as the case may be, in the principles expatiated upon by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* of 1776. This latter definition conceives of 'resource control' as a basic capitalist political economy theory grounded on the fact that

land, labour, capital and entrepreneurs are factors of production, owned and controlled by individuals. In this wise, what wage is to labour, interest is to capital, and profit is to entrepreneurship, rents and royalties are to land ownership (Dafinone, 2001: 30; UND, 2001: 41). Not minding the differing positions of its proponents, 'resource control' is a clamor for a renegotiation of Nigeria, through a (sovereign?) national conference or any constitutional amendment that will take into account such requirements of restructuring, fiscal federalism and drastic decentralization in the polity.

Even though the clamor may not be entirely about oil politics, given that it makes the same case for all other revenue-yielding resources into the federation account (see Atumah, 2001: 35, Alamieyeseigha, 2001), the manner in which oil has overdeveloped the revenue allocation capacity of the Nigeria state (Obi, 1998) and the resulting seeming hegemony the majority ethnic groups have, through their control of the federal government, maintained over it, makes the agitation a struggle from the manacles of internal colonialism, spawning serious polarization that can be categorized in three ensembles. They are: the polarization along such social/primordial forces as the so-called majority ethnic groups and oil minorities of the Niger Delta in the larger Nigeria composition, the polarization along the 'majority-of-the-minority' and the 'minority-of-the-minority' ethnic groups within the Niger Delta region, and an ethno-class interface with a national character.

It will be worthwhile to quickly dispense with the polarization along the 'majority-of-the-minority' and 'minority-of-the-minority' ethnic groups within the Niger Delta region. While members of the former agitate for 'resource control' in the name of state governments, where they apart from being in majority, exercise dominance and hegemony, members of the latter reason and speak of the concept either in relation to support local governments or oil-producing communities, since they are disadvantaged by the nature of the ethnic composition of their states; otherwise the latter would settle for the continued centralization of the collection and allocation of oil revenues in the federal government. A case in point is the Itsekiri who are in permanent minority in the ethnic composition and political equation in Delta State. The pathological character of conflicts in the relations between them and the majority Urhobo ethnic group in the state is discernable in their divergent views on several national and state issues, especially the ongoing 'resource control' agitation.

As for the polarization among the "big three" (i.e. Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) and the collective of the oil minorities in the Niger Delta region, the grievances of the latter, in their deep-seated feeling of marginalisation, despite the huge wealth the oil from their areas fetches the country, have been identified under five major themes: (1) The disposition of mineral land which, since colonial time, has been 'unfairly' placed with the crown/federal government. (2) The 'partiality' (in terms of mode and percentage of sharing) in the application of the principle of derivation (e.g. as in the recent Supreme Court verdict, wrongly referred to as the 'resource control' verdict, which determined "the seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources" derived from the state pursuant to Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution to be the low water mark of the land surface thereof – seaward

limits of inland waters within the state) of federally collected revenues. (3) The appropriate institutional and fiscal responses to the ecological problems of oil-producing areas (not minding the acclaimed commitment of OMPADEC and its NDDC successor). (4) The responsibility of oil-prospecting companies to oil-producing communities which, because of the blanket cover the Nigerian state provides the former in its desperation to keep the smooth flow of oil, is never taken seriously. (5) The appropriate arrangements for securing the integrity and self-determination of oil communities within the present federal structure (Suberu, 1996: 27; Garuba, 2002). These grievances have brought oil minorities into direct confrontation with oil companies and the Nigerian state largely controlled by the majority groups – “the big three”.

Even though there is no agreement as to the overall demands for better treatment (in terms of socio-economic and infrastructural provisions, and human rights and environmental protection), which are canvassed through group representations and associational activities, the agitation for ‘resource control’ has remained the most central since Nigeria’s return to civil rule. Among the numerous ways by which the oil-producing communities pursue their interests are “peaceful domestic demonstrations, mobilization of international support and violent disruption of the operations of the oil companies” (Suberu, 1996: 33). While the political nature of the conflicts arising therefrom is sometimes spontaneous, localized and communal (Darah, 2002: 8), several others exhibit a well-orchestrated character and international networking. It is in this latter context that the release of such historical documents as the Ogoni Bill of Rights, Kaiama Declaration of the Ijaw, Oron Bill of Rights, Ikwerre Charter of Demands, Aklaka Declaration of the Egi People, Urhobo Economic Summit Resolutions, depicts *survival* as the organizing principle in the struggle for ‘resource control’ (ERA, 2002: 5). And much more than any other ethnic minority group in the Niger Delta, the sustained struggle by the Ogoni via the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) for justice has become a source of strength for several others left behind by development. The instability thus created by the recurring restiveness in the Niger Delta belt is not only affecting the region, it is also (on a regular basis) diverting the attention of the entire country from its mounting task of pursuing a development agenda.

The other side of the divide in the contestation for domination and opposition against the governance of oil is the position of the major ethnic groups – Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. Even though there may not have been any formal forum where they presented a common position statement, an aggregation of the comments of traditional rulers, politicians, retired military officers, leaders of thought and other highly placed public officers from among these groups, particularly those of the Hausa-Fulani, likens the Niger Delta to the symbolism of a “conquered territory, with oil as the war booty” (Obi, 1999: 12); and by right of conquest it has ceased to belong to its traditional/original owners, but to its British conquerors and the successor-Nigerian state which they largely dominated. This is the only way one can comprehend the imperialistic statement credited to Usman and Alkassum (of Hausa-Fulani stock) that:

Whatever sovereign rights the governments of the pre-colonial politics of the Niger Delta and its hinterland had, over the soil, water and minerals of the area, were destroyed by the British conquest (as cited in Ekeh, 2001: 9).

President Obasanjo (of the Yoruba ethnic majority group) also confirmed this greed and the predatory character the majority ethnic group inherited from the British colonialists at independence in 1960 when, upon his official visit to Bayelsa State in 2001, he told the people that the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70) was fought because of 'resource control'; adding that if his mission as a commander on the federal side in the battlefield had failed, there would have been no Nigeria, not to talk of resource or its control (Chinwuba, 2001: 8). This statement, if anything, reveals that the civil war was a by-product of the scramble for access to oil wealth by the majority ethnic groups, rather than the image of a genuine 'national cause' that was made of it.

It could also be inferred from the statement that the centralization of the collection and distribution of the revenues accruing from oil in the federal government through various laws and decrees is a calculated effort by the majority ethnic group-dominated Nigerian state, and a tiny faction of an often co-opted and rewarded elite of the oil minorities, to dispossess and free the teeming Niger Delta people of their God-given oil resource (Garuba, 2002).

The co-option of a faction of the elite from oil-producing minorities in this predation has not only resulted in inter-elite squabbles, inter-generational tensions and breakdown of local authority in the region, in which the youth represent the radical faction (Obi 1998: 13), it has also, in a paradigmatic shift from the long conceived notion that the politics of oil is polarized along ethnic majority and minority lines, raised the issue of the ethno-class interface in the broader Nigerian social, political and economic relations. This is so because neither ethnicity nor class alone (never mind the Marxist-socialist and ethno-relativist leanings) fully explains or effectively addresses the complexities of the "national question" in which the 'resource control' debate has arisen; rather the problem is one fostered and exacerbated by joint ethno-class concomitants (Eteng, 1998: 162). Thus, instead of seeing the agitation for 'resource control' from a purely socially constructed and ethnically polarized angle, it is, both in concept and in concrete Nigerian social reality, as much ethnic as it is class-based. In fact, its posture of ethnicity is mediated by the factor of class as the dominant contenders confront the challenges of survival. What this implies is that for a proper understanding and effective resolution of the conflicts it throws up, 'resource control' discourse/ agitation must recognize the necessary condition of a horizontal-ethnic structure, as well as the sufficient condition of vertical-class structure. To gloss over this fundamental character of the politics of oil in Nigeria in the belief that scratching the face of the issue with such palliative measures as the government-overbearing NDDC and the marginal raising of the principle of derivation in revenue allocation in favour of the Niger Delta states will provide the needed respite for the crisis set off by the issue, is simply prolonging and exacerbating the matter in a manner that further impinges on the country's vision for development.

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF POLITICAL SOLUTION

This chapter has shown that oil is the incubus that the Nigerian economy and the state – under heavily dominated ethno-class elements – have had to carry in the last couple of decades. Despite the vital role the mineral resource plays in the country's tortuous march to development, there has been a near absence of an acceptable definition and enforcement of institutional arrangements regulating its governance/management. This is owed to the deliberate and avaricious centralization of collection and disbursement of revenues accruing from it by the ethnic majority-dominated Nigerian state. The agitation for 'resource control' by the people of the Niger Delta is therefore the latest manifestation of a mystic wind of resistance to exploitation and demand for restructuring of blowing across the Nigeria. The situation, if anything, vindicates Awolowo's earlier warning about lopsided federal structure that:

In a country where there are divergence of language and nationality – particularly of language – a unitary constitution is always a source of bitterness and hostility on the part of linguistic or national minority groups. If the linguistic or national groups concerned are backward, or too weak vis-à-vis the majority group or groups, their bitterness or hostility may be dormant or suppressed. But as soon as they become enlightened and politically conscious, and/or courageous leadership emerges amongst them, the bitterness and hostility come into the open, and remain sustained with all possible venom and rancour, until home rule is achieved (Awolowo, 1966: 48-49).

Time being a vital element in political tutelage, oil-producing minorities of the Niger Delta have attained an appreciable enlightenment not only about their rights as citizens of a supposed federal state, but also about how much the overbearing central government raked regularly from the oil extracted in their region, and for which they suffer a lot of environmental pollution and degradation, as well as health hazards. This explains their resort to struggle for internal decolonization within the discriminatory Nigerian setting through a constellation of social group representations, associational activities and international networking. In their various endeavors, they find allies, create coalitions and accept accommodations to which forays of other privileged opposing social forces (largely those of ethnic majority groups) have triggered intensified social battles.

The Nigerian state has been at the center of the social currents of the intense discord and deep antagonism in this interaction. And to vindicate that it is not a fixed ideological entity (as often misconstrued by scholars who assigned it an ontological status) but an ongoing dynamic which changes its set of goals as it engages social groups in the society (Migdal 1994: 12-13), the state has introduced all sorts of (palliative) programmness (e.g. OMPADEC and its NDDC successor) in its effort to win the minds of the Niger Deltans; while still dispensing violence and maximum force of repression against even the most pacific of protests that threaten or interrupt the flow of oil income. The most heinous instances of these premeditated assaults in recent memories are the arrest, detention and judicial murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in 1995; the military invasion of Odi, Bayelsa State in 1999 and Unuechem and Choba, Rivers State in 1990 and 2000 respectively. These incidents and several others, rather than cow the people of the

Niger Delta, have further precipitated the peoples' resort to more daring methods – of hostage taking of oil company personnel, seizure of planes and sieges on oil exploration facilities – to ventilate their anger against an exploitative unitarily structured Nigeria, often camouflaged in a legal caricature known as a federal constitution. The vicious cycle of instability the situation represents impedes on Nigeria's vision for development in the same manner it raises intractable questions of the abnormality in the country's federalism.

Even though there is no universal agreement on the definition of federalism, the near absence of its basic features in Nigeria gives the impression that the only reason for which the oil minorities of the Niger Delta are wanted in the union, after they have in a matrix bound the belligerent majority ethnic groups in the country, is to "be raped and their resources carted away in a manner that even the worst external colonialists could not have contemplated" (*News Africa*, June 10, 2002, p. 18). This is the scenario to which the recent verdict of the Supreme Court on the on-shore/off-shore dichotomy suit adds 'insult'. Even though the case, which is wrongly referred to as 'resource control', may have been initiated with supposedly good intentions, its backlash (especially in terms of how a political dispute of its nature was transferred to the court) nevertheless inflicts excruciating pains that tend to question the rights of the minorities in a supposed federation. It is in this context that the struggle for derivation or 'resource control' by oil minorities of the Niger Delta symbolizes a clamor for the restructuring of Nigeria to reflect the principles of true federalism.

In recognition of the fact that a just resolution of the former is fundamental to the peaceful resolution of the latter and the entire crisis of development the instability in the Niger Delta portends for the country, a new direction of thinking, otherwise known as 'political solution', is currently being canvassed. Climaxing on the heels of the failure of the Supreme Court verdict on the onshore/offshore dichotomy suit to deactivate restive youths and other activists on the Niger Delta course, the 'political solution' to the crisis, which the politics of oil depicts in Nigeria, is partly rooted in the minority ruling by Justice Karibi-Whyte (JSC) on an earlier challenge of the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the onshore/offshore suits, given its political nature. He ruled thus:

The consensus is that any attempt by the courts to exercise jurisdiction in political issues would lure it into political thicket from which it will be difficult to extricate itself.

...It is preposterous to assume jurisdiction where there is no cause of action. Similarly indiscreet to do so in a factual situation fraught with dangerous political consequences and fit only for political resolution. This is because the court will by so doing be sowing seeds of inevitable recurring political disputes with their attendant imminent social conflicts.... As angels of justice, the courts should avoid treading dangerous allies (Karibi-Whyte, 2001).

By way of conclusion, the diversity of interests in the politics of oil in Nigeria and the crisis thus provoked are such that they threaten the country's vision for development. While a political solution is being currently canvassed for the peaceful resolution of the crisis, it needs to be said that such a solution must move beyond the current clamor for a return

to true federalism to include the setting of a minimum standard of living below which all sections of Nigeria and citizens thereof should not fall. Such a minimum standard of living should be guaranteed from public resources countrywide, including oil. This will not only go a long way to allay the fears of those who feel threatened by the ongoing agitation for 'resource control', it will also help to secure the confidence of all Nigerians, as well as spur them to work for the genuine realization of its vision for development.

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8

VIGILANTISM V. THE STATE: A CASE STUDY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF PAGAD, 1996-2003

Keith Gottschalk

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARMED ORGANIZATIONS

To contextualize PAGAD it is essential to reflect on the scale of other quasi-military clashes between armed groups, and examine other contemporary vigilante organizations, in South Africa. These phenomena peaked during the 1990s, as the authority of white supremacy collapsed, while state transformation and the construction of new democratic authorities and institutions, took a good decade to be consolidated.

The first category of such armed groupings is feuding between clans “faction fighting” in settler jargon). This results in escalating death tolls once the rural combatants illegally buy firearms. For decades, feuding in Msinga¹ has resulted in thousands of displaced persons. More recently, feuding between the Zondo and Dladla clans near Nongoma reached the scale of over 200 armed men operating from nearby forests. (*Business Day*, 23 June 2000). In the Majola area eight persons had already been killed before police prevented a 300 strong armed group from attacking a 100-man group (*Cape Argus*, 7 January 1999).

The second category is “taxi wars”, the popular name for what is more accurately analyzed as route turf wars by syndicates of minibus owners. This is a variant of protection racketeering, under which drivers or owners have to pay yearly “membership fees” of thousands of rands, or even higher or get shot.² Between 1994-1999 in Gauteng province, which includes Johannesburg, the estimated number of persons killed was between an astonishing 1500 and 3000 dead (*Business Day*, 25 January 2000). For example, the South African Local and Long-Distance Taxi Association (SALDTA) and the Letlhabile Taxi Organisation admitted that they were amongst the rivals who hired hit squads to kill commuters and taxi bosses of their competitors, on such a scale that they need to negotiate amnesty for their hit squads before they can renounce such illegal activities (*Sunday Times*, 1 December 1996).

Petrol-bombing minibuses (*Cape Argus*, 15 July 1999) and shooting drivers (*Cape Argus*, 30 November 1999) is a routine part of such ‘wars’. In Cape Town, killings started

in 1993 when seven drivers were shot (*Cape Times*, 19 June 2000). There, the rival taxi associations CATA and CODETA, both appointed a “top ten” to negotiate with the bus company, and a “bottom ten” as a hit squad. The police were able to secure triple life sentences plus 70 years jail for each of three CODETA taxi bosses (*Cape Argus*, 26 April, 3 May 2002). Various hitmen were paid between R350 and R10 000 for their assassinations. (*Cape Argus*, 17 August 2000; *Cape Times*, 22 July 2002). Some taxi owners were also involved in other crimes such as vehicle theft. In Nelson Mandela Metropole³ the AssetForfeiture Unit seized one million rand from one such taxi owner (*Cape Argus*, 12 March 2003).

The Weberian concept of the state as possessing a monopoly on lawful violence is most starkly challenged by the third category, armed clashes which on the face of it are between rival political parties, though in practice their dynamics are usually of smaller groups, who seek wider affiliation to gain leverage and legitimacy for power or to acquire firearms. Killings of African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party town councillors and members in various localities in KwaZulu-Natal Province have resulted in the arrest of suspects ranging from princes of the Zulu royal house to the grandchildren of another prince who is Provincial MEC for Welfare (*Business Day*, 21 June 2000; *Cape Argus*, 8 October 2002).

In Philippi⁴ there has been a spiral of assassinations and attempted killings. These include UDM and ANC town councilors and other local leaders (*Sunday Independent and Sunday Times Metro*, 14 March 1999; *Cape Argus*, 16 November 2000; 27 March 2001 18 September 2001; *Cape Times*, 24 August 2001) This, amongst other local power struggles, involved rival factions attempting to occupy 140 council houses (*Cape Argus*, 17 November 2000). At Hammanskraal⁵ a local SANCO chair was prosecuted for attacking a shack and office of their nominal ally, the ANC (*Cape Argus*, 18 July 2001).

This confirms that formal party affiliations often obscure rather than explain local power struggles. Death threats are made between factions within the same ANC shanty town branch (*Sunday Times*, 21 April 2002). Also, power over land is power to extort payments from homeless persons seeking to erect a *pondokkie*.

Such shacklord protection racketeering probably merits being analyzed as a fourth category of armed groups. In New Rest at Gugulethu⁶ new arrivals have to pay R1000 to “the local committee”, in addition to paying R1500 to buy a shack. (*Cape Argus*, 15 September 1999). In Brown’s Farm a “local area committee” charges between R100 and R200 for each of about 600 sites that the committee does not own (*Cape Argus*, 25 March 1999). Once local authorities build brick houses and grant freehold title deeds, the shacklords lose their power to exact and extract such payments (Ngwema, 1996: 18-19)⁷.

In the Vrygrond shantytown, a grouping of around 120 persons calling themselves the Vrygrond Community Organisation repeatedly tried to disrupt the building and allocation of houses by the Vrygrond Community Development Trust representing 5 000 others. (*Cape Argus*, 9 August 1999) The latter had its leader assassinated. (*Cape Times*, 20 December 1999. The same cause led to killings in Crossroads (*Cape Argus*, 22 April 2002).

The importance of allocating housing as a cause of factionalism and clashes was underscored when the Cape Town council replaced houses destroyed by a tornado in Mannenberg township. One grouping of the homeless persons destroyed houses built for the homeless, and disrupted meetings of a rival group (*Cape Argus*, 20 February 2001).

A fifth category, explicitly plans to overthrow the government through counter-revolution, exists on the far right. During 2002 a series of sabotage and bombings ended when police arrested most members of the *Boeremag*, (*Sunday Independent*, 1 December 2002), 22 of who are currently standing trial for treason (*Cape Argus*, 20 May 2003)

The sixth category of armed groupings is probably those most relevant to the context in which PAGAD was born: other anti-crime vigilantes.

Middle and business class suburbanites respond to the crime wave by paying for burglar alarms and fees to security companies for armed response, and bicycle patrols. The working class townships and shanty towns have time rather than money, especially the unemployed, and form neighbourhood watches, which can swiftly degenerate into vigilantes.

By far the largest vigilante organization in South Africa is Mapogo a Mathamaga.⁸ Monhle John Magolego founded it on 27 August 1996 in Jane Furse⁹ with about 100 business owners who had suffered a string of robberies. By 1999 it claimed 35, 000 members, with 90 branches in Gauteng, including Pretoria, North-West Province, and Mpumalanga. The founder was “snapped up” by the United Democratic Movement, and almost won a seat in the Limpopo Provincial Legislature (*Cape Argus*, 13 July 1999, 11 September 2001; *Sunday Independent*, 11 July 1999).

By 2000 it claimed 50, 000 members. In 2001 it opened new branches in the Eastern and Northern Cape. Members have to be on call for duty, and pay subscriptions, depending on services hired, of between R100 (now raised to a minimum R165) and R10 000 per year. It calls its hundreds of floggings with *sjamboks* “medicine to cure the culprit”. Its vigilantes also beat with *knobkerries*, and have killed one suspect with electric torture. Its vigilantes have reportedly killed at least 20 suspects, and face 120 criminal charges. So far, there has not been one conviction. Mapogo usually has close links with chiefs, and also taxi operators, where it operates.

In Tzaneen, schools, clinics and regional government offices are paying “protection levies” to Mapogo. In February 2000 the ANC ordered its members to resign from either Mapogo or the party. Magolego’s dictatorial behaviour, reportedly using the organization for his own benefit, led to a secession by some 300 members who founded a rival crime-fighting organization called Sekhukhuni se Bonawa ke Sebataladi,¹⁰ which does not beat suspects (*Mail and Guardian*, 5-11 May 2000).

The second largest vigilante grouping is Mfelandawonye.¹¹ It arose in the 1980s as a burial society. Stock theft made persons form armed formations, which began to act as quasi-judicial bodies, arresting suspected thieves and their supporters, and punishing them. Between 1993 and 1996 it had killed over 350 persons in 750 attacks around Tsolo, Qumbu, Tyira and Tina Bridge.¹² It spread to include offices in Gauteng cities, where migrant workers from the Transkei are employed, as well as in the Free State and Mpumalanga Provinces. Some allege that both individual Communist Party members,

and individual policemen, are involved. Persons who had been accused of stock theft, or attacked by Mfelandawonye, have in turn set up the smaller Inkumpa grouping. (*Sunday Independent*, 1 December 1996).

This chapter's brevity precludes more than a mention of a sample of innumerable smaller vigilante groupings. When Cape Town gangs extended to Bredasdorp, a mob killed three gangsters and burnt down their house and car (*Cape Argus*, 22 November 1999). In Khayelitsha¹³ a mob of 3,000 persons captured three alleged criminals, interrogated them, beat them, kept them overnight, then burnt them alive when they heard that the previous three suspects they had beaten and handed to the police had been released. (*Cape Argus*, 16 January 2002). After democracy was achieved, the street committees affiliated to SANCO stopped themselves trying criminal cases, sending the suspects to the police, and confining their own trials to civil cases. One CONTRALESA leader in that township ran a kangaroo court at his home, keeping persons imprisoned until their families paid a fine. The PEACA sometimes acted as vigilantes, in one case even temporarily kidnapping a policeman on the accusation that he had stolen the car he in fact owned (Tshehla, 2002: 55, 59, 62-62)

PAGAD's largest analogue outside Cape Town is People Against Drugs and Violence, PADAV, in Nelson Mandela Metropole. In September 1996 the Provincial Police Commissioner generously offered PADAV that they could both work from a joint operations room, share information and maintain transparency, provided PADAV did not take the law into their own hands. PADAV walked out of the meeting. (*Eastern Province Herald*, 16 September 1996) PADAV anti-crime units, armed and masked, with no legal standing, searched a flat. (*Eastern Province Herald*, 10 September 1996). On one Christmas holiday PADAV smashed up a disco and its liquor, assaulted night club security guards, broke into houses and stole cash and sports shoes (*Eastern Province Herald*, 29 December 1997). Like PAGAD, PADAV, operating in the Gelvandale and Bethelsdorp suburbs (*Eastern Province Herald*, 13 November 1996), could virtually only attract members from Coloured persons.

RELIGION AS A COMMUNITY POLITICAL RESOURCE

The liberation upheavals of the 1990s made some amongst both the Christian and African traditionalist faith communities draw on religious beliefs to a far more extreme extent than previously. This was especially so amongst individuals who lacked confidence in any political party, and who had relatively low levels of formal education. The early 1990s saw "Satanism" scares breaking out amongst poorer Afrikaner whites. The police set up a Satanism and occult crimes unit, though no such crime is known in South African law. Unable to process more than convictions for cruelty to animals, and malicious damage to property such as tombstones, his unit was disbanded soon after South Africa became a democracy in 1994.

During the 1990s, more persons were accused of witchcraft and murdered than in all previous recorded South African history. By 1994, witch-hunting mobs in Northern Province (now Limpopo Province) had burnt 250 middle-aged and elderly persons as

“witches”, (Sidiropoulos, 1996: 60. Some of these “witch” accusations involved mobs of unemployed youth extorting pension money under threat of death from elderly persons living on their own, without family to protect them.

Both the Satanist and witchcraft scares were peaking around 1996 when PAGAD was launched with religious symbolism. This simultaneous adaptation of community-specific religious resources, by strata in society feeling marginalized, is suggestive to a sociological imagination. That point made, scholars need to interrogate whether it is heuristic to describe PAGAD as an “Islamic fundamentalist” organization.

PAGAD’s words differ from their deeds as to whether or not PAGAD is an Islamic organization. To the media, it denies it is an Islamic organization, claiming that it is simply an anti-drug and anti-gang grouping whose members happen to be mostly Muslim, but which welcomes members whatever their religion (*Cape Times*, 12 August 1996). But its meetings are held in mosques, never churches; their supporters chant Muslim Arabic taunts such as *munafiq* (hypocrite or traitor), rather than in Afrikaans; they gave their spiritual leader, Hafiz Abdulrazaq Ebrahim, not the title of dominee, but *amir*. (*Sunday Independent*, 17 September 2000). PAGAD’s posters advertise such mass events as *Iftaar* and *Eid Salaah*. (Posters, 2000). These are specifically Muslim prayers, not terminology prayers common to other religions. During the last trials, which suppressed PAGAD’s armed wing, the G Force, the accused wore white robes, and some came to court holding Qu’rans. (*Cape Argus*, 6 October 2000).

Further, South African Muslim clergy use the titles *sheikh*, *imam* or *moulana*. The title *amir* is not in usage locally. Amir literally means commander spiritual and temporal. This certainly reflects Qibla’s theocratic ideology. The same could be inferred from a poster on a PAGAD protest march: “Democracy’ is the Devil’s Law”. (*Sunday Times, Cape Metro*, 19 January 1997). This reflects Qibla’s perspective that even in a country 98% non-Muslim, it is not the democratic majority, but *Qadr*, divine power, that is the source of legitimacy and victory. (Esack, 1988: 486.

But on the other hand, neither media reports nor oral communications indicate that PAGAD activists were anything except Western mainstream Muslims in their daily dress codes, frequency of mosque attendances, or permitting TV and videos in their homes. Their daily practices were not remotely the most “fundamentalist”, i.e. the most stringent, of all Muslim schools of belief in South Africa. In fact, the most fundamentalist Muslim, Christian and Jewish sects alike avoid South African politics, which they consider a profane matter, which wastes time best spent on study of scripture and practice of religious ritual.

To conclude this theme, there was previously existing prejudice against Muslims amongst many of the Christian majority of Coloureds (Adams, 1978: 263-5). PAGAD’s strident militancy and militarism perpetuated Western stereotypes about Islam amongst the Christian majority, and so hurt Islam and the Muslim minority. Malicious Christian pranksters spread rumors “like wildfire” that some Muslim men, in return for a favour, warned them not to use the Canal Walk, or other shopping centres, because of a possible future terrorist attack (*Cape Times*, 21 December 2001).

CRIME WAVE CRISIS AND NARCO-BARONS

To argue that religious extremists exploited the drug dealer crisis begs the question, Why would religious extremists focus on drug dealers when religious extremists typically attack other persons over dress codes, selling taboo foods, or other issues of personal behaviour?

First, PAGAD supporters are not alone in demanding more effective state action to suppress the crime wave. The official opposition made this an election issue: that since South Africa became a democracy in 1994 there have been two million house-breakings, 500, 000 rapes and 250, 000 murders (*Cape Argus*, 20 May 2003). COSATU has demonstrated to demand police protection of workers from mugging and murder on commuter trains.

At the time PAGAD killed him, Rashaad Staggie was making R100 000 per day selling drugs (*Cape Argus*, 19 June 2001). By contrast to these vigilantes, it took the prosecution a further *six years* to succeed in convicting the co-leader of this gang, Rashid Staggie, and even then they could not get a conviction for drug selling. In the end, he was convicted of ordering the rape of a teenage police informer, and illegal possession of a gun (*Cape Argus*, 28 January 2003).

After Rashaad Staggie's killing, his Hard Livings gang painted his face on walls. Balaclava-clad gangsters fired shots as salutes, while supporters wore tracksuits with the logo *weermag* (*Sunday Independent*, 17 September 2000). The Hard Livings were creative in bribing policemen and low-ranking court officials, and buying community support by paying an unemployed person's rent, or making a contribution to a funeral. (*Cape Times*, 6 August 1996). The Staggie brothers sponsored the Crystal Palace and Benfica soccer teams, buying them togs, plus sponsoring a netball team. (*Cape Times*, 11 June 1996). Rashaad Staggie allegedly gave money on the Grand Parade to clothing workers who were on strike, (*The Argus*, 6 August 1996). Rashid Staggie and his convoy in fast cars, designer sunglasses and mobile phones, used his front organization Community Outreach (CORE) to stage a series of popular rallies in working class, Coloured Hanover Park, Lavender Hill, Mitchell's Plain, and Parkwood (*Cape Times*, 3 October 1996).

Such was the power of those gangs that during the 1980s MK had to negotiate a degree of cooperation with them to use safe houses and safe routes in the Coloured ghettos (*Mail and Guardian*, 9-15 May 1997) During the 1990s the Olympic bid company agreed to negotiate with the gangs' front organization CORE (*Cape Argus*, 9 June 1997) until PAGAD threatened them for treating the gangs as legitimate.

Similarly, the police could not get a drug selling conviction against druglord Colin Stanfield, but only a conviction of tax fraud. Stanfield's gang gave a chilling demonstration of its social base of support when it mobilized a demonstration of 2, 000 working class supporters, with banners and printed T-shirts, for a protest march to the Western Cape Director of Prosecution's offices, and later, several hundred supporters for a protest march to Parliament, complete with a "People for Justice Foundation" led by a born-again Christian pastor (*Cape Times*, 24 May 2001; *Cape Argus*, 19 February 2002). These included not only heavily-tattooed gangsters and their dependents, but also those who had been given loans by the ganglords, or helped with their rent and other pressing debts, on the implicit understanding that this was in exchange for favours that could be called up in turn.

Second are the issues of police incompetence and corruption. Where a state has to employ persons by the hundreds of thousands, as police, nurses and teachers, their wages will inevitably be low. Also, there will be scant moral sanctions on accepting bribes not to enforce unpopular laws on legitimate behaviour. The colonial state imposed prohibition of “white” wines and spirits until 1962, and enforced the *dompas* and other pass laws until 1986. Pressure from the Woodrow Wilson administration and League of Nations led to the criminalization of the traditional *dagga* (cannabis) from the 1920s. The result was such levels of bribery that the *ancien* apartheid regime had police squads flown in from other cities to raid shebeens (illegal pubs and wine shops). Under the apartheid regime, *dagga* gangs bribing policemen was legendary. Gangs, including prison gangs, grew for nine decades. One former MP, when an apartheid political prisoner, noted how gang “godfathers” controlled some prison warders. (Suttner, 2001: 132, 133) When cocaine burst upon Cape Town’s working class townships from 1995, the gang bosses had hugely increased their takings from which to bribe police and court officials.

The Grassy Park police station had allegations of corruption reported (*Cape Times*, 25 October 2002). It is interesting that this correlates with where the most active cell in PAGAD’s G-force was in Grassy Park.

Since 1994, the police and magistrates’ work was also in turmoil due to transformation in two senses. The upheaval of demographic transformation (“corrective action”) left many white policemen demoralized. They were also learning that the democratic constitution and its Bill of Rights mean that the higher courts now overturned convictions on a large scale when assault and torture were used to obtain confessions, or even to improperly obtain material evidence. Case upon case collapsed, until many of the police learnt detective methods compatible with democracy. South Africa was caught by surprise by the crime wave, or shifts in crime, as were the new governments following regime change and democratisation in South America, Eastern Europe, Nigeria and Mozambique (Shaw, 2002: 1).

The overthrow of the pass laws enabled many caught in rural poverty traps to escape and join the mushrooming shanty towns. While the democratic government made significant progress on demands to extend safe water, sanitation and electricity to shantytowns, it was far slower on right demands to build police stations and extend police patrols. When it did, quite a few of those policemen were former Bantustan “greenflies” and *kitskonstabels*, authoritarian to the public, ill-trained with only a primary schooling, and incompetent police. Robbery, murder and rape led to shackland neighborhoods across the country setting up vigilante patrols and community courts, some of which degenerated into kangaroo courts.

THE START OF PAGAD: ANTI-DRUGS AND ANTI-GANGSTERISM 1996–97

South Africa is not the only African state where people threatened by an unprecedented crime wave have modified religious institutions in attempts to combat this moral and social crisis. In Northern Nigeria, at the end of the 1990s, the traditional shari’ah courts had their jurisdiction extended to criminal law, and their policing beefed up. This came about in the context of the secular police and courts being perceived as ineffective in dealing with theft, while many crime victims had long resorted to vigilante justice (Christelow, 2002: 198).

In the period under discussion, Cape Town had an estimated 137 gangs with estimates of gangsters from 30, 000 upwards (Sidiropolous, 1997: 73). One little-noticed statistic provided the last straw that triggered of the founding of a new social movement. In 1990, the police seized 125 grams of cocaine entering South Africa. In 1995, the police seized 65 kg of cocaine (Sidiropolous, 1996: 71). As drug smugglers increased their efforts exponentially, the price of cocaine plummeted. Until then, only the millionaire class and their youth could afford it. By 1996, its price had fallen until working class addicts of earlier drugs could buy cocaine in its variants. The scale of drug smuggling escalated. During the last six months of 1998, police seized 434 kg of cocaine in Gauteng Province alone (MRC, cited in *Cape Argus*, 8 June 1999. The amount not seized by police is estimated to be ten times higher (*Cape Times*, 2 April 2001).

In what its website calls “the untold side of the PAGAD programme” due to “sensation seeking media”, PAGAD reports that its Drug Counselling Centre opened for out-patients in Rylands¹⁴ in February 1999. It emphasizes after-care, only charges R20 per counseling session, and waives that if the patient cannot afford it. It refers those needing in-patient treatment to existing rehabilitation clinics, (www.pagad.co.za). Christian drug addicts have also attended it as they cannot afford the fees of other drug rehabilitation centres. (oral communication). PAGAD also staged anti-drug plays and cameos in various Cape Flats schools (*Cape Argus*, 15 May 1997). It is interesting to note that some Islamic groups in the Middle East, such as Ha'mas, were social welfare organizations for many years before becoming a political party, in their case only in 1987.

PAGAD was formed on the Cape Flats, the working class townships, in the same year that Mapogo was formed at the other end of the country. Its first major public event was its May 1996 march to Parliament to demand effective action against drug dealing within 60 days. The thousands of demonstrators included Muslim establishment figures. One Catholic priest, Father Christopher Clohessy, was a PAGAD leader at its start, until swiftly transferred to the Vatican (*Cape Argus*, 6 February 2003). The government initially tried to work with PAGAD, arranging a meeting including the Ministers of Justice, Safety and Security, and Correctional Services, the Western Cape Attorney-General and Premier, and senior police and magistrates. Sticking points were PAGAD insisting they would continue to wear masks and carry guns at their public rallies (*Eastern Province Herald*, 4 December 1996).

One of the organizers warned that if the state failed to deal with crime within 60 days they would start taking matters into their own hands (*Cape Times*, 8 August 1996). By late July 1996 PAGAD rhetoric had taken on a more militant and militaristic tone. In August PAGAD launched another major march to a crack house in Salt River (selling R100, 000 worth of drugs per day) where it shot dead the Hard Livings gang co-leader Rashad Staggie. PAGAD leaders considered this as proving to the public that gangsters are not invincible (*Cape Argus*, 22 September 1998). A week later PAGAD was formally launched at an Athlone stadium with well over 10, 000 supporters present, including Sheikh Nazeem Mohamed, head of the Muslim Judicial Council (*Cape Times*, 12 August 1996). Towards the end of that year, a survey found that PAGAD enjoyed the support of 64% of Muslims and 18% of Christians in Cape Town. This support eroded to only 200-400 within two years (*Cape Argus*, 15 June; *Cape Times*, 13 July 1998). PAGAD also

launched a few branches outside Cape Town, such as one in Durban which made verbal threats against gays and lesbians. (*Weekend Saturday, Cape Argus*, 7-8 December 1996) There was also a Gauteng-based People against Crime and Drugs, PACAD (*Eastern Province Herald*, 9 December 1996.)

OFFENSIVE: COMMUNITY CONTESTATION AND TERROR 1997-99

PAGAD's website, last updated in 2000, states "we condemn the recent terror attacks in Cape Town". It bluntly denies PAGAD involvement in terrorist bombings and shootings, and claims such terrorism was in some cases frame-ups by the police, or else done by agents provocateur (www.pagad.co.za).

However, not so long after its founding, more and more PAGAD speeches and slogans included the words "death", "kill" and "bullet". They adapted one wartime slogan of the youth wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), "one settler one bullet" as "one [drug] merchant one bullet" and "one gangster one bullet". This militarization of PAGAD's public face was simultaneous with its founding an armed G-Force of at least six cells who made their own bombs (*Business Day*, 5 January 1998). PAGAD activists were seen in public armed with AK-47s, R4s, Uzis and a wide variety of shotguns and pistols. (*Eastern Province Herald*, 13 August 1996).

PAGAD soon established its strategy. Masked marchers would demonstrate outside the shop or house of a drug dealer. They would deliver an ultimatum to "stop all illegal activities within 24 hours or face the mandate of the people" (*Cape Argus*, 31 October 1996). Within a week, their death squads would shoot that drug dealer. At its meetings held at a mosque it would read out a list of names. If these were alleged drug dealers, they were given an ultimatum to confess at the Gatesville mosque. If they did not, within weeks they would be bombed or shot. Another PAGAD list of names were denounced as "political criminals" who "should be eliminated". This included policemen (*New York Times*, 29 March 1999). The drug dealers confessed in front of a crowd, but were first led to a small room at the mosque to a PAGAD panel headed by Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim. (*Cape Argus*, 16 February 2000). They also had to pay all their profits into PAGAD bank accounts, allegedly to be used for rehabilitating drug addicts (*Cape Times*, 16 February 2000). As early as 1996, the G Force hitmen started stealing from the drug dealers they attacked, jewels, money, even drugs which they distributed amongst themselves. (*Cape Times*, 13 May 1999). By 1998, the PAGAD extortion racket was squeezing Muslim Indian shopkeepers in Athlone and Surrey Estate. Those who did not pay up were bombed (*Cape Times*, 11 June; *Cape Argus*, 12 June 1998). Two alleged drug dealers, father and son businessmen, took a lawyer with them when PAGAD "summoned" them to the mosque. PAGAD shot the father within six months, the son a month later. Their lawyer received death threats and had his Porsche stolen and dumped in Yzerfontein fishing harbour (*Sunday Times*, Cape Metro, 13 June 1999).

Extremists from the Qibla movement, founded by Achmat Cassiem around 1979, reportedly gained control of PAGAD (*Cape Times*, 30 September 1996). The core of second-generation leaders that came to power in PAGAD, replacing all but one of the founders, are mostly reported Qibla enthusiasts. This merits a brief digression to a few reflections on Qibla.

Jhazbhay has noted that some Muslims perceived South Africa's transformation as threatening¹⁵, and that "a universal alienation, when mediated through particular interests, produces exclusivist discourses". One of Qibla's slogans is "One solution, Islamic revolution". When the Call of Islam was formed in 1983 it renegotiated new inclusivist discourses; Qibla sent dozens of its poster-waving activists to try to disrupt the first Call of Islam rally. They chanted, not in Arabic but in Farsi, "Death to hypocrite-traitors!" and "Death to the Soviets!" (Esack, 1988: 487). In 1983 the latter slogan alluded to the Call of Islam affiliating to the UDF. Friends and foes alike saw the UDF as the home of supporters of the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, which was given foreign aid by the Soviet government.

Cassiem's greatest coup to date was to be elected as head of the Islamic Unity Convention, founded in 1994. This has its own community radio station, Radio 786, and acts as a militant rival to the community establishment Muslim Judicial Council, which operates its community Radio, Voice of the Cape.¹⁶ Radio 786 gave empathetic coverage to PAGAD.

What is fact is that four PAGAD founders, Ali Parker, Farouk Jaffer, Nadthmie Edries and Ebrahim Satardien complained of a "Qibla faction" with a "hidden agenda". They were expelled in September 1996 (*Cape Argus*, 25 September; *Cape Times*, 26 September 1996). Jaffer was subsequently assassinated (*Cape Argus*, 19 July 1999) and Satardien assassinated three months later. Both killings were marked by many shots to the head (*Sunday Times*; *Cape Metro*, 3 October 1999). Satardien's brother was imam of the Lotus River mosque. When he criticized Qibla at meetings, his mosque was petrol-bombed (*Cape Argus*, 28 July 1997). There was an attempted assassination of Ali Parker. (*Cape Argus*, 21 November 2000) PAGAD's G-Force also threatened to kill any members who dropped out (*Cape Argus*, 4 September 2000). Aslam Toefie, national coordinator, and other founding leaders also resigned, warning that what was going on in PAGAD gave an alibi to gangsters and drug dealers to commit crimes, claiming it was in PAGAD's name (*Mail and Guardian*, 5-11 December 1997).

The first sensational conflict between PAGAD and the Muslim religious establishment came on Friday 10 January 1997, when a 50-strong PAGAD group, watched approvingly by its balaclava-masked "Amir", invaded the Muir Street mosque¹⁷ during the mid-Friday prayers before Ramadan, to abuse and manhandle the congregation's Sheikh Mogammad Moerat and his family. The Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) issued a statement expressing:

our strongest condemnation of the abhorrent behaviour ... This constitutes a violation of the sacred time of Ju'mah, the sacred space of the masjid, and the sacred person of an individual, and calls for the highest censure

The MJC condemned Achmat Cassiem, leader of Qibla and the IUC, and Radio 786 for creating an atmosphere of belligerence and intolerance. They violated shari'ah by demonizing Muslims who held alternative viewpoints as *munafiqs* (hypocrites). Sixty-two imams, maulanas and sheikhs signed the statement, supported by the Muslim Youth Movement (*Cape Times*, 14 January 1997).

PAGAD activists manhandled, spat at, and called “hypocrite” and “pig” Sheikh Achmat Sedick, Secretary-General of the MJC (*Weekend Argus*, 17-18 October 1998) PAGAD leaders now spoke of “economic gangsters” and “religious gangsters” (*Cape Times*, 16 September 1998). After criticizing PAGAD’s methods, Sheikh Nazeem Mohamed, a much-loved leader of the MJC for forty years, and then its President, had a hand grenade thrown at his house in mid-1998. (*Cape Times*, 22 November 2000) Also publicly critical of PAGAD’s methods was Ebrahim Moosa, a liberal Muslim academic theologian, director of the Centre for Contemporary Islam at the University of Cape Town, and amongst the first Muslims to be appointed in that department. The day after PAGAD’s legal spokesman denounced him as an enemy of Islam (*munafiq*), reported on Radio 786, he had a bomb thrown at his house. The bomb attack was preceded by a PAGAD trade-mark, the balaclava squad, who in this case made a roadblock keeping people away while the bomb was planted. PAGAD leader Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim denounced Moosa as a “religious gangster” (*Cape Times*, 14 and 15 July 1998; *Cape Argus*, 15 July, 1 and 9 October 1998). He relocated himself and his family to the USA. Many other imams, from Mountain View to Surrey Estate to Grassy Park congregations, had to endure aggressive confrontations from PAGAD leaders and supporters. This echoes how Qibla had earlier during the 1980s alienated one congregation after another (oral communication). Sheikh Sattardien of the Lotus River mosque criticized Qibla’s agenda again in 1996. (*Cape Times*, 30 September 1996).

PAGAD regularly made use of the Masjid-ul-Quds mosque in Gatesville on the Cape Flats. When the mosque committee stopped PAGAD in 1997 from using its mosque for meetings, its Sheikh Sa’dullah Khan suddenly received death threats, and took a sabbatical in the USA.¹⁸ When in August 1999 he returned to deliver a Jumu’ah sermon, PAGAD chief coordinator Abdoes-Salaam Ebrahim and others shouted him down, and prevented him from delivering the sermon. The current imam, Maulana Ahmed Mukkadam, the mosque executive, and the Muslim Judicial Council condemned this as a violation of the sanctity of the mosque (*Cape Argus*, 11 July and 10 August 1999). During 1997 one mosque after another, such as Grassy Park (5th Ave) Lansdowne (York Road), refused to let their mosques be used for PAGAD meetings (*Cape Times*, 4 September 1997). PAGAD members also disrupted a meeting at Kensington mosque (*Cape Argus*, 30 September 1997). PAGAD had created perceptible fear amongst both the traditionalist, mainstream Muslims, as well as the liberal minority of intellectuals (*Sunday Times*; *Metro*, 13 September 1998; *Cape Times* 18 January 1999). Many from then on confined their criticisms of PAGAD to private occasions.

Most Cape Muslims rejoiced as democracy saw their co-religionists rise for the first time to high positions in the great institutions of civil society. Moegsien Williams became the first Muslim to be editor of a daily newspaper, the *Cape Times*. To the contrary, PAGAD swiftly denounced its reporting, and launched an unsuccessful boycott of that newspaper (*Cape Times*, 11 and 15 November 1996; *Cape Argus*, 13 November; *Weekend Argus*, 9/10 November 1996). Many journalists were harassed (*Cape Argus*, 11 November 1996). PAGAD threatened specifically Muslim photo-journalists working for the *Cape Times* and Reuters, such as Benny Gool and Shafiek Tassiem (*Cape Times*, 18 December 1999). Dullah Omar became the first Muslim to be Minister of Justice. PAGAD demon-

strators invaded his house. He deemed that avoiding the possibility of a future shootout made it advisable for him to move to the Presidential estate. (*Eastern Province Herald*, 15 August 1996). Ebrahim Rasool became the first Muslim to be elected a Provincial Chair of ANC. PAGAD supporters chanted threats at him, graffiti demanding he be killed appeared. Since 1998 he has had to be protected by armed guards. These and other incidents create the impression that PAGAD saw every prominent Muslim leader that did not toe its line as a rival, who must be broken in a power struggle for hegemony over the Muslim community.

PAGAD's next stage appeared to be attempting to project its power to cow non-Muslims. The Jewish Book Centre, housed in a private home, was burnt down. The Wynberg synagogue (Orthodox denomination) had a bomb planted¹⁹ when no one was in the building (*Cape Argus*; 7/8 October; 10 October 2000). These were the first and only such incidents in 180 years of mosque and synagogue congregations co-existing in Cape Town. Another bomb exploded as the then Western Cape Premier Gerald Morkel and other DA leaders arrived at the Samaj Centre²⁰, which is owned by the Hindu community. Seven persons were wounded (*Cape Times*, 13 September 2000).

Throughout 1997, the media gave decreasing publicity to pipe-bomb attacks and shootings amongst the Coloured and working class Cape Flats. Events indicate that the bombers realized that headlines could from then on only be obtained by killing wealthy whites.

Around this time PAGAD G-Force members learnt how to make bombs detonated by remote-control via mobile phones (*Cape Times*, 11 June 1998). In August 1998 a bomb killed two diners and wounded 27 at the Planet Hollywood Restaurant in the popular Waterfront shoppertainment precinct. Business slumped, and the restaurant later went bankrupt. This came weeks after two PAGAD G-Force men blew themselves up with a pipe bomb outside the Wett Spot nightclub in Wetton (*Cape Argus*, 30 July 1988). In late 1999 bombs went off in a Camps Bay pizzeria (wounding 48), and Mano's restaurant. Other targets included the Blah Bar and The Bronx nightclub, popular with gays and lesbians in Green Point's "Pink Triangle" (*Cape Times*, 21 August 2000). Year 2000 targets included NY Bagels take-aways in Sea Point. Another PAGAD cell was arrested after planting a bomb outside a pub (*Cape Argus*, 29 July 2000). A bomb exploded outside Obz Café (*Weekend Argus*, 9/10 September 2000) and the Constantia Village shopping centre (*Cape Times*, 12 September 2000) while a bomb was defused before it could explode at the Kenilworth Shopping Centre. (*Cape Argus*, 13 October 2000). A PAGAD cell was arrested after planting a bomb outside the Keg and Swan pub near the Tyger Valley²¹ Shopping Center (*Cape Argus*, 3 and 6 November 2000).

A huge number of Muslim organizations condemned the Planet Hollywood terrorist bombing, including the militant Islamic Unity Convention (*Cape Times*, 27 August 1998); and Qibla founder Achmat Cassiem (*Cape Times*, 28 August 1998). Imam Abdurahmaan Gafiieldien of the Manenberg mosque joined other clergy who staged a peace march to Planet Hollywood restaurant a day after it was bombed. Less than two months later, he was shot at in his home (*Cape Times*, 8 October 1998).

As early as December 1996 PAGAD members shot and wounded a policeman (*Cape Times*, 18 December 1996). Police detective Ben Latagan was assassinated, shot thirteen

times (*Cape Times*, 15 January 1999; *Cape Argus*, 23 August 2002). Schalk Visagie, a commander of the PAGAD Investigative Unit, and son-in-law of ex-President PW Botha, was shot and wounded weeks later (*Cape Times*, 16 September 1999). Policewoman Natasha Pillay had one leg amputated after a remote-controlled bomb exploded (*Cape Argus*, 28 December 1999). Pipe bombs exploded outside the PAGAD investigative unit offices in August 1998, in 1999 outside the Cape Town, Woodstock and Athlone police stations, and in 2000 outside the Wynberg magistrate's courts. (*Cape Argus*, 20 July 2000) A PAGAD squad attacked Claremont police station and stole guns (*Cape Argus*, 5 and 8 January 1998). They also assassinated magistrate Pieter Theron in his driveway (*Cape Times*, 8 September 2000) and planned to assassinate another magistrate, Wilma van der Merwe, who presided over trials of PAGAD activists. (*Cape Times*, 13 September 2000). Shots were fired at Judge Nathan Erasmus. (*Cape Times*, 10 December 2002).

Alongside this, PAGAD continued operating as another vigilante group against crime. In the last eight months of 1996, it staged 112 marches to the homes of drug dealers, and was estimated to have launched 38 attacks by petrol bombs, drive-by shootings and hand grenades. In the first six months of 1997, marches dropped to 41, freeing up manpower for 71 terror attacks (Sidiropoulos, 1998: 57-58). Police estimated that between October 1997 and January 1998 there were in Cape Town 195 attacks by PAGAD on gangs, and 429 attacks by gangs on each other, and on PAGAD. During 1998 PAGAD was thought to have committed another 168 bombings and other incidents (Forgey, 1999: 62, 75). By 2000, PAGAD had killed 24 gang leaders (Forgey, 2001: 82) plus street drug dealers.

In the end, PAGAD's vigilante campaign had little effect on the gangs, except that its assassination of several gang bosses led to increased turf wars as other gangs tried to seize the opportunity (*Sunday Times, Cape Metro*, 19 March 2000). Some gangsters responded to the attacks of PAGAD hitmen by shooting the nearest Muslim corner shop owners, and petrol bombing their shops. In one week gangsters shot dead five Muslim shopkeepers and a doctor. (*Cape Argus*, 27 September 1997; *Cape Times*, 24 October 1997). Other gangsters shot and bombed Muslim clergy and worshippers (*Cape Times*, 4 September 1997; 1 December 1999). Gangster threats to take revenge by shooting Muslim schoolchildren once led to all Muslim schools being closed for a day. (*The Argus*, 6 August 1996). Gangsters routinely shot PAGAD activists (*Cape Times*, 8 August 1996). When police intelligence heard that the gangs planned to attack mosques (where PAGAD held meetings) during the most crowded Ramadan days, they raced to the Hard Livings' gang hangout *Die Hok*,²² and seized Uzis, and armour-piercing bullets (*Cape Argus*, 30 September 1997).

STATE: FROM FAILURE TO COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, 2000 – 2002

The ANC's Western Cape provincial leadership strategized to fight back at PAGAD, which had demonized both democracy and the ANC, and to prevent PAGAD acquiring legitimacy and support (ANC interview, 2002) The strategy was:

- Deny them political space. All political parties were encouraged to not be frightened, but to speak out against PAGAD and vigilantism. In September 1998 the ANC organized an anti-PAGAD protest march and leaflets. (*Cape Times*, 25 September 1998).

- Deny them economic space. All likely donors were approached and urged not to support the vigilantes financially. When the Iranian Vice-President visited South Africa, he was amongst those urged to discourage any donations.
- Deny them religious space. The ANC leaders lobbied 50 imams to deliver simultaneously one Friday midday in all Cape Town mosques a sermon in the name of the MJC, condemning PAGAD's abuse of mosques, aggressiveness towards imams, sheikhs and other religious leaders, and impious attitudes and actions. The Muslim Judicial Council, Islamic Council of South Africa, and Majlisush Shura al Islami urged congregants to "shun extremes" and condemned "those among us who have glorified violence and have put aside reason and rationality in the search for solutions". (*Cape Argus*, Friday 1999; *Sunday Times*, 14 October 2001).
- Deny them media space. All media were urged not to offer sympathy to the vigilantes, nor to legitimate such responses to crime. Since the vigilantes urged a boycott of the daily Cape Times, and had threatened journalists and photographers from the other newspapers, PAGAD had already alienated the mainstream media.
- Deny them criminal space. The police and courts must do their job, and the party leadership had interviews with senior prosecutors and police officers, stressing the urgency of arresting and convicting the killers and bombers.

While South Africa had been a police state since at least 1963, rookie detectives learnt on the job from their experienced colleagues. It was only in October 1997 that the first detective academy opened, training 90 cadet detectives in each of ten courses per year (Sidiropoulos, 1998: 59). The focus was to retrain detectives from assault and torture of suspects (euphemistically called "confession-based procedure") to modern forensic Science-based procedures aimed at collecting material evidence. Notwithstanding repeated assassinations of prosecution witnesses in many PAGAD trials, the police one by one arrested the G-Force cells. The police suffered from tensions between old guard policemen and new police from MK backgrounds (*Business Day*, 5 January 1998).

The police had prosecution witness after witness assassinated before they could give evidence against Ebrahim Jeneker and other PAGAD hitmen (*Cape Times*, 14 October 1998). One state witness had his aunt's house bombed (*Cape Argus*, 11 November 1999). PAGAD killed two witnesses to the Ben Lategan murder (*Cape Argus*, 17 May 2000), including one whose name was on a list in Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim's diary. (*Cape Argus*, 19 May 2000). Two witnesses, a husband and wife, to the Keg and Swan attempted bombing were each shot seven times (*Sunday Times*, 31 December 2000). The assassination of Ashraf Saban left no witnesses against the accused who planted a bomb outside the Wynberg magistrate's court. (*Cape Argus*, 21 March 2001). Witness Mogamat Abrahams was murdered before he could testify against Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim, PAGAD national coordinator. He was the eighth witness PAGAD murdered. (*Cape Argus* 9 April 2001). Abader was assassinated before he could give evidence about five PAGAD murders. (*Cape Argus*, 18 June 2001) Another PAGAD hitman murdered relatives of a witness to their killing of PAGAD founder Farouk Jaffer (*Cape Times*; *Cape Argus*, 17 October, 9 November 2001).

Initially, led by Minister of Justice Dullah Omar, the police in Cape Town as in Port Elizabeth tried to negotiate with PAGAD to refrain from vigilantism and provide police

with evidence about drug dealers (*Weekend Argus*, 11/12 October 1997; *Cape Argus*, 17 October 1997). PAGAD stopped cooperation with the police when they started to arrest PAGAD bombers (*Cape Times*, 20 October 1997).

In August 1997 the police set up a PAGAD and crimes against the state squad of some 130 police (Sidiropoulos, 1998: 58). By 2000, the police had 26 PAGAD members in jail, and charged a total of 117 gunmen in 55 cases (Forgey, 2001: 82). There were no further remote-controlled bombs. After a Scorpions raid of November 2000 caught the PAGAD Grassy Park G-Force cell red-handed with bombs, no further bomb blasts at all occurred.

The first conviction of a PAGAD G-Force leader was for intimidation of a policeman (*Cape Argus*, 29 September 1999). The first murder conviction of a PAGAD member came in December 1999. Dawood Osman shot four teenagers at the entrance to the V and A Waterfront, and stole a mobile phone from another person murdered in Plumstead. He was sentenced to 32 years in jail (*Cape Argus*, 15 December 1999). PAGAD hitmen were convicted of killing a 7-year old girl while shooting at Ocean View drug dealers (*Cape Argus*, 15 September 2000). Another five were convicted of illegally possessing guns, ammunition and a stolen police bullet-proof vest (*Cape Argus*, 21 November 2000). Ronald Johnson was jailed for twelve years for murder in a series of trials which ended the G-Force Mitchell's Plain cell (*Cape Argus*, 25 June 2001). Later that year prosecutors had two PAGAD members convicted for bombing the Lansdowne police station. (*Cape Argus*, 21 September 2001). PAGAD member Mansour Leggett was convicted of eleven murders and seven attempted murders. (*Cape Argus*, 29 March 2001) Another three PAGAD members were found guilty of attempted murder of a drug dealer, and robbing his nephew's *bakkie* (*Cape Argus*, 20 April 2001). PAGAD's national coordinator, Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim, and its amir, Abdur-Razaak Ebrahim, were sentenced to five and three years jail respectively for public violence (*Cape Argus*, 26 March 2002). Another PAGAD supporter was convicted of killing the 4 year old daughter of a drug dealer and attempted murder of her father. (*Cape Times*, 8 May 2002) Mogamat Isaacs was sentenced to 25 years for three murders. (*Cape Times*, 22 October 2002) Ebrahim Jeneker, found guilty of three murders and other crimes, received three life sentences (*Cape Argus*, 18 and 20 December 2002).

During the series of trials held in Cape Town since 2000, in no case have the accused nor their legal teams complained of torture. The most severe pressure upon the rule of law concerned intelligence agencies placing a hidden TV camera within the court room to monitor intimidation by the accused, which could only pick up "loud shouting",²³ bugging of a defence advocate's phone or chamber (*Cape Argus*, 30 October, 22 November, 20 December 2001; *Cape Times*, 31 October 2001) and the legal tactics used by two prosecutors to get an interdict from a British court to obtain a video.²⁴ No state of emergency was proclaimed, and detention without trial was not re-introduced. Police were given temporary powers to search without warrant in the Silvertown precinct.

Equally important as PAGAD's eventual suppression by the police was how it discredited itself and alienated mainstream Muslims by its abuse of religion. For example, more and more of PAGAD accused at major trials for murder wore the white robes of worship in front of the TV camera and media and held a Qu'ran. But few of them wore it when praying in their mosques, even on Fridays, as other members of those congrega-

tions pointed out. Fellow Muslims also criticized PAGAD members for marching into a mosque to recruit members after a service, but not coming for the prayers themselves (oral communication).

CONCLUSIONS FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW

The young democracy was fortunate that PAGAD never succeeded in enlarging its social base wider than a minority within a minority within a minority – a militant minority within a Muslim minority within a Coloured minority. The PAGAD episode offers several lessons spanning the whole political and security spectrum for other states confronting the same phenomenon.

1. Governments, in both state and party dimensions, should give high priority to inclusivity, with its reassuring symbolism. The ANC, for example, became the first political party to elect a Muslim as its Western Cape Provincial leader. (His two ANC predecessors had been former Christian clergymen, from the NGSK and Presbyterian churches.) This minimized the proportion of Coloured and Indian Muslims who might feel marginalized by an African-dominated government, and would reject a South African identity. When the ANC won the Cape Town municipal elections, it placed large Eid greetings press ads to Muslims (*Cape Times*, 19 January 1999).

The ruling parties must encourage their rivals to also accept that is the duty of political leaders to speak out against religious bigotry, so that religious minorities do not feel marginalized. As is often the case, religious inclusivity also aids ethnic inclusivity. A huge proportion of Cape Town Muslims are of partly Indonesian or Indian descent.

2. Fear is a nursery for polarization and extremism. The public must feel safe, for the abolition of capital and corporal punishment to be safe. Governments must indeed “take back the streets” from muggers and other criminals through visible policing. The state has to prove that it is certainty of arrest and conviction, not ferocity of punishment, that rolls back the crime wave. Permanent struggle against organized crime must always enjoy high priority in allocating resources, or support for a variety of vigilante groupings will persist. Equally, any state erodes at the margins if it lacks the capacity to stop the operations of non-governmental armed organizations. The Max Weber truism that the modern state has a monopoly of legal violence reminds us that to the extent that gangs rule and tax -entire ghettos, bus and taxi stops, and train stations, the state shrinks as a state.
3. The more torture and other coercion are criminalized by justiciable human rights, the more vital does police intelligence become. This necessitates a paradox. Democracy and the rule of law require huge expenditure on both human and electronic surveillance. Democracy requires that this be regulated through judges, to prevent all use of political opponents.

This is the appropriate place to emphasize the necessity of avoiding one-dimensional views and stereotypes in favour of a more sociological imagination. Conspiracy theories are popular with the intelligence services and tabloid media. In the case study under discussion, that could divert both police and public to “international Islamic

terrorist conspiracies” and theories. It is as important in the post-Cold War world as during the Cold War to analyze the *local* social order and its specificities at the grass-roots. Both understanding social movements and defending democracy require this. PAGAD’s overlap with religion was mostly to use it to mobilize support, to claim legitimacy for killing and extortion, and have venues for meetings. To the extent that PAGAD in fact used religious symbols, sought revenge against police and magistrates, and diversified its attacks from drug dealers to restaurants, delis and pubs, they triggered their own nemesis. They baited the state into prioritizing crushing them ahead of larger and far more widespread vigilante groupings such as Mapogo or Mfelandawonye.

4. Estimates of PAGAD G-Force activities include 472 attacks by shooting, petrol bombs, pipe bombs and grenades, with over 24 gang leaders, street drug leaders, and passers-by killed. This is less than one-fiftieth those killed in taxi wars. PAGAD’s members are less than one-hundredth the number claimed by the largest vigilante group, Mapogo a Mathamaga, and less than one-tenth its likely members. PAGAD’s G-Force killed less than one-tenth those killed by Mfelandawonye.

But once PAGAD’s G-Force used or misused religious symbolism, and diversified their attacks from drug dealers to restaurants, delis, pubs, the police and magistrates, they triggered their own nemesis. Their actions meant the state had to prioritize suppressing PAGAD over other vigilante groups or the crime wave.

5. Police counter-intelligence is vital to combat both corruption and infiltration by vigilantes. The criminalization of some states in Asia and Africa has given rise to Andreski’s concept of the kleptocracy. Many Middle Eastern theocratic opponents of regimes cite corruption as one reason legitimating the overthrow of their governments. The leaders of the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) have pleaded for adopting the Hong Kong “where did you get it?” law. This empowers the state to confiscate all property from police or other civil servants in excess of their salaries, unless they can explain by which lawful means they acquired it.

The extent of gang leaders’ bribery of low-paid policemen, sometimes their street neighbors or relatives, makes a huge increase in counter-intelligence investigations one prerequisite for sustained success against wealthy crime syndicates.

PAGAD G-Force members infiltrated neighborhood watches in: Grassy Park Lotus River, Hanover Park, and Lansdowne (*Cape Times*, 7 August 1998). Apart from its implications for gathering information, some neighbourhood watches included police reservists who were issued with police walkie-talkies, bullet-proof vests, and guns. One court official was arrested in connection with PAGAD bomb attacks. (*Cape Argus*, 24 April 2002).

6. The PAGAD episode confirms another truism: generals always plan how to win the last war. When South Africa became a democracy, the only fears of counter-revolution focused on the ultra-right, Afrikaner Nationalist extremists such as the AWB, Israel Vision²⁵ and the Boeremag, whose leaders were jailed for assault, sabotage or murder. The biggest armed attack upon the state came from an unexpected direction. This has led to incidents of petty harassment of some Muslims by the more mediocre amongst security guards at airports and the V and A Waterfront shopping precinct (*Letter, Cape Argus*, 25 August 2000).

Any future such attempts will again come from yet another unexpected political direction. A vibrant multi-party democracy, which maximizes the interest groups operating within its party organizations, with diverse media, is the best defence against this.

NOTES

1. Msinga, Nongoma, Majola districts are all in KwaZulu-Natal Province.
2. A similar phenomena existed in Curitiba, Brazil.
3. Port Elizabeth.
4. In Cape Town.
5. In Tshwane, Pretoria.
6. Gugulethu is a township, while Brown's Farm, Vrygrond and Crossroads are shanty-towns in Cape Town.
7. The dynamics are well explained in two letters to the editor from Jonathan Schrire, chair of the Vrygrond Community Development Trust, *Cape Times* 2 July and Cape Argus 4 December 2002.
8. Translated idiomatically as "if you act like a leopard, I act like a tiger".
9. In Limpopo Province.
10. Translated: "you think you are hidden, but are watched".
11. Translated: "we are unit(ed)."
12. In Eastern Cape Province.
13. A township in Cape Town.
14. An Indian suburb in Cape Town.
15. He is not explicit, but we may note that in the 1980s the overwhelming majority of Muslim Capetonians were under apartheid classified as "Cape Coloured", "Cape Malay" or "Indian", while the overwhelming majority of ANC members were African.
16. The Muslim Students' Association and Muslim Youth Movement incline to the MJC. The IUC claims it represents 356 Muslim organizations, but in 2000 only 36 organizations came to its bi-annual general meeting (*Muslim Views*, December 2000).
17. This is the largest mosque in District Six, where the entire congregation had been evicted during the ethnic mass removals of apartheid's Group Areas Act.
18. He was also managing editor of Muslim News, director of the Gatesville Islamic Centre, and on the Exco of the Islamic Council of South Africa (*Cape Times*, 14 September 1998).
19. Four PAGAD accused, notwithstanding arguments over the possession of a pipe bomb, were later acquitted of the bombing as a prosecution witness's testimony was "riddled with lies". They were found guilty of stealing a van used in the bombing. Another state witness, Faizel Steyn, did however testify to PAGAD leaders expanding its targets to include Jewish ones (*Cape Times*, 28, February 2002).
20. Gatesville is the largest Indian suburb in Cape Town.

21. Camps Bay, Constantia, Green Point, Kenilworth, Observatory, Sea Point, Tyger Vally in Bellville, and Wetton are all suburbs in Cape Town.
22. "The Den" is probably the best translation in this context.
23. While application for a mistrial was rejected, the Bar Council protested that it was "adamantly opposed to installing secret surveillance apparatus without prior notification to the defence lawyers (*Cape Argus*, 8 November 2001).
24. An enquiry by the chair of the General Bar Council found that the prosecutors were not guilty of improper conduct (*Cape Argus*, 13 March 2002).
25. "Israel Vision" has nothing to do with the State of Israel nor Zionism. It is yet another of those ultra-right white racist groups who argue that they, not Jews, are the real "chosen race".

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9

THE IMPACT OF THE NGO REVOLUTION ON TRANSFORMATION IN SENEGAL

Nancy Kwang Johnson

The story behind President Abdou Diouf's 1999 decision to ban female genital circumcision (FGC) in Senegal is symptomatic of the ambiguity of the relationship between local social movements and global international health and development organizations, especially with regard to the making of domestic policies in Third World countries. On a macro-level, Western perceptions of globalization have fostered a paradigmatic shift from "local knowledge" to "international knowledge" to the extent that the newly defined rubric of "human rights" not only encompasses female genital circumcision (FGC) or "human right to health"¹ (and "human right to bodily integrity"), but also promotes the co-optation of local agents, e.g. *imams* (religious leaders), cutters, and indigenous populations, as a means of promoting developmental policies at the expense of centuries-old ethnic rituals which reinforce one's communal affiliations with inter-marrying groups. On a micro-level, the patron-client networks (which exist between the village chief, the *imam*, the cutter, the teenage girls, and the inter-marrying groups), under the auspices of international donors and local NGOs, are promoting social transformation in Senegal—village by village.

My objective is two-fold. First, this chapter will provide a brief chronological account of critical moments (1995 to present) in order to re-trace the origins of the ongoing anti-female genital circumcision (FGC) movement in rural Senegal. How did the grassroots movement inform President Abdou Diouf's decision? Secondly, this paper seeks to examine the process of collective action in Senegal, and therefore, focuses on the movement's principal actors and agents, mechanisms and outcomes. How did collective action in eleven villages in rural Senegal spawn a national movement? What are the consequences of this societal transformation?

Molly Melching, the Director of TOSTAN, an NGO in Senegal (an American who has lived in Sénégal for over 27 years), notes in the passage below that the movement began in 1995, and proposes that TOSTAN began promoting the decline of female genital circumcision at the request of rural villagers who were active participants in TOSTAN-oriented programmes:

Health huts were really torture chambers for these women and the more we [TOSTAN] looked into it [female genital circumcision] the more it was sad. What we realized was that women had really absolutely no control over anything related to health aspects, their bodies, their lives, their childbirth, when, how, where... We got into FGC then but very little....In 1995, nobody was really talking about FGC. People were really ashamed to be talking about it....But we did hear from the women underground sort of...

In the passage above, Melching notes that the female villagers were not inclined to speak about female genital circumcision in a formal setting—namely at a TOSTAN-run assessment meeting. As a result, Melching and TOSTAN volunteers learned through the grapevine, so to speak, that female villagers were interested in ending female genital circumcision. TOSTAN's efforts to broach the subject of FGC entailed an elaborate workshop on human, rather than health, rights as Melching wanted to reach a wider female audience.

As early as September 1996, Melching notes the degree of consciousness-raising as a result of human rights-informed programmes:

"Amazing things started happening...We were using human rights for the first time. Maybe we were really exciting people. What happened in that year...1996....organizing and starting health groups, and becoming outspoken, delegations of women who worked against violence, sent girls to schools for the first time...an explosion of women standing up for their health rights."

At the end of the programmes (September 1996), Melching notes that some of the female participants in TOSTAN-run programmes had decided to "seek abolition"² of female genital circumcision in their village, Malicounda Bambara³ (a village of 3, 000 people). However, Melching wanted to wait until the schedule for cuttings (December and January) had passed before deciphering the success or failure of the female villagers' efforts.

In June 1997, one of TOSTAN's co-ordinators went to Malicounda to check on the progress of the female villagers' anti-FGC campaign. The TOSTAN co-ordinator returned with the following news: there had been no *public* circumcisions in the village. That is to say, the female villagers had effectively mobilized the male heads in their village, namely the village chief, the village *imam*, and their husbands. At that point, the TOSTAN co-ordinator returned to TOSTAN and Melching contacted UNICEF, one of TOSTAN's donors. UNICEF, in turn, wanted the female villagers to publicly announce their success before 20 Senegalese journalists. Hence, July 31, 1997 as Melching notes, was "a turning point. The men [in the village] did not realize that they were going to go public with this. No one [from TOSTAN] ever asked these women to stop."⁴

As Melching reflects on the success of the Malicounda case study, she notes that the female villagers, as a result of a series of workshops on human rights, had essentially broadened and indigenized the international conceptualization of human rights in the following manner. 'In our programmes [TOSTAN] we did human rights: human rights to health, human rights to bodily integrity...' ⁵

According to Melching, the female villagers took the international rubric of "human rights" one step further by suggesting that FGC violated one's right to "be free from all

forms of discrimination because if you're not circumcised you can't marry who ever you want".⁶ Moreover, Melching argues, if you're a Wolof, you can't marry a Mandinka because you're not circumcised. And if you're a Mandinka you can't marry the woman you want to marry because she's not circumcised. And so it leads [according to the female villagers] to lots of other human rights violations."⁷ That is to say, Melching suggests that the female villagers argued that "we have a responsibility to assure that our children will have the highest level of health or minimum standard of health"⁸.

Shortly after the Malicounda outcome, other villages followed suit in November 1997 (Nguerigne Bambara) and on November 20, 1997 President Abdou Diouf, according to Gerry Mackie, "called on the nation to emulate the women of Malicounda".⁹ Between February 14, 1998 and April 7, 2000 other villages in the countryside of Senegal would end public female genital circumcisions.¹⁰ In the interim, former US First Lady Hilary Clinton and former US President Bill Clinton would visit the village of Malicounda (April 1998) and publicly praise the female villagers.

In the context of the anti-FGC campaign, the process of social transformation is noteworthy. While the village of Malicounda gained international and domestic recognition, Demba Diawara, the *imam* from the mosque at Keur Simbara, according to Melching, "was furious when he heard that Mali Tambicounda had ended FGC".¹¹ Consequently, he went to meet with the female villagers of Malicounda and returned with the following testimony, as recollected by Melching:

*"My niece is, you know my niece is mentally disturbed, I didn't know it was because she had bled and had almost died. I didn't know that my sister-in-law is sterile following an infection due to the cutting. I didn't know the pain the women had. I don't even know what a normal sex looks like..."*¹²

Based on his heightened awareness of the health complications of FGC, Demba (who had worked as a TOSTAN facilitator in his village) would not only become one of the most active agents of collective action and social transformation, but would also devise the "mechanism," namely the "public declaration" (denouncing FGC), and mediate between inter-marrying groups in eleven rural villages.

Upon his return from Malicounda, Demba delineated his concerns (with regard to a teenage girl's ability to get married in the context of inter-marrying ethnic groups) to Melching:

"If my daughter quits, and she's not circumcised she won't have a husband tomorrow. So in order for her to have a husband (we marry in 10 villages over by Joal) so they all have to stop in order for us to stop. So there's no way that any one village in those 11 villages can stop alone because then the kids wouldn't have a husband or wife."

According to Melching, Demba "discovered" the mechanism for ending female genital cutting in Senegal via the public declaration. He then went and walked from village to village and then talked to his parents. Melching notes that "because he is very listened to, because he is an *imam*, because he is of a noble group, because he's an older man (he's 66 years old), everyone listened to him".¹³ Melching notes that he was the ideal facilitator as he "...got the women to talk, and he got people to talk...they never ever ever [her emphasis] talked about this before publicly and he got them talking about these things".¹⁴

In the context of the ongoing process of social change in rural Senegal, Demba served as a catalyst for social change. For example, on February 14, 1998, Demba and the villagers of Keur Simbara, as recounted by Melching:

“met as a group with their representatives...., and as a group, you see, as an inter-marrying community they made the [public] decision to end female genital cutting, and therefore they could actually carry through on it because then they know that the children if they're not cut will have husbands tomorrow and that their boys will marry girls who are not cut and they will accept that.”¹⁵

That is to say, in the context of Senegal's ethnicscape, the Wolof ethnic group does not cut whereas the Bambaras (Demba's ethnic group), Soninké, Toucouleur, and Serer ethnic groups cut. Following Demba's example, a Serer woman canoed from village to village as all of her relatives lived in the Sine-Saloum region. Melching notes that as of April 7, 2000 all 27 islands of Sine-Saloum had banned female genital circumcision.

CONCLUSION

This project is a work in progress to the extent that I will interview some of the Muslim NGOs in Senegal in order to assemble a more holistic perspective of the NGO/international health and developmental organizational dynamic. On one level, it is ambiguous as to who is formulating and implementing domestic policies in Senegal a grassroots-up movement and/or the top-down dynamic of the international health and developmental network.

In response to the legislative ban on female genital circumcision and the Senegalese government's efforts to rid the country of this practice by 2005, there has been a religious and ethnic backlash, as well as the continued practice of cutting *en cachet* (in secret). For example, Mountaga Tall, the supreme spiritual leader of Northern Senegal's Toucouleur people, has noted to his followers that he would “rather die than be forced to stop what I believe in,”¹⁶ whereas other traditional leaders have defied the ban by circumcising *en masse*. The religious backlash stems from religious leaders determining to what extent cutting and one's purified status as a result may be implicitly or explicitly inferred from the Qu'ran, religious, and social norms. Hence, Demba, the *imam* of a Bambaras village, was the exception to the rule.

NOTES

1. Interview with Molly Melching in Dakar, Senegal (January 12, 2002).
2. See Gerry Mackie, “Chapter 13: Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of the End,” in Shell-Duncan B. and Hernlund, Y. *Female “Circumcision” in Africa; Culture, Controversy, and Change* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 256.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Interview with Molly Melching in Dakar, Senegal (January 12, 2002).
5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. See Gerry Mackie, "Chapter 13: Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of the End," in Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund, *Female "Circumcision" in Africa; Culture, Controversy, and Change* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 257.
10. See Gerry Mackie's essay for a village-by-village account of the anti-FGC campaign between February 14, 1998 and April 7, 2000.
11. Melching interview on January 12, 2002.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. "Health-Senegal: Ban on Female Circumcision Backfires", February 8, 1999, Dakar, Senegal, Global Information Network.

10

RETHINKING CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE

Bhekinkosi Moyo

That there is a vibrant civil society in South Africa encompassing political, labour, religious, cultural, welfare and developmental organizations, many of which developed as resistance structures to apartheid, is not debatable. However, what is debatable is the extent to which part of this vibrancy is a result of the society's own commitment or that of its donors¹ in response to the country's development challenges. The question that we are concerned with is the extent to which the development agenda is owned by development organizations in South Africa and the extent to which it is promoted by international donor agencies. This chapter is an attempt to interrogate the assumptive argument that the development agenda in general has not emerged from the country itself but from interaction with foreign agencies. The chapter argues, first, that the extent and manner to which international aid impacts on the development agenda is uneven. Secondly, we observe that in South Africa, there is a strong civil society. We then draw the conclusion that evidence seems to suggest that the development agenda is promoted by a variety of role players, chief of whom are the third sector, donors and government. However, we also note that the relationship that develops between donors and recipients is complex. There is evidence, which suggests that a lot of local NGOs² are dependent on donor funding.³ This opens up a whole set of questions around long-term impact and the feasibility of donor assistance. Partly, this is so because the survival of these organizations depends not so much on their ability to engage their constituencies, but more upon their ability to persuade the donors. In the long run this could contribute to unhealthy donor-recipient relations.⁴ This could confirm the view that the importance of donor funding in the short term is offset by the dependence that it creates in the long term. As a long-term solution to the dependency syndrome, the chapter argues that community foundations need to be created in South Africa to enable communities to mobilize their own resources to tackle developmental challenges.

This chapter is a result of widely held interviews with international donor foundations and their grantees.⁵ The role that these international agencies have played in supporting the non-profit sector in South Africa cannot be ignored. A huge impact, which manifests itself in a number of ways, has been made in areas such as: gender and wom-

en's development; strengthening the non-profit sector; institution building; democracy building and good governance; promotion of citizen rights and responsibilities; lobbying for a more enabling environment for the sector; capacity building; economic justice; human rights and democratisation; and community development among others. However this achievement does not preclude the fact that these foundations can call the shots. They certainly have the leverage to do so through their broad priorities. There is evidence, which suggests that donors such as these foundations indirectly promote their own agenda and NGOs often model their programmess to suit donor guidelines. At the same time, local NGOs have more power in the relationship than they realize and should exploit it to get donors to support the kinds of programmess that they believe are most important and relevant to their constituencies. Our final point is that the development agenda appears to be the result of a multiple response to South Africa's contextual needs.⁶ And community foundations with the ability to engage the community of local donors seem suitable to run the show and respond to the needs of the non-profit sector and the community at large.

STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER

First, we start by framing the conceptual paradigms that we use in the chapter. In this section we look briefly at the aid and development literature in Africa. Secondly, we then move to give a snapshot of the state of civil society in South Africa. Thirdly, we discuss the question, who is promoting the non-profit sector's development agenda in South Africa? And lastly we discuss why community foundations are better suited to respond to the needs of the third sector and the communities in which they operate.

FRAMING THE PARADIGMS

CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

a. Explaining the sector

We are not going to delve into the discussions that have surrounded the concept of civil society in this chapter. Instead we define our working definition and give a brief discussion of its state, size, nature and scope. We follow the general trend of using the terms, third sector, non-governmental sector, voluntary sector, non-profit sector, non-profit organizations and community-based organizations interchangeably, as if they meant the same thing, to refer to the constituents of civil society. The term civil society, in political philosophy, has been contest(ed.), Discussions around it have stretched from Hegel, through Marx, Gramsci and Habermas on the one hand and through Durkheim, Simmel and Parsons on the other to its rebirth in the 1990s. These debates have given birth to a wide range of alternative definitions of civil society. However, in short, these range from broad-based popular participation (Locke, Hobbes) to elite bargaining of one kind or another (Montesquieu) to elite-citizen-government interchanges (de Tocqueville).

The term today still has as many definitions as there are people defining it. Its ugly face, however, is that donors are not unanimously agreed on its definition. More of-

ten they regard it as the organized arena in society located between the state and the private citizen. For the Mott Foundation, for example, civil society consists of three sectors: namely, public or government, private or for-profit business, and voluntary, charitable or non-profit (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 380). And for Ford, civil society is broadly constituted but also specific, hence it is not the society as whole. For Ford, civil society's role is to instill a democratic temperament and to monitor and restrain government (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 378). As a result of this debate about the meaning of civil society, Bebbington and Riddell note that:

Civil society is a notoriously slippery concept. It has entered donor terminology without careful attention...In many respects the term is used as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good government, human rights, privatization and public sector reform (Riddell and Bebbington 1995:23).

This debate on civil society is also found in South Africa. The term is contested. A recent research project forming part of the broader CIVICUS/South African Non Governmental Organizations Coalition (SANGOCO) process in developing a common vision of a healthy civil society by the Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE) and the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) defined civil society as:

The sphere of organizations and/or associations of organizations located between the family, the state, the government of the day, and the prevailing economic system, in which people with common interests associate voluntarily. Amongst these organizations, they may have common, competing, or conflicting values and interests. (Core/Idasa, 2001: 4)¹⁰

We use this as our working definition. However we go a step further to distinguish what a non-profit organization or a non-governmental organization is.

b. Defining a non-profit organization

According to a study on the size and scope of the non-profit sector in South Africa which was modeled against the Johns Hopkins Non-profit Comparative Project, a non-profit organization must be organized, private, self-governing, non-profit distributing and voluntary. This agrees with the characteristics of civil society organizations in South Africa that are identified by the CIVICUS-SANGOCO study. These include NGOs, CBOs, associations-networks of NGOs-CBOs, trade unions and federations, professional associations, employer-business associations and their federations, sports-arts-cultural organizations, religious organizations, and independent research institutes.

c. The size of the non-profit sector in South Africa

Evidence from the two studies referred to suggests that the non-profit sector in South Africa is heterogeneous. It ranges from the less sophisticated burial societies to the most professional research institutes. This makes it very difficult to accurately and reliably define its size in numbers. However, "The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector in South Africa" estimates that there are 98 920 NPOs across all sectors. According to the study, the sectors with the largest number of NPOs are culture and

recreation (20 587), social services (22 755), and development and housing (20 382). Other findings about the size of the sector are that the majority of NPOs are less formalized community-based organizations concentrated in the poorer communities. No less than 53% of all NPOs can be classified as less formalized community-based organizations (i.e. not formally structured as Section 21 companies, trusts, churches, trade unions or co-operatives). Women and black people play a leading role in the NPO sector. According to this Study 59% of the managerial level of all NPOs surveyed are women. And 60% of all full time employees are women. The study also suggests that the sector is a major economic force. It employs just over half a million people and generates income in excess of R10 billion per year. According to the study, there are 645 316 full-time equivalent staff employed by the sector, which is equivalent to 9% of the formal non-agricultural workforce or 7.6% of the total non-agricultural workforce. This shows not only the vibrancy of the sector but its contribution to economic development as well. It is here that the part played by donors is also to be appreciated.

d. Funding to the sector

Soon after the negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa, there were fears that the sector was experiencing financial problems. The general assumption was that donors had decided to re-route funding to the democratic government especially after 1994. However new findings, for example, from the International Organization Development (IOD), reveal that international development aid to South Africa has not declined. It averages between R2.3bn and R3bn, with a quarter going to the non-profit sector (*Development Update*, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 4: 135). Another study is that of the US Foundations in South Africa, which argues that even though most official donors to civil society in South Africa re-routed their support to the democratic government, U.S Foundations bucked this trend. According to this study, US Foundations showed no tendency to scale back their grantmaking to South Africa during the transition to, or consolidation of, democracy (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001: 390). In fact, funding from these agencies increased steadily from 1988 until today. The findings of these studies concur with the findings of "The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector in South Africa" (2002), which shows that the non-profit sector had an estimated income of R14bn in 1998, with contributions from: government, 42% (R5, 8bn), the South African private sector, 21% (R3bn), donors (private philanthropy and international non-governmental organizations, 25% (R3, 5bn), and service fees and other self-generated income, 34% (R4, 6bn).

This section shows that the third sector in South Africa is very huge. It is a force to reckon with. What we want to point out is that this sector has existed for a long time with the support of international donor agencies. The foundations that we used in this chapter have been active in South Africa as early as the 1980s, well before they even set up offices. For all these years in South Africa, the question that we want to ask is, how have they been interacting with their grantees? To what extent have they promoted their own interests? And to what extent have they been influenced by their grantees in shaping their guidelines? These are complex questions that we do not claim we will be able to answer in full.

WHO CALLS THE SHOTS?

a. “Pay the Piper, Call the Tune”?¹¹

Generally, there is no direct answer to the question of the impact of aid on agenda setting. First, the impact is uneven and relations are complex. According to Christa L. Kuljian, Director of the Mott Foundation in South Africa:

There are cases where support by the donor for an organization can be broad, covering the general operations, general activities and the overall budget. Here there is some flexibility for the organization. In other cases support could be in the form of project funding, thus making it more targeted and thus less flexible on the part of the organization. There are also cases where the donor provides support for the organization's capacity building thus covering strategic planning, organizational development and staff development. This is usually a response to the realization that one cannot have an effective project if one does not have an effective organization.¹²

Secondly, this question pulls together priorities and programme areas. How do grantees negotiate the agenda without either alienating their constituencies or losing their donors? There is overwhelming evidence, which suggests NGOs are increasingly facing the challenges of donor dependence¹³ and shifts in donor policies.¹⁴ However, looking at the programmess and projects that agencies such as Mott, Open Society, Hivos, Atlantic Philanthropies and Ford have supported in South Africa, it seems that international funding has had a significant impact on local NGOs. Yet, the question that cuts across this discussion is whether these NGOs are carrying out their own agendas or the agenda of donors. How do donors decide on their priorities? Are donors influenced by their domestic concerns or they are reacting to what seem to be overriding problems in the recipient country? Does paying the piper necessarily translate into calling the tune? In other words do donors set the agenda for NGOs because they support them?

There are mixed opinions about the above questions. Using gender development as a way to carry the discussion forward, we can only say that answers depend on the type of the NGO that is receiving support and the agency supporting it. Intermediary NGOs, like the International Fundraising Consortium, for example, would answer the questions differently from research-oriented NGOs like CSV, CORE, CPS etc. Likewise, organizations with a diverse funding base would also respond differently from organizations without.

Organizations with a diverse funding base in most cases find it easy to create healthy donor relations. However, according to Alicia Pieterse, Director of Interfund, diversifying funding may cause more problems than it seeks to solve. Her words capture the argument clearly:

The most important thing that you must understand about us is where we are placed. We are very much in the middle, we have all these donors in the top and we are funding about 130 organizations some of which are NGOs and others CBOs. In all honesty you cannot begin to know how much time it takes to negotiate upwards. We are all saying we

*are talking about partnerships and partnerships imply equality, but then why are we not negotiating the other way; downwards and both ways because we always find ourselves in a position to satisfy donor requirements. We serve so many donors and they all have different requirementsthe following is not politically correct but it is a fact that resources are still located at the top and the cultures are different. There is still a culture of superiority plus the resources...*¹⁵

However, this is not to say Interfund, has not had any achievements. And yet these achievements say nothing about agenda setting. According to Renald Morris of the Open Society Foundation in South Africa, donors assist in setting the agenda for NGOs but they do not go as far as telling them that this is the kind of work that they should be doing. He noted:

*Unfortunately, I do not have first hand information of having spoken to donors but based on a wide range of NGOs that we interact with on a daily basis, there seems to be a very strong movement by donors to set the agenda for NGOs. I think so, partly as you would know that if you talk collectively all donor funding that comes to the country amounts to less than 3% of the annual budget of the country. Even though it translates to hundreds of millions of Rands,¹⁶ there is not much that goes around to actually sustain these NGOs to work. So NGOs are really desperate for survival. The other thing that I think has acted negatively or forced NGOs to accept this agenda by donors is that the National Development Agency has been slow in releasing funds to NGOs. Just speaking to beneficiaries and the way we interact, and I am not saying we do not have an agenda, we have an agenda in terms of programmess, we need to support the broader mission of the organization but we will not in any way force an organization and say this is what you have to do. What we ask for is that programmess need to have an evaluation component. Now if some NGOs see that as an agenda by the Foundation, then that probably could be seen as pushing our own agenda. But we are saying funding is scarce and because our funding is limited to our experience, we need to be very sure that the work we are funding has a particular impact because part of our agenda is to disseminate learning in the sector and push NGOs to be innovative in the work that they are doing.*¹⁷

Mokgapi Maleka, a Senior Project officer at the Open Society Foundation concurred with Morris. He said:

*I know that the organization I work for has a clear agenda, to promote democracy – that's the agenda. And in cases where NGOs are contracted, I would imagine they are forced to conform to that philosophy that the organization stands for. We treat NGOs as independent entities but make sure that they do not go out to do their own things, whatever we agree on they have to do it.*¹⁸

And Phiroshaw Camay, Director of CORE echoed the same sentiments. He argued that:

*Often donors come along and say we have a Civil Society Strengthening Programme or a governance programmes and yet those agendas have been set in Washington, London, Paris or wherever. So often local NGOs bid for work and agree to do that work which is really the donor's agenda, it's definitely not the local agenda. The trick is how to implement changes so as to create a local agenda. That is really the skill.*¹⁹

b. Donors and funding guidelines: Bad tools or sources of creativity?

The above remarks indicate that donors can directly influence the agenda priorities of the recipient organizations through their funding guidelines, mission statements and objectives. Guidelines serve to ensure responsibility and accountability for funds.²⁰ However, the questions that need to be asked are whether this is a bad practice when these guidelines define and determine the agenda for recipient organizations? How do they do this. Gary Hawes of the Ford Foundation suggested an answer:

I am sure that our partners are intelligent human beings and they know what some of our priorities are and they would shape proposals to meet those priorities. I do not want to sound over cynical, but it is a fact of life that NGOs and CBOs have to scramble to find funding to implement the projects and programmes. So it is in their best interest to get to know what the priorities of the donor are and see how their goals might overlap with the goals of the Foundation.²¹

Hawes's comments seem to agree with what Tvedt (1998) argues: that, in order to access money, NGOs tend to describe the local needs in the aid language prevailing at any one point in time, as a means of maintaining organizational activities as well as for the sake of the oppressed. In the same line, Alicia Pieterse of Interfund commented:

I was a director of an NGO before and you learn to play the game. What I used to do was to match the needs of the community. I never used to just draft a standard proposal. I used to adjust the needs of the community to suit whichever donor's criteria. I would want to know that we have leaders who are passionate enough about local agendas but are also equipped enough to go back to the office and write a proposal in such a way that it can generate funds, because you can not do without funds. So what I am saying is that we have to report to these people in a very sophisticated way. You must understand that even here we have to be schizophrenic. We live in a third world environment but report to the first world people. So the reporting has to be in the first world standard, highly sophisticated. But when you go to the field, you surely do not want to be sophisticated but reality is, when you come back to the office and you have to present problems of that community, you have to do it in a sophisticated first world standard.²²

Moreover, it seems, according to Ben Fani, co-coordinator of the National Network of Community Based Organizations, proposals are then expected to be formulated in terms of what donors are known to be prepared to fund rather than in terms of what communities themselves have determined to be their priorities (*Development Update* 2001, Vol. 3. No. 4, 37). However Christopher Landsberg, a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, had a different argument. He argued that some NGOs do not have an agenda for what they want to do:

They go to the donors to raise funds for their agenda. They do this by asking what the donor is funding that particular year. They then go back to their offices to write proposals in line with the funding guidelines of the donor.²³

In the context of isomorphic change formulated by Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, one can argue that the more uncertain and ambiguous the goals of these organizations, the greater the extent to which organizations will model themselves upon organiza-

tions that they depend on.²⁴ Whether this is a bad practice or not is the question. What is clear though is the fact that at times donors do not have to directly put pressure on the NGO or set its agenda. Landsberg has a more simple explanation. He says:

*The NGO is just gullible and conforms to the donor's agenda without any conditionality*²⁵.

This view, however, misses the opportunistic element in the search of NGOs for funding to survive, even though it is true that such organizations jump from one particular plan of action to another in order to access funding. Abie Dithlake, Director of SANGOCO, maintained that:

*If one moves from the point of understanding that philanthropy is generally not an innocent thing, it is based on particular interests and particular needs of the philanthropists, there is no doubt of the impact of the donor community on NGOs especially as they are very dependent on that philanthropy. This impact happens in a number of ways. First, they determine what needs to happen because donors say these are our priorities and this is what we fund. We see that many people then go to develop proposals in line with what the donors perceive to be the priorities. Second, we see NGOs jumping from one particular issue to the next, for example from gender to HIV-AIDS because that is where money happens to be at that particular time. That in itself does not reflect what the particular nation needs and what the priorities are at that point in time. This reflects largely donor driven programmes.*²⁶

Dithlake's views could be matched with those of Steven Friedman of the Center for Policy Studies, who questioned cynically the motives of some NGOs:

*Why do people want to be part of civil society? What's so special about being part of civil society? Why is somebody who is part of civil society better than somebody who is not? Everybody wants to be part of civil society because donors give money to civil society.*²⁷

These views show that jumping from one issue to the other could really be problematic, especially if organizations end up taking projects that they have no expertise in or have very broad objectives that look fancy but unachievable. According to a 1999 CPS study, many CBOs had difficulty providing a clearly defined set of objectives and priorities. Many of their mission statements conveyed a strong commitment to values and principles such as social justice, equity, non-racialism, gender equality, human rights, democracy and freedom. These (laudable and unrealistic) aims according to this study were formulated to appeal to and attract funders (Core/Idasa 2001: 49). This is a situation where organizations knowingly, unknowingly and or willingly are influenced by what donors are funding in a way that is detrimental.

c. The problem

The problem with guidelines as the evidence suggests, is that they might facilitate lip service by NGOs to the issues. NGOs end up doing something completely new, different from their initial vision. For Xolela Mangcu, Director of the Steve Biko Foundation:

There are a lot of things that NGOs are doing that they would not do were it not for funders. If funding were not a major concern, these NGOs would be honest with themselves. There are things that have to do with issues of identity, issues of consciousness and

issues of values that NGOs are not attending to. A lot of NGOs develop this isomorphic syndrome; they begin to transform themselves to chase the money.²⁸

And according to Morris, NGOs end up chewing off more than they can swallow.²⁹ The problem here is that if the only reason for being an organization is to chase money and survive then there is something very wrong which needs attending to. There is obviously no commitment or passion about the vision of the organization, and donors should be very wary about this. However, according to some donors that I talked to, this appears to be something that they identify with ease. According to Jan Nijzink, Director of the Regional Office of Hivos for Southern Africa:

It is not difficult to see through applications. We never ask NGOs to write proposals based on our priorities. It is a big mistake if NGOs think they will get money because they have read our document. That would be very opportunistic of NGOs. We look at the experience of the NGO and if it is a new NGO, we look for the experience of the donors who are funding the NGO. It is very easy to find out if an NGO is just paying lip service for example on gender.³⁰

d. Solution

It seems therefore to us that funding guidelines can influence NGO priorities but this can be overcome through mechanisms to test the commitment of the NGO. The Ford Foundation, for example, spends quality time with its grantees. Ford Foundation staff makes site visits, evaluate what they have accomplished and at the end of the process reach a consensus on goals to be pursued.³¹ The Mott Foundation also has a regular process of feedback and reflection and thinking through what is needed. According to Christa Kuljian:

We have an on-going relationship with our grantees. We do not want to say we negotiated this grant, here is the money, we will see you in three years, good luck. We want to have an on-going communication and be able to learn from the experiences of our grantees.³²

Eugene Saldanha of the NPP also commented on the relationship between his organization and its donors (Mott, Ford and Atlantic Philanthropies). He said:

It is excellent. The advantage with Mott is that we have found them not only to be a grantmaker; we have found them to be a partner. In the Income Tax lobby, Mott has attended our meetings; made suggestions at the substantive levels...Mott has contributed in a way that goes just beyond just giving us a cheque. Those are the kinds of relationships that we look forward to with our funders, where funders understand the work we do, support it and are simply not an organization that gives a cheque.³³

It seems therefore that NGOs develop their own mission, and on the basis of that mission, they develop a set of work plans. They then take these plans to international donors who then fund them on the merits of their proposals and their capacity. They do this in response to particular needs in the NGO sector and in South Africa. The NPP, for example, responds to problems related to the financial sustainability of the NGO sector. Mott, Ford and other donors have supported the NPP's work on the basis of how it has delivered and that has been the primary drive for funding the

NPP.³⁴ The same applies to organizations like CPS, Interfund, CSVr and many others. It seems true that both donors and NGOs respond to problems and issues on the ground. There is a coming together of minds. In short, Alice Brown (Director, Ford Foundation) captured this when she said:

*An example would be HIV-AIDS. Everyone realizes that it is a problem facing South Africa. Donors, NGOs, CBOs and individuals realize this. There will be some groups, be they CBO or NGO who would respond to the problem by developing different programmes on HIV-AIDS and in turn because I am a donor who wants to be responsive to real issues and problems on the ground, I am going to be receptive to requests that are targeted at dealing with the pandemic. So it's not a matter of me as a donor setting the agenda, I do not think the donor should set the agenda. And for that matter I do not think the NGO can set an agenda in a vacuum. The issues set the agenda and the problems facing the communities in which we work (donors, NGOs and CBOs) and that is what we all need to be responding to.*³⁵

What we can say at this stage is that it seems that the development agenda in South Africa's non-profit sector is set by the context. Donors and grantees have been responding to needs of the communities that they serve. However, in doing this, NGOs should be evolutionary. For instance, during the period of apartheid, it was important and it made sense for public interest law centres to fight apartheid laws and focus their attention on promoting and protecting civil and political rights. In 2003, this is no longer as pertinent; most people have civil and political rights. What people lack are social and economic rights. It thus makes sense for public interest law centres which previously fought pass laws, lobbied for freedom of expression and association etc, to shift their work and deal with issues of housing, access to clean water and towards realizing that social and economic rights are guaranteed under the new constitution. This is an example where groups are not corrupting their mandate but are responding and adapting to contextual needs. We observe that there is overwhelming evidence, which suggests that it is not always true that paying the piper means calling the tune. From our study, this happens only in rare and extreme cases. One of these cases, according to Abie Dithlake is when:

*Ruthless donors, who in the event that that they failed to achieve what they wanted through their activities begin to have a direct and political role in coercing and determining who should be the people and leaders of the particular organization before they could fund it.*³⁶

Another case is where the grantee does not have a diversified funding base. Alice Brown (a donor) alluded to this when she said:

*We do not want a grantee to be solely dependent on us; it is not a healthy relationship. It is not healthy for any recipient to be solely dependent on one source of funding...Some organizations have done well in diversifying their funding bases and therefore will not be so completely or totally be subject to the whims or will of one or two donors. That is the best position to be in.*³⁷

While we have maintained that donors are not setting the agenda for their grantees, we have also observed that it is easy for smaller organizations to succumb to the demands

of a donor if their funding base is not diversified. This can be said to be a creation of donors. Donors tend to have a weakness of funding bigger and more professional organizations that have a good track record, at the expense of smaller grassroots based organizations. As a result of this, smaller grassroots organizations have no leverage to resist the demands of the donor. Resisting the demands may translate into losing the grant. This is a serious weakness and it is very common among donor foundations.

e. A common weakness

Most of the donor organizations that we looked at share a common weakness. They tended to fund larger, professional and urban organizations with a proven track record. One donor said:

I think that one area of weakness with quite a few international donor agencies is that we tend to fund larger, more established NGOs that happen to be in big cities like Gauteng, Natal, Western Cape and Braamfontein.³⁸

This has also been echoed at the grassroots level. Ben Fani, commenting on the state of community-based organizations, argued in 1998 that changes in donor practice favoured larger, sophisticated and urban non-governmental organizations at the expense of smaller, grass-roots organizations, which are no longer able to meet the more rigorous criteria and reporting requirements of Northern donors.³⁹ The book *Funding Virtue: Civil Society and Democracy Promotion* also discusses this. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers observe that donors end up concentrating on a very narrow set of organizations. These are the professionalised urban NGOs that focus mainly on issues directly related to democratisation. Marina Ottaway argues that the organizations that this aid targets are creations of donor funding rather than of social demands for representation. This has resulted in many of these organizations tending to resemble each other in their leadership, programmess and ideological outlook. They tend to be much closer to the donors' preferences than to the needs of the supposed constituencies. Bluntly put by Christopher Landsberg:

At times donors tend to have a buddy-buddy relationship with particular NGOs. They know the individual who can write the best proposal that suits their demands but not the needs and the critical nature of the work and simply give support on that basis.⁴⁰

This view obviously misses the contractual nature of relationships and the fact that outcomes are measurable. But supposing such relationships exist, the question would be; why is this? Who should carry the blame? Xolela Mangcu has the answer. He argues:

You cannot blame donors when NGO leaders have no guts to stand up for their own ideas. Do donors seem to influence local organizations? Of course they do, but the extent to which they influence depends on the quality of leadership of the organization.⁴¹

Mangcu's views seem to discard the notion that NGOs are vulnerable to a donor driven agenda. While we agree that this is true for organizations with quality leaders, we are nevertheless not convinced about the extent to which this can be advanced by smaller CBOs and other NGOs that do work that does fall into the priorities of

many donors. Research organizations, for example, seem to us to be vulnerable to a donor driven agenda. Steven Friedman, Director of CPS, a research organization, for instance, explained that while CPS stood and fell by its independence, it faced difficulties in accessing funding to carry through its own research agenda. He said:

We try to develop our own research agenda. However, we must be honest, most of the time a lot of what we are doing is not our research agenda, it is the donor's research agenda. But that does not mean we are total slaves. We try within that to do as much our own research agenda as we can. Sometimes we succeed in persuading the donor that our research agenda is worth funding... There is no way that I can look you in the eye and say that we have entirely our own agenda and we do not do what the donors want us to do. No research organization would look you in the eye and tell you that. It won't be telling you the truth. It is not possible to survive even for one day if you take that attitude. If you are asking me, are we simply slaves of the donors? Then I would get angry because we do get lucky and manage to persuade our donors that what we want to do is what they want to fund. Secondly we do not just take it at face value. We discuss and negotiate. We would not do the work, which we think is totally out of our experience and research interest.⁴²

While it is clear that there are challenges that the sector is facing, it is also true that there are mechanisms to meet these challenges.

f. Meeting challenges

It is very clear from Friedman's comments that research organizations, for example, can develop their own agenda but it is more difficult for them to follow through their entire agenda even if a good leadership exists. Donors will have something that they want researched. This is not true of CPS only. It is also true of CSVr, CORE and other research organizations as well. Mott's support, for example, for CSVr's Transition and Reconciliation Unit was to ensure the continuation of the process of transition and reconciliation in South Africa. And that to CPS was to support a survey on race and ethnic relations. Ford's support to the same organizations also has its own objectives. For the CSVr, the Ford Foundation's objective was to evaluate the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Gender Project, and to also examine the patterns, causes and prevention of violence. To meet these challenges, however, these organizations have consequently put in place systematic plans to attain sustainability over a period of time. For instance, they have developed marketing strategies for their publications that generate income, and perhaps more successfully, have developed consultancy units that charge for services.

This discussion leads us to at least suggest answers to the question, who then is promoting gender in South Africa? We give a brief discussion. Brief, because we believe we have discussed the question indirectly in the previous sections.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we looked at the extent to which donors impact on the development agenda of civil society organizations in South Africa. While this study is not a universal sample, its findings, nevertheless, may apply to other donors and NGOs as well that are not covered here. Based on the organizations that we looked at, there is evidence that

suggests that the relationship between donors and NGOs is complex. It is true that most NGOs are dependent on donors. However, the extent to which this dependence helps donors exert their leverage on NGOs in the prioritization of programmes is debatable. What is clear, though, is that dependence on external donor funding can shape the NGO's agenda in ways determined by broad donor priorities. However, NGOs are able to negotiate their agenda within the broad parameters of the guidelines. And this is not to say there are no challenges that NGOs and donors meet in their relationship. The position that International Fundraising Consortium (Interfund) occupies, as discussed earlier, presents an example of challenges that other intermediary organizations could face in South Africa. Interfund finds itself having to satisfy many donor demands and yet still be accountable to the community-based organizations that it supports. A balance has to be struck between donors and grantees.

Problems on the ground must inform policy as well as set donor and NGO priorities. As Alice Brown put it, the agenda must be set not by the donor or the NGO, but by the context. We conclude therefore by stating that while there are many challenges that NGOs face in South Africa, they have not sacrificed themselves to donors. They have achieved this by diversifying their funding bases. However, what this chapter did not explore, which might be worth doing, is the impact that internal funding may have on the same NGOs if they were to receive support from domestic sources like the National Development Agency. We recommend further research on this because we believe that there is more internal funding to the sector as shown by "The Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector in South Africa". And this makes us rethink the arguments that have been developed about the sector's vulnerability to international donors and their agendas. We also want to make a note that our study did not look at the impact funding has on grassroots organizations in its analysis. We recommend a further study on these. We believe relations with their grantors may be different from the ones that we looked at, that tended to be bigger and located in urban areas.

NOTES

1. We use the word donor to refer to foundations that support civil society organizations in South Africa. This support can be financial or technical. The word donor is not used in this chapter to refer to an individual or individuals.
2. For the emergence and role of NGOs in general, see Brown and Korten (1991), Tvedt (1998), Jorgensen (1996), Farrington and Bebbington (1993), Hadenius (1996), Naidoo (1997), Hulme and Edwards (1996). Korten (1991), Blair (1997) and Van Rooy (1998) among others.
3. A lot of literature on NGOs in South Africa testifies to this fact and most of my respondents concurred with this observation.
4. Steven Burkeman argues that donor-recipient relations are inherently unhealthy because they reflect unequal power relations (Burkeman, 2001:152).
5. Private foundations that we use are mainly American. These include the Open Society for South Africa, the Ford Foundation and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. In addition, we use European foundations such as the Humanistic Institute for International Development (HIVOS) and the Atlantic Philanthropies. Among the

development organizations most of whom are grantees of the above foundations, we use the Steve Biko Foundation, Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Center for Policy Studies, the International Fundraising Consortium, the Group for Environmental Monitoring, the South Africa NGO Coalition, the Cooperative for Research and Education, the Non-profit Partnership, the Southern Grant Makers Association and Mvula Trust.

6. See, for example, the list of demands that women made to be incorporated into the Freedom Charter in "What Women Want", www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/women/demand.html.
7. Andre Gunder Frank discusses this in *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, 1967 and also in *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa* (1973), probably influenced by the work of Walter Rodney (1972), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.
8. See for example the discussion by Hollis Chenery and Allan Strout (1966).
9. See also a study by Howard White (1992), *The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey*, Paul Mosley (1995), *Aid Effectiveness* and Peter Boone (1994), *The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth*.
10. This definition was agreed upon after conflicting ideas by South African researchers, academics and practitioners on the definition offered by the CIVICUS Index Project, which had defined civil society as: the sphere of institutions, organizations, networks and individuals (and their values) located between the confines of the family, the state and the market, which is bound by a set of shared civic rules, and in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests (Core/ Idasa 2001: 3).
11. Hulme and Edwards also used this to refer to pressures for co-optation of recipient organizations by donors.
12. Interview with Christa L. Kuljian (Braamfontein), 5 March 2002.
13. David Hulme and Michael Edwards (1996) discuss the effects of dependency in detail in *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort...* They say that although the evidence is inconclusive, there are signs that greater dependence on funding may compromise NGO performance in key areas, distort accountability and weaken legitimacy.
14. This discussion about the impact of international funding should also be understood in the context of South Africa's transition to democracy and the route donors took then. First, we will remember that after 1994, many donors rerouted support to fund the democratic government directly. Thus, NGOs were hard hit by diminishing budgets. Second, there was an exodus of people from the NGO sector to government departments. The sector therefore was affected in terms of both human resource capacity as well as financial resource capacity. Hence, according to Chetty (2000), this diminution in the pool of donor funding and rechanneling to government forced many CSOs to bow to the pressures of funder demands. Thus the agenda and plans of institutions become funder driven. For a detailed history of international funding to South Africa, see Christopher Landsberg and Michael Bratton in *Good Intentions...* pp. 259-314.
15. Interview with Alicia Pieterse (Braamfontein), 8 March 2002. Beni Fani also alludes to this. He says "donors own and control these resources... Sometimes, a donor's agreement to make funds available has strings attached, some obvious, some hidden" (*Development Update*, Vol. 2. No. 1. 1998).
16. The Rand is the South African currency.

17. Interview with Renald Morris (Braamfontein), 4 March 2002
18. Interview with Mogkapi Maleka (Braamfontein), 22 February 2002
19. Interview with Phiroshaw Camay (Johannesburg), 7 March 2002
20. Interview with Zakes Hlathswayo (Braamfontein), President of SANGOCO, 8 April 2002.
21. Interview with Gary Hawes (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002
22. Interview with Pieterse.
23. Interview with Christopher Landsberg (Witwatersrand University), 6 March 2002.
24. Terje Tvedt argues that donor money and donor policies shape organizational landscapes in other countries and this creates the dilemma between organizations' external dependency and their roots in society (pp. 5).
25. Interview with Landsberg.
26. Interview with Abie Dithlake (Braamfontein), 23 April 2002
27. Interview with Steven Friedman (Doornfontein), 12 February 2002
28. Interview with Dr. Xolela Mangcu (Braamfontein), 4 March 2002
29. Interview with Morris, opcit
30. Interview with Jan Nijzink (Harare/Zimbabwe) 27 May 2002
31. Interview with Gary Hawes and Alice Brown (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002
32. Interview with Kuljian.
33. Interview with Saldanha.
34. Interview with Saldanha.
35. Interview with Alice Brown (Braamfontein), 13 March 2002.
36. Interview with Dithlake.
37. Interview with Brown.
38. Interview with Kuljian.
39. See the article: "Sacrificed to the donor gods: community-based organizations' struggle for survival" in *Development Update*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1998, pp. 37-40.
40. Interview with Landsberg.
41. Interview with Mangcu.
42. Interview with Friedman.

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11

STATE, ETHNIC MILITIAS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

Augustine Ikelegbe

Nigeria has become an arena of intense ethnic anxiety, fears and suspicion, the ethnisation of nearly every issue, the erection of ethnic shelters and security, a growing ethnic self assertion, increased ethnic activism and disputation and increased ethnic based contestation and challenges. Ethnicity has since the 1990s acquired a heightened political salience. It has become highly mobilized and group platforms for collective ethnic action have proliferated. Ethnic and regional groupings are now at the center of the political arena, influencing the political direction of the nation (*This Day*, 2002).

Ethnic conflicts too have emerged as one of the main sources of violence and conflicts. Since democratisation opened up the political space in 1999, ethnic politicisation and mobilisation for political action have been reinvigorated. Particularly, contestation and claims for and against the state and other ethnic groups have become more recurrent. Ethnic politics in the form of the threat or actual deployment of violence to actualise ethnic objectives is on the rise. Ethnic and ethno-religious groups have engaged themselves violently at the slightest provocation. On several occasions, profound conflicts and crises that have pushed the nation's delicate unity and stability to the tip of the precipice and threatened the very basis of the nation's ethnic pluralism have occurred in the last few years. Ihonvbere (2000) notes that Nigeria is characterised by ethnic violence and "all forms of underground resistance and challenges to the state and instability". Ethnic based clashes with security forces in some parts of the country have become a rampant phenomenon and have recently assumed a more dangerous dimension, particularly in the South-West, South-South and Middle Belt regions.

The intensification and mobilization of ethnic nationalism has fed into a multiplication of ethnic nationalist movements and militias in the Southern and Middle Belt Regions and fundamentalist militias in the Northern region. In the Niger Delta, a cluster of armed communal and ethnic militias groups has been active in the resource, self-determination and environmental struggles. Militia groups have become the instrument for ethnic contestations and confrontations. The very bloody and highly destructive ethnic clashes between the Itsekiris and Ijaws in Delta, the Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani

in Lagos, Ogun, Kwara, Kano, Oyo and Kaduna states, the Yoruba and Igbo in Lagos, and the Hausa/Fulani and Igbo in Kano, Kaduna, Abia and Imo States have had some participation of ethnic militias.

Major ethnic and religious conflagrations and incidences have occasioned serious devastation, not only of lives and properties but of national integration, trust and confidence. The trend of ethnic and communal conflicts, the spate of violence and destruction, the scale of state security operations, and the frequency and recurring nature of the conflicts are some of Nigeria's worst experiences since the civil war. There are serious fears that the amorphous, standing and transient ethnic and fundamentalist militias could constitute the ready standby armies or the recruitment base for various groups in the event of civil war.

Mobilized ethnic groupings and militias represent a serious political challenge to Nigeria's statehood and democracy. Ethnic conflicts reflect the failure of political integration, the accentuation of divisions and the persistence of centrifugal tendencies. There are fears that this trend may not only scuttle the embryonic democracy but undermine national unity and security. The ethnic conflicts not only point to a failing state or one on the brink but raise serious fears of an implosion. The greatest challenge today to Nigeria as a nation and a fledgeling democracy is the maintenance of unity, peace and stability, which in the contest of increased ethnic contestation, conflicts and violence has been fairly lacking.

The chapter examines the phenomenon of ethnic militia groupings, the reasons for their emergence, and their objectives, roles and activities. It seeks to identify how the character and nature of the Nigerian state and the configuration of ethnic power or hegemony, democratisation, economic crisis and other factors impinge on or underlie the phenomenon of ethnic militias. It examines the underlying factors of ethnic militia deployments against the state and other ethnic groupings as well as the nature and magnitude of the encounters. The nature of state responses to militia group formation and activities as well as the problems and consequences of ethnic militia operations on inter group relations and security are also examined. Finally, the chapter prescribes policy recommendations and prospects for the management of ethnic militias, ethnic conflicts and violence.

The source of data for the research is secondary. We relied on newspapers, magazines, reports, documentaries and articles to provide information on the militia groups. Using content analysis, we sifted relevant information. We used the case study method in order to do an in-depth and detailed data gathering and analysis on a selected case, the Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC). The analysis is transactional as we seek to capture the nature of state-militia interactions and how these have shaped the militia phenomenon. Finally, the analysis is qualitative. Two central hypotheses are generated. First, the nature, character and policies of the Nigerian state explain the intense mobilization and militarization of ethnicity. The second postulates that current state policies and responses to ethnic militia activities intensify the phenomenon.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW

Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have today emerged as the most deadly threat to statehood, national and institutional stability, political order, national security, democratic durability and peace in Africa and elsewhere (Diamond, 1987). Osaghae (1994) has noted that ethnic conflicts have remained “the Achilles heel of the post-colonial states in Africa”. It has also become the “most serious challenge to the consolidation of new democracies...” (Plattner and Diamond 1993). Further, ethnic conflicts and the nature of state response to them have compounded the crises of legitimacy and governance (Suberu, 1996).

Several theses have been posited to explain ethnic conflicts and the ethnic nationalism, mobilization, politicisation and militancy that often underlie them. The social deprivation model situates ethnic conflicts in the differential modernization and development of groups and the social stratification, inequalities and disparities that result therefrom (Beck, 1980; Hodson and Kaufman, 1982; Horowitz, 1985; Siobhian, 2001; Wilson, 2001). But there is a poor fit between uneven distribution of opportunities, resources and capacity, and ethnic conflict (Horowitz, 1985). Ethno-nationalist antagonism is not proportionally related to any social inequality; neither does differential modernisation in itself lead to ethnic conflicts (Horowitz, 1985; Wilson, 2001).

The resource competition model posits that where ethnic identity is associated with clear advantages in valued political and economic resources, it becomes a basis for mobilisation, organisation and collective action (Melson and Wolpe, 1971; Olzak, 1983; Rothchild, 1998). While this may be true, it is the centrality and scarcity of the objects of competition and the nature of competition that determine how antagonistic, tense and violent inter-ethnic relations become. Ethnic mobilisation is also seen as a creation of the elites deployed in inter-elite struggles for representation, resources and privileges (Diamond, 1988; Sundberg, 1999; Ogachi, 1999). Ogachi (1999) claims that elite manipulation often underlies violent confrontations between communities. However, the thesis is weak except where some “mass sentiments, apprehensions and some general sentiments and aspirations, some threats to group well-being, survival and culture and some general psychological and material benefits exist” (Hayward, 1976; Horowitz, 1985; Esman, 1994; Osaghae, 2001).

More recent postulations situate ethnic mobilization and conflicts in the nature of the state and the terrain of politics it spawns. Egwu (2001: 3) note, that the salience of ethnicity is in its relations to the state and the political process. Esman (1994: 19) believes that state policies and practices precipitate most contemporary ethnic conflicts and are the “principal targets of mobilized ethnic movements”. Three dimensions of the state its size, character and behaviours are vital in our consideration of how it creates ethnic mobilization and conflicts.

The post-colonial state in Africa is an instrument of personal, ethnic and sectional interests and power (Osaghae, 1994). It is an ethnic hegemonic instrument, captured and used as an agent of excluding, subordinating, depriving and repressing other groups (William and Turner, 1980; Esman, 1994; Ihonvbere, 2000) It is partisan and partial (Rupesinghe, 1989). It is an exploitative, coercive, alien and violent structure employed

by the dominant forces and state officials to “exploit, suppress, repress and marginalize, impoverish and subordinate classes” and to cater for, protect, service and enrich the privileged (Ihonvbere, 1988).

The broad, extensive and powerfully influential terrain of politics spawned by the state determines ethnic worth, status, recognition and entitlement. Hence, politics in divided societies becomes a struggle for pre-eminence, domination and inclusion or the aversion of subordination, suppression and exclusion. The large stakes of politics and the huge consequences of inclusion or exclusion for the fortunes of groups, spawns mutual insecurity, fear, suspicion and tensions, and ethnic nationalism, activism, conflicts and violence (Magel and Olzak, 1981; Timbiah, 1990; Newman, 1991; Da Silva, 1975: 247; Horowitz, 1985: 185-188; Otite, 1990: 142; Esman, 1994: 234). Violent ethnic conflicts arise as both aggrieved and advantaged groups mobilize to struggle for survival and the decimation of rival ethnic claimants (Lemarchand, 1997). The state then is the site and focus of conflict. It is the critical issue in the heightening of identity and identity politics (Jibrin, 2000). Identity politics is further both a tool and a consequence of the behaviour and actions of the African state.

As a tool, the state constructs and reconstructs ethnicity to fragment resistance and to conceal legitimacy and regime problems and weaknesses (Ake, 1983; Mamdani, 1996). As Kieh (2000) points out, African leaders faced with legitimacy problems resort to establishing a political base in their ethnic community and thus manufacture conflicts with other groups (Kieh, 2001). As a consequence, they generate ethnic conflicts and accentuate their “intensity and disruptive capacities” (Osaghae 1994). For example, the state creates regional and ethnic inequalities and generate regional, cultural, religious, ethnic and communal insecurity (Diamond, 1988; Wunsch, 1995; Wunsch and Olowu, 1995).

The institutional or state weakness and collapse that pervades Africa alienates and frustrates the citizenry, raises fears of instability and security and heightens the need for ethnic shelters and protection outside the state (Ndikumana, 1998: 31; Ignatief, 1999: 7; Wilson, 2001: 369). Further, institutional weakness is associated with intense conflicts and violence, militarization of ethnic conflicts, proliferation of insurgency movements, private armies, self-help movements and ethnic militias (Zartman, 1995; Rothchild and Alexander, 1995; World Bank, 1997; Berschenk and De Sadan, 1997; Baker, 1999).

In addition, the corrupt, arrogant, repressive, personalist and abusive nature of the African state, its insensitivity to the problems, needs, difficulties and sufferings of the people and its weak and ineffective performance in critical roles have made the state irrelevant. As a result, the people have relied less on the state and its institutions and agents but rather turn to “ethnic, religious and philanthropic organizations for solace, support and security, hope, leadership, self expression, survival and refuge (Ihonvbere, 1988; Ekeh, 1998).

As for factors which transform ethnic contestation and conflicts into violent and oppositional encounters, several postulations also exist. First is the existence of real or perceived serious threats. Mobilized and violent ethnicity arises often in defence or strengthening of self against outsider aggression or interference (Esman, 1994: 244; Mortimer, 1999: viii). Second is the opportunity structure for agitation and change. The

choices faced by marginalized groups mediate or shape the nature of challenge, protestation and violence. Where opportunities exist for peaceful exchanges and for change, peaceful avenues may be sought but the case may be radically different in favour of more intense mobilization and perhaps violent avenues where the opportunity structure is slim. Third is the openness or closedness of opportunity for civil struggles. The existence of closed structures tends to mobilise ethnicity towards militant and violent actions. Fourth, the collapse of dialogue transforms manageable tensions into outright violence (Wilson, 2001). Fifth is the existence of state authoritarianism. Studies tend to indicate relationships between state repression and periods of political organizing and unrest (Warren, 1993). The authoritarian and oppressive African state, as examples of Siad Barre's rule in Somalia and Sani Abacha in Nigeria indicate, also generates ethnic and clan assertion, mobilization and militarization (Lemarchand, 1997; Baker, 1999). Repression tends to drive ethnic movements towards the extra-legal and violent. Sixth is the strength or weakness of a state. In fact, weak states are easy targets because of the high prospects for successful challenges (Esman, 1994). The depth of grievances is a factor too. Beyond a certain threshold, a frustrated group would challenge even a strong state (Esman, 1994).

The literature on ethnic militias is quite scanty, though some information exists on the phenomenon from Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville. What is quite clear is that they are neither driven nor incited dominantly by ethnic nationalism or hatred. In fact ethnic nationalism is more of a binding force and an "ordering device" rather than the 'motivating or impelling' force (Mueller, 2002). Ethnic militarization is actually either directly the handwork of the incitement, manipulation, recruitment, arming, direction, utilization and coordination or the stirring, permission and support of the political elites and authorities (Mueller, 2000). The core of the social base of ethnic militias comprises two groups. First the underclass of frustrated, poor and unemployed youths, and second is the underworld of criminals, hooligans, thugs, street boys, ex-convicts and ruffians (Richards, 1996; Mueller, 2000). Ethnic militias are rarely a disciplined force of ethnic agitation. Rather they are purveyors of harassment, intimidation, rape, looting, killings and destruction. They also tend to possess little social control, cohesion and unity being often subjects of factionalization, balkanization, division and strife.

STATE, ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

Nigeria has a comparatively extensive ethnic pluralism (Otite, 1990). There are over 250 different ethnic groups and a fairly equal distribution of two religions: Christianity and Islam. This configuration of identities rather than being an asset has become invidious since colonialism. Ethnic consciousness and identities were to a large extent created, widened and shaped under colonial rule (Forrest, 1995: 20). When Nigerian nationalism commenced, it was with the vigorous political mobilisation of sub-nationalisms (IDEA, 2000: 94). Since independence, the political process has been pervaded by intense ethnic and sectional/regional struggles for power, and intense ethnic and religious

identities have undermined political control, national unity and integration (Forrest, 1995: 3). Ethnic politics and conflicts have plagued Nigeria since colonial times and threatened the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity twice in the 1960s (IDEA, 2000: 94). The nation has had a "record of chronic and ultimately catastrophic ethnic and regional conflicts and in fact the first republic collapsed because of intense ethnic competition and conflicts (Diamond, 1988: pp. 3, 15).

Inter-ethnic relations have been characterized by competition and opposition (Nnoli, 1989: pp. 10). The relationship between the major ethnic groups, some minority groups, and majority groups and between some minority groups has been one of animosity, antagonism, hostility and tension. Inter-ethnic tension between the major ethnic groups dates back to the early 1940s. Osaghae (1994: pp. 4 - 5) identifies two phases of ethnic conflicts. The first, which followed independence, was largely orchestrated by the intense inter-elite competition for state power, within which ethnicity became an instrument or weapon. The ethnically based inter-elite competition and hegemonic struggles were not only limited to politics, but permeated labour, state institutions and the universities (Nnoli, 1978: pp. 215-255). Ethnic violence pervaded the public domain during the period.

The second phase which commenced with the 1980s, witnessed the resurgence of the old conflicts and emergence of new ones. The phase was characterized by economic crisis and reforms, state repression, civil challenge and democratisation. Inter-ethnic and inter communal conflicts have since become more rampant, devastating and recurring. There have been bloody and highly destructive intra and inter-ethnic clashes between the Ife and Modakeke, Aguleri and Umuleri, Ijaw and Yoruba, Itsekiri and Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo, Bassa and Egbura, Hausa/Fulani and Sawaya, Zango-Kataf and Hausa/Fulani, Tiv and Jukun/Kuteb, and Hausa/Fulani and indigenous groups in Plateau and Benue states.

The state and the governments at the federal and state levels have been the main instrument and object of inter-ethnic struggle. Consequently, the control of the state has been used to foster ethnic interests and for disproportionate appropriation. Consequently every element of Nigerian politics has been ethnically politicised and the object of inter-ethnic rivalry. Socio-economic development, social facilities, resource distribution, electoral representation and the creation of administrative units of states and local governments have been intensely politicised since the late 1940s. The sense of pride and ascendancy and the hierarchy of superiorisation or inferiorisation that these elements indicate has fuelled dangerous rivalry and conflicts (Nnoli, 1978: pp. 176-214). The state rather than an arena of mediating resource and political conflicts has been an integral and partisan part deployed to subject, subordinate, exclude or otherwise to favour particular groups (William and Turner, 1980: pp. 70, 96). Thus the state has been an arena of "competition for sectional and communal advantage and the advancement of community, ethnic and sectional interests particularly in the control of resources" (William and Turner, 1980: pp. 69-70, 80; IDEA: pp. 40). Vital state institutions have been victims of sectionalism, partisan-ness and repression.

Military rule underlined by ethnic and sectional hegemony considerably heightened the grievances of exclusion, marginalisation, oppression and subordination, which in

turn erected a large tinderbox of anger and antagonism that has been exploding since the 1990s. The attempted reverse of the direction of ethnic and sectional hegemony through democratic elections in Babangida's transition in 1993 was annulled by military fiat. The result was the heightening of ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and solidarity, the enlargement of an ethnic basis of democratic, resource and social activism, the crystallization of ethnic extremism and an increase in inter-ethnic tensions.

The incidence of politicised ethnic mobilization and conflicts and the phenomenon of ethnic militias have pertained more to the groups where there have been massive and generalized feelings of injustice, marginalisation, exclusion and domination. First are the Yorubas of the South West. Second are the Ijaws and other minority groups of the South-South and third are the Igbos of the South East. In order to protect their interests and prevent further injustices, these groups have been at the forefront of the struggle for a constitutional conference of ethnic nationalities, resource control, regional autonomy and decentralization of the over-bearing central government (Ijediogor, 2000). Ethnic militias have not only emerged but thrived in these groups as a means of addressing quite aggressively ethnic grievances.

Ethnicity has become more salient because of persisting economic crisis, declining living conditions, unemployment, socio-economic inequality and rising insecurity. Economic scarcity has accentuated the need for ethnic advantage and resistance against the ethnically favoured. Insecurity has accentuated the need for ethnic shelters and an ethnic alternative to the state in the form of vigilantes and ethnic militias. Poverty and unemployment have made more glaring existing injustices, inequities and neglect, particularly in the resource-rich Niger Delta. Besides they have created a huge mass of angry, frustrated and disillusioned youths who have become a mass pool available for mobilization and manipulation both to the ethnic militias and the ethnically based political elites for social and political unrest, protests and violence.

ETHNIC MILITIAS IN NIGERIA

The ethnic militias in their present formation in Nigeria can be traced back to 1994 when the Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC) was formed. By 1999, the militias had come to roost as different militia groups not only emerged but became active in the public domain. The Egbesu was active by 1998. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) were established between 1999 and 2000. It needs to be noted that the activity and formation of militias have been particularly high since democratic rule in May 1999. Though the early militias, OPC and Egbesu, were quite active between 1998 and May 1999, their activism grew tremendously between May 1999 and 2000. Either by emulation or as a response or other peculiar conditions, the other groups were formed and became active.

The militias can be categorized on the basis of actual or potential roles as militia groups. There are actual or existing or standing militias and potential militias or militias in different but lower stages of formation and manifestation. The standing militias are the OPC, the Egbesu, Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) and MASSOB. Of these, MASSOB

and APC have been less active and manifest as militias. They have also been less mobilized and their activities have been less threatening and violent. The groups with potential to form militias are the Bakassi Boys and Igbo Youth Congress. The Bakassi Boys are a standing armed group that was formed and is organized as a vigilante group supported by business groups and some state governments in South Eastern Nigeria. Its goals and activities have not been overtly political and engaging of the Nigerian state. But being an armed standing ethnic grouping, it is and can be easily drafted in the event of a threat to the Igbo ethnic group. This was what happened in 2000 when the Bakassi fought Northerners in Aba and Owerri as a reaction to the killing of Igbos in the North during the shari'ah riots. The Igbo Youth Council is assumed to be the Igbo equivalent of the OPC but it has not manifested as such in terms of activity and mobilization. It remains a group in formation. The third category is that of amorphous militias groups. These are not standing militias like the OPC and Egbesu but are disparate and transient groups that are quickly mobilized in the event of ethnic and communal threats. These include the militias involved in various communal and ethnic feuds such as the Tiv, Jukun, Itsekiri, Ijaws, Urhobos, Ile Ife, Modakeke, Aguleri and Umuleri.

The militia groups can also be categorized in terms of the object of grievances and militancy. There are militias whose object of engagement is the Nigerian state. These include the OPC, MASSOB, Egbesu and to some extent the APC. But these groups also attack other ethnic groups and corporate agencies seen to be associated with the Nigerian state. Thus the Hausa/Fulani has been the object of OPC attacks, the Yoruba the object of APC criticism and engagement, and the multinational oil companies the object of Egbesu attacks. The second category of groups do not target the state but other ethnic or communal groups with whom they are in conflict. These are the amorphous and transient militia groups utilized for inter-communal and inter-ethnic warfare. However, the state is a target where it is perceived that it supports or acts on behalf of the other group. Thus the Tiv militias have attacked the military forces sent to keep the peace in the conflict with the Jukuns and Kutebs, and there have been confrontations between the Ijaw militias and Egbesu on the one hand and the Nigerian military on the other in the conflict with the Itsekiris and the multinational oil companies.

As we have noted, the more prominent militia groups are the OPC, Egbesu, APC and MASSOB. Of these, we intend to use the OPC as a case study of the militia phenomenon in Nigeria. However, we provide some information on the other groups.

The Egbesu comprise militant youths who are initiates of the Egbesu deity, the unifying spirit of the Ijaws, the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, that stands for truth and justice and is patronized for invincibility in times of justified wars. The Egbesu deity and the initiation into it became relevant following increased militant agitation of the Ijaws against the federal government and multinational oil companies over grievances in the economy of oil. The repressive responses of the state and its multinational oil company partners to the agitation and particularly the militarization of the region made the need for fortification of the militant youths imperative. There was a flock of youths to the Egbesu shrines.

The Egbesu militant youths do not have a separate standing militia organization though there have been some groups by its name such as the Egbesu Boys of Africa. The

Egbesu is the fighting arm of most militant Ijaw groups which are coordinated and are part of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). In other words, the Egbesus operate through numerous militant groups such as the Movement for the Survival of the Izon Nationality of the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Niger Delta Resistance Movement, the Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities and the apex Ijaw youth group, the IYC. Through these groups, the Egbesu has been involved in encounters with the Nigerian state and oil companies in the Niger Delta. Most of the shut downs, closures, seizures and hijacking of oil facilities have been undertaken by Egbesu militants in various groups and communities. It has engaged in very violent encounters with the Nigerian military and its actions have several times occasioned the biggest peacetime military operations since 1997. It has also through various communities and militant groups been engaged in violent encounters with the Yorubas of Ilaje, Itsekiris and OPC in Ajegunle, Lagos (Okafor, 1998; Ikwunze and Ogoigbe, 1999; Ezomon and Okafor, 1999; Obari, 1999; Niboro, 1999; Suleiman, 1999; Ikelegbe, 2001; 2003).

The Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) is a militant organization which claims to address matters of mutual cultural and political interests to the Northern section of Nigeria (Usigbe, 2000). The APC believes in the unity of the North and opposes the self determination groups such as the OPC (Ugwunnebo and Humble, 2000). It alleges a marginalisation of the North by the Obasanjo presidency (Onwubiko and Madugba, 2000). The group is essentially a reaction to the attacks on Northerners in the South West. It is directed at groups that threaten the North with violence for violence. Membership of the APC cuts across the 19 Northern states. It was launched in December 1999. Its President is Alhaji Sagir Mohammed and the Director of publicity, research and documentation is Asaph Zadok (The Guardian, 2000).

The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is a militant Igbo ethnic separatist group, led by Chief Ralph Uwazuruike. The movement's main objective is the actualization of the hitherto failed secessionist state of Biafra. The militia's main grievance is the continuous marginalisation of the Igbos, the accumulated wrongs perpetrated against them and the incessant killing of Igbos under Shari'ah and related riots in Northern Nigeria (Mamah, 2000). The group threatened to declare a Biafran state on 27 May 2000 but was deterred from doing so by pressures from the federal government and prominent Igbo groups and personalities (Giwa *et al.* 2000). It is associated with few violent incidents, one of which was an attack on a police station in Abia state (Ojeme, 2001). It is based in the Igbo states of the South East and has offices in the state headquarters. It claims that it has a Biafra House in Washington D.C. and a Voice of Biafra International radio station in the USA (Okoro, 2001; Chukwu, 2001).

CASE ANALYSIS: THE ODUDUWA PEOPLES CONGRESS (OPC)

The OPC is a social-cultural association of Yoruba origin. Its name is derived from the ancestral Yoruba father Oduduwa. It operates within Yorubaland, one of the three majority ethnic groups in Nigeria, which occupies the entire South-West region and comprises though arguably about seven states of the Nigerian federation. It was formed on

August 29 1994 at Palm Avenue, Mushin, Lagos by a group of civil activists of Yoruba origin (Bolaji, 2000: 5, 17). Some of the activists such as, Dr. F. Fasheun and Dr. Beko Ramsome Kuti were involved in the pro-democracy struggle. At a point, the OPC was a member of the Joint Action on Democracy (JACON) chaired by fiery activist and democratic campaigner, Gani Fawehimin (Biesanmi and Agwu, 2000).

It was formed as a reaction to the annulment of the June 12 Presidential election presumably won by the late Chief Moshhood Abiola, a Yoruba. It emerged out of a perceived marginalisation, injustice against and domination of the Yoruba group epitomized not just by the annulment but the ensuing siege and repression during the Abacha administration. It was therefore intended as a vanguard for the validation of the annulled June 12 Presidential victory of a Yoruba and as a platform for canvassing for Yoruba self-determination and autonomy through a sovereign national conference (Akpör, 2000: 5). A good number of the early OPC members were involved in the de-annulment struggle. It was also formed as a framework for resistance against military rule and anti-democratic forces particularly during the Abacha rule when many pro-democracy groups and NGOs were being repressed.

The objectives of the OPC are: (i) to revive and sustain Yoruba socio-cultural values, raise a consciousness of Yorubanness and unite the Yorubas; (ii) to act as the ear and mouth piece of the Yoruba race and to act on their behalf to free them from any threat, jeopardy, oppression and domination; (iii) to monitor, protect, defend and promote Yoruba interests and integrity and to emancipate the Yoruba from social, political and economic bondage by other groups; (iv) to oppose and resist injustice, state misrule, repression and marginalisation, foster truth and honesty in governance, enhance peace and progress and correct societal anomalies; (v) to assert and fight for the right of the Yorubas to determine and control their life and resources and (vi) to seek, agitate and fight for equity, justice, regional autonomy, self determination and self government of the Yorubas and other nationality groups through federal restructuring and a sovereign national conference. More specifically OPC seeks the creation of an Oduduwa Republic, (Bilesanmi and Agwu, 2000; Achi, 2001; Umalu, 2001; Kayode, 2000; Bolaji, 2000: 15, and 17).

The Oodua Bill of Rights, promulgated by the OPC, acknowledges the retardation of Yoruba progress by civilian autocracy, military dictatorship and unitary rather than federal structure of governance. The Bill resolves to ensure Yoruba as a distinct federating unit, and to fight for federal restructuring, self determination, self development at own resource levels, equitable representation, good governance and fundamental rights. The OPC states that it can adopt any method or strategy deemed fit for the realization of the bill.

The OPC has national, state and local structures. At the apex at the national level is an Annual National Conference (ANC), National Executive Committee (NEC), National Co-ordinating Council (NCC) and National Secretariat. These structures are replicated at the state and zonal levels. The secretariat is run by the General Secretary under the policy supervision of the President. There are women's and youth leagues headed by a Chairperson and President respectively. At the national level, the President is Dr. F. Faseun, the National Secretary is Kayode Ogundamisi, the Treasurer is Dr.

Beko Ransome-Kuti and the National Publicity Secretary, Wale Asikolaye (Ehiemunor *et al*, 2000; Ajunwa, 2001: 16). The OPC has a secretariat in Lagos. The membership of OPC ranges from pro-democracy and human rights activists, educated elements, intellectuals, professionals, workers to artisans, traders, peasants and the unemployed (Adegbamigbe, 2000). It has a social base in the under-class as its presence and activities are said to be very high and noticeable in thickly populated areas of Lagos such as Mushin, Ajegunle and Bariga (Obaro, 2000).

Membership of the OPC is voluntary and open to all Yorubas above 18 and to youths above 14 (Idika, 2000). The members of OPC are given civil, cultural and political orientations. The membership of OPC is claimed to be over 4.2 million across the breadth of Yorubaland (Fatade, 2000: 15). Its members have registration numbers and identity cards. It has members overseas who also pay their contributions. Being non-partisan, members are prohibited from joining political parties and organizations. All OPC members belong to a branch with a minimum of 100 members. This is the basic unit of activity that meets at least once a month. The OPC is also quite well mobilized. It holds rallies in different towns. At such rallies, they move in convoys of tens of mini buses. The rallies are attended by crowds of members and supporters. In a rally on 7 June 2000, it hired about 252 vehicles (Ajibola, 2001).

The OPC acquired a militant and mobilizational orientation from its inception. The mass brutality, repression and human rights abuses of the Abacha era, radicalized the OPC and transformed it into a confrontational, militant, violent and armed group. This orientation was reinforced by its foundation or situation in mass anger, frustration and disenchantment with the Nigerian state which was perceived as unfriendly, repressive, and dominated by a feudal, sectional and ethno-religious bloc and characterized by ethno-religious inequity.

The OPC has been an armed and militant vanguard of the Yoruba ethnic group. It is the rallying point of the campaign since 1994 for Yoruba self determination and emancipation. It has sought and acted as the police, liberation movement and salvation army of the Yoruba (Oduanya, 2000). Even in its early days, the OPC claims that it decided to arm itself to effectively confront the military. It is the campaign vanguard of the Yoruba cause and the arrowhead for the struggle for their advancement. It is also the corrective force to redress or curb anomalies and crime in the Yoruba and Nigerian society (Idika, 2000).

The OPC is linked to other Yoruba groups clamouring for self determination such as Oodua Youth Movement (OYM), the Yoruba Revolutionary Movement (YOREM), Oodua Redemption Alliance (ORA) and the Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM). These groups constitute the Oodua Self Determination Groups (OOSSEG).

The OPC have been torn apart and turned on itself by divisiveness and factional fighting. Since 2001 there have been two groups, the one led by Dr. F. Fasehun and the other led by Ganiyu Adams. Dr. Fasehun was the springhead of the group that founded the OPC. However certain divisions relating to orientations, attitudes and policy arose. The Gani led OPC faction broke away from the Dr. Fasehun faction because of misunderstanding over whether to support the General Adusalami Abubakar's transition programme, or not and the nature of relations with the Obasanjo administration (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000; Kayode, 2000). The Gani Adams faction wanted a more

radical approach to fight for the rights of the Yoruba nation (Achi, 2001: 12). The Gani faction accused Dr. Fasehun of trying to rework the objectives of OPC from its self-determination objective to a socio-cultural outfit to satisfy Chief Obasanjo's ambition.

The Gani Adams faction is more youthful, radical, militant and violent in its attitudes, approaches, positions and responses. It is more associated with the spate of violent encounters, campaign and activism. The faction has been particularly involved in crime control and its popularity has arisen out of its success in curbing violent crimes in parts of Lagos (Eni, 2001: 56). It preaches freedom by all possible means. It is comprised mainly of the popular classes, particularly artisans, peasants, and uneducated young persons (Umahi 2001: 9; Tunji, 2000: 15, 17; Adediji 2000). It has also been more populist. Even when Gani Adams was declared wanted by the police, the faction held rallies in Kwara, Osun, Ondo and Lagos states (Ajibola, 2001: 2).

The Dr. Fasehun faction is the more intellectual, comprising more educated, professionals, the working class and social activists. Factionalization has taken a huge toll in terms of factional fighting, violence, bloodshed and destruction. The two factions were for example involved in a bloody clash at Abeokuta, Ogun State, over the sale and distribution of kerosene in 2000 (Kolade, 2000: 4). There have been attempts to broker peace but all seemed to have failed (Ogunyemi, 2001: 1 and 4).

OPC AND ETHNO-REGIONAL POLITICS

The militia groups have been at the forefront of the conflict dimension of ethnic politics because of their more vigorous and militant pursuit of ethnic interests. Particularly, the groups have been at the forefront of the struggle against perceived ethnic and regional oppression, neglect, marginalisation and the alleged unjust and inequitable treatment of their groups by the state and other groups that have been advantaged in the hegemonic struggle. As a result, the direction of grievance and the struggle has been against the state and the Hausa/Fulani in the case of OPC and related groups of Yoruba land and the MASSOB. The Egbesu's grievance is directed against the state and the multinational companies that are dominated by the majority ethnic groups. The APC's grievance is directed against the Yorubas and the Obasanjo administration that is alleged to be dominated by Yorubas.

The OPC has been strident in seeking autonomy, self determination and self control of resources of the Yorubas because of alleged persisting Hausa/Fulani hegemony and their alleged domination, marginalisation and unjust and inequitable treatment. Therefore it has sought as a primary objective the renegotiation and re-constitution of the Nigerian state through the convocation of a sovereign national conference. The OPC insists that unless the SNC is convened, Nigeria will continue to experience conflicts (Oni *et al*, 2000). We should note here that the Egbesu's position on the national question as pertaining to the SNC, true federalism, resource control and self development is similar to the OPC's. The MASSOB is more extreme in that it seeks more than a restructured state.

The OPC and its affiliate groups have been quick in the contestation of political space and the defense of their ethnic group and men. They have reacted vehemently when

Yoruba interests were threatened by other groups. Following an alleged threat by some Northern leaders against Governor Lam Adesina of Oyo state, the OPC ordered the then Inspector General of the police, Musiliu Smith, to probe alleged threats and vowed to curtail any Northern aggression against South-West Leaders (Yusuf, 2000: 4). The Oodua Liberation Movement (OLM), an affiliate of the OPC dissatisfied with the Hausa service on Ray Power 2, broadcast by AIT, a private radio/television station based in Lagos, threatened to deal with them with the assistance of Oduduwa if the broadcast was not stopped within two weeks of its threat (*The Post Express*, 30 07 01; Police Report, 2001: 28). The OPC alleged that the killings of its members were carried out by the non-Yoruba police in the South West. Therefore the group advocates a regional police command comprised at the minimum of 80% of the indigenes of the regions (Ewuola, 2000: 5).

OPC threatened in 2000 following the shari'ah crisis and riots to stop the payment of value added tax (VAT) from South-Western states into the Federation Account because it was immoral and irreligious for shari'ah states to receive taxes paid on alcohol and pork (Adeyemi and Fatade, 2000: 15, 17). The OPC opposed this and mounted peaceful demonstrations against the impeachment move against President Obasanjo (a fellow Yoruba), by the National Assembly in Yoruba major cities including Abeokuta, Lagos and Illorin (Yusuf, 2000; Kolade, 2000). The protests occurred again in October 2002 in Lagos. The OPC warned that if Obasanjo was impeached, Nigeria would cease to exist (Okocha and Olaleye, 2002).

ETHNIC MILITIAS AND VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The ethnic militias have posited themselves as the armed protectors of ethnic interests and integrity and the ethnic army in times of conflict with other groups. They have been involved in the conduct of inter-ethnic conflicts.

The first major conflict involving the OPC took place in Sagamu, Ogun state on July 17, 1999. It arose over a conflict between Yorubas of Sagamu and Hausa settlers. A fracas ensued in which the OPC fought in defence of their Yoruba kinsmen against the Hausa settlers. Over 50 persons lost their lives. There was subsequently a retaliatory strike on July 22, 1999 against the Yorubas in Kano, by the Hausas where over 1, 000 persons died (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000).

On December 27, 1999, the OPC converged at Ibadan, Oyo state and combed the city for APC members who were reported to have launched their movement there (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000). The OPC got arms and ammunition from people whom they claimed were of Northern extract, at Ibadan in 2000 and handed the arms to the police. The OPC claimed that they later gave the arms back to their owners (Odusanya, 2000: 25).

The Ketu riots were the first major crisis in Lagos. It started on November 26, 1999 when OPC took on Hausa traders (Johnson, 2000: 4). The Ketu resulted from the result of a conflict between Hausa and Yoruba traders at the Mile 12 Ketu market over the struggle for control of the market (Umahi, 2001: 9). The violence led to the looting and burning of hundreds of properties and vehicles and over 40 persons lost their lives. The OPC denied taking part.

On October 15, 2000 another clash broke out between OPC and the Hausas in Ajegunle. The reason for the mayhem was attributed to a disagreement between a Hausa community and the OPC over the chasing of armed robbers into their locality in Ajegunle (Egboboh, Ajayi and Ehigior, 2000). The conflict spread to Ijora, Ojo, Lagos Island, Agege and other parts of Lagos. There were attacks and counter-attacks between OPC and hordes of Hausa youths in Lagos Island and neighbouring areas. OPC members searched for Hausas and Northern guards while the Hausa, apart from defending themselves, sought assistance from Hausa in nearby towns such as Sagamu (Nnadozie et al., 2000 1-2; *Sunday Vanguard*, 22 10 2000: 13; Nnadozie et al., 2000: 1 and 2). Socio-economic activities were paralyzed, many homes were destroyed and several displaced persons took refuge in army barracks where camps for displaced persons were erected with government support. The riot which lasted for over four days, led to the death of about 114 persons (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000).

A dusk-to-dawn curfew was ordered in Lagos. The military were called in, to assist in joint patrols with the police to contain the violence. The federal government ordered the arrest of OPC leaders and those associated with the OPC. The militia groups were banned and a state of emergency was threatened (Egboboh and Ehigior, 2000; Nnadozie et al., 2000B; Barnaby, 2000; *Weekend Vanguard*, 21 10 2000: 7).

In February 2002, there was another OPC/Yoruba versus Hausa/Fulani riot in Idi-Araba, Lagos. The riot was attributed to a disagreement between some Hausas and Yorubas either over non-payment for the use of a public convenience or its closeness to a mosque. The conflict developed into an extensive, devastating, bloody riot in which over 100 persons lost their lives and over 400 were wounded. Numerous properties were destroyed and over 5, 000 persons were displaced and sought refuge in public institutions and an army barracks. The riots continued for about four days and in fact spread to other parts of Lagos. A combined team of police and the army struggled to keep the peace. A faction of the OPC was said to have been involved in the fighting (Obia, 2002; *Vanguard*, 12 02 02).

In reaction to the killings of Hausas in Lagos and the evident activities associated with the OPC, the leaders of the APC moved to reappraise its modus operandi towards greater militancy and retaliation (*Vanguard*, 21 10 2000: 7). The Northern governors and the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) threatened retaliation for any attack on Northerners (Akhaine and Meyal, 2000: 4). This was later withdrawn. The ACF claimed that the OPC attacks were motivated by cultural exclusivism, ethnic puritanism and ethnic hatred, and called for the arrest of OPC members and its proscription (Usigbe, 2000: 1 and 2; *Vanguard*, 3 11 2000). There were retaliations in the North in response to the 2000 Lagos riots. Yoruba residents in the North had to take refuge in various army barracks. Joint police and military patrols could not stop losses of lives and property. In the 2002 Lagos riots, there were fears of reprisal attacks particularly in KaNo. Police and military patrols of streets in Kano were put in place to forestall reprisals. In fear, some Yorubas sought refuge in the police and army barracks in the city.

As part of its ethnic agenda, the OPC laid siege in 2000 and 2001 to Ilorin in an attempt to invade the town in order to terminate the emirate system and install a Yoruba monarch as Olullorin of Ilorin from the Afonjas of Ilorin (Alabi, 2002). The OPC claimed

that the installation of the Yoruba king was not negotiable, as the city was dominated by the Yoruba, who it is claimed, constitute about 95 percent of the city's population. The OPC in Kwara state called the Hausa/Fulani and the emirate in the state "tenants" (Yusuf, 2000: 5). In the second attack in 2001, the police mounted guard at all entry points with armoured tanks. There were clashes at Ganmo and Eiyikorin with casualties on both sides (Akparanta and Fagbemi, 2000: 3). In reaction to the Ilorin invasion and threat, members of Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) in Ilorin rose to the challenge of the OPC threat by allegedly recruiting 5,000 militants from the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC). The APC for its part served a quit notice on the OPC on the grounds the Kwara was a Northern territory (Yusuf, 2000).

During the shari'ah riots in the Northern section of Nigeria, the OPC threatened to embark on retaliatory attacks on Northerners in the South West if the unwarranted killings of Southern residents in the North persisted (Ogunyemi and Adeyemi, 2001: 1-4).

There have been clashes with other ethnic groups. There have been clashes leading to violence and destruction between OPC and Igbo traders at Ajangbadi and central Lagos (Haruna, 2002). The OPC and Ijaw youths fought in Ajegunle, Lagos. The clash led to loss of lives and property and threats of a widened scale of confrontation between the two groups outside Lagos (Bolaji, 2000: 15 and 17).

Violence and destruction have also trailed the OPC crime control activities in the Yoruba areas particularly in Lagos. Bloody clashes occurred between the OPC and suspected fraudsters in Lagos in 2000 and between OPC and notorious armed robbers in the Akala area of Mushin. These operations have been associated with killings and destruction of properties (Nweje, 2001: 25; *Vanguard*, 21 10 2000: 3). The OPC has attacked embassies and public institutions. It attacked the Libyan Embassy to demand apologies over the alleged killing and deportation of Nigerians from Libya. About 300 members armed with dangerous weapons were involved. They also attacked the American Embassy (Nnadozie, 2000: 1-2). The OPC in July 2000 attacked the Ejigbo depot of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Bolaji, 2000: 15-17). In July 2000, the OPC also attacked customs officials at Badagry for allegedly mounting illegal roadblocks (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000).

The Nigerian police force claims that in 1999 alone, the OPC launched over 60 illegal attacks on the police and innocent citizens leading to loss of lives and properties (Orji, 2001: 1-2). By 2000, the OPC was alleged to have been responsible for 60 percent of the 200 violent clashes that had taken place in the nation (Elesho, Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000).

THE STATE AND MILITIA ENCOUNTERS

The federal government has regarded the ethnic militias as operating outside the law and social control, and are therefore subversive, extra-constitutional, illegal, and unacceptable (Ojeane, 2000). It regards the activities of ethnic militias as dastardly, banditry, lawless, violent, criminal, divisive and potentially dangerous to national unity and stability (Ajayi and Ogbeitun, 2002). Their activities are further regarded as undermining

the nation's security and unity, law and order, and as capable of orchestrating anarchy and wounding the sensibilities of other ethnic groups (Benson, 2000; Egboboh, Ajayi and Ejigaior, 2000; Elicmunor *et al.*, 2000).

The state has used several strategies in the management of the ethnic militia phenomenon. These have spanned arrests and litigation, confrontation, and repression and proscription.

First is that of arrest and trial in the courts. In 2000, the government ordered the immediate arrest of leaders and anyone associated with the OPC. Anyone resisting such arrests was to be shot (Barnaby, 2000). The President also directed the police command in Lagos to do everything in its power to seek out, arrest and bring to justice any lawless and criminal person who paraded himself as a member of the OPC, or a similar body (Ajayi and Ogbeifun, 2000). The OPC leader, Dr. Fasehun, and others were arrested on 19 October 2000 and charged with murder in the wake of ethnic violence in Lagos. They were granted bail by a Lagos High Court on Monday 13 November 2000 (Anaba, 2000). On 17 September 2001, Dr. Fasehun and Adams were charged in a Federal High Court for managing an unlawful society involved in killings and destruction (Kayode, 2001). On 17 January 2000, 91 suspected OPC members were arraigned before a chief magistrate's court in Lagos over the killing of a police officer, Afolabi Amao (Elesho Asoya and Omenuwa, 2000).

In 2000, the police declared wanted the militant faction leader of the OPC, Ganiyu Adams. On Wednesday August 22, 2001, Adams was arrested in the Ikorodu area of Lagos and was arraigned before a chief magistrate's court in Ikeja on a 23-count criminal charge which included conspiracy, murder, armed robbery, treason, arson, unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition, and willful destruction of property (Onyike, 2001; Oni and Ojelu, 2001: 1 and 2; Agha, 2001: 28). He was granted bail by a Federal High Court (Abawuru and Ojelu, 2001: 30). The Oduduwa Youth Movement claimed in 2000 that 97 of the 136 OPC members arrested in Lagos had been arraigned by courts on trumped-up charges of murder, armed robbery and other offences (Ahiuma-Young and Anaba, 2000).

The other policy response has been banning and proscription. In October 2000, the militia groups were proscribed by the federal government. More recently, the Obasanjo administration has presented a bill that bans ethnic associations and militia groups to the National Assembly. The administration urged the National Assembly to expedite action on the bill so as to control ethnic and political violence well before the 2003 national elections (Omarah, 2002: 56). There have also been tribunals and commissions set up by both state and federal governments on the ethnic violence conducted by the militias. In Lagos, the Justice Famakinwa-led tribunal of inquiry into disturbances in Lagos state was set up in which even leaders of the OPC testified (Olusunandanmi, 2000: 3).

There has also been repression of the different militia groups. Police harassment of OPC members and disruption of their meetings and processions began in the mid-1990s. In 2000, the President directed the police to shoot OPC members on sight. There have been indiscriminate arrests, monitoring and searching of suspected members' and even burning of members' properties (Aremu and Mojuba, 2000: pp. 40). The police have allegedly opened fire on OPC members without provocation, just as there have been extra-judicial killings (*The News*, 2000; Bolaji, 2000: pp. 15 and 17). Some OPC

militants have been shot in the streets (Obaro, 2000). By 2000, the OPC President alleged that over 50 members had been killed by the police and about 2,000 others were in various detention cells and prisons in the South-west. The Oodua Youth Movement (OYM) also alleged in 2000 that over 272 OPC members had been killed by the police and 12 others could not be accounted for following the shoot-on-sight order against the group by President Obasanjo. In addition, houses and property worth thousands of Naira of over 14 members had also been looted, burnt and destroyed in various locations across Lagos state (Ahiuna-Young and Anaba, 2000).

The other militia groups have suffered the same fate. The state response to MASSOB has been police harassment, arrests, detention of leaders and members and deaths (Alunma, 2001; *The Guardian*, 23 01). In March 2001, the police arrested 30 MASSOB members who were trying to enter Anambra state (Eguwa, 2001). Some members of the group are alleged to have lost their lives in confrontations with the police at Okigwe (Enyim and Nwachukwu, 2001: 8; *The Guardian*, 02 03 02). The same response is noticeable in relation to the ethnic militias of the Niger Delta. The Nigerian armed forces have been on duty several times against the militias in Odi, Kaiama, Mbiama Junction, Yenagoa, Warri and numerous Ijaw and Itsekiri settlements in Bayelsa and Delta states. The federal government sent in the Nigerian army to hunt down and apprehend the Tiv ethnic militias that abducted and killed 16 soldiers on a peacekeeping mission in the Tiv/Jukun conflict in Benue state, in 2001 (Isaac, 2001: 1-2, Rotimi, 2001: 1-2). The result was the Zaki Biam tragedy in which whole villages were sacked.

The repressive strategy and even the arrests and proscription of the militias has brought them into violent confrontation with the state. Violent confrontations between the state and the OPC began quite early during the Abacha administration. During the Abubakar administration, the police were reported to have disrupted OPC meetings and processions several times between September and November 1998. In the November incidences, several members were shot. However, the confrontations have become particularly frequent and violent since 1999.

The OPC is reported to have attacked police stations in Mushin in July 2000, Shasha in November 1999, Alakara in March 1999 and the headquarters of Area D Command in Lagos (Nnadozie and Akpor, 2000). The OPC in May 1999 invaded the Chief Magistrate Court in Oyinbo and freed murder suspects. There were clashes between the OPC and police at Apapa Wharf in September 1999, Mushin in 2000 and Isheri in July 2000. There has been a spate of violence against OPC members by the police, sometimes without provocation (Bolaji, 2000: 15 and 17). The police have been reported to have invaded OPC meetings, offices and residences of members. It has also been reported that the police opened fire on OPC members in Bariga in 2000 and attacked a convoy of members at Olofin and Egan in January 1999 (*The News*, 25 01 2000).

The encounters have been associated with considerable casualties of injuries, deaths, loss of arms and ammunition and destruction of properties on both sides. Police officers and men have been killed or wounded. Some have been attacked with acid. Police vehicles, facilities and properties have been destroyed or vandalized. Arms and ammunition are also reported to have been seized from policemen or removed from attacked police stations (Police Report, 2001).

STATE RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE ETHNIC MILITIA PHENOMENON

The state response has been first to curtail and contain in terms of security the ethnic rioting that results from militia activities or involvement. It has been directed at first restoring normalcy, law and order. Second has been to control and deter further occurrences by decisive and perhaps brutal responses. However, the security response has been slow, weak and ineffective. The state has always responded slowly therefore enabling considerable killings and destruction. Even the involvement of the military has not enhanced speedy control. Hence, some of the riots have lasted for several days. The handling has not deterred further occurrences. The governments have also been slow in the provision of assistance, which has only been immediate relief materials to victims. State policy has been reactive rather than proactive. The governments have merely been reacting to incidents as they arise. They have not in the main pre-empted or prevented the inter-ethnic rioting. In spite of the tremendous problems posed by the militias, the state has been merely responding to their actions and manifestations. The issue has been the clashes and rioting rather than the social and political issues that nests and sustains the militias.

The state strategy has been comprehensively repressive. But the repressive strategy has failed. First, it has failed to arrest the phenomenon or to prevent and curtail militia confrontations and riots. After the February 2002 riots, the ACF accused the federal government of not doing enough to enforce the proscription of the OPC and arrests of its members. In fact, in 2000, the Northern Senators Forum demanded the resignation of the Minister of Police affairs and the Inspector General of the police for failing to arrest the menace of violent ethnic riots across the country (Adekeye, 2000).

The repressive strategy has rather heightened the militancy, confrontations and fatalities. Further it raises the fear that the groups may be driven underground, thus prolonging and heightening the militancy of the groups and increasing problems of control. Third, it has tended to create a human rights problem embedded in the brutalities, shootings, detentions and hunting down of militia members. The incidences of the military sacking of Odi in Bayelsa state and Zaki Biam in Benue states indicate the tragedy of militia repression. The spate of extra-judicial killings of militia members is also a terrible dent on the human rights record of the civilian administration.

In spite of the ban, indiscriminate arrests, harassment and repression, the militias have continued to exist. Though there has been a lull in the South West since 2003, the militias in the Ijaw area of the South-South have been very active in confrontations with the military. Inter-ethnic militia-involved confrontations have persisted in the Warri area. Roving militias have also remained active in Benue and Plateau states.

The state has for the most part, ignored the militias. It has not sought dialogue over the issues in contention nor has opened avenues for interaction. Thus, the government may not even know the real grievances of the militias. Several groups such as the Justice, and Peace Development Commission of the Catholic Church have advised the police to parley with the militias in order to effectively respond to their grievances (Nweje, 2001).

The state has not particularly sought to address the fundamental political problems and issues raised by the militias. The issues of state reforms, particularly true federalism, state autonomy and resource control, have been ignored thus far. The government

has resisted the convening of a sovereign national conference. No real fora for negotiations over the grievances of different groups have been provided. Even with the civilian democracy, the South-South and South East and sometimes the Northern section are alleging marginalisation.

Thus the political problems that nest the militias and the social problems of unemployment, and poverty that create the pool of militants have remained unresolved. With the reasons for their sustenance, support and even popularity within their ethnic base intact and unresolved, the militia phenomenon will subsist. The persistence of the militias in spite of bans and repression indicate that they may be embedded in the ethnic group and supported by civil and political society. The extent of devastation in most of the ethnic riots and violence suggest much more participation than the militias.

There has been no fundamental or comprehensive programmes of response to the phenomenon other than proselytizing, raising panels and seminars on security and state repression. The state has merely been remediating and patching the existing conflicts rather than mediating, and resolving them. The state has thus merely been treating the symptoms rather than the disease. It has just been muddling through the militia phenomenon and the spate of ethnic, sectional and ethno-religious riots. Consequently, the government has just been “lurching from crisis to crisis” (Maier, 2000).

Thus the state has failed to resolve the ethnic conflicts and to effectively manage the militia phenomenon. Rather, its strategy is intensifying the phenomenon. This has been particularly so because the state has thrived in its peculiar arrogance and repressive tendency. The state ignores social forces and formations or represses and suppresses them. It does not believe in dialogue and negotiation. Rather, these are perceived as signs of weakness. The central thing to the state is to be decisively authoritarian and coercive.

We refer to our second hypothesis. The attitude, performance and response of the Nigerian governments are not resolving but are rather exacerbating the militia phenomenon.

THE NIGERIAN STATE, ETHNIC MILITIAS AND CONFLICT

The emergence of ethnic militia groups is a phenomenon of the 1990s. It has been traced to numerous factors basically related to a crisis of the state and of governance. Essentially, they are regarded as the children of circumstances situated in the economic and political crisis occasioned by a system of governance characterized by repression, inequity, marginalisation, the politics of inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups and poverty.

Initially militant ethnic-based groups were believed to emerge basically for political agitation under authoritarian rule. The seeds of the militant groups were sown in the 1990s when military rule became more totalitarian, repressive, oppressive and intolerant on the one hand and blatantly partial, partisan, exclusive and corrupt on the other. Prolonged military rule is thus the major culprit in the heightening of ethnic and regional provocation and confrontation. Military rule was underlined by sectional and ethnic domination and provocations. The state became more directly an instrument for executing an ethnic agenda and hegemony.

The character and behaviour of the Nigerian state has also created an environment for and generated the intense feelings and reactions that underlie ethnic conflicts and the ethnic militias. The state penchant for force and repression has made the state “weak and vulnerable” (Amuwo, 1998: pp. 73). The state is inherently anti-democratic, unfriendly and immoral (Amuwo 1998: pp. 74-75). The Nigerian state has assaulted the ethnic sensibility of Nigerians and utilizes force and violence in its relationship with multinational groups (Amuwo and Heranlt, 1998: 8). Political decay and crisis inherent in the Nigerian state and governance and indicated by fraud in the political process, prolonged exclusion, marginalisation and repression, inequitable political representation, resource distribution and application, real and imagined cases of unequal access to power, resources and inequitable distribution of social amenities and benefits, have created perceptions of deprivation and disadvantage and generated ethnic solidarity and mobilisation and ethnic conflicts (Otite, 1990: pp. 162-163). Particularly the insurgent civil groups are a creation of alleged several injustices and domination by certain groups. As Tinubu noted in respect of the OPC, “who created OPC, without the military dictatorship? Without the annulment of June 12 1993 election? Without the usurper Interim National Government (ING)?, Without the Abacha government? Without the accusation of phantom coup and trial?”, (Anaba, 2000).

The net result of the crisis of the state and governance and the accompanying social and political crises has been growing exasperation and challenge of the state. The conjoining of a restive, frustrated and disillusioned public with an increasingly alienated, vulnerable and repressive state has resulted in an unprecedentedly popular and democratic affront on the state since the late 1980s. In this affront has been an assemblage of communal, ethnic, religious and other cleavage groups conjoined with democratic and social activists. The phenomenon of ethnic militias is a manifestation of the persisting discontent with the political and economic situation.

The weakness of the Nigerian state is also a factor. The Nigerian state is one that is largely alienated and has not been able to respond to the yearnings, needs and survival requirements of the populace. The weaknesses have not only weakened the value, sense of belonging and identity with the state but have driven the people towards their own community (Ijediogor, 2000). The failure of economic and social services and the abysmal failure of the security agencies have contributed to the recourse to ethnic security and protection and to the acceptance, confidence and strength of the ethnic militia groups.

Further prolonged economic crisis has created a large social underclass of the under-educated, unemployed, deprived, frustrated, pauperised urban and semi-urban dwellers. These constitute a reserve army of frustrated, dissatisfied and disillusioned youths and men, who are readily manipulated and exploited by factions of the ruling class and easily mobilised for perpetrating disturbances, riots and violence (*The Guardian*, 1985; Sankore, 2001: 10; *The Guardian*, 2002). The spate of ethnic violence in the country has been linked to the high level of unemployment and consequent “unrest among the youth” (Igboanugo, 2000).

The militia phenomenon and the militant agitations in many ways indicate the poor performance of the democratic process and governance. As the Ijaw Economic Monitoring Group (IEMG) has stated, the clashes and restlessness are a manifestation of

dissatisfaction and disappointment with the inability of the democratic government to live up to expectation (Ajanaku, Kalu and Ndujiha, 2000). This is not just in the persistence or even deepening of the economic crisis and the scarcity of quantifiable dividends of democracy. It is also in the inability of the democratic government to resolve the deep political problems of the nation. Further the democratic regime has in several instances failed to effectively manage law and order and protect lives and property.

In some ways, the ethnic passions and their violent manifestation are fallout of democracy. Freedom is seen by Nigerians as the main victory offered by democracy. Unfortunately, freedom has been popularly misconceived as the alibity to do anything unrestrained; even lawlessness and violence (Osadolor, 2002; *The Guardian*, 2002). This contradiction, that the entitlement of freedom has become the freedom to “curtail the freedom of others”, has been expressed by even the President, Obasanjo (Obasanjo, 2002). Democracy has merely provided the freedom and avenue for the expression of pent up anger and grievances suppressed by prolonged military dictatorship. Numerous groups have taken advantage of the victory of freedom, to vigorously assert or demand their rights, express their problems and grievances, and resist the injustices of the past.

Further, the emergence of democracy has occasioned a change in the direction of ethnic, regional and religious hegemony and state benefits. There is a new direction and tendency for agitations for a return of power to the hegemonic status quo in the northern section which has been attended with tensions and ignitions of ethno-religious conflict at the slightest regional, national and even international provocation. A case in point is the Kano ethno-religious clashes in which Southern Nigerians were victims of death and destruction. The clashes were a reaction to the United States-led action against the Al Queda/Taliban terrorism, quite unrelated to the Nigerian problem.

The situation is further aggravated by the high level of social volatility and violent civil protests that have often accompanied social agitations and expressions of public grievance in Nigeria. There has been a culture of resistance to unpopular public policies such as SAP, de-subsidization of petroleum prices, cancellation of elections, economic hardship, electoral fraud, state repression, and inconsistencies in the democratic transition (Okome, 1999). These tendencies have been virtues in the circumstance of resistance of popular forces against dictatorship, misrule, corruption and leadership perpetuation. But it also established a culture of violent protest and violent encounters with the state. The phenomenon of ethnic militias and of their violent encounters with the state and other groups falls into the cast of the culture of violent resistance against state and group perpetrated injustices. The difference here is of course the ethnic basis of the solidarity, mobilization and resistance and the direction of resistance against the ethnic groups associated with the injustices.

In response to our first hypothesis, this discourse of the centrality of the Nigerian state, its nature, behaviour and performance and the resulting state, political and governance crises as well as the nature of the struggles, conflicts and resistance that have been spawned tends toward the a certain conclusion. The Nigerian state has been central to the militarization of identity politics.

CONCLUSION

The Nigerian state has been the focus of the militias and the ethnic conflicts and confrontations that they orchestrate. The struggle for its control and, ipso facto, the resources that it produces, distributes and controls has been the issue. But it is not just that of today, it has to do with who has controlled the state, dominated its resources and how the ethnic/sectional hegemon has treated those outside the state. State power has been used to the glaring advantage of those that control it while those outside are marginalized, neglected, excluded and subordinated. The militias and the ethnic violence they orchestrate tend to arise from mass anger, bitterness and political grievances. These run deep and have existed for a while. It is these political grievances and feelings that have enabled considerable ethnic mobilization, support and participation in the militia phenomenon.

The militias tend to be competing for space, asserting themselves in the contestation for supremacy or placement in the superiorization and inferiorization scale. The space of contestation is political as in the case of the Yorubas and Hausa/Fulanis, political and economic as the Ketu's OPC/Yoruba and Hausa/Fulanis, economic as in the case of OPC/Yoruba and Igbos in Lagos, and political and economic as in the case of Egbesu. The militias have threatened the nation's delicate unity quite frequently. They have become the militant reminders of group grievances that beg loudly for redress.

The ethnic militia groups and the resultant conflicts arise from and have drawn attention to the national question. The militia activists have raised quite poignantly the issue of state reforms and restructuring. They persistently insist that the only solution to and guarantee to peace and stability is dialogue through a conference of ethnic nationalities that would result in re-negotiated terms of co-existence (Benson, 2000: 12; Mwokedi, 2000: 12).

The militias are a product of and have in turn squarely placed ethnicity and violent ethno-religious conflicts at the centre of politics, featuring prominently and warranting mitigation, at least to prevent the push beyond the precipice. Ethnic and religious identities have been strengthened. Identity consciousness and an identity basis for conducting socio-economic and political affairs has been heightened and solidified. An identity basis for mobilization and contestation for even the minutest of disagreements, competition and conflict has also been heightened. The result is that disagreements over public conveniences, control of town markets, cultural festivals and tenancy have been blown into ethnic, ethno religious and sectional wars.

The violent ethnic encounters and the bitterness, anger and frustration that underlie them are indications of a loss of confidence in the Nigerian state. They demonstrate the weaknesses of the state as well as the perverse use to which the state has been put. Particularly, they indicate the probable outcomes of the peculiar nature and behaviour of the post colonial state, that heightens identity politics, represses, marginalizes and excludes groups, creates immense injustice and inequity and generates anger and bitterness that pushes inter-group relations beyond the threshold such that militarized identity conflicts and violence pervades the political process.

The chapter finds that the Nigerian state is the main culprit in the militarization of politics. But unfortunately, its management of the phenomenon has tended to exacerbate it.

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12

ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF DIRE DAWA

Asnake Kefale

INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of the 1995 constitution, Ethiopia is experimenting with ethnic federalism¹, and the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) regime which came to power in 1991 claims that the new ethnic federal structure brings a solution to the age-old ethnic problems of the country and serves as a political instrument in the management of the country's ethnic relations. Moreover, the new constitution has recognized the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination² up to and including secession. There are, however, inconsistencies in the application of the ethnic federalist agenda. This has been witnessed from the experience of the city of Dire Dawa in Eastern Ethiopia since the reorganization of Ethiopia's local and regional administration in 1992.³ This chapter attempts to explore problems of using ethnic identity as the main determinant of federalism in nations where patterns of identity are complex and often overlap.⁴ The Dire Dawa case presented here illuminates the difficulty of delineating ethnic and boundary when neighboring ethnic groups (Oromo and Somali) claim a particular area on the premise that the territory historically belonged to them. As a result of the competition of the two groups over Dire Dawa and also because of Dire Dawa's economic and geo-strategic significance,⁵ and its character,⁶ the federal government is directly administering it from Addis Ababa, apparently in contravention of the constitution. The present status of Dire Dawa exhibits two important interrelated problems in Ethiopia's young experiment with federalism. First, the reconstitution of the country on the basis of ethnicity has been associated with the changing of arenas traditional conflicts and in some cases emergence of new patterns of conflict which include among others: boundary/territorial, identity, governance and power sharing, and minority and majority conflicts. In other words, ethnic federalism changed arenas of ethnic conflicts from the hitherto, i.e. center-periphery,⁷ into complex and multiple level of conflicts.⁸ In the case of Dire Dawa, we notice competing territorial claims by the Somali and the Oromo ethnic groups. Secondly, the formation of a 'temporary' special administration for Dire Dawa under the federal government demonstrates the dominance of politico-

administrative instruments of conflict management instead of the legal and institutional instruments that are provided in the federal constitution

COMPETING ETHNIC NATIONALISMS OF THE OROMO AND SOMALI OVER DIRE DAWA

The establishment of a special administration for Dire Dawa could mainly be explained by conflicting claims of the Oromo and Somali ethnic groups to control the city.⁹ Historically, Dire Dawa was the creation of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad (Pankhurst, 1985, Shiferaw 1989). The city's emergence and development is thus directly related to the construction of the railway. According to Shiferaw Bekele, who studied the early urban history of Dire Dawa (1902-1936), the town was divided into two sectors, i.e. 'European' *Gezira* and 'indigenous' *Magala*. While *Magala* was fully under Ethiopian administration, *Gezira* was until 1929 directly administered by the Railway Company (1989; 91). The two distinctly separate parts of the town came under the jurisdiction of one municipality after the implementation of the accord signed by the Railway Company and the Ethiopian government in 1926 (Ibid). Even if Dire Dawa's growth as an urban center is well documented (Shiferaw 1989; Getahun 1997), written sources about the history of (present-day) Dire Dawa before the introduction of the railroad are scarce. Some sources suggest that before the introduction of the railway, Dire Dawa was largely uninhabited which was periodically visited by herders after the summer rains for water and pasture. Moreover, it was suggested that there were frequent skirmishes in the Dire Dawa plain between Afar, Issa, Gurgura and Nolle Oromo herders (Getahun, 1997: 6). It is, therefore, difficult to clearly ascertain to which ethnic group Dire Dawa belonged before the introduction of the railroad, from the available literature.

Conflict in the claims of the Oromo and the Somali groups to Dire Dawa begins right from the very meaning of Dire Dawa. In this regard, there are different explanations. Accordingly some argue that the prevalence of Oromo place names such as *Legahare* (river of donkey); *Gendekore* (village of wood); and *Gende Gara* (village of mountains), in Dire Dawa, and also the meaning of Dire Dawa, which means 'place of remedy' in Oromiffa (Oromo language) (Bladet, 1970: 15) attest to Oromos' historic claim to Dire Dawa (Mohammed, 1999: 21-22). Somali elders, however, counter this argument by saying that as Oromo and Somali languages are members of the *Chustic* language family and share many similarities, the presence of Oromo place names in Dire Dawa does not justify Oromo claims to the city (Ibid.). The idea that there could be Oromo place names in Somali areas because of affinities between the two languages was rejected by some of Oromo elders, who challenged the suggestion by posing a question, "why are there not other places in Somali areas bearing Oromo names like that of Dire Dawa?"¹⁰ Actually conflicting claims of the two groups to Dire Dawa include other arguments, in addition to the somewhat interesting interpretations of meanings of place names from linguistic viewpoints.

According to Mohammed Sheik, many Oromo political organizations at the beginning of the transitional period in 1991 claimed Dire Dawa and its outlying areas up to a

place called *Adigala* (presently in Somali regional state), which is one hundred kilometres away from Dire Dawa.¹¹ He further alleged that, “to achieve their goal of bringing Dire Dawa into the Oromia region, Oromo political organizations sought to coerce the Gurgura people, who speak Oromiffa to identify themselves as Oromo, though they belong to the Somali nation” (Ibid.). Neither did our Oromo informants deny these allegations by Mohammed Sheik. Hence, a group of Oromo elders we interviewed claimed that Oromo territory in the region used to extend up to *Adigala* including Dire Dawa.¹² Moreover, the elders claimed that the Gurgura people who speak Oromiffa belong to the Oromo nation and they only started to identify themselves with the Somali after the 1974 change of the Haile Selassie regime (Ibid.). The possible shifting of identity by the Gurgura group shows the fluidity of ethnic identity in the face of massive pressures from competing local and international forces, which include the governments of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and the changing geo-political significance of Eastern Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Thus, interventions of forces, which are largely external to the two groups influence, and other relationships between the Somali and the Oromo in Dire Dawa and its adjoining areas. It is from this viewpoint that we need to view conflicting claims of the two groups to Dire Dawa.

In this respect, Oromo elders argue that Ethiopian regimes usually favour the Issa (Somali) in Eastern Ethiopia, in order to co-opt their traditional leaders so that they help them in securing the railroad. On the other hand, Somali elders maintain that their group is usually given the responsibility of securing the railroad despite change of regimes as they rightly own the areas along the railroad from Dire Dawa to Djibouti.¹³ They further contend that the people of Gurgura, even if they speak Oromiffa, belong to the Somali ethnic group.

These conflicting claims to Dire Dawa by the Somali and the Oromo led to violent competition in the aftermath of the EPRDF's takeover of power in 1991. Accordingly, the EPRDF government first urged the two groups to cease their claims, until the national elections scheduled to be held in 1994 (Markakis, 1994: 76). Tamrat Layne, then Prime Minister, also advised the inaugural meeting of the Somali regional council held in January 1993 in Dire Dawa not to press ahead with Somali claim to Dire Dawa as the capital of their regional state (Ibid.).

In addition to conflicting claims of the two groups to Dire Dawa, a number of other factors might have also influenced the decision of the federal government to establish a special administration for Dire Dawa, which is directly controlled by it. These include the geographical significance of Dire Dawa and its adjoining areas to Ethiopia's linkage to Djibouti's port services and the character of the city.

As stated above, Dire Dawa is an outcome of the construction of the railroad from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. The geographical significance of Dire Dawa as a transit to Ethiopian exports and imports through the port of Djibouti undoubtedly influences policies of the Ethiopian government about the governance of the city. Indeed, both the Haile Selassie and the Derg (military regime 1974-1991) regimes were influenced by their desire to maintain the security of the rail connection with Djibouti when they decided to make Dire Dawa first part of the Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* and later part of the Dire Dawa autonomous region. In the post-1991 period, the geographical significance

of Dire Dawa was reinvigorated because of the disintegration of governmental authority in Somalia and more significantly because of the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war, which suddenly made Ethiopia dependent on Djibouti for most of its port services. Under these circumstances, the central government does not seem to be ready to take chances by changing the status of Dire Dawa from the existing special administration by giving it either to the Oromia or the Somali regional states, which could bring instability to the area. The multi-ethnic character of the city might also be taken as an important factor for the continuation of the status quo.

SOME EMERGING TRENDS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN FEDERAL ETHIOPIA

Even if federalism is hoped to bring about a solution to the age-old ethnic conflicts in the country and to serve as a better political instrument for managing the country's ethnic relations, there are still violent ethnic conflicts in the country and the track record of both the regional and federal government in the management of conflicts is not encouraging. In what follows, we will review some emerging trends of ethnic conflict management after the establishment of the federal government in 1995 and situate the case of Dire Dawa in this context.

Legal instruments of conflict management

Several articles of the federal constitution provide the principles, procedures and institutional set-up for the management of conflicts between regional states, the federal government and the regional governments. The Constitution also provides some principles and procedures for managing disputes over issues of national self-determination and identity. Art. 39/1 of the constitution, for example, provides that "every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia has unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession." Art. 39/4 stipulates the procedures for how to exercise the right of secession. Art. 46/2 outlines the criteria for forming regional states, which are settlement patterns, language, identity, and the consent of the people concerned. Art. 47/2 provides the procedures of forming new regional states out of the existing ones; and Art. 48 states the principles and procedures of settling border disputes between the regional states.

The constitution also provided for the establishment of the House of Federation (Art.61), which is composed of representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. Relating to management of conflicts, this institution has the power to:

- Interpret the constitution (Art. 62/1);
- Decide on issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession (Art. 62/3);
- Strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states (Art. 62/6);
- Divide revenues derived from joint federal and state tax sources and the subsidies that the federal government may provide to the states (Art. 62/7).

- From among the several constitutional provisions relating to the management of ethnic diversity in Ethiopia, the provision for national self-determination up to secession has been one of the most controversial concepts in post-1991 Ethiopian politics. The idea behind the inclusion of this principle is still contested. The EPRDF, however, persistently argues that this provision constitutes a fundamental opportunity to maintain Ethiopia's unity through respecting the unconditional rights of its nations, nationalities and peoples. The EPRDF further argues that the country was spared from descending into uncontrollable ethnic warfare and chaos after 1991 mainly because of the recognition of the rights of nationalities to self-determination. The ruling coalition also warns that tampering with this right can undo the unity of the nation and bring intense conflicts. Many political groupings welcome and support this principle as a way of redressing the conflict-ridden relations between the country's dominant and oppressed groups, while others view the principle as a danger to Ethiopian unity and stability.

When it comes to the actual management of conflicts, for example, in the case of Dire Dawa, the significance of the constitutional principles, procedures and institutions mentioned above is very limited. Thus the conflicting claims of the two ethnic groups (Oromo and Somali) were not addressed through the above mentioned legal and institutional instruments of conflict management. Several factors explain why these constitutional instruments of conflict management did not function well.

First, lack of experience. As the federal system in Ethiopia is still very young, there is a lack of adequate knowledge and experience in running a federal government from both the sides of the federal and regional governments. The House of Federation, which is given the most important task of conflict management, has not yet finished its work of organizing itself. In a startling admission of this problem, the House of Federation in its most recent report revealed that it had not yet acquired an office space and had not hired support staff who are crucially important to execute its constitutional functions (*Reporter*, October 21, 2002).

Secondly, the composition of the House of Federation. The House of Federation, which is responsible for interpretation of the constitution, is composed of representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples of the country, who are in practice delegated to it by regional councils. This impacts upon the independence of the House in deciding on constitutional issues. As the members of the House are representatives of regional governments and also political parties, they could not independently function in their task of interpreting the constitution. This could, therefore, undermine the vitality of the House as an important and impartial instrument of conflict management. For instance, the Constitution provides that the House of Federation should decide on issues of interpreting the constitution thirty days after getting the opinion of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (Art.83/2). The House, however, failed to make a decision six months after it received the opinion of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry on a question submitted to it from Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State concerning the right of voting. The reason given by the House for this delay was its inability to get what

it regarded as opinions of the “higher political leadership” (Ibid.). This clearly indicates that there is a serious limitation on the House of Federation in independently addressing its constitutional obligations.

Politico-administrative instruments of conflict management

By far the most frequently used instruments in managing conflicts in federal Ethiopia are politico-administrative¹⁴ to the detriment of constitutional institutions and principles. The creation of an anomalous administrative structure, the Dire Dawa Administrative Council, under the Office of the Prime Minister of the federal government without statutory basis, is a good example of the dominance of politico-administrative instruments of conflict management in Ethiopia.

The underlying features of managing conflicts in Ethiopia are still characterized by hegemonic and centralizing tendencies of the political center. The continuity in these behaviours of the Ethiopian State after 1991 could be explained by the attempt of the EPRDF to delicately mediate its policy of empowering ethnicity and its desire for hegemonic control of political power. On the one hand, unconditional rights to self-determination up to secession are proclaimed and strongly and at times persuasively argued for by the EPRDF, but at the same time political groupings and attitudes that favour secession are discredited as “narrow nationalists”. In principle, self-administrative structures are promised for all ethnic groups of the country, but because of economic and administrative expediencies, amalgamation of diverse groups is pursued. These and other contradictions explain the nature of conflicts and their management in the post 1991 period. Some features that have emerged in terms of politico-administrative management of conflicts in Ethiopia will be discussed below.

First, inaction and reactive nature of interventions by politico-administrative organs. In many of the conflicts that occurred in the post-1991 period, both administrative and political organs were slow to respond and their actions were largely reactive. In the majority of cases, one may say, political and administrative organs involved themselves in conflict resolution efforts after the damage was already done. In many cases, no preventive actions were taken, even if tensions were simmering for a long time between rival ethnic groups.

Secondly, the dominance of the executive and the ruling coalition in conflict management processes. The hazy boundary between the ruling party and governmental bodies has even been recently criticized by the EPRDF for much of its difficulties. In the realm of conflict management as well, institutions such as the House of Federation and regional assemblies which are in principle given the task of conflict management were weakened by the undue dominance of the executive and party organs. The dominance of the central executive on questions of managing conflicts has been even more institutionalized after the establishment of the new federal cabinet in 2001. The somewhat dubious regional affairs bureau under the Prime Minister’s Office, which was a pivotal institution in the relations of the regions with the central government and between themselves, is now reorganized as a new ministry, Ministry of Federal Affairs, and headed by one of the veteran leaders of the TPLF. This shows that the dominance of the executive in conflict management processes will get even more institutionalized and strengthened.

Thirdly, neglecting demands and use of force. Another important feature of the politico-administrative style of conflict management is the apparent tendency of ignoring demands of some ethnic groups for recognition of their separate identities and for changes of administrative structures. Both regional and federal authorities are usually reluctant to accept the demands of ethnic groups for changes in their status in regional administrative structures. In fact, politico-administrative organs only react to such demands after the ethnic groups persisted with their claims and particularly when claims and counters claims lead to violent conflicts.

Fourthly, peace and democracy conference. A number of such conferences have taken place for several purposes. In fact, it seems to observers that the preferred instrument of conflict resolution by the politico-administrative organs is the so-called 'peace and democracy conferences' particularly for the lowland regions of Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella. The former Regional Affairs Bureau at the Prime Minister's office organized numerous such conferences by bringing in conflicting parties and different interest groups. For example, various conferences were held to resolve the conflict between the Borana and the Garri, the Afar and the Somali, and different Gambella factions. In some cases, uniting the political organizations of the regions (Gambella), which are clan based, was pursued as an important instrument of conflict management. The contributions of these conferences to building non-violent conflict management systems were, however, very limited because of failure in the implementation of agreements reached in these conferences and also suspicion of some of the groups about the real interest of the politico-administrative organs.

In sum, the politico-administrative instruments of conflict management remain ad-hoc, disparate, not well organized and above all reactive; intervening in a conflict situation after the damage is already done. The idea of federalism as an instrument of better management of ethnic diversity and conflicts could only become successful, if there is a credible system of conflict management. For this purpose, it is important to strengthen the legal and institutional instruments of conflict management.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATION OF DIRE DAWA'S ANOMALY FOR ETHNIC FEDERALISM

The difficulty of applying the ethnic-federalist project throughout Ethiopia is testified by the present status of Dire Dawa. As a result of competing ethnic nationalisms between the Oromo and the Somali, the federal government directly administers Dire Dawa from Addis Ababa.

Federalizing through the parameter of ethno-linguistic identity could pose ethnic rivalries and conflicts, even if it is intended to tackle ethnic contradictions through empowering ethnicity. In this respect, we observe some impending trends of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, which include inter-ethnic competition and conflict in multiple regional states; conflicts regarding regional states' boundaries; and tensions in the relations of regional majorities and minorities. The government, to manage these ethnic conflicts used both legal and politico-administrative instruments. The legal instruments

refer to several articles of the federal constitution, which provide the principles, procedures and institutional set-up for the management of conflicts between regional states. On the other hand, politico-administrative instruments of conflict management refer to administrative interventions of executive agencies of the federal government to manage conflicts. By far the most frequently used instrument of conflict management in federal Ethiopia remains politico-administrative, though it is characterized as ad-hoc, disparate, not well organized and reactive. How does the situation of Dire Dawa configure in these impending ways of ethnic conflict management in Ethiopia?

First, the case of Dire Dawa shows the difficulty of clearly delineating the country along ethnic lines. It also reveals how ethnic federalism could lead to territorial claims and competitions with the possibility of precipitating into conflicts. Moreover, the Dire Dawa case indicates the problems of accommodating multi-ethnic urban centers in ethnic federalism.

Secondly, the way the federal government reacted to the situation in Dire Dawa was purely politico-administrative, as the administrative arrangement created for Dire Dawa was ad hoc and temporary without following the constitution. This illuminates that the limitations of the available legal and institutional methods of conflict management.

Thirdly, the experience of Dire Dawa seems to have far-reaching consequences regarding the management of urban centers of the country. After the September 2001 restructuring of the federal government, the newly established Federal Affairs Ministry is increasingly claiming responsibilities regarding the development of the urban centers of the country and pastoral areas.¹⁵ This indicates that the federal government would assert more authority and power over regional urban centers and probably over the regional states themselves through executive measures without necessarily amending the federal constitution. In this respect, one might conclude that the unique situation of Dire Dawa during the last eleven years might not be resolved by awarding the city either to the Somali or the Oromia regional states. Instead, the federal government might set up some institutional and legal basis for its direct administration of Dire Dawa.

NOTES

1. The Federal Constitution lists nine regional states as members of the new federation. These are: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Gambella peoples, and Harari people. Addis Ababa has become the federal capital city. Together these are divided into zones (66), which are in turn divided into Woredas (550) and Special Woredas (6). Dire Dawa in eastern Ethiopia is administrated under the federal government.
2. These terms are used interchangeably in the Federal Constitution. The constitution defines "nations, nationalities, and peoples" as "... a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory". Cf. Art 39/5 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

3. The Transitional Government's Proclamation No. 7/1992 laid the foundation for the establishment of national and regional governments. According to Proclamation No. 7/1992 there are fourteen regional governments: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benishangul, Gurage/Hadya, Sidama, Wolayita, Omo, Kafa, Gambela, Harar and Addis Ababa. While the first twelve were national states, Harar and Addis Ababa were given special status because of their population make-up.
4. Patterns of identity are complex and often overlap. For instance, many pastoral communities such as the Garri and the Gurgura use the Oromo language but their ethnic identification fluctuates between the Somali and Oromo.
5. Dire Dawa is the second largest city in Ethiopia next to Addis Ababa. Because of its strategic location on the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, it has an important economic significance. Dire Dawa serves as a transit for Ethiopian exports and imports through Djibouti to international destinations. In fact, Ethiopia's near complete dependence on Djibouti for port services after the eruption of the Ethio-Eritrean war in 1998 dramatically increased the economic and political significance of Dire Dawa. Moreover, Dire Dawa serves as a hub of east Ethiopia's lucrative trade relations with Djibouti. According to the Dire Dawa Administrative Council report, the largest employer in Dire Dawa (about 67%) is the commercial sector. Furthermore, Dire Dawa has several large and small-scale industries, which hire thousands of workers.
6. The Dire Dawa Administrative Council covers 1,977 square Kilometers sharing borders with the regional states of Oromia and Somali. It has four *Wored*, 23 urban *Kebele* administrations and 29 *Kebele* Peasant Associations. According to the 1994 census, the total population of Dire Dawa was 277,245. The three largest ethnic groups in Dire Dawa include Oromo (48%); Amhara (27%) and Somali (13.9%). According to the same census, the five largest ethnic groups in the urban areas are Amhara, Oromo, Gurage and Tigraway. In the rural areas, however, Oromo and Somali comprise 85.2 and 14.3 percent of the rural population, respectively (CSA, 1994). The urban population of Dire Dawa comprises more than 70 percent of the overall population of Dire Dawa.
7. Traditionally ethnic and/or regional conflicts in Ethiopia were between the political centre at Addis Ababa and ethnic and regional groups (such as Ogaden, Eritrea and Tigray).
8. After the federalization of Ethiopia on the basis of ethnicity, new patterns of ethnic conflicts are emerging between several groups on such questions as boundaries of ethnically constituted regions, recognition of identity and level of representation at local councils and others. The emergence of these patterns of conflicts in addition to the traditional centre-periphery conflicts which are persisting at some levels makes the milieu of ethnic conflicts in present-day Ethiopia complex at multiple levels.
9. Presently Dire Dawa is run by an administrative council established in 1995, which comprise five members, each two from the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) and Ethiopia Somali Democratic Party, and one from the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). The members of the Council are appointed by the Prime Minister's Office, presumably after they were nominated by their respective political organizations. The representative of the ANDM chairs the Council. There is no legal basis for the formation of Dire Dawa Administrative Council.

10. Interview, Aliye Robo, and others, September 2001, Dire Dawa
11. Mohammed Sheik, member of the Dire Dawa administrative council, Interview, September 2001.
12. Ibid.
13. Mohammed Hassen Ugza and others, September 2001, Dire Dawa
14. Refers to the role political and administrative structures in the management of conflicts and also the dominance of the executive in conflict management processes.
15. See Federal Affairs Ministry's report to the House of Peoples' Representatives on the first quarter of the 2002/2003 fiscal year.

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13

THE CHALLENGES OF CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA: SOME CONTENDING ISSUES

Gani Joses Yoroms

Africa has been seen as a continent where crises and conflicts leak like water from a basket. They are not susceptible to prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. And true to type, the parades and scourge of crises on the continent make this assumption, at some levels, given. In the light of this, how are confidence-building measures relevant in the management of deeply embedded conflicts on the continent? Can the concept help to build a scenario of conflict prevention management and resolution? If not, what could be the militating factors? These questions are relevant to the setting of the objectives of this chapter, which include, first, providing a generic conceptual framework for explaining the nature and character of confidence-building. Secondly, to examine the historical context of the application of the concepts in Europe, and the impact they have had on crisis management in Africa. Thirdly, to understand the challenges of 'escaping scenarios' in the application of confidence-building measures for crisis management in Africa. Lastly the chapter concludes on how to evolve an African confidence-building measure, to address its peculiar type of crisis.

Before we proceed, it is important to state that this work is set to assert that it is a misperception to assume that confidence-boosting indices can be taken or projected as confidence-building measures (CBMs). As would be demonstrated, confidence-building measures, as much as they are relevant for crisis management, must be contextualised on the basis of their operational mechanism, and should demonstrate the ability to meet the challenges of managing or resolving crisis without being deflective. But in Africa there are contentious issues involved in crisis management.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

Confidence-building measures or mechanisms are sets of structural and institutional frameworks effected by states in a given sub-regional or global regime to check and

shape contentious conflicts. According to Holsti, they are “arrangements designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create”.¹ In an expanded conceptual approach, confidence-building is seen as a “process of reciprocal behaviour among states in the military and security dimensions. It entails the communication of relevant information among the parties concerned in order to enhance knowledge and clarity of each other’s intentions, reduce mutual suspicion and avoid misperception”.² Confidence-building measures are therefore not mere procedures of achieving policies and/or actions of a given international or regional organisation, but are instead conceptual approaches in which groups in a given setting not only mix but are combined. It is like a melting pot rather than a salad board. It is rather comprehensively enhancing than boosting.

The emergence of confidence-building networks as security regimes is a shift away from the classical view of international relations as an anarchic system where states seek to maximise their relative security and welfare with an in-built bias in the defence of national interest and the maintenance of their national independence.³ According to Retterberger, *et al*, the model is anarchic and cannot easily be reconciled to the fact of institutionalised co-operation between states. However, Retterberger and his colleagues note that institutionalised cooperation between states for collective handling of conflicts has helped to turn our attention “away from the model of international anarchy to one of international governance; that is, to how states manage collectively to rule themselves without setting up international (supranational) government”.⁴ Thus it is the efforts of states to govern themselves collectively through consensus rather than force that has led to the emergence of international regimes.

It is in the light of the above that Jervis distinguishes between security regime and non-security regimes.⁵ Confidence-building regimes emanated from security regime with the following attributes: First they carry along with them security alarms, for checking suspicion and ill perception. Secondly, members of the regime take collective measures against offender(s). Thirdly, member states see the regime as the governing institution without necessarily establishing supranational government. Lastly, the governing rules, principles and convergent norms cannot be manipulated as is common in non-security regimes (NSR). Therefore security regimes have been analytically conceptualised as:

*a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscription for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making or implementing collective choice.*⁶

Given the above analysis we can further understand international regimes from an intricately linked conceptual angle; such as omnibus and organic regimes. Omnibus is taken to represent the nature and character of states in non-security regimes but wobbling on how to build a sustainable security regime, while organic regimes represent security regimes that are properly anchored on CBMs. In omnibus regimes, members tend to be mixed like a salad board but can hardly be combined. There exist sharp and contentious inter-

ests among them, which are basically contradictory. Members are loose and membership of the regime is voluntary with wide time-horizons regulated by set norms and rules.⁷ Cooperation is rather adhoc and exigent. However, organic regimes provide international governance of the affairs of member states. The members are made up of states, which are conscious of their collective assurances and trustworthiness. Member states, though independent entities, are of necessity dependent on each other in an overlapping and interactive process. Omnibus regimes are like a rainbow coalition of states with differences, demands and orientations, which are not easily reconcilable though tolerable. They may be confidence-boosting but not confidence-building measures.

Therefore what one expects in omnibus regimes is confidence-boosting indices or steps, and not measures or mechanisms. Steps are processes or indicators, while measures are the established principles and convergent norms governing state behaviour. The possibilities, which made organic regimes establish confidence-building measures, are based on historical connections, established principles and practices of democratic governance, strong economic system, common internal threats and fear of inter-state threats. An unstable political system, contentious value system, poor economic growth and weak social relations of production regulate the omnibus system.




Figure 1: Confidence-Building parameters in organic and omnibus regimes

A - represents the organic regime of confidence-building measures.

A1 - represents the institution of confidence-building, which involves A2 as members. The circle is thick, indicating that the regime has rule-enforcing and governing authority over the members.

A2 - represents members in A1: they have an overlapping relationship, which makes them relate and be organically linked.

B - represents the omnibus regime of confidence-boosting indicators.

B1 - represents the institution of the regime with broken circle lines. This indicates that the institution is weak and lacks rule-enforcing, mechanism-governing rights over member states.

B2 - Represents member states in B1. They lack coherence with each other. Each pursues its interests with less regard to B1.




Figure2: How the regimes confront their enemies

1. - Organic regime
2. - Omnibus regime
3. - The Enemy (External threat)

The enemy could be anything thought of by either A or B. To A, the enemy may pose a threat in form of communism and arms transfer. B may see the threat from A in the form of imperialism, debt crisis and dumping of nuclear waste. However, C has greater impact on B because of its weak institutional frameworks of confidence-building. This is shown by the strong and unbroken direct arrow from C to B. The broken arrow pointing to C shows how B is incapable of affecting C. In the relationship of A to C, A is stronger in affecting C. And C is lacking the strength to confront A. This is because A has a well-enhanced security regime.

From Figures 1 and 2 it is clear that confidence-building measures are not just the outcome of ideas and principles set out from the chancellery. Rather, they evolved from the patterned behaviour of states, having the confidence that the idea and principles set out are self-assuring to regulate misperception, suspicion, and misunderstanding and also create governing measures. In the light of this, it is difficult for omnibus regimes to evolve meaningful confidence-building measures without understanding the relevance for doing so, giving the practical restraints. Thus, according to Garuba security regimes that evolved out of European experiences were based on the idea of joint-management of threats through confidence and security-building measures.⁸

There are two factors that account for this in the case of Europe: first, routine compliance with the norms and rules by member states. Though confidence and security-building measures “may not address to the hypothetical objectives of threats arising from capabilities to wage a war, has at least the potential for reducing, if not overcoming the perceived threats of surprise attack and thus, of contributing to the stabilisation of East-West security relations”.⁹ Secondly, it is possible for security regimes to either

precede the creation of economic cooperation or, when established, receive more attention than non-security regimes as members are committed to their own security. This is because security is paramount to any government and its people; unlike in an omnibus regime where security supersedes all other interests yet lacks organic linkages to the social realities of the entities.

In organic security regimes, member states demonstrate their credibility in sustaining a stable political system. Thus it is imperative to point out that confidence - building measures are first and foremost superintended by credibility-building of states involved (i.e. political stability, social security and sound diplomatic relations). This informs the strength, nature and structure of the regime as an effective instrument for sustaining confidence-building measures among members. Because of the weak nature of the omnibus regime, what we expect or envisage is mutual suspicion and insecurity as there is lack of trust and faith in the system.

The failure of confidence-building in an omnibus environment makes it possible for one to accept the position that the concepts are Eurocentric. The intentions in Europe are basically for arms control, to reduce and eliminate misperceptions of potential threats that emanate from military competition, and to overturn communism from continental Europe. These were done through notification, exchange of information, transparency and on site inspection.

From this conceptual analysis, how can we understand the importance of confidence-building for crisis management, given the European historical experience? We may as well ask, as Sesay did, which generation of confidence - building measures are relevant to the African-situation? If none, how has Africa been coping with crisis management?

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The concept of confidence-building has long been in existence, and formed the basis for the graduation of humanity from the Hobbesian state to organised human society. However, the more society becomes sophisticated, the more the concepts become scientific in approach, analysis and application. The armed race between the East and West, leading to the amassing of destructive nuclear weapons, created fear of nuclear war in Europe and the world at large. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, coming after the end of the Second World War, where two Japanese cities were bombed, also raised serious questions about human survival. These factors created some internal logic, which is inherent in the development of confidence-building measures in Western Europe. Here, it is important to trace the historical relevance of CBMs to the development that occurred in the aftermath of World War II. These developments include (i) aid from the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe, with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) creating a valuable frame-work for institutional collaboration; (ii) apart from the aid, the USA committed it to investing in building a stable, prosperous and committed Europe to enable the region to participate fully in the global trading system in order to close the dollar gap, and also to create the basis for economic co-operation among western European nations as a *sine qua non* for regional recovery, and lastly, (iii) the emergence of Europeanism as an ideology shifted progressively toward European unity as a counterpoise to the threats of Soviet imperialism.¹²

Indeed Europeanism became an ideology in a way Atlanticism never did, as it created a valuable extra-mural focus for the constitutional parties of Western Europe to focus their struggle against internal communism. The 1948 communist coup in Prague gave this European struggle an impetus, to the extent that in 1949 the Council of Europe was formed, creating by 1950, a European climate which gave inspiration for much of the European thinking about Europe.

At the Council's meeting in 1950, the European Defence Community and European Political Community were established, prompting the anxiety that the Council had become the centre and framework of all efforts being made towards the unification and integration of Europe. Unfortunately, the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1957, had the problem of resolving its differences with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was formed in 1959 as a countermeasure. The fact is that, in spite of these differences (which were later resolved with the expansion of European union at the 1992 Maastricht treaty, given the collapse of the Soviet Union), subsequent co-operation in the area of security demonstrates Europeans concern for security regime above all other non-security issues. For instance as at 1973, membership of the EEC was put at six and that of EFTA at seven.

But as from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, 33 European countries, Canada and the USA were involved in comprehensive confidence-building measures in order to bring about East-West detente. Nevertheless, the two World Wars had a great impact on security and economic co-operation in Europe. The wars succeeded in breeding nationalism and subsequently led to the creation of independent states according to nationality boundaries, along linguistic frontiers. This tended to reduce the minority question except in some instances like Spain (Catalans and Basques), Britain (Catholics in North Ireland, Scottish and Welsh), Switzerland and Belgium. However, where minority nationalities existed, the constitutions of such areas were framed towards proportional representation and/or consociationalism.

In short, Western Europe has a fair history of democratic governance which has helped to reduce ethnic conflicts. From indications, there was no fear of internal threats other than communism. It becomes easily possible for member states to institute confidence-building measures in accordance with their common expectations. The Marshall Plan provided a strong economic basis for states in Europe, and with stable a political system, they were able to contain the spread of communism, control arms transfer and build an overlapping security network among themselves. The US, using NATO equally deployed its nuclear warheads to Europe to challenge the superiority of the defunct Soviet Union over Europe.

During the Cold War, Europe had the greatest concentration of arms and forces. One basic fact about the practice of confidence-building measures in Europe is the compliance with the principles, rules and convergent norms by member states. At the peak of Cold War politics, the emphasis in Europe was "we must never go to war with each other again".¹⁴ Western Europe, through confidence-building measures, was able to stoutly resist and defend it against threats emanating from communist Europe. This objective was achieved in 1990 when member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Stockholm and signed the termination of the

Cold War. The European approach to confidence-building measures is symbiotic, combining rather than mixing, economic integration, political co-operation, and, security, and defence collaboration.

Given the credibility and reputation Western Europe had built for itself, it was able to withstand and control the contradictions and conflicts that broke from the Eastern Europe following the dissolution of Soviet Union. The European Union is being enlarged to accommodate and integrate the Soviet breakaways

On the basis of the historical excursion to Europe, how can we understand the nature of conflicts and crisis management in Africa? In what ways, if any, have confidence-building measures managed conflicts in Africa?

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

The absence of confidence-building measures as found in Europe has affected the pattern of crisis management in Africa. What we have in place are omnibus, loose and convoluted confidence-building indices or steps, which are not measures of confidence-building in Africa.

In all the sub-regions of Africa there are deeply embedded crises. These crises took root at independence and have spread, changing only in form and structure. Among them were the inter-state crises, which came in the form of liberation and independence struggles (Namibia, Saharawi Arab Republic, South Africa, Eritrea), trans-border destabilisation of one state by another (South Africa destabilising Angola, Mozambique, Zambia) and border disputes (Ghana-Togo, Senegal-Mauritania, Libya-Chad, Somalia-Kenya, Somalia-Ethiopia). These conflicts were exacerbated by Cold War politics, which led to the infiltration of the great and super-powers into the continent, in search of partners and alliances.

Imobighe has demonstrated that between 1964 and 1989 Africa experienced a series of foreign threats and intervention. Most of these interventions were as a result of defence pacts with some African states, which led to the establishment of military bases in states involved in the pacts.¹⁵ France, for instance, had 22 military pacts with African states. Apart from this, the USA, Britain, France and their transnational corporations have captured the economies of Africa through the World Bank and other international finance institutions. With the end of the Cold War, intra-state crises, which existed in only a few African states, became contagious. Even so, some of the prevailing intra-state conflicts have persisted, especially Sudan. There are those that have emerged in the post-Cold War era for various reasons due to the collapsing nature of the state in Africa. These are Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).

However, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) remained the relevant instrument for crisis management, creating a climate of peace between states and taking necessary measures to resolve those it deemed necessary. The OAU has the following conflict situation types:¹⁶

- When the conflict has escalated into a sustained conflict between two or more independent African states, like the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Angola in which they supported each other's dissidents;
- When there is an absence of an effective authority in the affected state, like in Chad and in Angola after the collapse of Portuguese colonial authority;
- When there is no opposition from the effective authority in the affected country, like attempts the organisation made to reconcile the parties in the Nigerian civil war.

In the light of the above, the Organisation tended to rely on several structures within and outside its Charter to resolve crises. These included Article XIX of the Charter (Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration), summit resolution, decisions of Heads of states and Government, office of the Current Chairman, Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, Defence Commission, Presidential Mediation and other ad hoc arrangements. Though each mediation organ may have its weakness and strength, depending on the nature of the conflict and the disposition of the parties towards a peaceful settlement, Presidential mediation has been the most effective method of managing conflicts among African states.¹⁷ Unfortunately the first major peacekeeping outing embarked upon by the OAU in Chad in 1982 met with disaster. Only a few member states responded in sending troops. The financial burden of the exercise was borne by Nigeria.

In another development, economic integration has also been seen as a stepping-stone towards creating confidence-building measures in Africa. In 1980 the Lagos Plan of Action was enacted by African states, followed by the 1991 creation of the African Economic Community as a means to enhance regional integration. This was based on the hope that:

*apart from the obvious economic gains from successful integration and economic co-operation, economic endeavours can provide a framework and a forum for diffusing discords, engendering mutual trust, and providing regional security arrangements. Regional co-operation does, therefore, provide an opportunity for developing an array of military and non-military confidence-building measures.*¹⁸

The OAU, in the light of the changing international environment, established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in 1993. The aims of the mechanism were to anticipate and prevent potential conflicts and two, undertake peacemaking and peace-building in post-conflict situations. And three undertake peacemaking and peace building in post conflict situations. In the same vein ECOWAS's experience in resolving regional conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone decided on an enhanced framework for peace and security. This is the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.¹⁹

Despite the initial doubts about ECOMOG's capability in crisis management, ECOMOG proved its relevance and demonstrated the possibility that countries in omnibus security regimes do have certain potential abilities and indices to establish their system-specific confidence-building measures. But what has been militating against these indices evolving into confidence-building measures for the management of African crises?

CHALLENGES

The models and practices of confidence-building measures in Africa are at variance with the classical concepts. Because they are not structured and consciously built into the social system and the realities of African societies, they lack rule-enforcing mechanisms. Members act at will and in most cases are affected by spray diplomacy²⁰ rather than complying to norms relevant to the creation of security regime. Rules, principles and convergent norms are not coded with sanction-enforcing mechanisms.

Most of the discussions on the concept as they relate to Africa are basically hypothetical and projective of how to apply the concept to African situations. At the same time these authors turn round not only to identify the indices of confidence boosting in Africa but also to extrapolate these indices and contextualise them as institutions of confidence-building measures for crisis management in Africa.²¹ Their focus has been on the OAU and regional organisations like ECOWAS. The problem is that the structure and institutions in OAU and ECOWAS are not related to the assurances and trustworthiness of mind, which are the basic dynamic variables in confidence-building. The OAU structure, especially the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), has been ineffective since it was set up. The ECOWAS protocols on defence and non aggression were not well structured before the outbreak of the Liberian crisis. The structures of these organs were not only porous but cumbersome in terms of implementation.

Therefore, it becomes difficult to resolve conflicts on the basis of ad-hoc approaches and exigencies. This informed the reason why the Liberian conflict took a longer time to resolve than expected, because there were differences of views and interests by members on how to handle the crisis, and not on the basis of what the ECOWAS structure of confidence-building had in place. Thus, members had to work outside ECOWAS structures to create the Standing Mediation Committee (later expanded to the Committee of Nine) to address the Liberian problem. Even at that, it was with a lot of difficulties. This also explains why the organisations (OAU and ECOWAS) are omnibus in nature, without any mechanism for enforcing norms on recalcitrant members. Within ECOWAS, two security operations exist. There is the Francophone led *Accord de non aggression et d'assistance en Matiere de Defence* (ANAD) and the two ECOWAS pacts. The differences between the two operations were manifest at the time ECOMOG was being set up. The same mistake in Liberia has been repeated in the Sierra Leonean crisis without any commitment towards creating confidence-building measures. Even with the new protocol on conflict prevention, ECOWAS has found it difficult to address the crisis in Ivory Coast.

The African crisis is a crisis of credibility building. The increasingly authoritarian rules and the politics of exclusion makes it difficult for African states to establish domestic credibility that should inform confidence among member states. National interest has become regime interest, and state security structures are intended to protect the leadership rather than the people. This was strengthened by the OAU, which encased in its charter the doctrine of “non-interference of the sovereign equality of member states”. The clause made it difficult for easy application of an early-warning system, which the

OAU had put in place. The concept of an early-warning system is “envisaged to be based on a co-ordinating facility located at the OAU secretariat capable of collecting and analysing and communication of relevant evidence, estimates and conclusion for the use of policy makers in making strategic choices”²²

Under the OAU regime of non-interference, it was not possible for a country plagued by crisis to open its door to early warning, when the leadership was deeply implicated in the causes of the crisis. Most of these crises are basically due to:²³

- Inequitable access to power and resources;
- Total absence or abandonment of moral and ethical restraint against the arbitrary and selfish use of power and public resources;
- Discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, ethnic origin and socio-economic status;
- Non-democratic and exclusive governance;
- Denial of basic human rights;
- Failure of institutions of government.

The departing colonial authorities imposed the nature of state creation in Africa. The African people and nations or ethnic group did not sit to decide the nature of their sovereign state. Many ethnic groups were forced to live together at independence. Initially the leaders of these states were engaged in boundary disputes, given the assumption that the internal affairs of these states were externally settled. Unfortunately, at the close of the Cold War chapter, there has been an increasing pressure for ethnic self-determination. There has been a demand across Africa for sovereign national conferences for each ethnic group, people and minority to decide on their own whether to be in a given sovereign entity or not. These revolutionary pressures have led to the collapse of the state in Africa. The state is no longer functioning, but crawling.²⁴ It is still in the realm of imagination as to whether the African Union will achieve faster measures for confidence-building, given the continuing perpetuation of conflicts on the continent.

Given this parade of problems, it is difficult to establish confidence-building among states and ethnic groups in the continent. However, some authors have called for regional hegemons as sustaining measures of confidence-building. In this case, Garuba noted, “Nigeria almost acting as a regional hegemon, succeeded in forging a consensus on the resolution of the Liberian conflict. It is clear that without a country like Nigeria... it would have been difficult to attain the success recorded in Liberia today.”²⁵ But the question is, how long would Nigeria continue to sustain a security regime that is omnibus, loose and convoluted? How would Nigeria continue her hegemonic role when she is equally afflicted by her domestic crisis? Supposing Nigeria turns out to be faced with an earth-breaking conflict like that of Liberia, which of the countries in the region would take the challenge to play the role Nigeria played in Liberia or attempted to do in Sierra Leone?

From the foregoing, organic CBMs cannot be easily built in a region where states have collapsed, or as Rothchild puts it, “Where the rules of the game proved difficult and connections among political elites unravel.”²⁶ If this is so, what is the future of confidence-building measures in the light of crisis management in Africa?

CONCLUSION

What this chapter has done is only to raise an eyebrow about the conception of confidence-building measures in Africa, and to argue that the failure to manage crises in Africa is as a result of challenges of creating confidence-building measures. This crisis is rooted in the nature of state making and state formation in Africa, which makes Africa a perforated and penetrated society. African interests are divided on several issues that should inform African solidarity. Apart from military pacts with developed countries, which make Africa a launch pad of crisis, Africa is one of the most indebted continents of the world. There are social problems, political instability and economic stuntedness. With these situations, it is difficult for member states to set up confidence-building measures of their own to checkmate crisis in the continent. Therefore whatever exists are indices of confidence boosting with the hope that some measures would emerge. These indices and steps are found in the OAU and other regional organisations like ECOWAS and Southern African Development Community in the continent. To compound the problem, foreign involvement in African affairs and their interest in establishing an African security network have divided the attention of the African states. According to Okolo, "following mercenary attacks and foreign invasion of a number of African states and external military intervention, growing doubt has emerged that external powers could guarantee the security of African states let alone commit themselves to their effective defence in an actual military contingency".²⁷

Thus, France influenced a proposal for "Inter-African Security Forces", which was discussed in the Francophone Summit in Dakar in March 1977. Similar discussions were made on the subject by the Summit in May 1978 and by NATO in June 1978. Nigeria was the lone voice against the proposal. Also, immediately after the Cold War the US came up with the Africa Crisis Response Initiative as a security measure in response to the African crisis. Already, Ghana, Uganda and Ethiopia and a host of others have accepted to be part of the initiative. France is also building up her own crisis management initiative in Africa, with Francophone member states supporting it.

But even with the array of crisis management initiatives, crises have persisted in Africa, which points to the fact that there is something wrong with confidence-building measures in Africa. It is possible that Africa faces the current problem of crisis management because the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was not originally conceived as a confidence-building organ. It was established rather as a clearinghouse for conflict resolution. It is therefore difficult to expect effective crisis management at that level when the foundation for prevention is not properly anchored on effective confidence-building principles. Invariably, it has been seen as a club of dictators. However, the organisation missed an opportunity, during the early years of its existence, to establish an African High Command (AHC). Probably, if it had been established it would have evolved a principle of confidence-building measures for Africa by now. However, it is difficult to stretch this position because at the time it was propounded African leaders were divided along the Cold War ideological mesh. It would have been impossible to expect any reasonable outcome from an AHC.

In spite of these problems, we are not proposing military related confidence-building measures, as was the case with the European experience. In order to move Africa from its omnibus security regime to an organic security system, there is a need for credibility-building in the domestic affairs of African states. The indicator of credibility-building is democratic governance. If African states turn to democracy, at least two-thirds of African crises could be resolved. Then, it would be possible for African states to work together, because democracies hardly fight among themselves. Then it would be also possible to have a strong regional or continental organisation that would create norm-enforcing mechanisms. In this case, Africa would be in a better position to establish confidence-building measures that could respond to its debt crisis, foreign intervention and eco-system (dumping of nuclear waste, nuclear bomb tests and others) which the developed world has trapped it in. The 1998 OAU Summit held in Burkina Faso, in its Ouagadougou Declaration endorsed the expansion of democratic space in Africa without delay as a basis for designing confidence-building measures that would properly manage and resolve African crises. It is unfortunate to say that Africa is still dominated by corrupt and repressive leaders. As long as the appeal to good governance and democracy is being promoted without a deeper understanding of African conflicts, Africa is not likely overcome its shortcomings anytime soon.

The position of this work is that for credibility-building to be established, the international community should also support the programme of leadership transparency in Africa. That is the development of standards of openness, reassurance and the ability of the potential leader to build trust and confidence in the minds of the people. If in the post Cold War era it is being noted that "Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct", it means the international community can penetrate any territory to restore hope among the people who have come under repression, where authoritarians and belligerents are tolerated in spite of atrocities against their people, it is difficult to expect an end to African crisis. The 1998 ECOWAS Summit seemed to establish a blueprint for confidence enhancing security measures which would incorporate African traditional methods of conflict resolution using council's of elders and statesmen. It is, however still questionable, as these elders and statesmen were the very people that participated in building a culture of repression in Africa. They have caused havoc to African statescraft by exerting power arbitrarily when they were in control of thier states. How then would the current occupants of power take them seriously, when it is now their turn to exercise power in the same arbitrary manner in which Africa was initially ruled? The current power occupants desire this regime and personal security, creating a cycle of crisis in Africa. This is the dilemma of confidence-building measures in Africa.

However, the formation of the AU by the democratic regimes seems to be the right steps towards meeting the challenges of confidence-building measures. It is hoped that the AU Constitutive Act will stand the test of time by rising to the challenge of building a culture of resistance against military or authoritarian dictatorships which are anathema to confidence-building. A regime that instils fear in the minds of the people cannot create confidence. The African people and electorate need to imbibe the culture of civil ethics with inbuilt distaste for military rule. If the civil servants stop working at the outbreak of a coup, the banks close down and the industrialists lay down their tools, it is im-

possible that any dictator would survive under such a state of anarchy. One major reason for the collapse of Johnny Koromah's military junta in Sierra Leone was not really the support given by ECOMOG but the paralysed state apparatus by the civil populace. By this means dictatorship would be weakened, leading to the emergence of new democracies and a new culture of confidence-building measures in Africa.

Lastly, in spite of what has been pointed out, for confidence-building measures to be established and rooted in Africa, African people, ethnic groups and minorities must determine their territorial component by plebiscite or through sovereign national conferences. Increasingly, ethnic groups are reacting to forced co-habitation. Based on a false impression about the state they no longer want to be in a territory that is not of their choice. In short, ethnic groups want the state structure to take after the similitude of the 1848 Westphalia Treaty. However, the Westphalia Treaty came about after 30 years of civil war in Europe. If it should be a yardstick in Africa, it means ethnic groups and minorities fighting for self-determination would have to engage themselves in a long period of revolutionary warfare with their authoritarian leadership, either horizontally or vertically as the case may be. Indeed, the struggles for self-determination by various ethnic nationalities have been on going in the pre-colonial era. A superior authority, colonialism, aborted this. Colonialism only suppressed but did not resolve the problem. Therefore the resurgence of conflicts in Africa is part of the struggle to complete what colonialism aborted. Most ethnic groups still fantasize above what Inglehart called "imagined republics". Until this process is completed, the possibility of constructing mechanisms for confidence-building measures may continue to be fluid. And if the task is not completed (it even seems too late), Africa may again be left on the periphery of globalization in the next millennium. What an unfortunate scenario for Africa at the turn of the century.

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14

AFRICAN PEACE SUMMITS AND THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, 1998-2002

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The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) erupted when Laurent Kabila ordered his former allies out of Congolese soil. Since 1998, the DRC has held a series of peace summits and unilateral talks in major centres of Africa. The purpose of these summits was to try to bring the Congolese internal conflict to an end. All these efforts instrumental in creating an environment conducive to the drafting and signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord.

In terms of this background, this chapter seeks to discuss various peace summits, which were held in major centres of Africa. It will examine whether African peace summits succeeded in containing the conflict or bringing about a peace settlement in the DRC. This chapter starts by discussing the Victoria Falls summit, which was held in Zimbabwe and chaired by President Robert Mugabe. The second section will deal with the Pretoria summit, which was chaired by the then South African President, Nelson Mandela. The next section will discuss the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit held in Durban, South Africa in September 1998. Although the NAM summit was not held specifically to deal with the DRC crisis, it attempted to focus on the DRC crisis. The following section discusses the Addis Ababa summit held in Ethiopia on 11 September 1998.

The chapter then looks at the Mauritius summit, which was held three days after the Addis Ababa summit. The summit was held under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and was chaired by Mandela. Attention then turns to the unilateral talks held between Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD-Kisangani) and Mandela. The talks were held in Pretoria in November 1998. The Gaborone talks, also held in November 1998, were attended by dignitaries from the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as foreign ministers from Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. The RCD, which was previously prevented from attending other summits, managed to attend the Gaborone talks.

The next summit, the unilateral talks between Laurent Kabila and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, were held at Sirte in Libya in April 1999. The main purpose of the talks be-

tween the two leaders was to sign a peace agreement. The chapter analyzes the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord, which was initially initiated by the former Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba. Various countries especially in SADC, came to witness the signing of the peace accord. Another summit was held in Lusaka in Zambia in April 2002, and was attended by the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The chapter then discusses the Sun City summit, which was held in South Africa in April 2002. The purpose of the Sun City summit was to initiate the interim government in the DRC.

THE VICTORIA FALLS SUMMIT

The Victoria Falls summit was held on 7 and 8 August 1998 (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 75) and was chaired by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Presidents from Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia and the DRC were present (*IRIN*, 30 September 1998). South Africa was not involved in the Victoria Falls summit. However, the South African Foreign Minister and Defence Minister attended a meeting with Kabila prior to his departure for the Victoria Falls summit. At the meeting, it was agreed that a Ceasefire accord would be signed. This unfortunately did not materialise.

As the summit was attended by most of the countries involved in the Congolese rebellion, observers thought they would be able to come up with some solution to the Congolese crisis. To their disappointment, the Victoria Falls summit failed, as nothing concrete was agreed upon during the summit. The SADC leaders seemed to support Mugabe for his involvement in the Congolese conflict rather than condemning him for his domestic affairs. At the end, a communiqué was issued. The communiqué mentioned a commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the DRC.

THE PRETORIA SUMMIT

The second summit was held in Pretoria on 22 and 23 August 1998 (*Summary of World Broadcast*, 28 August 1998). The former South African President Nelson Mandela chaired the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate an end to the conflict and to broker peace in the DRC (*Reuters News Service*, 22 August 1998). In fact, there were two consecutive meetings in Pretoria. At the first meeting, Kabila failed to attend but he was able to send a representative. Also present at the summit were the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda. Representatives of 12 of the 14 SADC members attended the second meeting as well as Kabila's former allies, Rwanda and Uganda (*IRIN*, 30 September 1998). Kenya, which is neither a member of SADC nor a participant in the DRC conflict, backed SADC efforts in bringing a peaceful settlement in the country (*The Daily Dispatch*, 24 August 1998). Both Kabila and his friend, Mugabe, could not attend the meeting, with the former lashing out that the meeting was superfluous since the organisation (SADC) had already made its decision (*Reuters News Service*, 23 August 1998). The Pretoria summit ended by giving Mandela a mandate to seek an immediate ceasefire and the ending of military hostilities in the DRC, to be followed

by political negotiations. Apart from discussing possible ceasefire in Congo, the summit also expressed the wish to see all DRC tribes given equal status in terms of human rights (*Summary of World Broadcast*, 28 August 1998). Angola, which was absent from the summit, had agreed to halt the advance of its troops to the town of Kitona (*Daily Dispatch*, 24 August 1998).

Like the Victoria Falls summit, the Pretoria summit could not convince the participants in the DRC conflict to consider the peace settlement in the country. It showed that Kabila and his partners, particularly Mugabe, were not keen to bring Congo's crisis to an end. Kabila feared that once the rebellion would come to an end, there would be a call for democratic elections and his chances of winning the elections might be very slim and that is why he would sometimes stay away from important summits.

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT SUMMIT

Another important summit was of the NAM, which was held in Durban in September 1998 (*Sowetan*, 31 August 1998; *Inter Press Service*, 2 September 1998). Initially, Kabila had announced that he would be unable to attend the NAM summit as he was occupied (*Agence France Presse*, 31 August 1998). However, he mentioned that he would be represented by one of his Foreign Ministers, Jean-Charles Lolakombe. It was announced that at the summit there would be another mini-summit to discuss the DRC crisis and UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, should have chaired the summit. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, however, were present at the summit (*Inter Press Service*, 2 September 1998). NAM delegates were taken by surprise when Kabila emerged at the summit (*Inter Press Service*, 2 September 1998). Kabila's friend, Mugabe, also arrived late for the summit. His reason for arriving late was to avoid shaking hands with Mandela, who was then chairman of the NAM summit (*Reuters News Service*, 13 September 1998).

The Durban summit seriously attempted to resolve the DRC conflict. The DRC delegates at the summit totally rejected any idea of a ceasefire and demanded that foreign forces, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, should first vacate the captured areas before they could talk about a ceasefire in the DRC. The Durban summit urged both SADC and non-SADC members to involve themselves in ending the conflict in the DRC (Malan, 1998: 93; Kabemba, 2000: 29). Even Kabila, who arrived in the middle of the NAM summit, delivered a speech accusing Rwanda and Uganda of being responsible for the 1996-97 massacre of Hutu refugees in the DRC (*IRIN*, 30 September 1998).

The NAM summit was characterised by numerous problems around the conflict. First, the DRC delegates did not agree with the implementation of the ceasefire because foreign troops were still occupying the country. Secondly, Kabila walked out in the middle of the summit and made excuses that he had an important meeting to attend back home. Kabila was quite capable of making decisions on his own and his decisions sometimes appeared irrational. People were hoping that because the Durban summit was an international summit, the delegates would be able to deal with real issues affecting the DRC. Unfortunately, the summit was unable to come up with a concrete solution to end

the conflict in the DRC. The NAM should have come up with an immediate solution, which would have forced Kabila to renounce hostilities in his country.

THE ADDIS ABABA SUMMIT

Another summit was held on 11 September 1998 in Addis Ababa (Cornwell and Potgieter 1998: 82). This summit seemed to be far better organised than the previous summits because it showed signs of progress from the outset. The Addis Ababa summit showed signs of progress because the language of the summit was centred on the presence of foreign forces in the DRC and the issue of whether the rebels should be allowed to attend the talks. However, the summit, like other previous summits, was characterised by major problems. First, Rwanda, which had troops in the DRC, did not want to admit that it was involved in the crisis (CNN, 11 September 1998). Rwanda seemed to be delaying any meaningful progress with regard to a peace settlement in the DRC because it always denied the presence of its army in the country. Even its ally, Uganda, denied several times that it had troops in the DRC, but ended up admitting this. The participants at the summit came to the conclusion that unless Rwanda followed its ally and admitted that it had forces in the DRC, a ceasefire would be impossible in the region (Cornwell and Potgieter 1998: 82). On the other hand, Kabila was also difficult as he refused a demand from Uganda and Rwanda that the rebels should become participants in the negotiations.

While many observers were viewing the Addis Ababa summit as very progressive compared to previous summits, they were disappointed to learn that the participants at the summit were not easy to deal with, especially Kabila. The exclusion of the rebels weakened the negotiation process. There was no way in which the negotiations could continue without the participation of the rebels because they were also part of the problem in the DRC. This appeared to be another tactic to delay or block any meaningful negotiations in the country by Kabila.

THE MAURITIUS SUMMIT

The Mauritius summit was held three days later on 14 September 1998 (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 83). This summit was organised by SADC. The Mauritius summit, like other summits, emphasised the need for a political settlement in the DRC. The then South African President, Nelson Mandela, chaired the summit. ‘The challenge was to develop and implement an agreement so that the people of the Congo could “determine their own destiny and embark on reconstruction as a united, stable and prosperous nation”, he said (*Reuters News Service*, 13 September 1998). The conclusion of the summit was delayed for seven hours by wrangling over the wording of the communiqué (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 83). It was regrettable that an agreement by all SADC participants over the DRC issue was still being avoided. In fact, the final statement at the summit was that all groups involved in the DRC conflict should lay down their arms and negotiate a peaceful settlement.

The Mauritius summit did not come up with convincing suggestions. Many observers thought that because the summit was hosted by SADC, the conflict in the DRC would bear some fruit. Even if the diplomatic efforts continued, the negotiations were not able to stop the war as it was gradually expanding. The forces involved in the conflict continued to capture strategic areas. On 12 October 1998, Kindu, which was previously captured by Kabila forces, fell to the rebels and their allies (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 83).

At the meeting, observers hoped that Kabila, who preferred not to listen to his fellow African friends at summits, would be convinced at the Mauritius summit to renounce the rebellion in the DRC. The Mauritius SADC summit hoped to bolster the region's diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a lasting ceasefire and the promise of real negotiations. The summit wanted to do something about the ongoing rebellion in that country. However, SADC was very soft on Kabila. The Mauritius SADC summit failed to convince its members participating in the DRC conflict to withdraw their troops from Congolese soil.

What was, however, interesting about the Mauritius summit was that it was initiated by SADC itself. Since the DRC conflict erupted, some of the SADC's 14 member states had been reluctant to involve themselves in the DRC issue. Only a few SADC countries, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, had showed their concern over the DRC.

THE GABORONE SUMMIT

Following the failure of the meeting in Mauritius, SADC organised talks again on 19 November 1998 (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 85). Talks were held in Gaborone and various stakeholders attended. Those who attended the Gaborone talks included the UN, the OAU, and the Foreign Ministers of Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa (Reuters News Service, 19 September 1998). The RCD, which had been prevented on several occasions from attending diplomatic meetings, attended. The intention of the talks was to secure the rebels' formal adherence to the draft proposal of the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord. The document, which stated that all foreign troops and other participants in the DRC conflict be withdrawn from the DRC was accepted by the rebels. The document also asked the SADC members to prepare an agenda, set a date and decide on a venue where the peace talks between the rebels and Kabila would be held.

Unfortunately the talks, which it was hoped would pave the way for peace, were eventually hijacked by Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of RCD-Kisangani. Wamba, in fact, left the negotiating table dissatisfied with the ceasefire proposal laid before him by a four-nation committee (BBC Monitoring Service, 23 November 1998). The rebels demanded that they should be included as full participants in all future negotiations on the DRC crisis. The rebels further requested SADC ministers to acknowledge that Kabila was responsible for perpetrating genocide as well as other crimes against humanity. On the other hand, both RCD rebel groups, the RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani, were not happy because they claimed that the Lusaka meeting had not been properly reflected in the balance of diplomatic power.

WAMBA DIA WAMBA/MANDELA TALKS

Apart from the summits, held in Africa with regard to the DRC crisis, other unilateral talks were held in Africa, especially in South Africa, to deal with the continuing conflict in the DRC. Wamba dia Wamba, the leader of RCD-Kisangani, held a meeting with Mandela in South Africa on 29 November 1998 (IRIN, 29 October 1998). Like other previous summits, Mandela tried to initiate mediation to end the conflict between the rebels and Kabila's forces. Wamba told Mandela that his movement's main objective was free and fair democratic elections and non-tribal government (*Saturday Star*, 31 August 1998; *Sowetan*, 30 October 1998). On 6 November 1998, Mandela held a meeting with Rwanda's Paul Kagame in Pretoria (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 84). During the meeting, Kagame came up with the convincing statement that his country had deployed troops in the DRC in the interest of its own security (IRIN, 6 November 1998). Kagame further said Rwanda would not pull out its troops from the DRC until the situation was normalised in the country. Kabila repeated his earlier statement that he was not ready to negotiate ceasefire until foreign troops had departed from the DRC.

When Mandela arranged to meet people of Wamba dia Wamba's calibre, some political observers became convinced that peace was about to be achieved. This was because South Africa was said to be the only country in Africa with the ability to mediate the DRC conflict, for two reasons. First, it was because of its leadership embodied in the person of President Mandela. Secondly, the call for the African Renaissance by the new South African President, Thabo Mbeki (Kabemba 1999: 24). However, Mandela's efforts in trying to bring peace in the embattled DRC never materialised as war continued in the countryside.

LAURENT KABILA/YOWERI MUSEVENI TALKS

The implementation of the ceasefire agreement in the DRC seemed to be very problematic to Kabila and his antagonist countries, Rwanda and Uganda. On 18 April 1999, bilateral talks between President Kabila and President Museveni of Uganda were held at Sirte in Libya (Africa Review 2000). The purpose of the talks was to propose a peace agreement. But prior to the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the two countries had to agree, especially Uganda, which had forces in the DRC, that its forces would be withdrawn from the country. Meanwhile, Uganda had already completed the training of 1,550 Congolese rebel troops who were to be dispatched to the DRC (Africa Review 2000, 2000).

THE LUSAKA CEASEFIRE ACCORD

It took several months of hard bargaining by Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, SADC chief negotiator, to bring the warring parties to the table. In May 1999, the Zambian President launched a peace initiative. The peace initiative became known as the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord. Various African countries came to witness the signing of the peace accord. Ugandan President Museveni and Rwandan's Bizimungu, together with their allied rebels, also took part. It would have been impossible to sign the Lusaka

Accord without the participation of parties involved in the DRC conflict, including Kabila and his allies.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Accord was initiated under the auspices of a Joint Military Commission (JMC). It was the responsibility of the JMC to monitor the smooth running of the accord. The ceasefire agreement was finally signed in Lusaka on 10 July 1999 (Neethling 2000: 36; Kabemba, 1999: 1; *Sowetan*, 31 August 1999). Kabila, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola signed the ceasefire agreement. Another Uganda-backed rebel group, MLC, under the leadership of Bemba, also signed the accord. The accord stipulated that all air, land and sea attacks were to be discontinued within 24 hours of the signing. Also to be halted was the movement of military forces and all acts of violence against civilians (*Security Council Resolution 1291*, 24 February 2000). They all signed in the presence of representatives from the OAU, SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (*Renaissance*, February 2001). The Lusaka Ceasefire Accord also succeeded in bringing together the Kabila government and the three rebel movements. The accord was also aimed at closing the communication gap between the feuding parties and starting to build trust between these parties. Other clauses the parties were to adhere to, were the cessation of hostilities, the release of all detainees, hostages and refugees, and the disarming of militias and other armed groups (*Renaissance*, February 2001).

On 31 August 1999, the MLC and the RCD agreed to sign the document after they initially refused to sign. The initial reason for the refusal of the RCD to sign the Lusaka document was because of a leadership dispute. They did not know who should sign on their behalf. Furthermore, the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord provided for an appropriate force to be constituted, facilitated and deployed by the UN, in collaboration with the OAU, to ensure the execution of the agreement. Other peace enforcement endorsed in the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord included the tracking down and disarming of armed groups, repatriation and arresting the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and in particular the Rwandan genocide perpetrators.

Even though other parties agreed to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord, some rebel groups were excluded from the peace process and these groups included Ugandan rebels, Burundian rebels, UNITA, and militia groups operating from the DRC, particularly the Hutu militia (Kabemba, 1999: 6).

In August 1999, fighting broke out between the Ugandan and Rwandan troops, backing different rebel factions in the capital of Kisangani (*Association Press Online*, 5 May 2000). These two countries were fighting over control of some buildings in central Kisangani as well as Bangoka airport (*The Star*, 18 August 1998). These assets were being controlled jointly by the two until their relations went sour. The clashes between Rwanda and Uganda were actually based on who would control the DRC's wealth in areas under their control (*African Research Bulletin*, 1-31 August 1998). The two parties, Rwanda and Uganda, did not trust each other even though they fought together against Kabila's forces. The Rwanda-Uganda clash spread to other areas as far as where Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was located. When conflict between Rwanda and Uganda broke out, Uganda became even more frustrated because it was beset with additional problems back home (*Africa Analysis*, 20 August 1999). The major problem faced by

Uganda was its forthcoming referendum and it therefore wanted to get out of the DRC as soon as it could. Rwanda's mission was to get Kabila out of the country as soon as possible. Rwanda's main concern was to replace Kabila with someone who would guarantee security on its borders. Rwanda made it clear that it would not pull out of the DRC until Rwandan Hutu militia members responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda were removed from Kabila's army and tried (*Africa Analysis*, 20 August 1999).

The fighting between Rwanda and Uganda started just after South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Zuma, visited Kisangani to establish which leader of the RCD, between the Goma and Kisangani factions, should sign the national peace accord. The conflict between the two allied groups was difficult to comprehend as it was not expected since Rwanda and Uganda were the ones that fought alongside Kabila to topple Mobutu, and they again fought together in an attempt to topple Kabila.

While Rwanda and Uganda fought their own wars, Burundi, which fought together with Rwanda in a war against Mobutu and later against Kabila, joined the fray. As Rwanda and Uganda were busy engaging each other in the conflict, Burundian troops supported their own ally, Congolese Banyamulenge rebels, (*Africa Analysis*, 20 August 1999).

Burundian troops along with their counterparts, the Banyamulenge rebels, were working alongside each other near the border with Zambia to take control of the most important mining belt. Moreover, the Burundian troops in the DRC had concluded a deal with the supporters of Kabila, the Mai Mai, to chase Burundian rebels from their ranks. Their deal was that once the Mai Mai had succeeded in chasing Burundian rebels, they (Burundian troops) would stop attacking the Mai Mai.

Rwanda and Uganda suddenly realised that their differences were not taking them anywhere and decided to settle them. "On the evening of August 17 1998, Rwanda and Uganda, declared an immediate ceasefire to the Kisangani fighting" (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 1-31 August 1998). A compromise agreement between the two recognized all the founders of the RCD as signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord, which had the backing of all regional powers and the international community.

While a truce between Rwanda and Uganda was being maintained, a clash between the two main DRC rebel groups arose, namely, RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani. The clash left at least 50 people dead and several others injured (*The Star*, 12 June 2001). Another Ugandan-backed rebel group, the MLC, headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba, became involved in a fight with troops loyal to Mbusa Nyamwisi. This happened after some of Nyamwisi's men looted a bank (*The Star*, 12 2001). The fight broke out when Bemba's soldiers went to arrest Nyamwisi's men.

Ethnic clashes worsened the situation in the DRC. About 500 civilians fled bloody ethnic clashes in the Eastern DRC into Western Uganda (*The Sunday Independent*, 14 June 2001). The refugees were from the pastoralist Hema tribe, whose members had been fighting agriculturists, the Lendu tribe, over land disputes since 1998. The ethnic conflict had intensified during the civil war, which provided a steady flow of weapons into the region. Thousands of people lost their lives and more than a hundred thousand were displaced.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Accord was finally signed by the RCD amid mounting of both domestic and international pressure, from countries such as the US, Belgium and France. But, even though a ceasefire agreement was signed, the fighting continued vigorously between the rebels (*BBC Focus on Africa*, October/December 1999). The civil war continued as if the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord had never existed. The fact was that Kabila did not honour his promises to end the civil war in the country. He eventually became a stumbling block towards peace. In other words, he halted the entire process by going back to war. The reason why Kabila failed to stick to his promises of ending the conflict by signing the ceasefire document was perhaps that he did not sign the document willingly, but did so because of pressure from his ally, Zimbabwe (Hanekom, 2001: 3).

One-and-a-half weeks after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the government in Kinshasa continued to violate the accord as if it was never signed. Both RCD rebel groups and military authorities in Kasai-Southern DRC claimed that Kinshasa government forces continued to attack the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) positions. RCD-Goma's leader, Dr. Emile Ilunga, consulted with fellow RCD founders to nominate who would represent the movement in the JMC. According to the *Summary of World Broadcast*, (12 September 1999), Colonel Bonduka and Commander Nzigo were nominated to represent the movement. Other members, such as Lawyer Alexis Tambwe Mwamba and Dr. Bizima Karaha, were nominated to represent the movement in the Joint Political Committee (JPC) under the chairmanship of Uganda (*Summary of World Broadcast*, 12 September 1999).

Despite the continuing fighting in the DRC and many ceasefire violations after the signing of the accord in July 1999, the UN Security Council (UNSC), in collaboration with the OAU, was to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force of 5,000 troops to ensure the implementation of the agreement and track down all non-statutory armed forces (*Renaissance*, February 2001). The UN decided to intervene in the DRC conflict because the peace process proposed by President Chiluba of Zambia was being delayed. The Secretary-General stated that the UN and the international community in general should see to it that it assist the DRC government, parties, people and other governments involved in order to achieve a peaceful solution (Neethling, 2000: 36; *Integrated Regional Information Network*, IRIN, 6 August 1998). The purpose of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was not to enforce peace, but to monitor and secure the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord (*Summary of World Broadcast*, 8 May 2000). According to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the organisation should not employ the use of force during its intervention; the UN military observers were expected to adhere to this clause during their peacekeeping mission in the DRC. However, Chapter VII of the UN Charter stipulates that if the Security Council deems it necessary to use force to restore peace and security, it is free to do so (Security Council Resolution 1291, 24 February 2000).

The UN military personnel were not alone, but were accompanied by both humanitarian and administrative staff. Following an agreement between Kabila and the UN about the deployment, military liaison from neighbouring states, Kigali, Kampala, Harare and Windhoek, were dispatched to the DRC (Neethling, 2000: 36). The UN was also ready to deploy officers in the DRC and dispatch a technical survey team to assess security condi-

tions and infrastructure where the deployment would take place. The UN also succeeded in sending liaison officers to Bujumbura, Lusaka, the provisional seat of the JMC, and the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. By January 2000, small teams of military liaison officers had been deployed to nine locations in the DRC: Kinshasa, Kananga, Kindu, Goma, Boende, Lisala, Gamena, Gbodolite and Isiro (Neethling, 2000: 36).

On 1 November 1999, Annan requested the Security Council to sanction the setting up of an observer mission in the DRC and the deployment of about 500 military personnel with the necessary logistical and personnel support. Because both the MLC and the RCD's Wamba dia Wamba had already declared the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord null and void, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1279, permitting the UN Observer Mission in the DRC. Security Council Resolution 1279 (30 November 1999) states the purpose of the adoption of Resolution 1279 as follows:

- To make contact with the stakeholders of the ceasefire agreement;
- To liaise with the JMC and provide technical assistance to ensure the smooth functioning of the Ceasefire Accord;
- To provide information on security conditions in all areas of operation, so that the UN personnel should be introduced;
- To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces; and
- To liaise with all parties involved in the ceasefire agreement and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, children and other affected people. However, there had been no progress in the deployment of the UN military observers as Laurent Kabila rejected the deployment.

THE LUSAKA SUMMIT

Another summit was held in Lusaka on 3 April 2002 prior to the Sun City summit in South Africa (*IRIN*, 12 April 2002). The summit was attended by the Presidents of the DRC, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa (*IRIN*, 4 April 2002). The Presidents of Uganda and Angola did not attend the summit but were represented at ministerial level. The leaders of the rebel movements, which are also fighting in the DRC conflict, were absent.

At the summit, a communiqué was issued. The purpose of the communiqué was to call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC as well as the demilitarisation of the DRC. It also called for the deployment of more UN troops before foreign forces could be withdrawn (*IRIN*, 4 April 2002). It called on the participants at the forthcoming Sun City summit in South Africa to reach political consensus with immediate effect in order that the country's unity could be restored.

Like other African summits, the Lusaka summit failed to come up with adequate suggestions as leaders of foreign troops resisted withdrawal. Foreign troops continued to occupy strategic areas.

THE SUN CITY SUMMIT

The failed Lusaka summit was succeeded by yet another summit, the Sun City summit. The Sun City summit was held between 25 February and 19 April 2002 in South Africa (Department of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 2002; *IRIN*, 22 April 2002). The summit was described as the longest peace summit ever held in Africa since the eruption of the second rebellion in the DRC. The summit lasted for 52 days (*African News Service*, 10 April 2002). The talks at Sun City were facilitated by the former Botswana President and the Lusaka Cease fire Accord facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire (*IRIN*, 19 April 2002).

When the Sun City summit was initially organised, many African political observers were convinced that because the summit was being hosted by South Africa it would be a success. They were convinced that the country (South Africa) had some ability in mediating or resolving conflicts in the continent due to its better resources. The fact of the matter is that the Sun City summit was meant to end the four-year conflict, which had already claimed millions of lives. It also aimed to install an interim government, which would lead to the democratic elections in two-and-half years (BBC News, 11 April 2002; *African News Service*, 10 April 2002).

During the summit, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, came up with a proposal. According to *African News Service* (10 April 2002), Mbeki proposed that an interim government be implemented in the DRC, with Joseph Kabila as the interim President. It was also proposed that two rebel leaders, Adolphe Onusumba of the RCD-Goma and Bemba of the MLC, be appointed as interim Prime Minister and President of Parliament respectively (*IRIN*, 10 April 2002; *IRIN*, 12 April 2002; *IRIN*, 4 April 2002). However, Mbeki's proposal was not universally accepted. While the MLC welcomed Mbeki's proposal and agreed to work with President Kabila, its rival rebel, RCD-Goma, opposed the idea of sharing power with Kabila and preferred that President Kabila be replaced with a new President (BBC News, 11 April 2002; *IRIN*, 9 April 2002). At one stage, delegates attending the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) at Sun City threatened to withdraw from the talks after failing to reach consensus on the establishment of an interim government and the integration of the armies. On the other hand, the election of a Prime Minister seemed to be narrowing down as various individuals from different opposition parties wanted to contest the premiership. Those who had wanted to be included included, Eitienne Tshisekedi of the *Union pour la Démocratie et la Progrès Social* (UDPS), Francois Lumumba of the *Mouvement national congolais* (MNC); and Gerald Kamanda Wa Kamanda of the *Front commun des nationalistes* (FCN) (*IRIN*, 15 April 2002). Other candidates were Eugene Diom Ndongala, leader of the *Front pour la survie de la démocratie du Congo* (FSD); Andre Bo Boliko, the leader of the PSDC; and Arthur Z' Ahidi Ngoma of the *Forces du future* (FF). Even though there were deadlocks on power sharing agreement, an agreement was finally signed on 19 April 2002 (*IRIN*, 19 April 2002). However, the signing session was not recognized by the dialogue organisers. The organisers were in fact hoping for an inclusive agreement involving all the main groups in the conflict.

Apart from the political discussion at the summit, economic issues were also discussed. According to *IRIN* (27 March 2002), a total of US \$3.5 billion was budgeted for

over three years. Western embassies in Kinshasa were willing to contribute a certain amount to the DRC government. These funds would be used in the reconstruction and development programme of the DRC. According to *IRIN* (27 March 2002), the DRC could attract about 1.7 billion euros from public and private sources over three years.

Meanwhile, there had been many arguments on Mbeki's proposal of interim government and the sharing of power in the DRC. Some sources argued that the exclusion of other groups from the dialogue, such as unarmed opposition parties and civil society representatives, would lead to antagonism, while others such as Olivier Kamitatu, Secretary General of the MLC, argued that power-sharing could take the form of a rotating presidency as in Burundi (*IRIN*, 9 April 2002). Another argument was that a shared power could exacerbate the country's crisis. In the meantime, the RCD-Goma forged an alliance with five other political parties in the DRC to form a new party. The five parties were UDPS, the *Dynamique pour une transition neutre* (DPTN), the *Mouvement Lumimbiste progressiste* (MLP), the *Conseil de l'opposition congolaise externe de l'Amerique du Nord* (COCEAN) and the *Ressemblement pour une nouvelle société* (RNS) (*IRIN*, 26 April 2002). The new alliance became known as the Alliance pour la sauvegarde du dialogue inter- Congolais (ASD) and was led by Tshisekedi of UDPS (*IRIN*, 26 April 2002). The main purpose of the formation of the new alliance was to fight attempts by Joseph Kabila to form a coalition government with Bemba's MLC. Other objectives of the ASD included monitoring the ICD; the formation of a new consensual political order; the defence of the Lusaka Peace Accord; and the establishment of the rule of law (*IRIN*, 26 April 2002).

The Sun City talks reached deadlock on the issue of whether Joseph Kabila should continue with his duty as the country's President or step down for a new President as RCD-Goma had suggested. After 52 days of meetings at Sun City, the parties failed to agree on a formula that would reunite the entire country. The dialogue resolution on power-sharing was not agreed upon.

Meanwhile, as the talks continued at the Sun City, Rwandan-backed RCD, troops staged a mutiny in Moliro near Katanga Province (*Panafrika News Agency*, 15 May 2002; *IRIN*, 18 March 2002). As a result of the attack in Katanga by the RCD, the Sun City talks were suspended.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This chapter focused on the series of African peace summits, which attempted to deal with the DRC rebellion, particularly the second rebellion, which erupted on 2 August 1998. These summits ranged from the Victoria Falls summit in Zimbabwe to Sun City summit in South Africa. The purpose of these summits was to bring the Congolese conflict to an end as well as the signing of a Ceasefire accord by the participants of the conflict. However, because Laurent Kabila was a stubborn leader who did not want to take advice from or listen to his fellow African leaders some of these summits failed to come up with convincing suggestions as to how to resolve the Congolese situation, although a peace settlement was finally agreed upon.

Another reason for the failure of some of the African peace summits in dealing with the Congolese conflict was that Kabila himself became an obstacle to a peace settlement in his own country. He had a tendency to either turning a deaf ear to the discussion at some summits or to stay away from important summits. For example, Kabila failed to attend the second summit, held in Pretoria between 22 and 23 August 1998. He became very difficult during the NAM summit, where he arrived late and left early. He further violated the Lusaka CeaseAccord, which was signed in Zambia in July 1999, by continuing, to wage a war against his former allies (Rwanda and Uganda).

The conflict in the DRC compelled the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force with the aim of containing the conflict. The OAU was also participating diplomatically in the DRC conflict.

This chapter recommends that there should be improved mechanisms to deal with conflict in Africa. The prerequisite to any peace initiative should be the unity of all the African countries in dealing with African conflicts. This is because the African countries tend to isolate themselves whenever there is a conflict on the continent. We have witnessed how some African countries did not want to involve themselves in the Congolese conflict. For example, African countries such as Seychelles, Madagascar and Burkina Faso, among others, were very quiet on the Congolese conflict.

Africa also needs to resolve its own problems without the interference of outside forces. We have witnessed how foreign countries such as the United States, Britain, France and Belgium attempted to intervene in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the Congolese conflict. The African continent should come up with a common solution to prevent its fellow African leaders from coming to power militarily, as many conflicts in Africa are caused by coups as well as attempted coups. Africa should come up with policies that will prevent leaders from forcing themselves into power.

However, even if Africa should solve its domestic problems, the assistance of international bodies such as the UN is needed to take the initiative in halting conflicts in Africa. The African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU, should also play an active role with regard to conflicts in Africa. It should see to it that conflicts in the continent are totally halted. SADC, which had tried on several occasions to resolve the DRC situation, should continue doing so in other conflict situations in the region.

With regard to the Congolese situation, now that peace is being achieved in the DRC, Joseph Kabila should start serious talks with the Congolese people regarding constitutional elections in the country. However, before constitutional elections can take place in the DRC, Kabila should see to it that all the perpetrators of human rights abuses are brought to book.

NOTES

1. The chapter has been extracted and developed from the writer's research dissertation.
2. The writer of this chapter completed his Master's degree in political studies at the University of Port Elizabeth, South Africa. He was also a research intern at the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA).

3. My acknowledgement goes to Mr PFG Mtimkulu of Unisa (Department of Political Sciences) for his supervision of my research dissertation.

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15

CITIZENSHIP AND DIVERSITY IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS

Okwudiba Nnoli

CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE: VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL LINKAGES

Citizenship is a phenomenon associated with the state. It is, therefore, a political phenomenon. It involves a strong identification of the individual with the state and a reward by the state for this identification. In other words, citizenship is a form of political identity built around the state from which the state derives benefits and in turn rewards the individual. It has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The former links individuals to the state. This linkage is supported by loyalty and patriotism that give legitimacy to the state. The horizontal dimension involves the positive identification of individuals with one another as members of the same state. It reinforces empathy, sustains solidarity and promotes 'we-feeling'. Its absence limits social cohesion; the center cannot hold; and "things fall apart". Thus, "citizenship is a linkage mechanism, which in its most perfect expression binds the citizenry to the state and to each other" (Cairns, 1999: 4).

However, citizenship is also a concept of exclusion. It distinguishes between a citizen and a non-citizen whom the state rewards differentially. A non-citizen may not be accorded a number of benefits enjoyed by the citizen. These include protection by the state, especially outside state boundaries, access to a passport that permits travel, and political participation. Furthermore, citizenship remains important for individuals in laws relating to tax, residency, testamentary dispositions, extradition and marital status (Leary, 1999: 252). Non-citizens do not have the right to enter a country at will, nor to reside there. Entry and residence of non-citizens are prerogatives of the state. Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) provides for procedural guarantees against the expulsion of non-citizens, but it does not prohibit such expulsion when procedures are complied with. Such expulsion remains a common practice (Nowak, 1993).

Since citizenship is a function of the state and individual, its substance varies. First and foremost, it varies with the character of the state. As a mode and institutionalized aspect of class politics, the state is often associated with the hegemony of the dominant class over the subordinate classes. Hegemony demands the loyalty of both the dominant and subordinate classes alike. The loyalty of the dominant classes comes naturally

from the rewards of domination. Hence, historically citizenship has been granted incrementally to subordinate classes and other disadvantaged groups such as women (Finley, 1973; Sandel, 1984; Turner, 1986). Whether or not it is granted, and when, is determined by struggles between the dominant and subordinate classes as well as within the dominant classes.

In the ancient city-states of Greece, citizenship was the prerogative of the slave masters who represented a small minority of the population. Citizens were the free and native-born men to whom the idea of equality before the law and active political participation applied. Emphasis was placed on the link between citizenship and political participation because of the Greco-Roman conception of “man” as a political being. Citizenship represented the full expression of “man’s” humanity. However, citizens’ participation in public life was only possible because of the existence of slaves who performed the main economic functions and women, who performed the domestic functions (Mouffe, 2001: 136).

As slave revolts increased in scope and intensity, and the demand for soldiers to fight imperial wars became more urgent, a new dynamic was added to the phenomenon of citizenship. In the slave society of the Roman Empire, citizenship was extended first to the plebeians and then to conquered peoples. This produced a much more heterogeneous body of citizens than in the Greek city-states. Citizenship continued to be linked to public office and the common good but it ceased to be tied to active political participation and acquired a legal status, especially protection under the law. It was granted to the vast majority of imperial subjects; only the very lowest classes and women were excluded.

The demise of the slave states and empires together with their replacement by feudal societies radically transformed citizenship. Political loyalty became as decentralized as the political system itself. A system of vassalage that transcended geographical boundaries commanded the loyalties of individuals and dispensed rewards to them. A hierarchy of “citizenships” culminating in loyalty to princes, and even the Holy Roman Emperor, replaced the direct relationship of the individual to the state, and mediated such a relationship.

The period of absolutism in Europe saw the reconstitution of a sovereign authority within a territorial boundary, thanks to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The pervasive influence of religion at the time ensured that the king was absolute, receiving his/her mandate from divine authority. Emphasis was placed on subject rather than citizen. Nevertheless, the Greco-Roman tradition of republican citizenship was revived in the Italian republic of the Renaissance; Nicolo Machiavelli championed it, philosophically. James Harrington, John Milton and other republicans, in the course of the constitutional revolution of the seventeenth century, reformulated it in England. Universalized by the work of neo-Harringtonians, it was influential in the American Revolution.

The bourgeois revolution of 1798 in France was, in part, a culmination of struggles over citizenship. Led by the rising bourgeoisie, the struggles were inspired philosophically by Jean-Jacques Rousseau who, in the *Social Contract* (1762), established the modern figure of the citizen by connecting it to the theory of consent. In an attempt to link the republican conception of political community with the premises of individualism,

he defined the citizen as a free and autonomous individual who is entitled to take part in making political decisions. Citizenship is incompatible with serfdom and the privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy. This view found revolutionary expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen that accompanied the French Revolution.

With the rise of market relations and the hegemony of laissez-faire capitalism this view was reformulated in the language of natural rights. Citizenship was reduced to a mere legal status, including the possession of rights that an individual holds against the state. This, however, did not prevent bourgeois societies from hinging rights on property qualifications, and excluding women as well as racial and other minorities from enjoying them. It took protracted struggles by these excluded groups to attain citizenship status. In the case of Britain, T.H. Marshall has charted a progression of citizenship rights from civil to political and finally to social rights (Marshall, 1950). The sense of common purpose of citizenship in pre-capitalist societies was removed. According to Isaiah Berlin, ideas about the common good today can only have totalitarian implications and are incompatible with the modern idea of liberty (Berlin, 1981).

The tension between the common good and private interests in capitalist societies was diffused by a return to the common good in socialist societies. The socialists saw the dominance of organized private groups in capitalist societies as the main threat to the wellbeing of society. Consequently, they emphasized collective ownership of productive and distributive enterprises as the major avenue to the common good, and social rights as the best means by which the population may share in this common good. As Isaiah Berlin had predicted, one of the consequences was totalitarianism.

Although the colonial state was motivated, in part, by the goal of establishing and sustaining a capitalist society in the colony, it did not permit a citizenship in it that was appropriate to capitalist societies. Colonial racism made it difficult to accept the citizenship of the colonized. In Africa, for example, this racism portrayed the colonized as a primitive savage, with an ahistorical and barbarous past, in which no system of ethics and no principle of conduct were developed. Africans were like children; they were a child race, needing the civilizing mission of the white race to bring them into history and civilization. The granting of citizenship would proceed hand in hand with progress in this self-imposed mission. Africans had to fight all the way to have citizenship extended to them across classes and gender.

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETIES: THE CHALLENGE OF CITIZENSHIP

Thus the character and political dynamic of the state have an impact on the scope of citizenship, its definition and objective, and its implications for the socio-economic and political organization of society. However, the state is not the only variable in the equation that defines citizenship. The characteristics of the individual are equally important. The individual is not only an autonomous political actor in the state; he/she is also a member of one group or another. This group membership raises important questions for citizenship. One of the ongoing debates in many countries, as well as in the litera-

ture on citizenship, is how to establish a notion of citizenship that makes room for the multi-ethnic and multicultural character of the populations of most states. The task is to effectively combine cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious and other identities with a common political identity built around the nation-state.

There are some 5, 000 to 8, 000 ethnic groups in the world and only around 200 states. Therefore, most states contain more than one ethnic group. In fact, over 90% of states are multi-ethnic (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 13). In 40% of all states there are five or more ethnic groups. A few contain over 100 of them. More significantly, in 31%, the largest ethnic group is not even a majority (Connor, 2000: 164). In addition, most states are not just multi-ethnic, they are also multi-homeland. A homeland is more than a territory. It evokes emotional attachment deriving from its perceptions as the cultural hearth and the geographical cradle of the ethnic group. As Bismarck says, "blood and soil have become mixed in the homeland" (Connor, 2000: 165). It is this emotional attachment that gives poignancy to the concept of "sons/daughters of the soil".

In some of these multi-ethnic societies the ethnic group provides a material as well as an emotional support network for individuals in society. It fosters a sense of belonging as an intermediate layer of social relationships between the individual and the state. This function is particularly important as the society becomes complex, massified, bureaucratized, impersonal and alienating. For these reasons also the ethnic group competes with the nation-state for loyalty, identification and a sense of belonging. In the light of this competition how is the individual's relationship and identification with the state to be strengthened?

This question is particularly important because the stability and progress of such societies depend on the sense of identity of their citizens and how they view competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities. Equally important is their ability to tolerate and work with others who are different from them. Stability and progress are also affected by their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the common good; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands; and their sense of justice and commitment to a fair distribution of resources.

In the search for an answer to this question, two contending and contrasting viewpoints have emerged. One of the viewpoints argues that justice, in relations among identity groups, requires state institutions to be difference-blind. This is because it is morally arbitrary and inherently discriminatory to ascribe rights or benefits on the basis of membership in ascriptive groups. It would necessarily create first and second-class citizens (Van Dyke, 1977). The general trend towards group rights threatens to erode the sorts of civic virtues and citizenship practices that sustain a vibrant democracy. Multi-ethnic countries are as much in need of public reasonableness, mutual respect, and critical attitudes towards government, tolerance, and willingness to participate in politics, forums for shared political deliberations, and solidarity as other countries. There is ample evidence that ethnic groups have appealed to notions of identity and differences that leave little room for the promotion and nurturing of these aspects of citizenship and social unity.

Respect for group rights usually involves some form of differentiated citizenship status. Certain groups or their members are granted certain rights or opportunities not available to other groups of citizens. According to this viewpoint, however, citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. Therefore, the basic rights of citizenship cannot vary among citizens. This is what distinguishes modern societies from feudal and other pre-modern forms that determined people's political status by their religious, ethnic or class membership. Thus, the organization of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship (Porter, 1987: 128; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 31).

Those who hold this view also insist that the national identity on which citizenship is based should be each individual's primary and highest identity, and it should be a major aim of the politics of the society to bring this about. If ethnic, regional or religious identities obscure a common national identity, politics is likely to be reduced to a mere *modus vivendi* among groups that barely tolerate, let alone cooperate with, each other. There is little hope for the sort of mutual understanding, deliberation, trust and solidarity required by a flourishing society (Vertovec, 1995).

In fact, some policies designed to promote the interests of disadvantaged groups, such as affirmative action programmes, may instead lead to a politicization of ethnicity. Ethnic champions and entrepreneurs may seize the opportunity to mobilize group members to perpetuate their sense of vulnerability or disadvantage in order to strengthen group identity at the expense of the larger citizenship identity. In another respect, if the cultural identity of most members of an identity group is stronger than their national identity, then they may feel emboldened to demand their own state or at least most of the autonomy of an independent state. Providing rights of self-government or extending federal autonomy gives ethnic chauvinists and institutions the legislative jurisdiction with which to progressively strengthen ethnic cultural identity at the expense of national identity.

Underlying this viewpoint is the belief that democracy thrives under conditions of individual dynamics. By analogy with the free market, it is assumed that elite members compete for the political support of individuals and that each individual would give his/her support to whom best represents his/her most important interests. This is because the individual operates on the basis of specific and variable interests rather than fixed interests. The scope and intensity of these interests vary both across the spectrum of interests and, within a given interest, over time. It is this variability that is capable of uniting individuals across identity groups in pursuit of common goals and in forging a common citizenship (Nnoli, 1994).

On the other hand, a contradictory viewpoint to that of individual dynamics emphasizes group dynamics. Its proponents argue that deviations from difference-blind rules that are adopted to accommodate ethno-cultural differences are not inherently unjust. While difference-blind institutions purport to be neutral among different ethno-cultural groups, they are in fact implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests and identities of the majority or advantaged group. This creates a range of burdens, barriers, stigmatizations and exclusions for members of disadvantaged groups. The adoption of

certain group rights helps to remedy the situation, and in doing so the system promotes fairness. Preferential group rights are not unfair advantages or invidious forms of discrimination, but rather compensations for unfair advantages, and so are consistent with, and may be required by, justice (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 3-4; Young, 1990; Minow, 1990; Philips, 1992; Tully, 1995). Ethnic group rights "must be recognized, promoted and protected, precisely because the hypothetical market-place is not a level playing field, and because conditions of perfect competition do not exist in the market-place, and the state itself is not a neutral body or agency" (Jinadu, n.d: 10).

This viewpoint refutes the claim that group rights are inherently in conflict with the very concept of citizenship. It argues that virtually every modern democracy recognizes some form of group-differentiated citizenship. As Parekh puts it, citizenship "is a much more differentiated and far less homogeneous concept than has been supposed by political theorists", (Parekh, 1990: 702). Therefore, differentiated citizenship is not a contradiction in terms, nor even particularly uncommon. The task is to determine when differentiated rights involve some real disadvantages or stigmatization in citizenship status, such as some inequality in respect of government policy or life chances as a result of government policy, or influence over government policy.

Proponents of this viewpoint reject the suggestion that group rights may obscure a common citizenship identity because it presupposes that such identity already exists or would exist were it not for the presence of group rights. The truth is that many members of a minority and, in some cases, even majority groups, do not identify with the state in which they live. Instead, they may feel quite alienated from it. This is particularly true of groups that have faced discrimination, prejudice or disadvantages and who, therefore, feel unwanted. Granting such groups preferential rights can hardly erode a sense of common citizenship identity since such identity does not yet exist. Indeed, minority rights may be the best way to encourage alienated groups to identify with the larger community. Refusal to grant recognition and autonomy to such groups is likely to provoke even more resentment and hostility, alienating them further from their identity as citizens of the larger state.

Advocates of group rights are not afraid that such rights would cause citizens to lose some of the virtues of citizenship as well as the motivation and capacity to participate in wider public deliberations. On the contrary, if special attention is paid to the circumstances and needs of diverse groups they will feel like full members of the society and acquire the capacity and opportunity to participate in society. Citizens who do not feel part of a common community or political entity have a hard time trusting each other and making the occasional sacrifices and principled compromises that are part and parcel of good citizenship. It is unrealistic to assume that the motivation, capacity and opportunity to participate as a virtuous citizen already exists. Far from eroding such pre-existing conditions, preferential group rights may, instead, help to create them.

Underlying the viewpoint of group rights is the belief that group identity is crucial for political behaviour, and hence for the individual's identification with the state. Where mass enfranchisement and extensive individual freedoms are presumed, where class, sectoral and professional interests are likely to be defended by specialized organizations, where the state has extensive responsibilities for the regulation of the market

and redistribution of income, and where the economic system is tightly integrated with and hence vulnerable to the international market, the previous liberal consent of the individual to legitimate authorities is no longer sufficient. It simply does not cover the range of probable rights and obligations, nor is it capable of delivering the requisite conformity of key social groups. An explicit social contract is a virtual necessity, in which both individual and group dynamics are recognized and reconciled (Nnoli, 1994).

Apart from private interests, individuals also act on the basis of identities derived from birth or socio-cultural circumstances. The interests derived from these identities are both readily identifiable and the same for all group members. They revolve around group entitlement and group worth (Horowitz, 1985). The unchanging character of these identities ensures that minority groups do not have the possibility of becoming majorities in a difference-blind society. Ethnic minorities cannot hope to win political power. They become alienated from the political system, with their elites being driven to ever more extreme positions (Nnoli, 1994).

A certain consensus has emerged from the contraposition of these two viewpoints on citizenship in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. It is now commonly accepted that justice cannot simply be defined in terms of difference-blind rules or institutions. It is now widely recognized that difference-blind rules and institutions can cause disadvantages for particular groups. Whether justice requires common rules for all, or differential rules for diverse group, is an issue that needs to be assessed and resolved in concrete case studies; it cannot be assumed in advance. Furthermore, as a result of the debate between these two viewpoints, the burden of proof has shifted. It no longer falls solely on defenders of group rights to show that their demands would not create injustice. Now defenders of difference-blind institutions must also try to show that the status quo does not create injustice for minority and disadvantaged groups (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 4).

DIVERSITY AND FEDERALISM

Thus the task at hand is to find ways and means of responding positively to the demands of minority and disadvantaged groups without detracting from the common citizenship identity of the population. The goal is to forge unity out of diversity. This goal rules out methods for eliminating differences among groups such as genocide, forced mass-population transfers or ethnic cleansing; partition, secession and irredentism; and forced assimilation. Emphasis is placed on methods for managing differences. McGarry and O'Leary (1993) suggest four methods: hegemonic control, territorial autonomy (federalism), non-territorial autonomy (consociationalism), and voluntary assimilation or multi-cultural integration.

With hegemonic control, the ruling class does not attempt to eliminate or merge the identities of minority groups. It merely makes any overtly violent ethnic contest for power either unthinkable or unworkable for the subordinated communities. Non-territorial autonomy emphasizes power-sharing arrangements and preferential incorporation of disadvantaged groups into public affairs and in the distribution of services

in the country. Federalism involves the granting of autonomy by the constitution to territorial units in relation to the national or central government. Finally, multi-cultural integration is akin to voluntary assimilation. It seeks to integrate people from diverse groups into common social and political institutions in such a way as to fashion a new transcendental identity of full citizenship and equal membership in the state but without eliminating cultural differences between the sub-groups in the state. Over the years, only three of these methods have been extensively justified in theory and implemented in practice. They are federalism, consociationalism and multicultural integration (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 15).

Levy (1997) suggests eight ways that cultural groups seek respect for their cultural or religious distinctiveness. These include: (1) exemption from laws that penalize or burden cultural practices; (2) assistance to do things the majority (or privileged group) can do unassisted; (3) external rules restricting non-members' liberty in order to protect members' culture; (4) self-government for minorities and indigenous communities (federalism); (5) internal rules for members' conduct that are enforced by ostracism and excommunication; (6) incorporation and enforcement of traditional or religious legal codes within the dominant legal system; (7) special representation of groups or their members within government institutions; (8) symbolic recognition of the worth, status or existence of various groups within the larger state community. Federalism is only one of the eight.

Therefore, federalism is not an automatic answer to the question of forging unity out of diversity. Its merits have to be clearly established in each concrete case and as the situation of that case changes. What is federalism and what are the arguments for and against it as a solution to diversity? Federalism is the principle of organization of state power in such a way as to combine self-rule and shared rule. By this definition it shares the same characteristics with confederalism. However, with confederalism joint decisions are binding only on the various governments that compose a confederation, while with federalism joint decisions are binding on the governments that constitute a federation as well as directly on the citizens, and both the federal and composite governments are directly accountable to the citizens. Federations thus create a structure of dual citizenship for all members of the state (Elazar, 1987; Riker, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995).

Federalism is identified with a federal system (federation) of government. This is a federal state within which both central and component governments operate directly upon the people, each being independent within respective, constitutionally defined spheres of allocated powers and responsibilities, and in co-coordinating relationship with one another. It unites separate levels of government within an overarching political system designed to protect the authority of both. Therefore, federalism is an institutional pillar of vertical separation of powers aimed at providing a mutual check and control between different levels of government in particular, and the political system in general (Basta and Fleiner, 1996: 1-2).

Federations take different forms depending on the dynamics of local factional politics within the ruling class. Nevertheless, there are certain dimensions that may be identified in a general form across all federations: (1) The constitutional and political aspects refer to the powers of the composite units to determine, organize and control their own

affairs: (2.) The fiscal role refers to the way in which a component unit can obtain its revenue; (3) The programmatic dimension refers to the functional areas of governmental activity over which the units have sole or predominant responsibility; (4) An aspect of federalism refers to the role of units in the policy-setting process of the federal government; (5) An important element of a federal system concerns the role of the units in determining the form, functions and finances of lower levels of government (Nathan, 2001: 277).

The attributes of a federation are the territorial division and separation of state power, the assignment of various powers and responsibilities to the various levels of government by the constitution, the constitutional delineation of the sources of revenue for the various tiers of government, a judicial mechanism for the resolution of conflicts among the various tiers of government, a system of political accountability of all the tiers of government to the citizenry at large, a common citizenship, and a written constitution that provides in as clear a manner as possible the rules by which all the various tiers of government must exercise their power. Thus while governments in some unitary states are to some extent decentralized, they are non-centralized in federal states. The powers of the component governments are not delegated by a central government but are directly derived from the constitution in the same way as the powers of the central government.

Various types of federations may be identified. Lijphart identifies two types, the congruent and incongruent. The former are composed of territorial units with a social and cultural character that is similar in each of the units and in the federation as a whole. Examples include Germany and the USA. Incongruous federations are composed of units whose internal political borders tend to coincide with ethnic and cultural boundaries. Examples include India, Nigeria and Russia. In other words, multiculturalism is not a prerequisite for the formation of federations. Similarly, not all multicultural societies are federations. In fact, the vast majority are not. The dynamics of factional politics within the ruling class determines whether or not a federation is organized in the various countries. Associated with this factional politics are arguments made for and against federal systems. As a result of this politics, federalism can come through union or devolution as in the US and Nigeria respectively.

Proponents of federalism believe in the efficacy of the federal system to manage differences within the political system. In their view, the underlying logic of modern identity claims makes compromise, tolerance and deliberation particularly difficult to achieve. Federalism provides a political framework to minimize this difficulty. It makes it easier to accommodate demands for self-government within the same political system. This is because of the nature of the claims for self-government. For example, there have been claims that a community was historically self-government and had not relinquished its rights, that a minority group in a homeland has been systematically mistreated by the majority group or that its special needs and interests are misunderstood or ignored within the larger political community. There is no *prima-facie* reason to deny political communities that wish to collectively decide matters of specific concern for their members and that form regional majorities the right to partial autonomy. It is also argued that in general, small, local governments are more democratic than the distant

central government because they are closer to the people who can more easily hold them accountable (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Therefore, federalism can provide a means of managing inter-group conflicts that might otherwise develop into violence and lead to the proliferation of mini-statelets of limited viability. The recent history of Yugoslavia is illustrative. Kant thought that international peace could only be durably maintained by an ever-enlarging federation of republican states (Kant, 1984). Joining such a federation is therefore, a moral imperative. Lord Acton believed that a “great democracy must either sacrifice self-government to unity or preserve it by federalism” (Acton, 1907: 22; Baubock, 2000: 373). Kant and Acton contradict J.S. Mills, who believed that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” (Mills, 1972: 392).

Other justifications for federalism include the protection of the rights of minority groups to be culturally different. Federalism is, therefore, an antidote to cultural assimilation by majority groups (Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor 1992; Smith, 2000). It attracts loyalty to the state from minority groups who otherwise would be alienated from the state because it denies them autonomy and special representation in pursuit of their particular interests. A manifest desire for self-government that could be continuously overridden by statewide majorities unless protected by federal arrangement is a powerful reason for transforming unitary states into federations. Other reasons include empowering individual citizens by multiplying the levels of government where they can exert their influence; preventing the abuse of political authority by establishing a system of checks and balances between regional and federal governments; or allowing for experimentation with various policies and forms of political representation (Elazar, 1987; Kymlicka, 1998; Baubock, 2000). A well-ordered federation is not a final settlement of claims among communities but an institutional framework for building mutual trust in an ongoing negotiation of claims (Tully, 1995). Far from endangering liberal democracy by granting some powers to minorities, federal devolution may actually help to strengthen commitments to democratic principles among dissatisfied minorities. Federalism allows for social integration across ethnic lines and does not undermine essential individual rights and liberties.

On the other hand, opponents of federalism insist that the use of a federal system to grant a minority group more rights pushes it logically to claim more and more rights. This compels the granting of the same rights to all other cultural groups that might request them. The system is then trapped in an endless spiral of ever-greater claims by an ever-greater number of groups. Again, a federal arrangement often involves differentiated citizenship that creates unequal status among citizens. In other words, its organization of society on the basis of group rights is sharply opposed to the concept of society based on citizenship (Porter 1987). Members of majority groups often complain that special rights for minorities reduce others to being second-class citizens. If this perception is deep and widespread, it can erode the sense of common identity and solidarity of the population.

Federations organized along regional or ethnic lines are more likely to promote ethnic chauvinism which, in politically unstable systems, increases the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and even civil war. Such an arrangement tends to solidify and make

permanent what might be temporary or partial identity; and it enables all key policy areas to be hijacked by ethnic champions whose activities create impediments to liberty for all. When combined with consociational practices, federalism can further reinforce limits on more genuinely democratic politics by highlighting inter-ethnic politics and by delimiting entry points and downgrading the politics of the marginalized to the local arena (Smith, 2000).

As Wayne Norman (1994) argues, there are two other possible shortcomings of the federal solution to multiculturalism. One is that devolving power to minorities who form provincial majorities also turns statewide majorities into minorities in these provinces. These latter groups will claim the same rights as their co-ethnics in other parts of the state. Secondly, small or dispersed groups who are not able to form regional majorities may feel that their position worsens if they are subjected to provincial laws rather than to federal ones. The situation of Anglophones in Quebec, Canada is illustrative. Furthermore, a federation requires a delicate balance between federal unity and the representation of regional units and cultural collectivities. This is sometimes difficult to achieve.

Geographical mobility and intermarriage between groups generate a certain number of horizontally overlapping identities, but the federal structure itself promotes dual identities for everybody by adding a federal layer of citizenship to the particular membership of the component units. In this way, federalism facilitates separation because it creates an internal division of the system, recognizes particular identities and allocates important public goods and political power to its sub-units. A federal structure of the state may also whet the appetite of secessionists who would be deterred by the much stronger resistance that a centralized state can put up against them. The experience of Ghana in 1954-1956 is illustrative. Opponents of federalism also believe that only central government institutions are liberal while minorities will always abuse any power given to them in order to restrict freedom in their provinces (Kymlicka, 1997).

FEDERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

Judging by the empirical reality of only a few federations among the numerous multi-ethnic and multicultural states of the world one is tempted to say that opponents of federalism have won this debate on the merits of federalism. In Africa, for example, only Nigeria and Ethiopia have adopted a federal system of government. Other federations are limited to the USA, Russia, Malaysia, India, Germany, Australia, Belgium, and the former Yugoslavia; Spain, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Lebanon may also qualify as federations.

Why then have some countries adopted the federal system? The answer can only be found in their concrete historical circumstances. These circumstances also explain the differences in their mode of organization and functioning. For example, contrary to Germany, India, Nigeria, Belgium and Ethiopia, the cantons of Switzerland did not emerge as autonomous decentralized districts out of the central state. Instead, the Swiss federation emerged with the sovereign will of its former 25 sovereign and independent member states. The sovereignty of the federation was transferred to the central govern-

ment by the then existing full sovereignty of the cantons. In fact, Article 3 of the federal constitution indicates that all cantons are sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not restricted by the federal constitution (Fleiner, 1996: 72). Similarly, in Canada and the US where the federal state is organized as individual liberal democracy, federalism serves to bring different groups together, and to transcend particularistic loyalties. Democracy is a basic, and federalism a supplementary, corrective principle of power control. Unlike them, Switzerland relies upon strong cantonal identity. It pursues democratic integration by maintaining linguistic and religious diversities as well as decentralized, communal and cantonal loyalty. This is why Swiss federalism lacks those institutional devices usually found in federal systems that are instruments of unification at the federal level (Basta, 1996: 6r). Here, federalism has been introduced as a structural principle of democracy. The Swiss have politically accommodated diversities in order to oppose outside pressures and not to overcome social and economic inequalities.

In comparison with Malaysia and India, Nigeria has a different federal orientation. In Malaysia, the idea is to protect the Malay majority that is economically disadvantaged. Therefore, section 89 and 153 of the country's constitution confer a "special position" on the group. In India, the goal of federalism as reflected in articles 341 and 324 of the country's Constitution is to protect the "scheduled" castes and tribes. On the other hand, Nigerian federalism has moved substantially away from the original view of ethnic rights as minority rights. Today, ethnic rights are regarded a rights that belong to ethnic groups in general (Jinadu, 1989; Jinadu, n.d; 23). Hence, the 1979 Constitution does not distinguish between majority and minority ethnic groups. As Jinadu points out, "what also sets these clauses apart from similar ones in these other countries is that they were not, in Nigeria, intended as *ad interim* measures, to operate for a number of years, after which they would be reviewed, and then renewed, modified or dropped" (Jinadu, n.d: 24-25).

Thus in order to fully understand the nature of federalism in a country and the status of citizenship in it, an examination of the history of its political economy is imperative. Nigerian federalism is illustrative. The most important factor determining federalism and, especially, citizenship in Nigeria is the exogenous nature of the Nigerian colonial state. As a state imposed by foreigners, the Nigerian people who found it very difficult to identity with it or give it loyalty resented it. Worse still, it made no efforts, materially and psychologically, to attract this loyalty and identification. The people kept their psychological distance from the state because of its racism.

Materially, the colonial state alienated the people by organizing an economy characterized by a divorce between the pattern of consumption and the needs of the population, a divorce between colonial consumption and the traditional consumption habits of the people, and a divorce between the resources used in the production of consumer goods and the local resources of the people. Unlike the externally imposed states of the pre-colonial era, it completely ignored the local economy and marginalized it in the new economic scheme of things. The people were further alienated by the brutalities inflicted on them as the colonialists forced them to participate in the new economy (Nnoli, 1981). Forced labour, debilitating taxes, extremely low wages and unequal exchange imposed severe hardships on the native population. It is not surprising that riots, strikes,

land agitations and popular demonstrations and petitions were a feature of early colonialism. They were later supplanted by the nationalist struggle for independence as the best way of escaping these hardships.

Furthermore, the colonial state organized a false, disjointed and disarticulated territorial economy in which the various ethnic homelands served as enclaves. The latter were unconnected to one another but linked to Britain and other advanced capitalist economies. A consequence of this economy is its capacity to be broken up into micro-economies without serious danger to the country as a whole. It is also a source of micro-nationalism (ethnicity). Host ethnic groups regard migrants from other ethnic homelands as strangers, if not interlopers, and a burden. The area interested in the export economy has no need for the rest of the economy, which economy may, indeed, seem a nuisance to it. People from each homeland were a quagmire in colonial economic activities in their own areas. Consequently, they acquired a regional economic outlook that limited their horizon, hampered their venturing out to the other homelands for economic activity, and encouraged them to view the homeland economy as their own preserve or empire, their own sphere of influence, an undisputed area of their economic supremacy.

The type of capitalism purveyed by colonialism reinforced this situation. In the US, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium, the capitalist system serves to “melt” all the individuals, groups and communities into one “economic pot”, permitting harmless cultural and political identities to emerge and peacefully contend with one another. On the contrary, in Nigeria and elsewhere in the colonies, Boeke has observed the divisive effects of capitalism (Boeke, 1942). Furnivall insists that in these colonies, “the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing interests; between town and country, industry and agriculture, capital and labour” (Furnivall, 1942). Rex also recognizes that the colonial market system itself produces new group affiliations. It creates a “boiling pot”, not a “melting pot”. Although it draws people together into a single social system, it also divides them into new dynamically related communal groupings (Rex, 1959: 111-117).

This phenomenon is further reinforced by the British strategy for maintaining domination over the native population. It imposed the Westphalian model. Each pre-colonial political society was provided with a central authority, whether traditional or not, its boundaries were clearly demarcated and made more or less impermeable, if necessary by the policy of “sabongari” or strangers’ quarters by which Nigerians lived separately from their host community. The society only lacked the monopoly of force within this territory; the British retained this monopoly of force. In other words, what amounted to a *de facto* nucleus of a federal system was put in place, with the British colonial government acting as the federal agent and the myriad of ethnic and/or regional homelands as the component units. But it was a highly centralized federal system. It needed to devolve power to the homelands.

The peculiar demographic character of the society further buttressed this development. The three major ethnic groups of the Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba are located in the three geographical regions of the country created by the Niger and Benue rivers with their confluence in the middle of the country. Minority ethnic groups of varying sizes

cluster around these major ethnic groups. The North contains the most numerous of these groups followed by the East and then the West (Otitie, 1990). The regional concentration of these groups has given the country a semblance of autonomous sphere in the geographical, political and sociological sense. Significantly, the country does not experience that emptying of the labour force on the coast that is characteristic of other West African states with the exception of Ghana. A significant proportion of the rural-urban and urban-urban migration in Nigeria takes place from the South, near the coast, to the North, in the hinterland (Mabogunje, 1965; Kilby, 1966).

Finally, the polarization of the Nigerian political system along the lines of ethnic homelands reached its apogee with the factional and fractional politics of the ruling petty bourgeoisie. This is a class that depends for its livelihood on distribution, not production. Its politics, therefore, emphasized distribution, ostensibly to the ethnic homeland, given the regionalization of the class attendant on the fragmented colonial economy. Those in each region perceived their interests as unconnected to those of their counterparts in other regions. They felt that once their needs, wants and interests were satisfied, the rest of the country could suffer. Attempts by the petty bourgeois from one region to carry on economic activities in another region were resented by the indigenous petty bourgeois in the latter region. Mutual exclusionism prevailed.

Under the circumstances the petty bourgeois do not seek rights, but privileges; not protection but wealth. They do not seek inclusion but exclusion; not national integration but that separation that brings them maximum benefits. They do not seek accommodation but opportunities to benefit, not benefits for their ethnic group but for themselves. They do not even seek the integration of their own ethnic group but may exclude their co-ethnics from benefits accruing to the group. The division of the ethnic group into separate states and the spectacle of displaced co-ethnics moving away to their own states are revealing. Arguments for federalism and states in Nigeria, and even those against the creation of states, serve as a mask for the pursuit of the sectional class interests of the Nigeria petty bourgeoisie.

Thus we can understand the status of citizenship fashioned by members of this class. Leaders of minority ethnic groups found no advantages in the list of fundamental human rights included in the Independence Constitution, rights that were designed specifically to guarantee and protect the civil, political and socio-cultural rights of minority ethnic groups. In addition, they rejected constitutional and institutional arrangements meant to protect them, such as section 27 of the 1960 Constitution and section 28 of the 1963 Constitution (Nigeria, 1960; Nigeria, 1963). The true character of the ruling class was reflected in the 1979 Constitution with the tying of citizenship to indigeneity. Its federal provisions encouraged Nigerians to reside in states to which they 'belong.' Only such belonging enabled them to enjoy the rights of full citizenship. Article 210 of the Draft Constitution of the Constitutional Drafting committee for the 1979 Constitution states that "belong to" refers to "a person either of whose parents was a member of a community indigenous to that state" (Usman, 1977: 8). The 1979 Constitution accepted this definition.

In one breath, that Constitution provided for a common citizenship by guaranteeing fundamental human rights to all Nigerians. It did so in Chapter IV, Section 30-42. However, its federal provisions in section 14(3) and (4), section 135 (3), section 203 (1) (b) and (2) (b) inadvertently or advertently created three types of Nigerian citizens. The most privileged were those citizens who belonged to the indigenous communities of states in which they resided. Others who were indigenes of other states than those in which they resided were less favoured. The least privileged were citizens such as women married to men from different states than their own, and those who were unable to prove that they belonged to a community indigenous to any state. Such a multiple system of citizenship inevitably engenders discrimination in jobs, land purchase, housing, admission to educational institutions, marriages, business transactions and the distribution of social welfare services. The 1989 and 1999 Constitutions retained these discriminatory citizenship provisions.

Such discrimination frustrates citizenship in two ways. In the first place it militates against national identifications. National loyalty is compromised by the distribution of benefits in states along lines of indigeneity. Individuals feel loyal to the ethnic group and state responsible for the benefits they derive from society. This strengthens state and ethnic group solidarity rather than national solidarity. In the second place it frustrates the horizontal dimension by making it difficult to build national solidarity between indigenes and non-indigenes of states. The discriminatory system of citizenship discourages the formation of trans-ethnic and trans-community groupings. Instead, it has produced numerous inter-ethnic wars. Examples of such wars include the Hausa-Bachama, Tiv-Jukun, Hausa-Kataf, Toto-Igbira, Azare-Tiv, Urhobo-Itsekiri, Ijaw-Itsekiri, Ijaw-Ilaje and Ife-Modakeke conflicts. Underlying all of them is the claim of one community to be indigenous and the other to be a settler community. These conflicts either emerged or intensified after 1979 when indigeneity became an important constitutional issue.

CONCLUSION

Some have suggested the introduction of residency requirement for non-indigenes to enable them to enjoy full citizenship rights in states. They point to the situation in the United States where such requirements range from a few days in the state of New York to one year in California. But in Switzerland and Canada there are no such residency requirements. In Russia all such residency requirements have been outlawed (Smith, 2000: 362). On the other hand, in India some states have passed legislation and introduced preferential treatment to indigenes over non-indigenes (Jinadu, n.d.: 34). In Ethiopia some states are adopting discriminatory policies against indigenes (Jinadu, n.d). In any case, suggestions for residency requirements in Nigeria have met with strong resistance. When in 1976 the Plateau State government directed that anybody who showed proof of birth or continuous settlement in the state for at least 20 years should be entitled to the privileges of, and rights to, education, employment and participation in politics enjoyed by indigenes, the rest of the state elite rejected it. The same fate befell a similar proposal in Niger State in 1985. No new proposals have been suggested by any other state ever since.

A half-hearted attempt was made by the 1999 Constitution to grapple with the problem. In section 15(2) it enjoined the states to pursue and secure national integration and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, or ethnic or linguistic association. In section 15(4) it also enjoined them to foster a feeling of belonging and involvement among the various peoples of the country so that loyalty to the nation should override sectional loyalties (Nigeria, 1999). Yet no effort has been made to see that these provisions are respected. In the event, they have been largely ignored.

Nevertheless, in the short-term, residency requirements hold the best prospects of reducing the deep animosity that has been generated by the policy of indigeneity. A residency requirement of five years seems appropriate, provided that none can claim rights and privileges of more than one state. A married woman should elect to belong to the state of her indigeneity, that of her husband's or that based on residency. In the long term, however, progress in the haul of citizenship must await the transformation of Nigerian politics from that of distribution to one of production, and the consequent transformation of the ruling class from the petty bourgeoisie to the bourgeoisie proper.

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16

LOCALISM, COLONIALISM AND NIGERIA'S NASCENT DEMOCRACY: ANY CONGRUENCE TOWARDS NATION BUILDING?

Christopher Isike

Social structures such as families, lineages, clans or even tribes (that have been maligned for promoting tribal nationalism and conflict) remain strong social units all over Africa. If properly controlled and positively managed, such larger socio-cultural units can play a key role in promoting the common well-being of Africans the same way they have done for South-East Asians and Indians for more than three decades now. In the Nigerian context, this assertion captures the crux of this chapter as it seeks aspects of the socio-cultural bases of political power prevalent in pre-colonial Nigerian societies that remain relevant to the extant political culture engendered by Western liberal democracy, in the country's efforts towards nation-building. This presupposes that the diverse political culture(s) (aptly termed Nigerian localism) that were prevalent in the various pre-colonial societies, which defined the contours of politics, economics, development and state-building then, have been either eroded or at best play a minor role in shaping the extant political culture which representative democracy engenders.

This chapter thus seeks to address questions of what the nature and character of pre-colonial Nigerian localism is, whether there were elements of democracy and integration which colonialism disrupted, how colonialism shaped the extant political culture that governs political behaviour in Nigeria's nascent democracy, and what aspects of pre-colonial localism, relegated or sustained over time, remain relevant to nation-building given the complexities of a culturally heterogeneous Nigeria grappling with modern democratic ideals and processes. It is the position of this chapter that in the evolutionary process of Nigeria's political sub-cultures from the pre-colonial era through to the colonial, post-colonial and military era culminating in our present nascent democracy, there has not been any congruence towards nation-building. This is a consequence of the country's inability to effectively integrate her adopted foreign political culture, which engenders Western liberal democracy upon her pre-colonial local political sub-cultures, which predominantly imposes a socialist type of democracy. To do this, Nigeria will

need recourse to the cultures and traditions of those days of yore where the forefathers were consummate players of the diplomatic game; devising intricate mechanisms of inter-group relations made possible by the peculiarities of their environment. This way, ethnic suspicion will be reduced and confidence in the 'national' rebuilt. Therefore, this chapter will cover the salient features of Nigeria's evolutionary political sub-cultures(s): the evolving character of the traditional rulership institutions; some of the beliefs, sentiments, attitude and values that have sustained these institutions over time; the concept of power, democracy and processes of political legitimization, including the social bases of traditional political authority as influenced by a variety of modes of production, occupations and the environment; the effects of foreign religions (Islam and Christianity); Western education; party politics, competition and rivalry as a means to political authority; military rule and the gradual decline of traditional values (localism).

The remaining part of the chapter will cover pre-colonial Nigerian localisms, the national integration problematique as a colonial inheritance, localism, democracy and national development in Nigeria: challenges for nation-building, prospects for nation-building; towards a convergence of tradition and modernity, and concluding remarks. However, there is a need to first clarify concepts that are relevant to this discourse.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

This chapter operationalizes some of the central concepts relevant to this discourse. To this end, culture, political culture, democracy and Nigerian Localism are clarified. Development is also operationally conceptualized to reflect a paradigm shift in this discourse.

Inglehart (1990: 18) sees culture as:

a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation.

He observes that while human nature is biologically innate and universal, culture varies from one society to another. This connotes that, just like the diverse pre-colonial and post-colonial Nigerian societies, different peoples or societies have different cultures.

Mazrui (1990: 7) for his part sees culture as that which "involves the totality of a people's life, including material and non-material aspects of their life". To him, modern African culture is a product of "the triple heritage" which implies that contemporary African society is a synthesis of three powerful cultural influences: indigenous African values, Islamic values (motivated by trade and islamization), and Euro-Christian values (motivated by colonialism, imperialism and Judaeo-Christian values of missionary work and education activities).

To Wagona Mokoba, "this cultural synthesis of internal and external influences, has given rise to some core or common values of African societies which include: the extended family ethos; a shared concern for the most vulnerable members of society (e.g. children, the elderly and people with disabilities), collective mutual responsibility and hospitality (often extended to relatives, friends or even strangers!)"'. According to him, the post-independence efforts for national integration, economic development

and yearnings for personal rule and pan-African solidarity, though largely unsuccessful, were inspired by these shared values and common historical experiences.

Since culture permeates the totality of a people's existence, it spreads to all spheres of their existence; hence, we can talk of branches of culture which are called sub-cultures. These include the economic, social and educational sub-cultures. However, we shall concern ourselves with political sub-culture, which is pertinent to this discourse. The *Encyclopaedia of the social Sciences* defines Political culture as:

the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumption and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of the polity.

To Almond and Verba (1963), "political culture is specifically the pattern of individual political orientations, their attitudes towards the political system and its various parts and to the role of the self in the political system". In the same context, Oronsaye (2003: 3) broadly sees political culture as "the emotional and attitudinal factors that determine the environment in which the members of a given society carry out their political actions and activities. It entails essentially the structures, institutions, ethos and norms of governance." He operationalised his discourse of political culture with the nature of the actual inter-relationships between and among the ruled and their rulers as well as the attitudes and orientations of the people to governance and the attendant political structures and institutions.

Consequent on the above, this chapter briefly summarizes the basic elements that characterize a nation's political culture. From these it espouses some assumptions that will be used to measure the attainment of nation-building ideals in Nigeria since 1800. These are that political culture is:

- The degree of social trust or distrust which prevails in a society;
- The general attitude of tolerance and interpersonal cooperation permeating political relations among people;
- Attachment and loyalty of the citizens to the national political system;
- People's attitudes towards authority and the degree of public recognition of what constitutes the legitimate authority;
- People's sense of their rights, powers and obligations, level of participation and or alienation.

The political culture of a society reflects both the cognitive feelings and evaluations of its population. According to Almond and Verba (1963: 14), people are induced into a political culture just as they are socialized into non-political roles and social system. Political culture is ingrained in social relations emerging from the cultural, economic and even ecological realms of a particular society. This implies that different societies, as is in a nation-state like Nigeria, have their different culture(s), which define the contours of the political culture of that particular society or ethnic group as the case may be. Almond and Verba (1980), in revisiting their earlier work on civic culture agreed that a single political culture covering an entire nation is inappropriate.

Thus, political culture entails essentially the structures, institutions, ethos and norms of governance; it also encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of the polity. In Nigeria, from its pre-colonial era to date, even though we cannot readily talk of a single political culture considering the inherent cultural diversities that define different political sub-cultures for the diverse peoples of Nigeria, we can recognize democratic elements in their governance. Therefore, democracy can become part of the political sub-culture of a people or society. However, democracy in its general sense or in itself as a concept has no appeal to reality. Indeed, as Dahl (1976: 4) observes, “no political term is more ambiguous or productive of fruitless controversy” as democracy. This is because the concept has undergone various definitions and interpretations by different scholars.

Therefore, to eliminate ambiguity, this chapter from the onset will see democracy from a socialist point of view instead of strictly from a Western liberal perspective. Evidences of a socialist variant of democracy was predominant in the various pre-colonial Nigerian societies, especially in the South-East, South-South and North-Central parts of the present Nigerian political configuration, including even the South-West. An example of this socialist variant of democracy is consocial democracy. Davidson (1991: 13-16) sees consocial democracy as a form of decentralized participatory democracy indigenous to many non-centralised African societies prior to colonialism, and which permits consultation, consensus and compromise in decision-making. It is in the same context this chapter understands and espouses Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy as a way forward to seeking a convergence tradition and modernity to achieve nationhood in Nigeria. According to Lijphart, consociational democracy is a kind of political arrangement in which the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are contrasted by the cooperative attitude and behaviour of leaders of different ethnic and cultural groups. Consociational democracy is predicated on the social structure of a society and that social structure is defined by the culture of that society. The sum total of a nation-state's diverse indigenous cultures is its localism. Thus that country's Localism includes all its sub-cultures such as the economic, social, political, military and religious. If that nation-state was to be Nigeria for example, we can conceive of Nigeria's localism in a singular form or refer to the different sub-localisms i.e. Hausa/Fulani localism, Igbo localism, in a plural form. However, before go further to contextualise localism in relation to Nigeria in this chapter, we shall first clarify the concept of localism.

King conceptualized localism as “a person's attachment to a particular place and the subsequent attitudes and behaviour that flow from such an attachment” (King; 1988: 4). Localism, to her, has both a spatial and value dimension such that, depending on the nature of the place and the people, it can be quite a complex concept. This is more so if conceptualized as a theory of integration and development. For example, on the one hand, it connotes a mode of human relationships characterized by cohesiveness, commitment and harmony. In this instance, the local is likely to be a small geographical area with a homogenous population in which individuals deeply share or respect basic values. As a result, they constitute a community bound by place (King; 1988: 4). Here the community so constituted is bound more by culture (value) than by place (space). On the other hand, localism may imply disintegration and discord. In this case the locale

(place) though a small spatially defined area, is likely to be inhabited by a heterogeneous population, which share some value, but hold other important ones that are in conflict. In this case though individuals intensely interact with each other and functionally depend on one another, the community that they represent is bound more by place (space) than by culture (value). King underscores a pertinent point to this chapter by summarizing this argument thus:

When the spatial and value dimensions are congruent, political stability is a major feature of localism. Conversely, if the spatial and value dimensions are in sharp conflict, instability is likely to be a major feature of localism (King, 1988: 4).

Localism manifested itself in its different dimensions in the various pre-colonial Nigerian societies, depending on the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity in such societies, the power relationships between the clans, tribes and or ethnic groups in a given area, and the patterns of settlement among the inhabitants of a particular area. For example, in largely homogeneous localities or societies like the Ife, Oyos, Egba, Ijaye and Ekiti parapos, all of which formed the Yoruba kingdom, there was political stability and development occasioned by cultural affinity and unity (value localism). On the other hand, the spatial dimension of localism manifested in the South-South and North-Central geo-political configuration of modern Nigeria, i.e. the Urhobo, Ijaw, Bini and the Tiv, Idoma, Mumuye respectively (Dalli, in Elaigwu and Erim 1996: 177). These were a culturally heterogeneous people who were bound together more by place than by cultural values (spatial localism). Whether these communities lived in peace and progressed despite their diversities was dependent on if there was a congruence of the spatial and value dimensions of their various localisms. Nigeria's localisms have profound implications for democracy and national development because of their basic features of intimacy, consensus, rationality and public participation which were common to all society and because they can be used to define the contours of a new political culture which will be truly Nigerian. Therefore, localism will be used in two contexts in this chapter. First, localism as a reality depicting the sum total of Nigeria's diverse cultures from pre-colonial times when they were wholly indigenous, through the colonial times when they were adulterated, to this modern post-colonial Nigeria where its adulterated indigenous values have mixed with the military culture of zombism to engender a culture of intolerance, exclusion hatred and violence. Second, localism will be used as a theory of integration and development which has profound utility for Nigeria's nascent democracy, national integration and future national development.

To contextualise this discourse on localism and thus guide the reader in understanding the nature of politics, governance and state-building in pre-colonial Nigeria as they relate to present nation-building efforts vis-à-vis a nascent democratic culture, this chapter will treat in broad strokes government and politics in pre-colonial Nigerian societies using inter-group relations and state making/building processes as fundamental basis. We will try to establish that while there is a co-relation between Nigeria's traditional patterns of political structures, processes and culture with her contemporary patterns and nature of politics as inherited from colonialism, there is no such correlation between them that is geared towards nation building.

PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIAN LOCALISM (S)

That our ancestors within the Nigerian region in pre-colonial times bequeathed to posterity a rich and dynamic legacy of socio-political organization is not in doubt. Indeed, the peoples of pre-colonial Nigeria had elaborate systems of governance that varied in scale and complexity depending on their environment, which in turn defined their socio-economic mode of existence. The sum of the various cultures and sub-cultures; structures, function, behaviours and the inter-relationships between the different tribes and ethnic groups that defined the political systems of pre-colonial Nigerian societies, is what this chapter refers to as pre-colonial Nigerian localism(s). Because of time and space, this chapter is not able to discuss in detail all of the various pre-colonial Nigerian localisms. It has only attempted to review some of them in broad strokes while measuring the level of inter-group relations and state-making processes between them. It is hoped that this will enable us assess their relevance to post-colonial Nigerian political culture vis-à-vis its implications for nation building.

The various autonomous peoples that constitute the social milieu of Nigeria today not only existed but reproduced themselves, just like the pre-industrial peoples of Europe, North America, Australia and others elsewhere in the world. Indeed, they evolved sophisticated social structures of state, religion and ideologies of political legitimization from their encounter with their physical environment and with other cultural systems around them. It is in this context that this chapter agrees with Dudley (1973) that the notion that Britain created Nigeria is a misrepresentation of the reality of the time, indeed, by the beginning of the 20th century, though broad differences still persisted, diffusion and assimilation were already providing a homogenizing effect sufficient for one to perceive the incipient emergence of a wider community covering the area known as Nigeria" (Dudley, 1973: 23-24). Bamaguje (2001) buttresses this further, saying that "even in pre-colonial Africa, nations existed. The Benin Empire comprised Edos, Urhobos, Yorubas and some Igbo speaking peoples. The influence of the Oyo Empire extended into modern Ghana. The Sokoto caliphate was. Around the world today, nations are the norm rather than exception. Even Britain, our erstwhile colonial master, is an amalgam of English, Welsh, Scots, Normans, Saxons et cetera. It is therefore likely that even without colonialism, (a) nation would have emerged (in Nigeria) today" (Bamaguje, 2001: 1). The point is that there were natural lines of inter-group relations and integrative principles that would have made for the natural evolution of a consensual Nigeria without colonialism.

Inter-Group Relations

Inter-group relations between the various pre-colonial Nigerian ethnic groups, and interface between their diverse localisms, took various forms. These were in the realms of cultural links, economic cooperation, foreign religions and military conquests. The ecological terrain of the areas influenced all. However, we shall concern ourselves with cultural interface and economic links between them to make for brevity and coherence.

Culturally, the links between pre-colonial Nigerian groups have been reinforced by archaeological finds within the Nigerian region. According to Erim (1996), evidence exists

which testifies to the cultural similarity between the faraway Ife and Nok culture complexes as is provided by the following summary: "All in all, the terra cotta of Ife look a more refined version of those of Nok, with emphasis on the naturalistic treatment of the head... There seems therefore to be little reason to doubt that the art of Ife grew out from the root in the Nok tradition of terra cotta sculpture" (Ajayi in, Erim, 1996: 12-13).

Other than the arts, cultural links between the peoples of pre-colonial Nigeria were in the area of inter-group marriages, e.g. between pre-Islamic Hausa/Fulani and their adjoining neighbours: the Jukuns, Battas, Bachamas, Kanuris and Nupes. Even in post-Islamic Northern Nigeria, such inter-marriages continue so long as both parties are Muslims (Bamaguje, 2001: 2).

Finally, under cultural links, traditions of origins among several Nigerian groups provide yet better integrating mechanisms of the Nigerian past (Erim; 1996: 13). Here, location and myths of origin combine to give a sense of identity based on common descent. For example, the waterway provided by the River Niger and its principal tributary, the River Benue, provided a vital root for the name 'Nigeria'. According to Erim these two waterways, over the centuries, provided the cosmopolitan character of business gatherings at such parts as Rabat on the Niger, and Yola on the Benue. As such, Rabat in Nupe country became the location of the ancient market where the Nupe met with the Yoruba, the Bariba, the Hausa, Igbo, Ibibio and Ijo (Ijaw). It was there that along with trade, other forms of interaction also took place, which generated among these diverse groups an awareness of one another (Ibid). Traditions of origins of the diverse Nigerian peoples in pre-colonial times also illustrate the diverse processes of both macro and micro state formations and systems within the Nigerian region. Evidence clearly shows that primordial groups deliberately sought various forms of association or identity between themselves. This search for group awareness often revealed itself in the myths and traditions of origins (Erim, 1996: 14).

Inter-group relations in the economic realm were evident in the various trade relations between the North and South and within themselves. For example, the waterway provided by the River Niger and Benue was supplemented by two land routes, the Kano-Badagry route crossing at Rabat on the Niger, and the Bornu-Yola route which crisscrossed the Jukun and Igbo countries, as ancient natural trade routes which facilitated inter-regional trade and integration. According to Erim, these were the routes that early British explorers, who prepared the way for eventual colonialism, took to reach Hausaland via Western Yorubaland. Trade and commerce among the diverse peoples of pre-colonial Nigeria changed their political configuration (power relationship) depending on ecological peculiarities. This is why the late Senegalese scholar and Egyptologist, Cheikh Anta Diop, argues that when the African from the savannah moved to the forest belt, power relationships changed. This is to say, in the savannah belt, horses and cattle helped empower local leaders and at the same time increase both their coercive power through the use of cavalry and their extractive power through taxation. As a result of this transformation of the political landscape, the physical spaces that were almost exclusively occupied by one ethnic group became diversified. Inter-ethnic diversification thus became the result of urbanization. This phenomenon is evident in pre-colonial Yoruba and Hausa societies because those who controlled trade were the ruling class.

The resultant economic empowerment trade offered them, made it possible for them to afford horses and cattle, which helped extend their dominion over the ruled. In the South-East where the thick forest, the tsetse fly and inaccessible roads made it impracticable for such economic inequality and dominion, the result was egalitarianism, which made the various villages autarkic thereby promoting their parademocratic culture which Njaka (1974: 53) calls ohacracy.

State-making/Building Processes

Politically, two broad types of state system are identified: the centralized and decentralised forms. In the centralized, power was concentrated in the hands of one person, i.e. the Oba, Obi, Emir, Ovie, Onoje, or a few person, while in the politically decentralized, i.e. the village assembly and age-grades in the Igbo societies and the elders and lineages in the Tiv society of North-Central Nigeria. Despite these differences on the issue of governance, both systems ensured a balance between power and authority on the one hand and service and accountability on the other hand (*Political Bureau Report*, 1987). Therefore, whether in a centralized political order where power concentrated in an individual engenders dictatorship and misrule, or in a decentralized order where power shared between groups engenders checks and balances, pre-colonial Nigerians placed a premium on good governance, leadership, accountability and obligation to the people. That is why, instead of impeachment as punishment for misrule as is obtainable today, there was dethronement leading to exile and death depending on the society. For example, in the Yoruba political system, the Oyomesi (Council of Ministers) could ask the Oba or Alaafin to commit suicide if found guilty of misrule that imperiled the people's existence.

Another common feature of the pre-colonial political sub-cultures of the Nigerian societies is a judicial sense of equity and reconciliation over the antagonism of 'right' and 'wrong' and the 'winner takes it all' approach to justice, which the inherited Western judicial culture engenders.

There was also a general sense of a politics of compromise and accommodation, which was watered by good sportsmanship or statesmanship. Even though ascension to political office was both by achievement and ascription, and not by competition, opposition was tolerated especially in the village assembly of the Igbo societies, where every adult was free to express his/her individuality.

In all, the essence of the state to the people was the promotion of their welfare and once this was guaranteed, their attitude to the state came in the form of support and co-operation, which further gave their leaders some legitimacy. This led Akpekpe (in Oronsaye, 1996: 178) to state that democracy as it is known in the West cannot be sustained under conditions of intense and salient preferences peculiar to Nigerians because in pre-colonial Nigerian societies, outcomes were valued more than procedural norms of liberal democracy. Therefore democracy, whether direct or indirect, whether there was mass participation or not, existed in various forms in pre-colonial Nigeria and was based on the social structures of these societies. Most significantly, these provided social benefits, law and order, and economic prosperity. Therefore, for Nigeria's nascent democracy to yield dividends and thus enhance nation-building, it should be rooted in

those traditional institutions of rulership, inter-group relations and state-making processes which our forefathers evolved and the colonialists met on the ground, and adopted in their 60 years of rule in Nigeria.

However, this is not to suggest that inter-group relations were smooth all round, neither is it to say that there were no disagreements or class conflicts between the ruling class and the ruled in centralized systems, or between the various organizations of kinship, neighbourhood, craft and creed in decentralized systems. The point is that certain values which had both ethical and philosophical contents were common to these societies despite their differences, and that these values had integrative principles which held them together and could have continued to do so if they were not disrupted by colonialism and the alien culture of Western civilization it introduced. For example, land as a key factor of production, was tied up with the organization of kinship, neighbourhood, community, tribe and village, and an ethical value which underpinned the ownership of land was that it was owned by everybody and all must have access to it. This was guaranteed through the law of inheritance which provided that all the children (sons in some societies) of a man should have a parcel of land and share in the properties he left behind at his death. Philosophically, members of a family or kinship who are alive are seen as involved in a passage in which they serve as links between generations past and those to come. Thus, while alive, they are trustees of land and that makes it impossible for individuals to sell land outside the family. With the introduction of capitalism into the social organization of Nigeria by the colonialists, the communal ownership of the factors of production like land was transferred to individual ownership as provided for by the tenets of capitalism. In post-colonial Nigeria, the land use decree of 1978 further eroded communal ownership of land. The point is, this land tenure system was common to all of pre-colonial Nigerian societies and due to its territorial character coupled with the cultural and economic interface between these societies, it served as an integrative mechanism between them.

Finally, to end this section, Nigerians, from pre-colonial times have never lived in isolation of one another. It is true, by and large, that in spite of the state system that evolved and the intricate network of trade routes across the entire space, Nigeria did not really emerge as a political entity until the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and the Southern parts of pre-colonial Nigeria. But in reality, if Nigeria, in the words of Uzoigwe, was a historical accident, then surely it was an accident anxiously waiting to happen (Ajayi in Erim, 1996: 47). In other words, the emergence of Nigeria as a modern state is a long historical process coupled with the experience of the diverse ethnic groups, each of which contributed to the emergence of a federal political structure. We can conclude that the major hallmarks of Nigeria's pre-colonial localisms include compromise, tolerance, consensus, and hospitality.

Localism (King, 1988) as a theory of development, also has a negative content which, depending on how it is employed, has adverse implications for nation building. This is when the plural identities of individuals and groups dissolve into a primordial attachment to tribe and ethnic group of descent, therefore creating the problem of dual loyalty a hallmark of the national question problematique in Nigeria. To King, "the many ethnic groups which claim Nigeria as their homelands rest their claim more on their identity with par-

ticular local areas than their identity with the country as a whole. Therefore, a spirit of localism has been a concomitance of ethnic pluralism in the emergence of the state (King, 1988: 21). King also gave a certain appeal to the convergence of ethnicity and geographical location to reinforce the above argument that "the convergence of ethnicity and geography tends to give the former a feature of permanence and to make it appealing as a durable basis for political mobilization and organization" (Ibid: 21). For example, to be Bini and live in Benin city, the traditional homeland of the Binis, and to pledge loyalty to the Oba of Benin (always a Bini man) reinforces ethnicity as well as territory, as the basis for political obligation, allegiance and loyalty. This convergence of ethnic identity with geography encouraged the persistence of the negative content of localism in the emergence of the Nigerian state (Ibid). Nnoli (1978) sums up this argument thus:

in the evolution of Nigeria, ethnicity has been both a powerful social and political force. It has often coincided with geographical location and political allegiance.

It was this negative content of localism that the colonialists exploited to perpetuate their rule during the colonial era through the divide and rule strategy adopted by Lord Lugard. This was also encouraged by the time they left officially in 1960. Instead of emphasizing the positive commonalities of the various political sub-cultures of pre-colonial Nigerian societies in order to forge a pan-Nigerian political culture, they emphasized the opposing localisms of the South with those of the North, which thus accentuated the present North/South dichotomy. Located in this dichotomy are the issues of political marginalisation, the minority question, state and secularity, and poverty, which have further compounded the national question, as Nigerians now tend to withdraw from the state and resort to local and primordial attachments for succour. These issues constitute the crux of our discourse.

THE NATIONAL INTEGRATION PROBLEMATIC: A COLONIAL INHERITANCE

The **Role** and **Impact** of national integration in a state. If the national question is effectively resolved, it creates an atmosphere conducive to national integration because mutual suspicion and political marginalisation (in the struggle for resources), which make people of a diverse nation resort to primordial sentiments, will be reduced to the barest minimum. Unfortunately for Nigeria, the negative culture of ethnicity, rivalry, greed, selfishness, intolerance, some of which undergirds its national question, makes up her post-colonial localisms. This is evident, as Nigerians have now resorted to these vices as virtues, which they uphold and practices with relish.

What then is the national question? Fedoseyev *et al* (1977) conceive of the national question as, "first and foremost a question of solving vital problems of social development, eliminating obstacles to the formation of nations and assuring freedom for the development of people including achievement of factual equality". This makes the national question a question of identity, the quest for recognition in the struggle for power to allocate resources. In the Nigerian context, it is the quest for the recognition of all ethnic groups as important and equal partners in the process of nation-building to achieve the project called Nigeria. Unfortunately, since 1914, attempts at achieving the project of a truly national Nigeria have been largely unsuccessful as its post-colonial polity is

replete with political, socio-economic and demographic inequalities which all combine to breed poverty and apathy with their attendant crisis of instabilities.

Since the inception of Nigeria's nascent democracy in May 1999, the national question has assumed the front burner with increasing tempo and complexity. There has been a rise in ethnic and religious agitation, conflict and violence that have resulted in wanton destruction of lives and properties. This development has left many Nigerians, especially the very poor who form the majority, gaping and asking the question of whether there is truly a Nigerian nation and if there is, whether they belong to it. There is no wonder therefore that calls for a sovereign national conference (SNC), national conference (NC) or a meeting of ethnic nationalities to redefine the Nigerian existence have increased in tempo since 1999, more than at any time in the nation's history.

Central to the resurgence of ethnic and religious violence since 1999 is the struggle for empowerment, the issue of human security, and participation in the sharing of the national cake. It is in this broad context that we will understand political conflicts in Nigeria since 1999. From the resource control agitations in the Niger Delta area which greeted the incumbent President in his first three months in office, to the last shari'ah crisis in Kaduna and Abuja that led to Nigeria aborting the hosting of the 2002 Miss World beauty pageant midway, we see evidence of centrifugal forces pulling apart the various ethnic nationalities and thus cracking the veneer of national unity and integration. More evidence abounds in the Niger Delta where the Ogonis, Ijaws, Urhobos, Isokos and others have been apoplectic with anger over their perceived and real political disempowerment, social alienation, economic exploitation and environmental depoliation, by the federal government in collaboration with the ruling elites and the multinational oil corporations, (MNOCs). While the federal government sees security/insecurity from the traditional and narrow prism of national security, the people view security/insecurity from a human security perspective, which of course takes their holistic existence into consideration. The people, political activists and environmental crusaders from the area, as well as human security scholars, feel that if they are economically empowered and environmentally safe, their security is guaranteed and there would be no wars or fires in the Niger Delta. Added to this already tense situation is intra-ethnic and inter-tribal conflict fuelled by youth unemployment. Examples abound in the Ijaw/Itsekiri Warri crisis of 1999, and the Urhobo/Itsekiri crisis of 2002. This is also evident in the South-West where a Yoruba separatist militia, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) unleashed mayhem on non-Yoruba inhabitants in the West, as was the case in the Yoruba/Hausa clash in Sagamu and in some parts of Lagos in 2000. This is not to gloss over the rising minority clashes in the North as evident in the vociferous campaign for political and cultural rights by the 'middle belt' Christian communities, including the peoples of Southern Kaduna and the Seyawa of Bauchi state. shari'ah has only served to aggravate the tension in the North as tolerance levels between the minority Christian communities and their majority Muslim Hausa/Fulani neighbours are now zero. The Igbos of the South-East are increasingly complaining of marginalisation within the polity. The most vociferous manifestation of their perceived marginalisation was in the 2003 Presidential elections where they fielded the most candidates in the Presidential primaries of all the 20 parties that contested the Presidential elections.

Other burning and unresolved national issues add momentum to the national question. These include over centralization of power at the centre (federal), thus increasing calls for power devolution, revenue allocation, secularity of the Nigerian state, residency rights, and boundary readjustment agitation at both state and local government levels. The list is endless. Issues that border on the national question which negatively affect the polity today are as vexed as they are many, such that a discerning mind is wont to ask what went wrong, from the pre-colonial era of diverse localisms (with clear lines of group interface which produced harmonious relations and trust between them) to today's post-colonial Nigeria. Was there a political sub-cultural vacuum? How did modern Nigerians come to harbour such animosities and suspicion against one another and why is it getting worse? Answers to these questions are located in the role and impact of colonialism on nation building in Nigeria.

The Role and Impact of Colonialism on the National Integration Problematique

It is the contention of this chapter that from the pre-colonial indigenous days to date, there was a disruptive interlude wrought by colonialism which was preceded by the "introduction of invidious alien religions" of Islam and Christianity (Bamaguje; 2003: 2). In addition, the patterns of Western education colonialism encouraged, its political system of 'divide and rule' and the political economy of patronage and clientage that was bequeathed to Nigeria at independence has contrived to shape a political culture which sees the state as a means to material acquisition and power that must be protected at all cost. This is the political culture that underlies the rigging of elections to acquire power, the resort to political violence to maintain that power, and the use of corruption to perpetuate the post-colonial social stratification of a few rich and the mass poor.

Taking these points one after the other, prior to colonialism gaining firm roots in pre-colonial Nigeria, the foreign religions of Islam and Christianity had already infiltrated various parts of the geographical area now known as Nigeria. The 1804 Jihad led by Uthman Dan Fodio changed the pre-Islamic Hausa Fulani localism, which was in congruence with the localisms of other pre-colonial Nigerian societies. Bamaguje helps to take this further: "even indigenous pre-Islamic Hausa-Fulani culture was not much different from that of other Nigerians. The difference came with the violent enthronement of Islam in the 1804 Jihad. Prior to that, most Hausas were pagans (Maguzawa) who had little or no interest in Islam even though they had been aware of it over eight hundred years ago". In his opinion, the pre-Jihad Hausas, like other indigenous pre-colonial Africans, never fought, killed, persecuted or discriminated on the basis of religion. They intermarried freely (without religious pre-conditions) with other neighbouring African peoples (Bamaguje, 2001: 1). He concludes, therefore, that the major irreconcilable difference between the core North and the rest of the country is religion: Christianity and Islam, two mutually antagonistic and intolerant foreign faiths, each claiming exclusive access to God. Thus, the historic mistake responsible for Nigeria's North-South dichotomy, which is inimical to nationhood and unity, is not Lord Lugard's 1914 amalgamation but the earlier introduction of invidious alien religions such as Islam which allows a Muslim Hausa man preference to allow his daughter to be the concubine of an

Arab rather than marry a non-Muslim fellow Hausa (how much more than an Ijaw or Urhobo) (Ibid). This chapter agrees with Bamaguje that such a mentality is not conducive for the development of nationhood because marriage is one institution that truly integrates diverse peoples.

At about the same time that the Jihad took place in Northern Nigeria, Christian missionaries along the coast attempted to advocate similar revolutionary changes: by the introduction of Christianity and the attendant Christian social and moral values, stoppage of the slave trade, and the abolition of slavery. With the return of converted freed slaves, it was not possible for the existing political elite to monopolize the resources of the new religion to strengthen their own position. Rather, the missionaries who were rebuffed by large sections of the ruling elite made special appeals to the under-privileged and those alienated from society. The success that Christianity achieved in this regard became subversive of the existing order, and strengthened the concept of secular political order and prepared the way for colonial rule (Ajayi and Ikara, 1985: 15), which disrupted the entire pre-colonial Nigerian political sub-cultures and localisms.

Indeed, colonialism emerged as a disruptive force in the evolution of democracy in Nigeria. Built on exclusive imperial control of politics and the economy, it restricted indigenous popular participation. It was not until the twilight of colonial rule, from the late 1940s onwards, that things began to change. The colonialists, as noted earlier, practiced divide and rule by exploiting Nigeria's diversity to their own advantage. In the process, colonialism created a political culture that tried to socialize the local population as passive subjects regardless of the fact that the political institutions it was establishing from the 1940s required their full participation. To the extent that the colonial overlords eroded their autonomies, traditional institutions were marginalized even when traditional rulers were part of the government machinery. Such identities as 'Hausa', 'Fulani', 'Igbo' and 'Yoruba', which now dominate Nigeria's social and political landscape and lexicon, were largely created as ethnic blocs to fuel colonial interests thus creating the national questions of ethnocentrism and tribalism. The net result was the development of two public realms: a communal realm based on membership of an ethnic group (primordial public), and a civic realm based on an assumption of universal citizenship (civic public). This is the two publics that Ekeh (1976) talks about in his treatise on colonialism and the two publics in Africa. This is one source of the crisis of citizenship and the national question in Nigeria. In addition, the religious differences which Islam and Christianity engendered (and which coincided with geographical boundaries) were further exacerbated by the colonial 'divide and rule' policy, which created the image of a 'Muslim North' and the 'Christian South'.

Western education was also designed and exploited to aid colonial interests which in most cases clashed with the nation-building interest, if at all there was one. When the first generation of educated Nigerians came back to Nigeria, they discovered they had no place in a largely indigenous milieu. They had metamorphosed into new people with new perceptions such that "they began to see themselves as leaders who should be followed by the rest of Nigerian society. They returned with a different conception of man, his value system, the attributes a leader should have and the course of history society should chart. Their metamorphosis made them regard the indigenous milieu as some-

thing that should be wiped off completely, Nigeria as a tabula rasa on which new things should be written, its society as one to be transformed by the magic wand they thought they possessed" (Ayandele, 1974: 9-10). In their delusion they forgot that they were first outcasts who were sold into slavery before they left Nigeria and that slaves were seen by most indigenous Nigerian societies as chattels who should never dream of becoming leaders. Their situation was not helped either by the colonialists who viewed them as rabble rousers who could threaten their imperial rule; as such they treated them with disdain. Therefore it was not out of altruistic intent that the British eventually handed over power to these educated elites in 1960, but out of the fact that they were best suited for the continuation of the imperial interests of the British in post-colonial Nigeria, compared to the unlettered Nigerians. Ayandele captures this thus:

Forced to transfer power to the very class of people they had venomously vilified for decades, the colonial masters began to appreciate and woo their elite heirs, whom they came to trust to retain, strengthen and further promote the cultural, economic and technological legacies of the colonial era and of the Western World (Ayandele, 1974: 2).

Since, the colonialist mentors of the educated elites-missionaries, secular officers and traders never saw themselves as building a Nigerian nation-state, and "at no time had they seen themselves sponsoring a future Nigeria for the educated elites" (Ibid: 55) the educated elites who took over governance in 1960 found themselves in a dilemma as to how to forge ahead and build a national Nigeria out of the diverse peoples and their sometimes opposing localisms. So to the extent that the colonialist never had a future 'united Nigeria' in mind, Western education was designed to give only elementary education to Nigerians. This became a source of further division between the North and South, as there emerged the 'illiterate North' and the 'educated South' with their limited education.

Another consequence of the colonial interlude in Nigeria's socio-political history is the creation of the present predominant political culture of bitterness, suspicion, apathy and the resultant alienation of the people from the state and its processes, which has its root in what I call pseudo-capitalism: Nigeria is not completely the pre-capitalist society it was before colonialism, and neither is it a full-fledged capitalist society. Bearing in mind that a basic principle of social life in a capitalist society is the dominance of individual ownership rights, which require that the factors of production such as land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship should be owned by individuals and that their to sell such assets should not be restricted, we can appreciate the damage wrought on Nigeria's social structures. Of course, this is completely at variance with the communal ownership of the factors of production, which was prevalent and dominant in pre-colonial Nigerian societies. Therefore, leaving post-colonial Nigeria hanging in between a communalist and capitalist social order is a most dangerous reality, which reveals the danger of letting loose a half-educated man on a largely illiterate society.

In all, the issue of the national question, which is central to the centrifugal forces that militate against nationhood, is the result of a complex interplay of social forces inherited from colonialism. Colonialism disrupted the various elements of democracy and nation-building patterns prevalent in almost all of pre-colonial Nigeria. Rather than encourage nation-building efforts, colonialism, through religion, Western education, and

divide and rule fostered disintegration. They could not forge congruence between the opposing localisms, of the North and those of the South. For example the native authority system was still entrenched in the North as at 1958 and traditional elements, which excluded women from voting in federal elections, still defined politics and were carried from the local (Northern region) to the national (federal level), therefore localizing the national. Conversely, in the Eastern region, the native authority system was abolished in 1950 and replaced with a modern system of elected councils and women were not disenfranchised. Thus the local influence on national politics from the Eastern region was likely to be supportive of change, which radically challenged traditions. Local voices from the North, on the other hand, tended to support the status-quo (King, 1988: 41). The inability of the colonialists, by the time they left, to find equilibrium between these opposing localisms of the diverse peoples of Nigeria is a major contributory factor towards national disunity and thus the national question till date. Recently, the localism of the North played itself out in the shari'ah induced crisis that made Nigeria abort its hosting of the Miss World Beauty contest (a national event) for the first time and, perhaps, the last time. Here the local could not be reconciled with the national.

In drawing this analysis to an end, there needs to be a reconciliation of the opposing localism of the North and South. There is a need for a linkage, which is a necessary pre-condition for national unity and nation building. According to King (1988), such a linkage could increase the level of interaction among Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups and pave the way for the resolution of conflict emanating from the clash of local traditions and (national) aspirations (Ibid: 42). At independence in 1960, such a linkage of localisms was vital for the creation of a pan-Nigerian political culture and would have engendered national integration and development but unfortunately there was none. Such a convergence is still vital for Nigeria's current efforts at nation building and quest for development, which it aspires to achieve through the instrumentality of the nation's nascent democracy. This presupposes a nexus between Nigeria's localisms, democracy and national development in its quest for nationhood.

LOCALISM, DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES FOR NATION-BUILDING

Central to the quest and need for democracy and nationhood in Nigeria is the question of underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is a state of lack and want that is lower than an ideal state of happiness; hence, there is the need to improve on that state. Characteristics of underdevelopment include poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, incapacity to utilize resources, all of which dehumanizes the people who suffer such a state of lack and want. A desire to change this state is thus in order. This underscores the need for a national development paradigm rooted in localism, which will be achievable through the instrumentality of a peculiar democracy. First, what is development redefined? What kind of democracy is pertinent to Nigeria taking her pre-colonial localisms into consideration? And what are the challenges before Nigeria's nascent democracy in the quest for nationhood and development?

Claude Ake once defined development thus:

Development is not a project, but a process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values (Obiagwu, 2002: 27).

According to him, “people can only be the end of development if they are already its agents and its means. They can be agents and means of development if they have the responsibility to decide what development is, what values to maximize and the methods for realizing them” (Ibid). This definition underscores the relevance of localism in the quest for national development in Nigeria. According to Mill, participation in local affairs is indispensable to liberty and essential to the development of both local and national communities (King, 1981: 10). Indeed, only by the work of their own hands can people positively improve their life circumstances.

Development is an ideal worth aspiring to attain. However, as Ake said, it is not an end in itself. It is given value by the people who desire it as a goal. It achieves that goal and assumes a meaning only after the goal and methods of attaining it have been defined by the people concerned. Democracy as a form of government is one method by which a people can attain their development goal. In this situation, the people's needs, preferences and values will define the type of democracy they require to achieve their development goal. It follows therefore that democracy in its general sense is meaningless, as was earlier posited in this chapter. To obtain meaning and value, like development, democracy needs to be contextualized by taking the preferences and values of its practitioners into cognizance. Flowing from this background, and taking the diverse localisms of pre-colonial Nigeria which highlighted elements of a socialist variant of democracy into consideration, this chapter will recommend Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969: 25). This is a kind of political arrangement in which the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are contrasted by the co-operative attitude and behaviour of leaders of different ethnic and cultural groups. This is most applicable to a plural society like Nigeria where the national question is the bane of the country's political instability.

According to Lijphart, consociational democracy engenders:

- Government by a grand coalition of elite groups from different ethnic nationalities and cultures;
- The exercise of mutual veto or concurrent majority;
- Proportionate representation of groups;
- A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its internal affairs;
- Conflict management and agreement systems among the different elite and groups;
- A multi-party system which reflects the pluralist character of a nation-state
- Commitment to the maintenance of political cohesion of a national community

Lijphart cites among others, Australia, Switzerland and the Netherlands as examples of consociational democracies.

Challenges for Nation Building in Nigeria

Nigeria, a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, tribes and localisms, has a lot of similarities in terms of plurality with Switzerland, who out of consensus and commitment to the national interests of a national community agreed to adopt a brand of democracy that is rooted in their socio-cultural structures. For example, six Presidents are elected, one from each of the geo-political regions, to rule every six years. Each year, one of them is President while the other five are Vice-Presidents. The result: Switzerland is one of the most peaceful countries of the world and has the highest per capita income. This poses a certain challenge for Nigeria.

Despite the exit of the military from politics in May 1999, the Nigerian society has not been demilitarized as evidence of the military mentality still manifests in its everyday relations: e.g. phrases like “with immediate effect” still persist in daily communication, Nigerians are still impatient with matters that require due process and violence has been employed as a means of settling issues (IDEA, 2000: 28). This is the consequence of the post-independence military era wherein the military culture of ‘zombism’ was injected into all aspects of Nigeria’s social existence in the evolution of her diverse localisms. The features of Nigeria’s localism during this military era include the culture of force, intolerance and violence, and they are still dominant. Therefore, since the effects of military rule have permeated all facets of society, the concern here has come to include the demilitarization of not just politics, society and economy, but also the vast array of attitudes, beliefs, orientations, customs, interests, actions and processes associated with the long entrenched and pervasive nature of military rule in Nigeria (Ibid: 107).

The plural character and multiple identities of Nigeria’s pre-colonial localisms are still prevalent and dominant in her contemporary political sub-cultures. Therefore if this plurality is not homogenized, it may be inimical to development and nationhood. This is so when the spatial and value dimensions of localism are not in congruence. When they are, localism can be a dynamic theory that will advance national development. This is where consociational democracy becomes relevant as Nigeria’s elite class in consonance with the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) must sit down to articulate how they can form a government of national unity that will incorporate all shades of opinion. This is necessary given the ‘sweeping victory’ of the PDP in the April 2003 elections and the resultant dissent of opposing parties following alleged subversion of the electoral process by the PDP in its favour (a situation which has made Nigeria a one-party state, more or less). What is needed at this point, given Nigeria’s past democratic failures, is not the politics of bitterness and exclusion by the ruling elites, but the politics of statesmanship and inclusion, which are hallmarks of pre-colonial Nigerian localisms.

Lastly, there is a causal relationship between poverty and the adversarial relations among ethnic groups in Nigeria. Indeed, “such indices of deprivation, along with the grave consequences of our nose-diving economy, as accelerated by mismanagement and corruption, have poured fuel on our communal tension and disturbances” (Emeh, 2003: 35). The challenge here is for leadership at various levels to pursue poverty alleviation based on an economic empowerment thrust that is rooted in social relations, with renewed vigor. This is because social bonds play a critical role in the formation of

social capital. Social capital is a concept that assumes that human bonding, work and capital are functionally linked. They have a cause effect relationship that is continuous and reinforces traditional and community ties as was prevalent in pre-colonial Nigerian societies. An example of social capital in Nigeria is the periodic thrift contributions made by social groups, which are generally referred to as *osusu*. There is the Obodo communal alignment of the Igbos, Ilu of the Yorubas and such other “home town development unions” as the Isoko Development Union of the Isoko-speaking people of Delta state. These groups make periodic contributions from which they make loans with minimal interest to help to develop their communities through education trusts and the provision of basic amenities. Social factors such as trust, integrity and solidarity play a critical role in promoting the material and economic wellbeing of members of a family, community, tribe, ethnic or such other social group. This has proved effective in the economic development of the South-East Asian tigers and India. In rural China for example, about 20 to 30 friends and relatives get together and help in building their own houses (Shurmann, 1996: 1) Also, in the United States, self-employment and general economic success, especially among Asians and Hispanic immigrants, are attributed to pooled family labour power and financial resources (Sanders, 1996: 233-4). In the Nigerian context, poverty can be alleviated using social structures like the family, clan, community and tribe to empower people economically. For example, government can grant loans to the mass poor and most vulnerable of the Nigerian society (women, children and the aged) using these structures as links. These proved successful in pre-colonial Nigerian societies where social factors such as trust, integrity, love and solidarity served as capital in place of physical collateral and financial capital as is obtainable in post-colonial Nigerian localism. Having been empowered, people at the margins will now be in good stead to create the needed social capital they require to develop themselves based on their own environment, values and choices. Apart from the challenge of putting effective poverty alleviation strategies in place, government should also endeavor to provide the conducive political environment in which social capital can flourish. This can be done through good governance, and emphasizing transparency and accountability in leadership. These were hallmarks of leadership that were central to the diverse pre-colonial Nigerian localisms. Shurmann (1996) summarizes this argument this way:

By ensuring real rule of law and maintaining good government, the state can go a long way in bringing about economic growth and social stability. The state must also go further and seek ways to support the family and other forms of social and cultural bonding

Of course, when people are secured against hunger, disease and illiteracy, they have something to live for and socio-political constructs like “peaceful co-existence” and “national integration” becomes more meaningful and realizable ideals.

TOWARDS A CONVERGENCE OF TRADITION AND MODERNITY: PROSPECTS FOR NATION-BUILDING

So far, this chapter has argued that there is no congruence between Nigeria's pre-colonial, colonial and the post-colonial localisms that is geared towards nation-building. Second, the colonialists disrupted the diverse pre-colonial localisms they met on the ground, and did not make for a melting pot of these diverse and sometimes opposing localisms to form a pan-Nigerian political culture when they left officially in 1960. Third, despite the inherent diversities in Nigeria's pre-colonial localisms, certain common indigenous values remain relevant to reinventing a pan-Nigerian political culture which will be rooted in the tenets of consociational democracy. These are the unstated hypotheses, which this chapter has so far validated, and they lead us to the conclusion that there is a conflict between tradition and modernity in Nigeria's evolving political culture. For example, many successive governments have made pronouncements emphasizing that traditional rulers are the custodians of our culture and traditions and as such have a vital role to play in Nigeria's political process. Ironically, traditional rulers have persistently complained that their power and authorities are daily being eroded and that in consequence they are no longer in a position to effectively play their role as custodians of culture and traditions. (Ikara, 1985). This underscores the conflict of tradition with modernity in the sense that, on the one hand, most traditional rulers are ignorant of modern democratic principles as embodied in representative democracy, and the rule of law. Hence, they cannot find a role for themselves, especially as the 1999 constitution is silent on that level of governance.

On the other hand, the Western-educated elites, from the 'new elites' (Ayandele, 1974: 9) that took power from the colonialists at independence to the present crop, have also been ignorant of the purposes and functions of the indigenous political systems and methods of local governance. The result has been deep contradictions and chaos, which breed under-development at the local level, disenchantment with the entire system, and ultimately, a resort to primordial attachments that spew national disunity. This cultural confusion arising from the clash of tradition and modernity in Nigeria's cultural evolution is evident in the craze by the Western-educated elites to acquire chieftaincy titles, and the monetisation of such titles by the traditional rulers themselves. While this shows a congruence between Nigeria's pre-colonial and colonial localisms, there is very little evidence of a congruence of the country's various localisms geared towards nation-building.

Consequently, this chapter seeks a convergence of the ideals, processes and roles of traditional political values with those of modernity as portrayed in liberal representative democracy, with the primary focus on nation building. Issues of concern will revolve around the concepts of power, authority and the reaction of the people to it, secularity, class relations and national development vis-à-vis national integration. As has been previously alluded to, Nigeria, a hodgepodge of ethnic groups and cultures, has not adapted well to the modern, foreign political culture of liberal representative democracy. This is because colonialism disrupted and relegated certain indigenous political values to the background and highlighted only those with divisive tendencies, which suited their

'divide and rule' strategy, aimed at realizing their imperialist goals. For example, the competition for resources, which capitalism and commerce introduced, filtered into the political realm as people now came to see the state as an avenue for primitive accumulation of wealth instead of service. Thus they engaged in bitter struggles for power, which changed authority relationships from "authority and support" to "authority and apathy/alienation" as the responsibility of leaders to the people became distorted. This also created new class relations wherein the socio-economic gap between the ruling elites and the non-ruling elites on the one hand, and between the ruling elites and the masses on the other hand, widened. This has certain implications for the poverty/integration nexus. Divide and rule also heightened the ethnicity and religious dichotomy between the North and South, which started heating the polity from the 1940s till date. This culture, which fosters inequality, bitter competition, exclusion, corruption, apathy and then alienation, is the hallmark of the political culture of representative democracy in Nigeria, and contrives to a play centrifugal role in the body politic.

However, given the global trend of democratisation and emphasis on the sanctity of fundamental human rights, democracy still holds some hope of development for Nigerians. Only, it must be redefined based on the country's peculiar localisms. This will seek to find a convergence of those indigenous socio-cultural and political values which are relevant to nationhood with those of representative democracy. Common indigenous political values like leadership and accountability, where leaders hold their positions as sacred and meant for the common good, which *ipso facto* makes them accountable, is relevant as a panacea to the crisis of leadership which Chinua Achebe says is the core of Nigeria's problem. For example, a leader who failed in his responsibilities to his people in the pre-colonial Yoruba kingdom was encouraged to commit suicide instead of being impeached, as liberal representative democracy provides. This if resorted to will restore the spirit of *noblese oblige* in Nigeria's leaders and help to rebuild the confidence of the people in the system. This engenders local participation which is vital for development from the local to the national.

Second, consensus was a common value of Nigeria's pre-colonial localism, which was prevalent in almost all societies. Features of consensus like sportsmanship, co-operation, reconciliation and communalism played themselves out in the socio-political and economic lives of Nigeria's forefathers. They agreed on a whole range of issues, taking brotherliness, tolerance and love into consideration. King (1988: 9) underscores the relevance of consensus to development and nation-building in this way:

Common values and beliefs tend to produce similar perceptions of the problems, which can result in general agreement at the local level. Such consensus injects stability into political life. The order and security that flow from such stability will not assure development, but it seems that the latter is unlikely in their absence.

She concludes that, "where there is agreement on fundamentals, cooperation and commitment to developmental activities will be greater and the quality of results more positive" (Ibid). To this end, local government should be clearly defined as a third tier of government, their revenues should be increased, and federal/local relations in inter-governmental relations should be encouraged. In the same context, the roles of traditional

rulers and institutions as real custodians of culture and traditions should be clearly defined in the Constitution and made to work hand in hand with local government institutions. This has the advantage of equating responsibility with authority. Government should not interfere in traditional rulership secession, selection or election.

The change and continuity continuum, which was a feature of all pre-colonial societies, served to accommodate changes (culture shocks) while continuing to coexist side by side. Inter-group relations, i.e inter-marriages, trade, war, which made Nigeria's forefathers consummate players of diplomacy, served to accommodate groups and practices outside theirs. For example, the Ibibio and Tiv societies established systems of enculturation for strangers, especially for the Igbos who today live in every village in any part of Nigeria. These were integrative mechanisms, which made the ground conducive for amalgamation and the adoption of federalism (Elaigwu and Erim, 1995). In this regard, government should encourage traditional rulers to revive the periodic festivals of their communities and create roles and recognition for non-indigenes residing in their communities at that point in time. This will help to break artificial and cultural barriers and forge national unity.

This convergence of indigenous socio-cultural and political values with modern representative democracy will dissolve into a pan-Nigerian political culture of consociational democracy, which requires a committed leadership to engineer. This makes leadership a most important factor because real development and nationhood cannot take place outside of a governance system that is transparent, accountable and participatory and, to that extent, moral. A lot therefore depends on our elites and leaders who must now retrace their steps to those days of yore when our ancestors carried out their daily business of government following those natural channels chiselled out for them on the economic landscape over time.

Finally, to achieve convergence, this chapter recommends a number of imperatives: first, the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be mandated with the responsibility of mobilising the elites on the need for the nation to merge cultural fronts to produce a pan-Nigerian political culture of consociational democracy. Other segments of civil society and the masses should be sufficiently re-oriented on the imperative of this Nigerian renaissance and cultural regeneration. Second, following this mass mobilization of Nigerians, the Obasanjo-led PDP government should immediately call for a National Conference (NC). The NC should address burning national issues of power devolution, resource control, revenue allocation formula, residency rights, boundary allocation, secularity, fixed tenure for executive offices, rotational presidency, and the role of local government and traditional institutions in national development. On the basis of this, a new people-oriented and National Constitution will emerge. This is not to suggest that a people-oriented National Constitution is the sufficient determinant of national unity and development in Nigeria. The Nigerian society still needs to develop a level of dynamism that will cope with cultural globalization. Therefore, to nurture and sustain the continuous convergence of tradition and modernism in Nigeria, the federal government needs to increase funding of higher education and research in Nigerian universities to unravel the mysteries of Nigeria's past existence and create the required social knowledge to tackle modern nation-building problems. There is so much locked

in Nigeria's historical and cultural past, which when unraveled will make her understand the present and prepare for her future. For example, through social research into Nigeria's pre-colonial localisms, we can evaluate the dynamic changes which different ethnic groups have made to their institutions and cultural elements in order to meet the challenges of modernization. We observed that some of the most notable transformations have taken place in the areas of family relationships, family formations, the land tenure system, marriages, organization of craft and labour and the formation of social capital. As said before, a most notable area of dynamic change is in the area of governance where pre-colonial leadership virtues of transparency and accountability have been replaced with greed, secrecy and corruption.

In summary, the mass mobilization and re-orientation of Nigerians to prepare them for a national conference where they will redefine their future, is the first step to revisiting the past that will give them the chance of informed consent, which the colonialists did not give them when Nigeria was amalgamated in 1914. Anything short of this civilized revolution will result in bloody revolution from which the elites themselves will be the greatest losers.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter recognizes that Nigeria's political sub-culture(s) in pre-colonial times present a broad spectrum of change and continuity in a manner that the two, rather than being mutually exclusive, were complementary through inter-group relations, constant accommodation of new styles of administrations, and the adaptation to the various and sometimes opposing localisms of the people. While the present Nigerian political culture of politics of bitterness and exclusion is an amalgam of pre-colonial localisms and the colonial interlude, they do not contribute towards nation building.

There needs to be a convergence of tradition with modernity to produce a pan-Nigerian political culture of consociational democracy where the elites and leaders will collaborate to forge one, indivisible, indissoluble and virile multinational Nigerian state. Indeed, as Elaigwu and Erim (1995) posit, "since the past forms part of the present and thus lays the foundation for the future, a search for solutions to current problems must trace the problems to their roots in the past". Therefore, the instrumentality of achieving a convergence of tradition and modernity as the way forward for Nigeria is located in the immediate convocation of a national conference where national issues that affect the polity will be addressed peacefully and the informed consent of stakeholders to the Nigerian project sought in a civilized manner. This is the only mistake of the past that 1914 made and Nigerians must go back to that past and undo it.

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STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY CONTESTATIONS: THE CASE OF ABUJA INDIGENES

Kevin Ebele Adinnu

The former Minister of Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory, Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu, stoked controversy in 1999. While receiving the only Senator representing the territory in the National Assembly, Hajia Khairat Gwadabe, the Minister declared that there were no longer indigenes in the Federal Capital Territory (Adinnu, 1999: 22).

This seemingly innocuous declaration only served to uncork the bottled-up anger of those who still considered themselves indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. In a swift reaction, notable indigenes of the territory poured invective on the minister. Soon, two groups had sprouted to champion the cause of the indigenes of the territory. These are Abuja Indigenes Youths' Forum and the Abuja Indigenes Elders' Forum.

The script of the unfolding drama in the nation's new capital was written when, in 1976, the area was designated the Federal Capital Territory. Following the recommendations of the Aguda Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital Territory, the military government promulgated Decree No. 6 of 1976 and announced on February 3, 1976 that the nation's capital was to be moved out of Lagos to a federal territory of about 8, 000 square kilometres in the central part of the country.

According to the then Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, in a national broadcast, "the few local inhabitants in the area, who needed to be moved out of the territory for planning purposes, will be resettled outside the area in places of their choice at government expense", (1976). By 1979, the government of General Olusegun Obasanjo announced that it could no longer resettle all the inhabitants of the FCT, estimated to be over 150, 000 (Jibril, 1989: 3), as it could not afford to complete the exercise.

Contestations with civil society groups such as this have become a feature of states, especially post-colonial or peripheral states, and Nigeria is not an exception (Ihonvbere *et al*, 1998; Usman, 1982; Osaghae, 1994; Woods, 1992; Stepan, 1998; Longman, 1999; Abutudu, 1995). Several civil society organisations have emerged to contest, contend and even confront the Nigerian state on issues affecting them in the country.

The problematics, which this work delves into, are not entirely new but are praxiologically different to the extent that civil society groups, the subject of this study, transcend class lines which other works have extensively and excitingly explored (Alavi, 1972; Saul, 1974; Leys, 1976; Mamdani, 1976; Shivji, 1976, Langdon, 1977). To what extent can a researcher extrapolate from the general findings of these works to the particular case of the contest between Abuja indigenes and the Nigerian state? In specific terms, will the Nigerian state employ subtle forms of legitimisation to pacify Abuja indigenes or will it repress them into quietude as Nigeria's recent history of repression shows? (Usman, 1982; Ihonvbere *et al*, 1998).

Secondly, do elected governments deal differently with issues of state-civil society contestation from military dictatorships or is the character of the state the same irrespective of the type of government running the state? Thirdly, can Abuja indigenes extract commensurate concessions or any concessions for that matter in this contest with the Nigerian state? Fourthly, what is the likelihood that Abuja indigenes will adopt violent methods in furtherance of their campaign as similar groups did in the past?

That some researchers reached some conclusions in similar scenarios in the past does not mean that their findings will hold true in this case. This is especially so as state-civil society relations are in a perpetual state of flux.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In contemporary intellectual circles, there is near consensus on the legal aspect of the state. To wit, the state is seen as an entity that is sovereign, and has a population under a government within a defined territory. Within the context of international relations and international law, these are taken for granted (Nnoli, 1986).

However, the philosophical bases of the state have been a matter of serious disputation among political philosophers, hence the alarm by Laski that, "[a] new political philosophy is necessary to a new world." (Laski, 1982: 1).

From the ancient period up to the medieval epoch, the dominant theory of the state was that which saw it as designed to harmonise various necessary parts of society. This idea is discernible in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Saint Augustine and Cicero. This idea was overtaken by the liberal theory of the state, which germinated from the renaissance and reformation, and remained dominant up to the beginning of the 19th century. Essentially, this school sees the state as an expression of a social contract. To them, to avoid anarchy in any political society, there must be a supreme authority, which gives orders to all and receives same from none. Following from this, the state exists to secure order, enable demand to be satisfied on the widest possible scale, and provides a technique of peaceful change. Purveyors of this theory include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau. This idea has remained the protective rampart of liberal democracy to this day as seen in Locke's concept of "government by consent", which has found expression in the American Declaration of Independence.

As an expression of what the state ought to be, the two broad ideas have some weight but from the prism of what the state realistically is, we have to look elsewhere. According to Laski (1982: iii):

...what is challenged is the liberal theory of the state.... the main ground for attack does not lie in a denial that the state-power secures order; this is universally admitted. What is argued is that what the order maintained by the state secures does not provide a technique of peaceful change and does not permit demand to be satisfied on the largest possible scale.

Arguing further, he states that:

... it follows that those who defend the classic theories of the state must be able to show not an ideal, which exists only in their own construction, but the actual states, England, France, Germany, the United States of America, that we know, are inherently capably granted the class relations they maintain, of fulfilling demand on the largest possible scale....For the individual member of any political society is bound to infer its ends not from its proclamation of purpose, but from his judgement, based on his own experience, of that purpose in action. (Ibid: v)

Against the backdrop of this profound critique of the liberal theories of the state, the latter cannot provide an adequate theoretical compass which a study state-civil society relations demand; a work which borders on praxis, on *what is* rather than *what ought to be*. We do not only need a realistic theory of the state but a realistic theory of a post-colonial peripheral state, in which category Nigeria falls. To that we now turn.

The realistic theory of the state, which provides the theoretical framework for this research project, is to be found in the corpus of theories now known as the Marxist theory of the state. Although Karl Marx himself never set out a comprehensive theory of the state, he provided the broad outline for such a theory (Miliband, 1983: 3). Marx sees the state as the organised power of one class for oppressing another. The commonest expression of this view is to be found in *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* where they maintained, “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels, 1977: 38).

Although Marx based his analyses on the capitalist states, his views have been expanded to cover other socio-economic formations. As Friedrich Engels wrote, the state is:

An organization for the purpose of preventing any interference from without with the existing conditions of production, and therefore, especially for the purpose of forcibly keeping the exploited class in conditions of oppression corresponding with the given mode of production slavery, serfdom, wage labour (Engels, 1950: 136).

Employing what he called empiricism, the British political scientist, Ralph Milliband, expounded graphically the import of the implications of the Marxist conception of the state. After studying the highly industrialised societies of the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan among others, he stated thus:

What the evidence conclusively suggests is that in terms of social origin, education and class situation, the men who have manned all command positions in the state system have largely, and in many cases overwhelmingly, been drawn from the world of business and property, or from the professional middle classes...and not only, it must be stressed,

in those parts of the state system, such as administration, the military and the judiciary, which depend on appointments but also in those parts of it which are exposed or which appear to be exposed to the vagaries of universal suffrage and the fortunes of competitive politics. In an epoch when so much is made of democracy, mobility, classlessness and the rest, it has remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist countries that the vast majority of men and women in these countries has been governed, represented, judged, and commanded in war by people drawn from other economically and socially superior and relatively distant classes. (Milliband, 1969: 66-67)

In Social Science circles, this position has been labelled the instrumentalist Marxist theory of the state. In a popular amendment to this, the French Political Sociologist, Nicos Poulantzas, explained that the modern state serves the interests of the ruling class irrespective of whether members of this class are in government or not. According to him:

[the] relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation. This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus is not the cause but the effect... of this objective coincidence... Indeed, one can go further: it can be said that the capitalist state best serves the interest of the capitalist class only when the members of this class do not participate directly in the state apparatus, that is to say, when the ruling class is not the politically governing class. (Poulantzas, 1972: 245-246)

Poulantzas's structuralist view has been described as that of relative autonomy of the state. It is in the light of this view that Claude Ake sees the state as:

A specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society and appears as an objective force standing alongside society. The state form of domination is the modality in which the system of mechanisms of class domination is autonomized—that is, the institutional apparatus of class domination is largely independent of social classes, including the hegemonic class... State domination remains class domination not just in spite of autonomization but precisely because of it. (Ake, 1985: 1-3)

How then does one look at post-colonial peripheral capitalist states like Nigeria? In highly industrialised, capitalist states, the level of development of productive forces is high, leading to the dominance of commodity exchange. In these states, the state appears as a neutral body mediating the relations among social classes, disguising class domination with such fanciful things as the rule of law, one man; one vote, etc. In peripheral capitalist states like Nigeria, the development of productive forces is low; commodity exchange is low, hence the state finds it difficult to appear to be neutral. It therefore immerses itself in the struggle of the classes undisguised as to whose interest it serves. As Claude Ake observes:

[the] unique feature of the state in Nigeria, and this is typical of periphery capitalist formations generally, is that the state has limited autonomy. That is, the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys little independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic class, and so is immersed in the struggle of the classes (Ake, 1985: 9)

He, however, erred when he states, “[since] autonomization is the very essence of the state as a modality of domination, it is not clear whether we can properly talk of the state in Nigeria or in other periphery formations for that matter”. The state remains the state irrespective of its changing character in different socio-economic formations. As Okechukwu Ibeanu points out:

[the] capitalist state is no more state-like than the feudal state. They represent two types of the state's form of domination different only in the material basis of that domination... The essence of the state is the relations of domination and subordination among classes and other social forces, whether these relations are mediated by a 'thoroughgoing' com-modification or not. (Ibeanu, 1993: 119-120)

Based on this exposé, the following abstractions can be made about the post-colonial peripheral capitalist states, which include Nigeria, and these abstractions would form the theoretical framework for this study:

- i. That the peripheral state, just like the capitalist state, is an instrument in the hands of the ruling elite or class for the domination of other classes or social forces;
- ii. That the peripheral state, because of its low level of autonomy, is interventionist and unable to distance itself from the struggle of the classes; and
- iii. That the peripheral state, following from its low level of autonomy, employs force, manipulation, intimidation and so on, if necessary, to entrench the hegemony of the ruling class.

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Complementarity in state-civil society relations is the hallmark of liberal thinking. According to Diamond (1994), civil society is the handmaid of the state as it is seen as a corollary of liberal democracy. To him, civil society is pluralistic and market oriented, respects the rule of law and eschews violence. He maintains that religious, ethnic and evolutionary organisations that seek to monopolise political space in society are not in the sphere of civil society.

Monty Narsoo re-echoes this when he states that:

Civil Society consists of a range of organizations of self-interests, which are protected by various mechanisms such as an independent judiciary and free press, from interference by the state. These organizations come in various forms and the greater their number and diversity, the deeper the democratic content of society. (Narsoo, 1991: 4)

This liberal position runs riot when it maintains that any relationship of antagonism and conflict with the state should be divorced from liberal thought. According to Beckman (1996: 4), the nature of such relations should be removed from the definition of civil society. He states that debates on dichotomous and conflicting state-civil society relations obliterate the dialectics of state-civil society relations. To him, state-civil society relations are dialectical to the extent that civil society complements the democratic project of the state. One should, however, point out that conflictual and antagonistic relationship between the state and the civil society is inherently dialectical.

Opposed to this patronising view on the relationship between the state and civil society espoused by liberal thinkers is the one put forward by Marxist thinkers among others, characterized by antagonism, confrontation, consent, hegemony, etc. The forerunner of this approach was G.W.F. Hegel. Following the rise of the bourgeoisie from the collapse of feudalism in Europe in the eighteenth century, Hegel saw the need to separate the political from the social form in the emerging modern society. These he called the state and civil society. To Hegel, the state is:

the actuality of concrete freedom (where)... personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development... but... also passes over of their own accord into the interest of the universal. (Knox.1965: 160)

From the above, one can see that Hegel believed in the absolute rationality of the state where the private and particular interests would merge with communal interests. The organic unity of these, according to him, would be represented by the state. On the other hand, civil society, to Hegel is:

[the] battlefield where everyone's individual private interest meets everyone else's, and as such it was conceived as an arena where the needs and interests of individuals conflict with common interests, on the other hand, and those interests together conflict with the interests of the state. (Knox, 1965: 189)

Civil society, to him, consists of individuals, classes, groups and institutions whose system of needs “represent a decisive and evident break with the natural environment” (Gamble, 1981: 54). This pluralist nature of civil society implies divisions and cleavages, which may be harmful to the common interest. As far as Hegel was concerned, it is the state that counteracts these harmful effects. This implies that anything emanating from civil society, which is harmful to the common good, can be suppressed justifiably.

Some works appear to have given credence to the zero-sum relationship inherent in Hegel's formulation. Midgal (1988), for instance, based on an evaluation of five cases in the Third World, concludes that the stronger, more complex and more autonomous the society is, the less capable the state will be of functioning effectively. See also Naomi Chazan (1991: 283) and Timothy Longman (1999: 340).

Unlike Hegel, who sees the state as the absolute good and civil society as harmful, Karl Marx sees the state as an instrument of coercion and oppression that evolved from the civil society. The state, according to Marx, evolved from objective material conditions of the civil society. As he puts it:

Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the state ...though ...it must organize itself inwardly as state (Marx and Engels, 1968: 48).

Although the state emerged from civil society, it became an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie to protect its interest and ensure the reproduction of the system. Ironically, civil society created the basis for a new form of domination—the state (Avineri, 1968: 20-21). Writing on Marx's position, Gebru Mersha (1990: 7) has this to say:

It could be noted that Marx did not mince words in emphasizing the separation of the state and civil society... He explained the separation between the two, which phenomena he thought would disappear once the material conditions for both the state and civil society cease to exist.

Another influential writer who contributed greatly on the relationship between the state and civil society was Antonio Gramsci. He agrees with Marx that the civil society developed historically in the West with the emergence of capitalism. However, there are differences in their perceptions of state-civil society relations. Using the base (substructure) and superstructure model, Gramsci locates civil society at the level of the superstructure and defines it as “the ensemble of organizations commonly called private” (Hoare *et al*, 1986: 12), comprising a wide range of social activities and institutions such as trade unions, voluntary associations, church organizations including political parties, if they do not form part of the state and its apparatus and the government (Forgacs, 1988: 420).

For Gramsci, the state, which also exists at the level of the superstructure, is a sphere of coercion and domination *à la* Marx while civil society is the site of consent, hegemony and direction. The dominant class or group establishes its consent and hegemony in the civil society while the subordinate classes or groups could also organise their opposition in the same civil society. This could lead to the realization of an alternative hegemony (Ibid: 224). It is this argument Gramsci used to buttress the capacity of civil society in the West to resist state intervention in its domain.

Gramsci and Marx agreed that the civil society originated historically from the West in the course of the development of capitalism. Both agreed on the primacy of civil society over the state and the former's centrality in the historical process. But unlike Marx who thought that both the state and civil society could be abolished eventually, Gramsci believed that the historical process would eventually lead to the identification of the state with civil society and the creation of a regulated society (Hoare *et al*, 1986: 263).

The above abstractions by Marx and Gramsci remain relevant although changes have occurred in the global scenes that call for more rigorous analysis not only about Western societies but in the Third World countries too. As Gebru Mersha notes:

More fundamental of the changed international circumstances are the formation of state socialist systems and the decolonisation process that led many countries to achieve political independence. This marked...crucial difference in the origin and development of the state and civil society in the West and the peripheral formations, both 'socialist' and 'capitalist'. (1990: 12).

The emergence of the Soviet Union, its sweeping intervention in civil society, its collapse and the fall of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe propelled by popular movements are some of the changes in the global scene. The role popular uprisings by civil society played in the Third World leading to the fall of autocrats, oligarchs, military dictators and racists in Ethiopia, Argentina, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Iran, South Africa, Zaire, Uganda and Rwanda among others is another cause for theoretical reorientation.

THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA

Available literature on state-civil society relations in Africa points out that the historical origin of the state and civil society in Africa is fundamentally different from their origin in the West. The state and civil society in Europe developed from the disintegration of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism, which are changes in the internal social and material conditions in Europe.

In Africa, the post-colonial state and civil society were determined, not only by the internal material conditions, but also by the historical circumstances of colonial domination, all of which joined together to stall the development of both the state and civil society. In the colonial period, according to this position, Africans were not part of civil society as both the colonial state and civil society were the exclusive domain of the colonialists. As Mersha points out:

The removal of the colonial form of oppression was substituted by the continuation, in a different form of the overall imperialist domination which partly defined the relationship between the post-colonial state and civil society. The post-colonial petty bourgeoisie elements in power demobilized and depoliticised Africans and used the rhetoric of anti-nationalism, shorn of its radical contents, to consolidate their power. Instead of promoting the growth of civil society, they found it easier and better to undermine it in anticipation that it could be the breeding ground for opposition politics. Because of their external connections, the power holders developed their repressive apparatus and that enabled them to reduce the possibility for opposition politics to incubate in civil society. (1990: 16)

Musa Abutudu (1995: 7) also notes the authoritarian character of the post-colonial state in its dominance of the civil society. According to him:

This dominance, sometimes, takes on very crude and brutal forms. At other times, it is achieved through subtler devices. The state has tended to rationalize and excuse itself on the grounds that the imperatives of rapid economic development and nation building would not permit any oppositional activities of individuals and groups.

The suppression of civil society by the post-colonial state was not only political but also ideological. This prompted further comments from Mahmood Mamdani who states thus:

The formulation of nationalism as a state ideology in the 1950's and 1960's required a dual shift on one hand, a delegitimation of all democratic struggles as partial, 'sectarian' or 'tribal' while upholding the state as the only legitimate expression of the interest of the whole (the country, the nation, the people); on the other, the displacement of all internal, popularly-derived efforts towards a way forward by an externally-imposed, state-centred, technocratic search for a solution. (Mamdani, 1990: 49)

Nevertheless, civil society has, in many cases, never fully succumbed to the totalising tendencies of the African state. As Abutudu puts it:

Elements of confrontation, peaceful and violent, have continued to characterise the relationship between state and society. This is epitomized in the activities of underground political parties, periodic group revolts especially by labour and student movements and

even certain primordial groups... Since the late 1980's, however, the activities of the various groups in confrontation with the authoritarian state have become more focused, systematic and organized (1995: 7)

THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN NIGERIA

There is also a lot of literature on the relationship between the state and civil society in Nigeria. Olojede (1999) traces civil society organisations in Nigeria to the colonial era. According to her:

Initial focus of most indigenously developed civil society organizations, was the development of their communities... Many traditional civil society organizations emerged in response to the inability or unwillingness of the colonial state to provide social services to all communities. (1999: 8)

J. Barkan *et al* (1991) have documented the emergence of such civil society organisations as Otan-Ayegboju Progressive Union, Fifti Progressive Union and the Egbe Omo-Ibile-Awe. Some civil society organisations emerged with the rise of African nationalism prior to and after the Second World War to play an increasingly political role, especially ethnic-based civil society organisations such as the Ibo State Union, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, and Jamiyarr Mutanen Arewa (Coleman, 1965; Sklar, 1963).

After independence in Nigeria, each of the three regions was run by a single political party—the Northern People's Congress, (NPC) in the North, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East, and the Action Group (AG) in the West. It was quite difficult then, against the backdrop of the foisted ideology of nationalism, for civil society groups to operate independently of the party in control of that region. Groups including women, farmers, students and labour found themselves acting as party wings (Anababa, 1969; Beer, 1976; Tokunboh, 1985; Otobo; 1986). As Abutudu observes:

The end result of this situation was that in spite of the 'democratic' set up in the First Republic, civil society was not allowed to take on an autonomous character... The tendency of the dominant party in the region to co-opt all groups or suppress resisting ones, then, did not encourage the development of a dynamic civil society. (1995: 9)

The relationship between the state and civil society started changing under military rule in Nigeria. According to Abutudu:

While opposition to military rule was sometimes articulated by organisations such as those of students and individuals at various times, the state itself tries to deflate the autonomous development of civil society through direct involvement in structuring and organisation of student and labour groups (1995: 10).

Since independence, civil society organisations that have emerged either to complement or contest with the state include professional associations like the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), among others.

Others are human rights groups like the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), the Campaign for Democracy (CD), the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), primordial groups like the Northern Elders Forum, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), etc; business groups like the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), and voluntary associations. Peter Lewis *et al* (1998) documented 116 civil society organisations in Nigeria, maintaining that the list was not exhaustive and that some might not be active “because of the fluid situation in Nigeria and the effects of government repression”. (Lewis, *et al* 1998: 125).

Contests between civil society groups and the Nigerian state have been well documented. In 1968, peasant farmers in Ibadan challenged the Nigerian State when the latter imposed taxes on the cocoa farmers. This uprising, known as the Agbekoya uprising, has been studied by Wasihi Sambo (1976) and Christopher Beer *et al* (1976). The confiscation of the lands of the Bakalori inhabitants in Talata Mafara Local Government Area of Sokoto State, for an irrigation project in 1980 provoked riots. The Nigerian state perceiving in the riot a serious challenge to it from civil society used armed anti-riot policemen to suppress the riot, leading to the death of about 386 people (Usman 1982).

The Ogoni through their organisation, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), in the 1990s presented yet another example of the contest between civil society and the state. The Ogoni challenged the Nigerian state on the grounds that as an oil-producing community, the state exploited oil in its land causing environmental degradation to its territory without ameliorating it. The ensuing contest left scores dead, many wounded, many raped, farms set on fire, whole villages razed, hundreds arrested and tortured and schools burnt after some days of military expedition. Ken Saro-Wiwa, their leader, was to lose his life in the course of this contest (Ihonvbere, 1998).

The series of contests involving the Nigerian state and civil society researched into by Nigerian scholars cannot be exhausted in this work. Be that as it may, it is pertinent to note that the ongoing contest between Abuja indigenes and the Nigeria state has received scant attention from scholars in spite of the seriousness of the face-off, hence this work.

ABUJA INDIGENES AND THE NIGERIA STATE

The Land and its People

The 8, 000 square kilometres of land now known as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, were carved out of three states in the middle-belt region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The states were Niger, Kwara and Plateau States. The Abuja area was formerly part of the old pre-colonial Kingdom of Zazzau—the Southernmost part of the Kingdom of Zazzau, also known as Zaria. According to recorded history, by the end of the 18th century, the area now known as Abuja was populated by several indigenous ethnic groups. Among them were the Gwarin Genge (the most numerous), the Gwarin Yanma (Gwari of the west), the Koro, the Gade, the Ganagana, the Gwandara, the Fulani, the Hausa, the Bassa, the Igbara, the Aluchi, and the Nupe (Nak Lokoprof 331/1917).

Before the Fulani conquest of 1804, the Habe (Hausa) Zazzau dynasty used various chiefs who owed allegiance to the kings of Zazzau to look after their Southern domains and extract yearly taxes. Following the conquest, the Zazzau Kingdom moved southwards from Zaria to establish Abuja, an independent Habe (Hausa) state later known as Abuja Emirate, with a population of various ethnic groups who had previously owed allegiance to them as rulers of Zazzau (Smith, 1960; Hassan *et al*; 1946: 36).

This Habe kingdom of Abuja Emirate with the various indigenous populations as subjects survived until the arrival of the British. The British did little to alter the emirate, as it was an integral part of the indirect rule system. Abuja Emirate survived as part of the Native Authority system of local administration until 1976 when the new federal capital was created.

From the pre-colonial period through the colonial period to the creation of the FCT, all the indigenous populations were mainly farmers. They were also hunters and fishermen in addition to engaging in other economic activities like weaving, dyeing, pottery, carpentry, blacksmithing, building and roof thatching. The occupation of the original inhabitants of Abuja underscores the importance attached to land in the socio-economic life of the people. According to Ibrahim Jibril:

Land is the most important factor and the basis of economic activities in this area. It did not therefore come as a surprise to find that agriculture is the primary source of employment in the area. Because of this, land tenure here has social and political as well as economic connotations. It is governed by customary rules, laws and established codes of conduct. (1989: 5).

All these were true before the creation of the FCT in 1976. Land is still the most important factor to these indigenous communities but the laws governing its use have changed, hence the contest.

Creation of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja:

In 1975, the military government of the late General Murtala Muhammed set up a committee on the location of the federal capital headed by Justice Akinola Aguda with the following terms of reference:

1. To examine the dual role of Lagos as a state and federal capital and advise on the desirability or otherwise of the city retaining that role.
2. In the event of the committee finding that Lagos is unsuitable for such a role, to recommend which of the governments (federal or state) should move to a new capital.
3. In the event of the committee finding that the federal capital should move out of Lagos, to recommend suitable alternative locations, having regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the country (cited in Wodi, 1999: 2).

The committee came up with some recommendations, among which were:

- That Lagos was incapable of performing a dual role as a federal and state capital due to the problem of inadequate space for development commensurate with its status;

- That the city of Lagos was identified with predominantly one ethnic group and, by implication, did not provide equal access to Nigeria's great diversity of cultural groups;
- That a new capital was desirable that should be secure, ethnically neutral, centrally accessible, comfortable and healthy. In addition, it should possess adequate land and natural resources to provide a promising base for urban development (Ibid. 2-3).

Explaining the rationale for its choice of Abuja in the central area of the country, the report said:

The conceptual process was therefore premised on the desire to find a location that would not be encumbered with claims by some of the inhabitants of being native inhabitants and a traditional stool with all its implications... Every Nigerian would be rest assured that he has opportunity to live in parity with every other Nigerian, and where no Nigerian will regard either in law or in fact as a 'native foreigner'... We conceived of a place where there would be a government run by every tribe within the country and not confined to any particular part of the nation (Ibid.).

On February 3, 1976, the then Head of State, Gen. Murtala Muhammed, in his address to the nation, accepted the committee's recommendations. He stated, *inter alia*, that:

The panel on the location of the Federal Capital has recommended that the nation's capital should move out of Lagos to a Federal Territory of about 8000 square kilometres to the central part of the country. The Supreme Military Council has accepted this recommendation. The site recommended satisfied the panel's criteria of centrality, good and tolerable climate, land availability and use, adequate water supply, low population density, physical planning convenience, security and multi-access possibility. The area is not within the control of any major ethnic groups in the country... The Federal Territory will belong to all Nigerians. The local inhabitants in the area who need to be moved out of the Territory for planning purposes will be resettled outside the area in places of their choice at government expense. In order to avoid land speculation in the area, a decree is promulgated immediately to vest all land in the Federal government. (Muhammed, 1976)

Decree 6 of 1976 promulgated by the Muhammed government gave legal backing to the acceptance of the committee's recommendations, thereby creating the Federal Capital Territory. As pointed out earlier, the government undertook to resettle the indigenous population and compensate them in order to create a 'virgin land' for the federal capital of its dream. Section 6 of Decree 6 of 1976 specified the modalities for compensation thus, "In computing compensation payable under this decree, account shall be taken of any building or crops on the land acquired for the purpose of this Decree..." To implement these policies, the military government set up the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA).

The Politics of Resettlement and Compensation of Abuja Indigenes

To carry out the resettlement and compensation of Abuja indigenes as envisaged by the Aguda committee report and endorsed by the government, the latter set up a Resettlement Committee in which Niger, Kwara and Plateau States (from which the FCT was excised) and the FCDA were represented. These three states, in addition, set up committees in their states to directly implement these policies. These committees were called Committee for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (CRDP).

Professor Akin Mabogunje of the University of Ibadan was contracted to produce the demographic statistics of the FCT. The Resettlement Committee, in which the aforementioned states were represented, met in Kaduna on 20 June 1978 and evolved uniform rates for compensation.

On October 10, 1977, the federal government released some funds to the states to enable them to start preparatory work on compensation and resettlement as follows: Niger State, 4 million; Plateau State, 1.5 million; Kwara State, million (Interim Report, 1980: 6). Following the census conducted by Prof. Mabogunje, it was estimated the population to be resettled and compensated was estimated about 300, 000. The estimated cost of the exercise was put at about 1.5 billion. This revelation compelled the government to redefine the policy of compensation and resettlement in 1978. According to the circular signed by Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who succeeded Gen. Muhammed:

Due to economic, political and social implication of approach to earlier policy that all the inhabitants of the Territory would be paid compensation and be resettled in areas of their choice, there would be change of policy as follows:

- *Those who are not affected by the first phase of resettlement, but wish to move out of the Territory may do so, but such people will have no claims on the FCDA as they are not being forced to leave. This in effect means that the inhabitants not moved out during the present exercise who decide to stay will now be deemed to be citizens of the Federal Capital Territory and FCDA will soon appoint an Administrator to administer and look after their welfare.*
- *The present land area gazetted as Federal Capital Territory will remain.*
- *The site cleared for the building of the Federal Capital itself will be evacuated and resettlement of the people so evacuated can take place within or outside the Territory.*
- *The meagre funds available now should be spent more on development of infrastructures than on payment of compensation.*

By 1980, the Niger State government had resettled seven villages out of 19 in Wuse village area and all the 12 locations of Aso Koro in a new resettlement area called New Wuse. The total number resettled in New Wuse was put at 2, 622. In the Niger State area affected by the creation of the FCT, the resettlement exercise was initially meant to affect about 80, 000 inhabitants. After the change of policy, Niger State government concentrated on resettling 10, 000 people living in the Phase 1 development area of the FCT.

As at March 1980, the Plateau State government had received 319, 047.80 for the exercise. Going by the initial policy, about 3, 100 people were to be resettled. The com-

mittee estimated that the resettlement work and compensation for all Plateau people in the Federal Capital Territory would not exceed 50 million. Kwara state refunded the 1 million advanced to it for compensation and resettlement purposes following the announced change of policy.

Before the announcement of the shift in policy, which made resettlement optional, indigenous inhabitants of the territory dismissed the compensation and resettlement exercise as a massive fraud. Addressing the Senate Committee on FCT on assumption of office in 1999, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu, lent credence to this position of Abuja indigenes. According to him:

I regret to report that this compensation aspect was not carried through 100 percent. Some of them (indigenes) were not resettled back in their states... State governments were given money to resettle their respective citizens but they did not implement it (Adinnu, 1999).

The shift in policy eroded the original idea of creating a 'virgin territory' and the provisions of Decree 6 of 1976 that stated that all the inhabitants of the area would be resettled out of the area at government expense.

In pursuance of this new policy, the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1980 set up the Presidential Ad-Hoc Committee on Resettlement of the Inhabitants of the Federal Capital Territory with the following terms of reference: "to determine the number of inhabitants who wish to move out voluntarily from Federal Capital Territory." (Interim Report, 1980: 1). The committee commissioned a survey. The result of this survey was a vote of no confidence in the government's resettlement and compensation programme. It also showed the unwillingness of the indigenes to leave Abuja and make it a no-man's land as envisaged by Decree 6 of 1976.

Following the recommendations of this committee, the government through the FCDA started building resettlement schemes within the territory for inhabitants who chose to be resettled within the FCT. The Shagari government built Shagari Quarters near Dei-Dei. The Babangida government resettled the inhabitants of Maitama and Kukwaba in Kubwa. The inhabitants of the site of Usuma dam were resettled in Peyi. Other resettlement areas within the FCT are Jigo and Kwabara.

With this development, the no-man's land dream of the founding fathers of the FCT was vitiated. Resettlement of indigenes within the FCT as against outside the territory encouraged some of those earlier resettled outside the territory who felt short-changed by the paltry compensation paid to them to return to the territory (*Weekly Trust*, April 23, 1999: 16). The position of Abuja indigenes was further strengthened when on July 1, 1977, the government of Gen. Sani Abacha promulgated Decree No. 8 of 1977 which legalised traditional institutions in the FCT. The government went beyond this recognition to build palaces for these traditional rulers. In an address to the Senate Committee, the FCT Minister, Alhaji Bunu, stated thus:

It is not in any of the laws that established Abuja that we should have traditional rulers but they are there on the ground. And to strengthen their position, each of them is housed or is being housed ...in houses worth 120 million each. Contracts were awarded for that and some of them are completed. (Weekly Trust, August 13, 1999: 21)

The legalisation of traditional institutions in the FCT runs counter to the recommendations of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital adopted by the Federal Military Government in 1976. According to the recommendation:

Our conceptual development framework also considered that the desired capital city must be a place, which would not worry about having an Oba, Emir or Obi. We believed in a truly cosmopolitan place. We conceived of a place where there would be a government run by every tribe within the country and not confined to any particular part of the nation (Wodi, 1999).

The Contest

On July 14, 1999, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu, fired the first salvo while receiving the Senator representing the territory in the National Assembly, Hajia Khairat Gwadabe, who paid him a courtesy call. He told her that, "there is no indigene of Abuja because when the law establishing Abuja came into existence, it stated that all the indigenes or natives should be resettled in their states (*Weekly Trust*, July 23, 1999: 21).

This statement drew the ire of Abuja indigenes, most of whom listened to the minister's declaration on the local radio. In a swift reaction, Ayuba Jacob Ngbako, a prominent indigene, now Nigeria's High Commissioner in the Gambia, reacted thus, "We will tell him that there are indigenes in the FCT. And we want the President to call him to order.... If he cannot rebuke him, indigenes can use legal means to prove that there are indigenes in the Federal Capital Territory". (Ibid.)

While the indigenes were still fuming over the statement of the FCT Minister, the latter addressed the Senate Committee on FCT and declared the existence of traditional institutions in the territory illegal. The indigenes addressed a press conference and observed thus:

It should be noted that the chiefs appointment and deposition (FCT decree) No. 8 of 1997 did not create the traditional institution. Before the FCT was created in 1976, traditional rulers were in existence. If the military decree No. 6 of 1976 that created the Federal Capital Territory could be upheld under the present democratic dispensation, the chiefs appointment and deposition (FCT decree) No. 8 of 1997 which is drawn from the same sources can also be maintained (Community, 1st Quarter 2000: 22).

It was against the backdrop of these exchanges that two organisations sprang up to engage in a struggle with the Nigeria State. These are the Abuja Indigenes Youth Forum and Abuja Indigenes Elders' Forum.

At this point, one distinguishes *civil society in itself* and *civil society for itself*. "The issue then, is not whether or not civil society exists in Africa but how it is transformed from one level to the other, from a state of lethargy to activism". (Abutudu, 1995: 4). Before June 1999, the indigenes of the FCT were organised into various cultural associations. Notable among them is the Gbagyi Cultural Association. There were others scattered in the six area councils that make up the Federal Capital Territory. During the First and the Second Republic, rather than exist to contest with the state, most of these

groups were wings of the dominant parties in the region, namely the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the National Party of Nigeria, (NPN).

This situation changed with the formation of the Abuja Indigenes Youth forum and Abuja Indigenes Elders' Forum. The former is led by Comrade Abdullahi Adamu, Gwandara by ethnic origin. He hails from Jiwa in Abuja Municipal Area Council. The Youths forum draws membership from all six area councils in the Federal Capital Territory. This new struggle blunted the edge of party affiliations as members of the youth forum are from all the political parties that operate in the territory.

Similarly, the Abuja Indigenes Elders Forum is led by Alhaji Abubakar Wodi, an educationist and former member of the Board of Directors of the Federal Capital Development Authority. He is Gbagyi (Gwari) by ethnic origin and hails from Tika in the Kuje Area Council of the FCT. All the elected chairmen of the six area councils in the FCT attend meetings of the Forum. All of them are indigenes of the territory. Although they belong to different political parties, these area council chairmen forged a common front against the Nigeria state.

After a meeting in Kuje Area Council, the youths articulated their demands and made the same public. According to them:

All land and natural resources (including economic resources) and physical assets (including buildings and our forefathers' remains) within Abuja covering 8, 000 km² belong to the indigenes of Abuja and are basis (sic) of our survival. All the 90% indigenes that have not been compensated should henceforth not allow anybody to clear or build in his farmland without adequate compensation... The 10% people of the FCT that were not adequately compensated but resettled in Niger, Nassarawa, etc, should be compensated without delay. The people of Maitama, Kukwaba and Katampe that ... were resettled in Kubwa and Jigo resettlement town of FCT be given their certificate of occupancy... (Weekly Trust, September 3, 1999: 21-22).

The Elders' Forum also met and came up with a position paper in which they demanded reparations of 4 trillion for not merely the loss of their homeland but for the socio-cultural dislocation the development of the FCT had thrust on them. Alternatively, they asked the government to restrict its development to the city centre to be run by the FCDA while another body be set up to administer the area councils and indigenous matters.

A non-governmental organisation, Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), threw its weight behind the indigenes in this struggle. The organisation accused the government of exploiting the ignorance of the people it resettled in Garki village, New Karshi, New Karu, Gudun Kanja, New Wuse, New Bwari and Gawun Babangida. The government, CAPP said, undervalued the assets of these people and underpaid them. (*Weekly Trust*, August 18, 1999: 23).

When the campaign started getting out of hand, the federal government made some deft political moves to contain the indigenes. Two of the most prominent indigenes of the territory who were also leaders of the Abuja Indigenes Elders' Forum were appointed into political office. They were Ayuba Jacob Ngbako and Maj.-Gen. Bagudu Mamman (rtd.). The federal government appointed Ngbako ambassador and posted

him to The Gambia as Nigeria's High Commissioner, while it appointed Mamman member of the Board of Directors of the National Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission, a position considered strategic.

In some of the roundtable talks with the leaders of Abuja youths and elders, the FCT minister had also promised to appoint Abuja indigenes onto the boards of some government agencies in the FCT. According to a newspaper report, "It was learnt that some selected individuals and traditional rulers were contacted and allocated a number of 'slots' for appointment into six key parastatals of the Federal Capital Development Authority". (*Weekly Trust*, September 24, 1999: 20).

These concessions were the result of various parleys between the indigenes and the government. In one such meeting in which President Olusegun Obasanjo was present, it was unanimously adopted that there was "the need to evolve a workable formula that will address the glaring imbalances in recruitment and appointment of Abuja indigenes into public office". (*Weekly Trust*, November 4-7 1999: 26).

The truce lasted only for a short time. On 23 December 1999, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu, addressed a press conference during which he outlined government's new policy vis-à-vis the indigenes of the FCT. According to him:

Since the problem has always been that government has appropriated the land called FCT and has rendered the inhabitants "stateless" while other Nigerians lay claims to one state or the other, then the implementation strategy of this option is to call adjoining states to a conference to accept their erstwhile indigenes as still belonging to their states with all the privileges, rights, recognition and representation accruing to those states being accorded these inhabitants. Consequently, as far as the FCT is concerned, these original inhabitants become residents like all other Nigerians living in the Territory. Indeed, this option will even accord the original inhabitants a double advantage in the sense they will have a state they could call their own and at the same time have an automatic residency in the FCT where they now occupy. In consequence, the FCDA will have to urgently provide Regional and Urban Plans and Land Use of the entire FCT incorporating these original inhabitants, while efforts are then made to issue them with allocation letters to the lands they occupy. If in future, any land is required for development by the federal government, the principle of overriding public interest as is usually done in other parts of Nigeria (will apply). In that case, appropriate compensation would be paid accordingly. (Community, Quarter, 2000: 20).

On January 15, 2000, Abuja Indigenes Youths Forum also addressed a press conference challenging the new policy statement of the minister. They not only rejected it but also called for the removal of the minister. They suggested that the government set up a committee to meet with their own delegation to deliberate on these issues. They even warned that they might be forced to employ unorthodox means to protect their interests if peaceful resolution failed (Ibid: 22).

The FCT Minister acknowledged the impact of this hardening of stance by the indigenes when he told the elders' and youths' representatives in a meeting that by not allowing him to tour the six area councils in the territory, rural areas in the FCT might have lost 30 million worth of infrastructural facilities.

A legal dimension was added to the contest when the indigenes took the battle to the courts. In a suit filed by Yusuf Babantakwa, an indigene and a member of the House of Representatives from Kuje/Gwagwalada/Kwali/Abaji Federal Constituency, and four others on behalf of Abuja indigenes, they urged the Federal High Court to, according to reports:

give proper interpretation of the 1999 constitution as it affects the status of Abuja. They sought also for inclusion of the indigenes in all appointments to public offices as well as other policy directions of the Federal government...to immediately set in motion the process of resettlement and payment of prompt and adequate compensation to the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory in a way that will guarantee their equal enjoyment of their constitutional rights, including, but not limited to the right to belong in a state (Weekly Trust, October 1-7 1999: 25).

The federal government has also risen to the challenge by sending legal representations to the courts on behalf of those joined in the suit as defendants. These are the President of Nigeria, the FCT Minister, the Attorney General of the Federation and the National Assembly. The matter is still a subject of legal tussle in the Federal High Court.

While the case in court continued, the Nigeria state moved to assert its ownership of the area known as the Federal Capital Territory. On 21 July 2000, the FCT Task Force on Illegal Structures destroyed over 600 houses in Kado. The area had been allocated to a company. Reacting to the incident, the indigenous traditional chief of the area, Malam Abdullahi Yako, said, "It is unfortunate that a civilian government operates like a military government. Despite all appeals, the FCDA still went ahead and destroyed houses even without proper notice". (*Weekly Trust*, July 28-August 3, 2000: 22).

Thus, the Abuja Indigenes Youths' Forum, on 6 September 2000, mobilised its members to stop the FCDA from repeating a similar exercise in a place called Durumi. As an internal memo by the Community Action for Popular Participation captured this show of confrontation by Abuja indigenes:

The situation was intense and thousands of natives/indigenes came out en masse to fight the Abuja Environmental Protection Agency and the FCDA with dangerous weapons, which were openly carried by the demonstrators. The resistance was organised by the Abuja Indigenes Youths Forum.

It was not surprising that the federal government, in a move to pacify the indigenes, removed Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu as FCT Minister during its first cabinet reshuffle and appointed a new one. The new minister, Alhaji Mohammed Abba Gana, on assumption of office promised to carry out the resettlement exercise to its logical conclusion.

At this juncture, it should be pointed out that about 10, 000 housing units, which the ministry had completed for the exercise, were rejected by Abuja indigenes. In March 2003, the Minister donated the buildings to the police. The latter converted them into barracks for its men.

CONCLUSION

This study undertook to find out:

- Whether the Nigeria state will employ subtle forms of legitimisation to pacify Abuja indigenes or repress them into quietude as Nigeria's recent history of repression shows;
- Whether elected governments deal differently with issues of state-civil society contestations from military dictatorships or the character of the state is the same irrespective of the type of government running the state;
- Whether Abuja indigenes can extract commensurate concessions or any concessions for that matter in this contest with the Nigeria state;
- Whether Abuja indigenes will adopt violent methods in furtherance of their campaign as similar groups did in the past or not.

Following from the above study, that the Nigeria state will employ subtle forms of legitimisation to pacify Abuja indigenes and if necessary repress them into quietude is borne out by the study. This is clear from the attempts by the government to blunt the sharpness of the indigenes' campaign by appointing the vocal ones among them into political positions. When this did not stop the indigenes from their agitation, the government moved in to demolish houses of the indigenes to assert its claim to the FCT.

The study has also shown that the character of the Nigeria state vis-à-vis civil society groups is the same notwithstanding whether it is run by elected civilians or self-imposed military governments. With the election of a civilian government in 1999 after 16 years of military rule, some took it for granted that Abuja indigenes would get a better deal. This view was strongly canvassed, as it was the military government headed by Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo that created the impasse between the indigenes and the Nigeria state. The thinking is that with the election of the same Olusegun Obasanjo as a democratic President, he would be more disposed towards the resolution of the problem in favour of the indigenes. As this study has shown, the character of a peripheral capitalist formation hardly changes in spite of the half-hearted concessions it makes.

That civil society groups will under certain conditions extract concessions from the Nigeria state in contest with it also comes out clearly from this study. The appointment of Abuja indigenes into various positions in government is a concession wrested from the state by a civil society group. The undertaking by the government, although rejected by the indigenes, to grant automatic residency in the FCT to the indigenes of the territory they now occupy and give them recognition as belonging at the same time to their former states is another major concession extracted from the Nigeria state.

That civil society groups will adopt direct confrontation with the state when peaceful representations fail is also substantiated by this study. Apart from verbal exchanges with the state, which culminated in the institution of legal proceedings, the indigenes effectively prevented all the efforts of the FCT Minister, Alhaji Ibrahim Bunu, from touring the territory until he was removed from office. The confrontation between agents of the Nigeria state and Abuja indigenes when the former wanted to demolish some structures in Durumi, a suburb of the FCT, is another case in point.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The case of Abuja indigenes, who are contesting the takeover of their ancestral land without adequate compensation, is in many ways similar to the recent crisis of the Ogoni in Rivers State over the degradation of their homeland as a consequence of the exploitation of petroleum. With this in mind, it is our opinion that the government should handle the case of Abuja indigenes with utmost care. In this wise, we make the following recommendations:

1. The government should revisit the original policy on the creation of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, especially Decree 6 of 1976 with a view to harmonising various policy changes since the implementation of the decree started vis-à-vis the complaints of the indigenes. It is to be noted that the continued agitation by Abuja indigenes is predicated on the inconsistencies in government policies.
2. The creation of the Federal Capital Territory was out of the need to establish a territory that would not be dominated by any ethnic group; a territory in which all Nigerians will have a sense of belonging. The poor implementation of this aspect of the decree has led to a situation where the original inhabitants of Abuja dominate the politics of the FCT. Presently, the six chairmen of the six area councils in the FCT, though elected, are all indigenes of the territory while one of the two representatives in the House of Representatives, Yusuf Babantakwa, is also an indigene. To really make the territory a no-man's land, the government should reconsider resettling the remaining original inhabitants out of the territory with adequate compensation.

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18

(DIS)CONTENT AND PERCEIVED (IL)LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT AMONG BLACK AND WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS, 1995 - 2000)

Marlene Roefs

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF (IN) JUSTICE

Structural transformation does not necessarily change feelings, nor do feelings necessarily remain stable in the absence of structural change. (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, (2001:47)

During the apartheid era, the racial cleavage between blacks and whites in South Africa obviously did generate grievances as witnessed by the long-lasting struggle against apartheid, but will it continue to do so now the political landscape has been altered so dramatically? Alternatively, will cleavages other than the racial divide manifest to determine dissatisfaction with living conditions? Is dissatisfaction a matter of objective disadvantage or is it rather the result of a feeling of being disadvantaged compared to others? Another impetus for dissatisfaction might be that people feel that the government is not looking after their needs and that it is impossible to influence its policies and implementation.

This study focuses on the relation between perceived living conditions on the one hand and distrust of the government and perceived lack of influence on the government on the other. Of vital importance for South Africa is the question of whether the enduring existence of the racial cleavage will continue to affect the way people perceive their living conditions and how this relates to perceived legitimacy of the government in the new, inclusive democracy. In a country that is socio-culturally so heterogeneous as South Africa, any grievance defined along socio-cultural lines poses a potential political threat. As long as grievances are randomly distributed in a society, they are politically neutral. If, however, members of a group feel that their group is treated unjustly, group-based grievances will develop and such grievances become politically relevant.

This question is not only of tremendous political importance, but also of great theoretical significance. The theoretical significance lies in the opportunity to study griev-

ance formation in an extremely unequal and heterogeneous society which is experiencing fundamental socio-political change. It is a well-documented social phenomenon that differential treatment does not necessarily turn into grievances. Grievances are the result of a process of comparison as stipulated by justice theories – a well-known family of grievance theories in social psychology. Grievances may arise from perceived unfairness in the distribution of resources or opportunities, i.e. distributive justice. Distributive justice has traditionally been the subject of relative deprivation theories (for an overview see Hegtvedt and Markovsky, 1995). However, grievances may also arise from perceived unfairness of the procedures employed in the distribution process, i.e. procedural justice, which is the major subject in recent social justice theories (see Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler and Smith, 1999; Tyler and Smith, 1998).¹

According to Hegtvedt and Markovsky, “Justice exists when there is congruence between expectations for outcomes based on the normative rule and the actual outcomes. What is normative, however, depends upon perceptual, interpersonal, and situational factors. Recognition of incongruence between the rule and reality rests on similar factors. Thus, determining what is just remains a relatively subjective process” (1995: 5).

Distributive justice

A House may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut. (Karl Marx, quoted in Nagata and Crosby, 1991: 349)

Distributive justice models in social justice theory describe the antecedents and consequences of the presumed fairness of outcomes. Outcomes are used in a generic manner. In other words, outcomes include all kinds of material and non-material goods people receive in a distribution process. Distributive justice deals with the perceived fairness of outcomes. Such a “resource-based model of justice” (Tyler, 1994) forms the core of relative deprivation theory and other theories claiming that concerns about outcomes give rise to political and social unrest. Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949) introduced the concept of relative deprivation, to explain why employees in the military police in America during World War II were more satisfied with the promotion system than were employees in the air corps. Feelings of relative deprivation according to Stouffer *et al.* develop when in comparison to others one's rewards are perceived to be lagging behind.

Runciman (1966)² made the conceptual distinction between individual and group relative deprivation: egoistic and fraternalistic deprivation. Group deprivation refers to feelings that the group to which people belong is deprived. Individual deprivation occurs when people feel personally deprived. These group or personal feelings of deprivation may have implications for reactions to feelings of deprivation. Group deprivation may motivate people to seek a collective solution in order to improve the group's situation, for instance through collective protest, whereas individual deprivation may lead to individual reactions. Support for the importance of group relative deprivation for the explanation of the propensity towards collective action has been found in several experimental and field studies (Martin, Brickman and Murray, 1984; Martin, 1986; Lalonde and Silverman, 1994; Dube and Guimond, 1986; Major, 1994).

After examining attitudes towards the disadvantaged position of working women in America, Faye Crosby (1982) tried to model the development of feelings of relative deprivation. The most interesting finding in Crosby's studies was that the working women in her surveys, despite being objectively worse off than male workers, seldom compared themselves to men.

In contrast to Crosby and Stoufer *et al*, who focused on comparisons between people, Davies (1969), Gurr (1970) and Folger (1986) concentrated on people's comparisons of their own situation at different points in time. Davies and Gurr explain their contention by people's growing concern that the experienced improvements in their situation will not continue. Davies' famous J-curve hypothesis and the various types of relative deprivation that Gurr distinguished, deal with the concern that outcomes in the future will no longer meet expectations. Davies showed that revolutions are more likely to occur not after a period of prolonged absolute deprivation, but after a period of prosperity followed by a sudden downturn. In "Why men rebel" (1970), Ted Gurr distinguished three patterns of relative deprivation. The first pattern, decremental deprivation, describes the discrepancy that occurs when people's expectations remain constant but their capabilities to meet those expectations begin to diminish. The second pattern, aspirational deprivation, describes the discrepancy that occurs when people's capabilities remain constant but their expectations increase. Progressive deprivation refers to the case where an individual's capabilities increase but one's expectations are rising at an even faster rate. The paradoxical implication of these models is that improving outcomes can sometimes produce greater discontent than previously existed in a deprived group.

Folger has offered a comprehensive cognitive theory of the development of relative deprivation. Interestingly, he incorporated distributive and procedural elements in his theory. Based on Kahneman and Tversky's (1982) ideas about the simulation heuristic, he introduced the concept of referent cognitions, which refers to imaginary outcomes and procedures. According to Folger's Referent Cognitions Theory (RCT), people use imaginary outcomes – based on the comparisons people make but also on the norms and ideologies they adhere to – to evaluate their actual outcomes. Dissatisfaction might result if people feel that actual outcomes are unfavourable compared to imaginary or referent outcomes. Furthermore, Folger (1986) reasoned that an unfavourable discrepancy between actual outcomes and referent outcomes produces resentment (which is stronger than feelings of dissatisfaction) if the means by which the outcomes are produced, which he calls referent instrumentalities, are unjustifiable. Thus, people compare applied procedures to imagined procedures. The capacity of a fair procedure to mitigate dissatisfaction has been called a fair procedure effect (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove and Corkan, 1979). In addition, resentment is limited when it is likely that the situation will improve in the future. According to Folger, "anticipated favourable outcomes are mentally substituted for the currently unfavourable; for one strongly anticipates an actual escape from present injustices" (1987: 193).

Shortly after formulating his RCT, Folger extended the theory to incorporate fraternal deprivation simply by stating that a person – without experiencing resentment due to one's personal outcome – may also experience resentment if one makes cognitive references to procedural injustice affecting the group with which one identifies (1986: 47).

In sum, Folger suggests that the development of feelings of resentment entails three crucial processes:

- Individuals imagine that better outcomes could have been produced for themselves or others;
- Individuals imagine that other fairer procedures could have been used;
- Individuals deem it unlikely that better outcomes will be obtained in an acceptable period of time.

Feelings of relative deprivation are not limited to disadvantaged groups. Members of advantaged groups can feel threatened by members from rising disadvantaged groups. Vanneman and Pettigrew (1972) showed that a majority voter's opposition to minority political candidates is related to the feeling that one's own group is being unfairly surpassed and ignored. Similar social dynamics have been found in studies on opposition to affirmative action (Veilleux and Tougas, 1989) and participation in socially conservative or reactionary movements (Klandermans, 1989). The result may reflect the greater psychological impact of a loss compared to that of a missed opportunity (Crosby, 1984). Research in South Africa (Appelgryn, 1991; Appelgryn and Bornman, 1996) suggested this was indeed the case among the white respondents in their study. Appelgryn and Bornman studied feelings of deprivation among black and whites in the Gauteng area in South Africa just before the national elections in 1994 and found that whites did not feel deprived. Whites did, however, anticipate relative deprivation because of the changing socio-political situation. This "decremental" deprivation manifested on a group level but not on a personal level. The reverse was found among the black respondents, who expressed relative deprivation on a personal and on a group level. However, they expected their situation to improve in future, especially their group situation. Appelgryn and Bornman hypothesised that this might turn into "aspirational" or "progressive" deprivation in future if changes for better their situation developed too slowly to their satisfaction.

In short, the core premise of the relative deprivation theory is that feelings of deprivation are relative: people feel entitled to a better situation when they feel what "is" is not how it "ought" to be and when what "will" be is not how it "should" be. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the distribution of benefits does not exclusively relate to the actual benefits or advantages people receive. It depends on the standards and criteria they employ in judging their situation. This implies that an objective state of affairs, such as living standard, would necessarily be a better determinant of dissatisfaction with living conditions than the outcomes of the comparisons process.

Procedural justice

In addition to evaluating the fairness of outcomes, people evaluate the fairness of the procedures by which those outcomes are produced (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove and Corkan, 1979). Procedural justice, in contrast to distributive justice, does not focus on outcomes (benefits or disadvantages) but on the procedures employed in the process of distribution (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Lind

and Tyler, 1988). Thibaut and Walker (1975) were the first to formalise the idea of procedural justice as a distinct social justice concern. Procedural justice concerns seem to be particularly important in judgements of legal, political, and managerial authorities. Similarly, procedural justice considerations have been found to be central to the willingness to accept third-party decisions and to follow group rules (Tyler, 1996). Hence, like distributive justice literature, procedural justice literature deals with the formation of grievances and with reactions to perceived injustices.

Process control and group value models

Two psychological theories consider why people care about justice: the social-exchange-based resource model and an identity-based relational model, which underpin respectively the process control model (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) and the group value model (Tyler and Lind, 1992). The social-exchange-based resource model argues that people want to maximise the resources they obtain from social interactions, a goal that they believe is facilitated by following rules of distributive and procedural justice (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978). Concerns about outcomes and procedures are according to this perspective “instrumental” in achieving this goal. Within this approach Thibaut and Walker developed their control theory of procedural justice. The theory proposes that people view procedures as fair if those procedures allow them to control outcomes of exchanges in social interactions. If third parties (judges, managers and politicians) are given control over the outcomes, people want to be able to influence the decisions taken by authorities. Numerous studies have since shown that the conviction that one can influence procedures is of great importance to the perception of fairness of the final measures taken by an authority regardless of the actual consequences of the decisions for the person (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove and Corkran, 1979; Martin 1986; Lind and Tyler 1988). Perceived control over outcomes is also called the “voice effect” (Folger *et al*, 1979) or “efficacy” (Bandura, 1997; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Reis, 1986; Leventhal, 1980). Obviously, efficacy is related to other evaluations of the authorities. The estimated influence on political decision-making processes is an important element in the degree to which people feel they can trust the authorities. Leventhal (1980) and Azzi (1992) showed that this is especially the case with the prospect of a power change.

These studies show that control over outcomes, or efficacy, impacts on grievances. They suggest that if people feel they can influence governmental decisions they will be less aggrieved. Hence, feelings of relative deprivation (feelings of injustice concerning outcomes) and dissatisfaction with living conditions (evaluation of outcomes) could both be influenced by feelings of efficacy. This leads to the hypothesis that people with higher levels of efficacy will feel less deprived and in turn less dissatisfied about their living conditions than people with lower levels of efficacy.

The more recent, identity-based relational model argues that people attempt to maintain high status within groups and use perceived justice to evaluate their group status. From this perspective, concerns over procedural justice are not merely instrumental, i.e. focused on procedures which could be useful in obtaining preferred outcomes, but also relational. According to the group value model of Tyler and Lind (1992), people use justice evaluations as an indicator of the quality of their relationship to their group and

authorities (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1994). Three relational concerns are particularly relevant to communicating identity-relevant information: the neutrality of authorities; the benevolence or trustworthiness of their motives; and status recognition, i.e. interpersonal respect and dignity of interpersonal treatment (Tyler, 1989; Tyler and Lind, 1992). However, trustworthiness appears to be the most important relational factor shaping evaluations of authorities, according to Tyler and Lind. Tyler and his collaborators demonstrated that trust in authority makes it more likely that one regards authority's decisions as fair, which in turn strengthens the authority's legitimacy in the eyes of the people involved (Tyler and Caine 1981; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Lind 1992; Tyler 1989, 1994). Trust signifies a "bond" between parties, groups or individuals (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Caine 1981; Smith and Tyler, 1996).

These studies suggest that dissatisfaction with unfavourable or unfair outcomes is mitigated by fair procedures. In other words, dissatisfaction with one's living conditions and subjective disadvantage resulting from comparison processes are not solely determined by objective deprivation or by instrumental (efficacy) concerns, but also by relational (trust) concerns. Moreover, in contrast to the process control theory, which suggests that perceived influence over decision-making processes is the important factor in people's fairness judgements, Tyler and colleagues' and Barnes and Kaase's studies suggest that fairness judgements would be dependent on trust in the government rather than on perceived influence.

The process control (instrumental justice concerns) and the relational justice (relational concerns) theories argue that efficacy and trust, respectively, have a direct or "main" effect on the formation of grievances. However, recent research suggests that the relevance of instrumental and rational concerns for perceived injustice depends on identification patterns. Smith and Tyler (1996) studied how identification with authorities and the group of people that is affected by the decisions of authorities impacts on justice evaluations. Smith and Tyler wondered when justice concerns would encourage the advantaged to support policies, which redistribute economic resources and encourage the disadvantaged to willingly obey the law. They investigated attitudes among white and African American residents of the San Francisco Bay Area towards affirmative action policies and anti-discrimination laws and feelings of obligation to obey the law. Their findings suggest that if people identify with a particular advantaged or disadvantaged group, instrumental concerns are more strongly related to their political attitudes than relation concerns, but if people identify with a superordinate category that includes potential out-group members and relevant authorities, relational concerns are more strongly related to their political attitudes. In other studies, Tyler and colleagues also found evidence for the importance of superordinate identity for the impact of procedural justice evaluations on reactions to decisions taken by authorities (Lind, Huo and Tyler, 1994; Tyler, 1994). Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo (1997) argued that the absence of superordinate identity makes the relation between authorities and citizens solely instrumental – what are authorities doing for my group. Superordinate identity makes it possible for people to accept a disadvantaged position of their sub-group in the interest of the larger community.

In sum, Tyler and colleagues' studies suggest that (1) trust in authorities reduces feelings of injustice and (2) that this is more applicable to people with strong superordinate identity than to people without a strong superordinate identity.

Furthermore, Tyler and colleagues have argued that people's inferences concerning the reliability of authorities are highly important, as these inferences have implications for people's expectations of the authorities' behaviour in the future, thereby providing a degree of security as to what one can expect for times to come. According to Tyler, "The obligation to obey is based on trust in authorities. Only if people can trust authorities, rules, and institutions can they believe that their own long-term interests are served by loyalty toward the organisation. In other words, the social contract is based on expectations about how authorities will act. If authorities violate these expectations, the social contract is disrupted". (1990: 172)

Thus, trustworthiness of authorities appears to be an important factor in fairness judgements and reactions to authorities, as trust makes people feel more secure about their future (Tyler and Lind, 1992). In addition, higher levels of efficacy might also make people more secure about the future since they feel able to influence decisions that affect their lives (e.g. Thibaut and Walker, 1975). People who trust their government and/or who feel able to influence its decisions are less concerned about the measures that it will take in the future. Particularly in times of uncertainty the extent to which people feel they can trust authorities supposedly impacts on their expectations for the future; that is, on the degree of optimism or pessimism (Leventhal 1980; Tyler and Lind, 1992: 155). People trust authorities to ensure that next time their group will benefit.

In other words, procedural justice literature suggests that both trust and process control (or efficacy) are important factors in the formation of grievances and that this might be partly explained by the impact of trust and efficacy on people's future expectations. The relevance of future expectations for the development of feelings of relative deprivation was also stipulated in Folger's RCT. This raises the question: what is the relative importance of trust and efficacy for the formation of grievances, once we take future expectation into account?

METHOD

The survey data on which the study is based were collected within the "Social Movements in South Africa" (SMSA) research programme, which started in 1993 and finished in 2000. The aim of the programme was to study social movements, protest events and contention in South Africa during a period of significant socio-political transformation: 1994-2000. This study, however, focuses on black and white South Africans³ and on data that were annually collected during the period March 1995 – eleven months after the first open democratic elections – and March 2000 – nine months after the second national elections.⁴

Design

A separate sample design was adopted, with annual measurement points.⁵ A separate sample design allows one to make comparisons over time if, as was done in this study, the same selection criteria are applied in each survey and if samples are drawn in the same manner and in a comparable time period (Hart, Van Dijk, De Goede, Jansen and Teunissen, 1996).

Sampling

The population drawn from included all residents of South Africa 18 years and older.⁶ Multistage stratified cluster (probability) sampling was used to draw the respondents. In the 2000 sampling procedure the 1996 Census data were used for the stratification; in the previous samples the 1991 Census data were used. Enumerator areas and similar areas were used to form clusters. The number of respondents drawn per enumerator area varied according to the size of the population in an area (4, 8, 10 or 16). All clusters were drawn with probability proportional to size, whilst households were drawn from the final enumerator areas with equal probability.

The surveys conducted between 1995 and 1998 were stratified according to province and socio-economic regions (tribal, traditional rural areas in former homelands; squatter areas; hostels, hotels, boarding schools in urban areas- metropolitan and non-metropolitan;⁷ townships for coloureds, Indians, and Africans -metropolitan and non-metropolitan; town and cities-metropolitan and non-metropolitan; rural areas- excluding former homelands). The 1999 and 2000 rounds used province and lifestyle classification⁸ as criteria for stratification. The sampling allocation to the strata was done proportionally to the 1991 and 1996 population figures with a few exceptions: provinces were given a minimum of 120 respondents, the minimum number of Indians was fixed at 120; and an additional sub-sample was introduced for live-in domestic workers.

Since the number of black respondents was much larger than that of the whites, 2, 875 respondents from the black sample were selected randomly to equal the total number of white respondents. This was done with the complete dataset (1994-2000). After excluding 1994, this amounted to 4, 889 respondents of which 2, 556 were black and 2, 333 white. Unweighted data were used, since the standard weighting procedures employed by the HSRC differed over the survey years. Weights for the selected sample were not calculated since the purpose of the study was not to describe and present a perfect representative sample but to investigate relationships between variables. Nevertheless, the above outlined sampling procedures ensured that the black and white samples were reasonably representative.

Data collection

The surveys among random samples of the South African population were each year conducted around February/March by the same research company. Professional trainers had trained the interviewers who usually resided in or near the area where they conducted their interviews. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in people's homes

by interviewers of the same ethnic background and who spoke the language of the interviewee. The interviews were based on structured questionnaires and lasted for about 30 to 45 minutes.

Respondents

Table 1 provides an overview of the major demographic characteristics of the respondents. As a consequence of the sampling procedures, the unweighted results are not precisely representative of the black and white South African population. However, for the purpose of this study it is more important that the subsequent samples are drawn according to the same principles and thus comparable. The following data (see Table 1) show that there was some variation between the samples over time. In order to control for the variation in demographics between the race groups and for the relatively small variation over time in the demographic variables, these variables have been included in the analyses as control variables, where this was needed.

Table 1: Demographics of black and white respondents over time

Variables		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Age: mean	black	37	39	38	39	41	38
	white	43	48	48	46	48	46
Gender: % males	black	38	37	48	35	43	38
	white	46	47	45	43	48	41
Marital sts: % married/living together	black	47	49	52	49	47	41
	white	69	72	76	77	73	70
Area: % periphery	black	79	80	80	77	84	83
	white	49	52	49	52	48	47
Educational level: % low (< std 10)	black	86	86	79	79	74	71
	white	24	31	25	21	26	21
Unemployment: %	black	28	33	22	26	25	33
	white	5	5	3	5	5	3
Personal income: % <R200	black	54	53	44	46	39	51
	white	28	24	23	29	21	23
Personal income: % R200-R1599	black	40	41	50	46	49	35
	white	19	23	22	14	20	16
Personal income: % R1600>	black	7	6	6	8	12	14
	white	53	53	55	57	59	61
Living standard household: % <4	black	50	50	43	46	34	33
	white	0	0	0	0	0	0
Living standard household: % 4-6	black	46	48	48	44	58	52
	white	12	10	10	8	6	2
Living standard household: % 7>	black	4	2	9	11	9	15
	white	87	90	90	92	94	98
Total number of respondents	black	405	390	409	408	440	504
	white	426	414	416	401	339	337

The average age in years hovered around 42 years. Generally the black respondents were somewhat younger than the white respondents. The average age of the former ranged from 37 to 41 years. Among the latter age varied from 43 to 48 years.

More females (58%) than males (42%) have been interviewed, especially within the black sample. Over time the proportions differed somewhat, though this was less so among the white sample.

On average 59% were married or living together with a partner. However, the proportion of respondents who were married or living together was generally higher among the white respondents (69% to 77%) than among the black respondents (41% to 52%).

The majority of the black respondents lived in the periphery. That is, approximately 81% did not live in the Western Cape or Gauteng. The white respondents were more strongly concentrated in the centre than were black respondents. Approximately 50% of the whites lived in the periphery. Over time the proportions fluctuated somewhat, but the general pattern remained the same.

Economic differences between black and white South Africans were apparent. Education was extremely skewed, with blacks being less well educated than whites. The majority of white respondents (69% to 79%) have standard 10 (matric) or a higher educational level, whereas most black respondents (71% to 86%) have not passed standard 10. However, the proportion of black respondents with matric was somewhat higher in the last two interview rounds (74% and 71%).

On average, 17% of the respondents were unemployed. Unemployment among the black respondents hovered between 22% and 33%. Unemployment varied from 3% to 5% among the whites.

As is obvious, low education coincides with a higher chance to be unemployed. In addition, one's living standard declines with lower education. This is reflected in the huge differences between black and white in their standard of living.

More than one third (35%) of the respondents had no personal income. Just more than half (55%) earned more than R600 per month. Between 7% and 14% of the black respondents earned more than R1, 600 p/m, whereas for the white respondents this proportion varied from 53% to 61%.

Among both black and white respondents, living standard was higher in the last few interview rounds. The proportion of respondents with a standard of living higher than 7 on a scale from 1 to 8 varied from 2% to 15% among the black samples and from 87% to 98% among the white samples.

Measurements

Demographic variables include population group, language, age, gender, education and living in the centre or the periphery (residing within Gauteng/Western Cape or elsewhere, respectively). Age was for some analyses recoded into age groups (1 '<30' 2 '30-40' 3 '41-59' 4 '>59'). Education was further recoded into high and low education. Respondents without "matric", the South African equivalent of a high school, were assigned to the low educated group; others to the high-educated group. Class was assessed by means of a living standard measure developed by the HSRC, which is based on the

availability in the household of a variety of items ranging from electricity and running water to a microwave. The scores range from 1 = 'lowest living standard' to 8 = 'highest living standard.' Class groups were constructed for black and whites separately since the distribution in living standard was strongly related to race and extremely skewed, with blacks having a lower living standard than whites. Black respondents were included in the higher-class if their living standard score was 5 or higher and among the whites if they scored 8. The others fell into the black and white lower-class categories. The consequence of this skewed distribution is that lower-higher-class black and lower-higher-class white are two separate variables. Employment status was categorized into working, unemployed, and other (housewives, students, pensioners). Unemployment was further defined as all those without formal employment and who were looking for work.

Dissatisfaction

Dissatisfaction with living conditions was assessed by asking our respondents how satisfied they are with their general personal situation, the neighbourhood they live in, the educational opportunities in their communities, their standard of living, the health care available, the recognition of their human rights, and the safety in the area where they live (to be answered on a 7-point scale ranging from "extremely dissatisfied" to "extremely satisfied"). The seven questions were combined into a scale of dissatisfaction ranging from 1 "not at all aggrieved" to 7 "very much dissatisfied" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$). The same questions were asked about dissatisfaction with the living conditions of the group people identify with and about dissatisfaction with the situation of South Africans in general.

Relative deprivation

The following questions related to personal relative deprivation regarding the past (Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$): a. "If you compare your general personal situation at this moment to your situation as it was about five years ago, how do you rate it now?" (1 = 'very much better' to 7 = 'very much worse'), b. "How just do you think this is?" (1 = 'extremely just' to 7 = 'extremely unjust'). These questions were also asked with regard to how individuals rate their present situation in comparison with that of others in South Africa (Cronbach's $\alpha = .66$): a. "How does your current personal situation compare with that of other people in South Africa?" (1 = 'very much better' to 7 = 'very much worse'), b. "You just said your personal situation is.. than that of... How just do you think this is?" (1 = 'extremely just' to 7 = 'extremely unjust'). The four items were combined in one overall measure of personal deprivation (Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$). Group relative deprivation regarding the past ($\alpha = .83$) and due to comparisons with other groups (Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$) was measured in a similar way, based on the understanding that the questions related to the situation of the group with which the respondent identified. In addition, the four items were combined in one overall measure of group deprivation (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$). National relative deprivation was measured with a single question: "If you compare the present situation of people in South Africa to their situation of about five years ago, how would you rate it now?" (1 = 'very much better' to 7 = 'very much worse').

Future expectations

Future expectations were operationalised in the same manner. Expectations with respect to one's own future situation and that of the group to which one belonged concerned the comparison of a. "What do you think the situation (personal/group) will be like in about five years' time, compared to how it is now?" and b. "How just do think this is?" (Cronbach's Alpha personal future expectations =.87; Cronbach's Alpha group future expectations =.86). A high score (7) on this scale indicated that the respondent expected to be relatively deprived in the future. In other words, he/she was extremely pessimistic about the future. A low score (1) showed that the respondent did not expect to be relatively deprived at all in the future: He/she was extremely optimistic. National future expectations were measured with a single question: "If you compare the present situation of people in South Africa to their situation of about five years ago, how would you rate it now?" (1 = 'very much better' to 7 = 'very much worse').

National Identity

From 1998 onwards national identity (Cronbach's Alpha =.85) was assessed by combining the answers to two questions: "To what extent are the following statements true for you?" a. "It makes me feel proud to be called a South African" and b. "Being a South African is an important part of how I see myself" (1 = 'strongly disagree' to 5 = 'strongly agree').

Trust in government

This was assessed by a single question on a 5-point scale: How often do you trust the government to do what is right for people like you? (1 = 'never' to 5 = 'always').

Efficacy

The respondents indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: People like you can have an influence on governmental decisions (1 = 'disagree very strongly' to 5 = 'agree very strongly').

Data analysis

In the analysis of the data a fairly straightforward strategy was employed. First, the variables of interest are described in terms of their distribution over time and in most cases also across the two racial groups. Hypotheses are tested after these descriptive analyses. Unless stated otherwise the analyses are based on the whole sample (i.e. 2, 875x2 = 5, 750).

Most of the analyses are ordinary least square regression analyses. In case the dependent variable was a dichotomy, logistic regression analyses were employed (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). If interaction between variables was tested on a continuous variable, the independent variables were standardised before they were entered in the equation (see Aiken and West, 1991). Many of these interaction terms were constructed to test for changes in effects over time. A changing-parameters model developed by Firebaugh (1997) is employed to analyse changes over time. This model tests for difference in effects of variables at two points in time, for instance, for differences in racial effects in year x and year y. This is done by means of including an interaction term of the

dummy variable (time) with the independent variable (e.g. race) for which one tests the changing parameter between year x and year y. In most cases this type of analysis was employed to test for differences in effects between 1995 and 2000.

Due to the racial inequality and segmentation in South Africa one typically finds “abnormal” distributions. For this reason, originally continuous variables were sometimes dichotomised and logistic regression analysis was employed. In all cases, analyses have been conducted within the racial groups as well, though this is only reported where it seemed relevant.

FINDINGS

The results of the analysis pertaining to discontent are described first. This is followed by a short analysis of trends in national identity, after which the relation between discontent and perceived legitimacy of government is discussed.

The Formation of Grievances

In our study, grievances have been defined as feelings of dissatisfaction with important aspects of people’s living conditions, such as housing, living standard, income, health care, human rights, safety and education. A composite score on questions about satisfaction with these living conditions, as people experience them personally, measured their level of personal grievances. In addition we asked people about dissatisfaction with the living conditions of the group they identify with and about dissatisfaction with the situation of South Africans in general. The latter two were measured with one question each.⁹

As is shown in Figure 1, in the last interview round our respondents were least dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction with personal living conditions had gradually increased until 1998. After this year, people seem to have become more satisfied. In order to test whether grievances were related to objective inequality in living conditions, several regression analyses were conducted.




Figure 1: Means of dissatisfaction with personal living conditions

Model 1 in Table 2 reveals that indeed dissatisfaction with personal living conditions was much higher among people who had a relatively low standard of living than among

people whose standard of living was relatively high. Model 1 also reveals that this effect was not strongly affected by variations in dissatisfaction associated with the other factors included, such as education or living in the centre or periphery.

Table 2: Regression analysis of dissatisfaction with personal living conditions

	R		Model 1		Model 2			
			B ^a	(s.e.) ^b	B	(s.e.)		
Year	-0.04	**	-0.02	*	(0.01)	-0.02	**	(0.01)
Gender	0.01		0.00		(0.03)	-0.01		(0.03)
Age	-0.05	**	-0.01		(0.01)	0.01		(0.01)
Centre-periphery (per)	0.14	***	0.03		(0.03)	0.03		(0.03)
Educational level	-0.22	***	-0.02		(0.01)	0.00		(0.02)
Living standard	-0.32	***	-0.13	***	(0.01)	-0.10	***	(0.01)
Year x gender	-0.02		-0.02		(0.01)	-0.01		(0.01)
Year x age	0.03		0.01		(0.01)	0.01		(0.01)
Year x centre-per.	0.00		0.02		(0.02)	0.02		(0.02)
Year x education	0.07	***	0.03	***	(0.01)	0.02	**	(0.01)
Year x living std.	0.05	**	0.00		(0.00)	-0.02	***	(0.01)
(Constant)			3.88					
Racec	0.29	***				0.21	***	(0.04)
Year x race	-0.09	***				-0.13	***	(0.02)
(Constant)						3.89		
Adjusted R2				0.11			0.12	
F change				54.297	***		50.382	***
df1 df2			2	4794		11	4792	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b s.e. = standard error

^c Race: dummy with black = 1 and white = 0.

As is shown in Model 2, in addition to class effects and changes over time, race and the interaction between race and year were significant. This means that the blacks were more dissatisfied over their personal situation than were whites. However the time interaction points to the fact that these racial differences varied over time.

Figure 2 depicts these changes over time. Racial differences had become smaller until 1999, after which the racial disparity became larger again. In 1997 and 1999 the gap was somewhat less pronounced than in the other years. Furthermore, among black respondents dissatisfaction had on average decreased, whereas among whites it had increased and began to decrease significantly between 1999 and 2000. Thus for black respondents dissatisfaction with personal living conditions had generally decreased.




Figure 2: Means of dissatisfaction with personal living conditions by race

It should be noticed that dissatisfaction with personal living conditions did not follow a strict linear trend within the white sample. A curve estimation test revealed that for the white sample a quadratic model best fitted the data. Therefore, I also conducted analyses for the two racial groups separately: one linear for the black sample and a quadratic for the white sample. The independent variables were the same as in Table 2, with the exception that race and race by time were excluded from the equation and that for the white sample the quadratic term for time was added to the model.

The results for the two groups did differ in interesting and understandable ways, though the effect of living standard was the same: the lower people's standard of living, the more dissatisfied they were. The adjusted R2 for whites was 0.08 and for blacks 0.05. Black respondents were more dissatisfied about their personal living conditions if they were female, whereas white men were more dissatisfied than were white women. For whites educational level also played a significant role. Higher educated whites were less dissatisfied than were lower educated whites. A small age effect was also found, which suggests that white young adults were generally less dissatisfied than middle-aged and elderly people.

Dissatisfaction with living conditions of the group people identified with followed different trends over time for the black and white respondents (Figure 3).

In 1995, dissatisfaction with group living conditions was lower among whites than among blacks. However, this was reversed in the following years until 2000 when the groups showed similar levels of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction increased among the white respondents after 1995 and decreased again after 1997. Among blacks dissatisfaction decreased after 1995, slightly increased from 1996 to 1998 and then decreased again somewhat.




Figure 3: Means of dissatisfaction with group living conditions by race

An overall regression analysis of the effects of time, race and the other demographic variables revealed that racial differences best explained variation in dissatisfaction with the group situation: whites were more dissatisfied than were blacks. Furthermore, on average dissatisfaction had decreased somewhat and those with a higher standard of living were slightly less dissatisfied than were respondents with a lower standard of living.

However, as was the case with dissatisfaction with one's personal situation, the strong curvilinear trend among the whites and the variations over time among the blacks complicated a simple linear analysis. Therefore analyses were conducted for the groups separately. A quadratic curve best fitted the development among whites; whereas a linear trend best described the over time changes among the blacks. The results of the two regression analyses of dissatisfaction with living conditions are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Regression analysis of dissatisfaction with group living conditions

	Black				White			
	R	B ^a	(s.e.)	b	R	B	(s.e.)	
Year	-0.09	-0.06	***	(0.02)	-0.19	-0.00		(0.02)
Year ²					-0.03	-0.09	***	(0.01)
Gender	0.01	0.05		(0.05)	-0.06	-0.14	*	(0.06)
Age	-0.02	-0.02		(0.03)	0.03	0.02		(0.03)
Centre-periphery	0.03	0.04		(0.07)	-0.04	-0.13	*	(0.06)
Educational level	-0.02	0.03		(0.03)	-0.00	0.00		(0.04)
Living standard	-0.08	-0.06	**	(0.02)	-0.07	-0.08		(0.04)
Year x gender	-0.02	-0.04		(0.03)	-0.03	-0.03		(0.03)
Year x age	0.02	0.02		(0.02)	0.00	0.01		(0.02)
Year x centre-per.	0.01	0.05		(0.04)	-0.03	-0.05		(0.03)
Year x education	0.01	0.03		(0.02)	0.00	0.00		(0.02)
Year x living std.	-0.04	-0.02	*	(0.01)	-0.08	-0.04		(0.03)
(Constant)		3.49				4.03		

Adjusted R ²	0.01			0.04	
F	4.00		***	9.05	
Df1 df2	11	2518		12	2261

p* <.05; *p* <.01; ****p* <.001.
a B = unstandardised beta coefficient
b s.e. = standard error

Although the results seem very similar to those with regard to dissatisfaction about one’s personal situation, important differences surfaced. First, the models explained little variance. This means that dissatisfaction over group living conditions was not strongly and systematically related to the demographic factors considered here. Secondly, living standard only played a role among blacks: the better off displayed less dissatisfaction than did those who were worse off.

Dissatisfaction with the situation of South Africans in general was higher among white respondents than among black respondents (see Figure 4).




Figure 4: Means of dissatisfaction with national living conditions by race

Curve estimation revealed that for both black and whites a model with a quadratic time term best fitted the data. An overall regression analysis based on this quadratic model revealed that racial differences best explained variation in dissatisfaction with the national situation. That is whites were more dissatisfied. Furthermore, higher educated and those with a lower living standard were more dissatisfied than were lower educated and those with a higher standard of living.

As the above results pertaining to personal, group and national grievances suggest, black respondents showed higher levels of dissatisfaction with personal living conditions (*M* = 4.12, *sd* =.91) than with group (*M* = 3.49, *sd* = 1.30) or national living conditions (*M* = 3.87, *sd* =1.32). Paired sample *t*-test revealed that dissatisfaction with one’s personal situation was higher than dissatisfaction with the group or the national situation (all *p* <.001). Whites on the other hand, were on average more dissatisfied with the

national situation ($M = 4.69$, $sd = 1.05$) and group conditions ($M = 3.77$, $sd = .84$) than with their personal conditions ($M = 3.60$, $sd = 1.34$; $p < .001$).

Regression analyses using a quadratic model for each race group showed that higher educated blacks were more dissatisfied than lower educated and that white respondents with a lower standard of living experienced higher levels of dissatisfaction than did whites who were relatively better off (see Table 4). Furthermore, younger whites were somewhat less negative about the national situation than were older and elderly white respondents.

Table 4: Regression analysis of dissatisfaction with general situation in SA

	Black			White			
	R	B ^a	(s.e.)	b	R	B	(s.e.)
Year	0.02	0.01	(0.02)		0.04	0.04	*** (0.01)
Year ²	-0.01	0.00	(0.01)		-0.11	-0.04	** (0.01)
Gender	0.02	0.05	(0.05)		-0.03	-0.04	(0.04)
Age	-0.05	-0.02	(0.03)		0.07	0.06	** (0.02)
Centre-periphery	0.04	0.11	(0.07)		0.03	0.04	(0.04)
Educational level	0.06	0.09	** (0.03)		0.01	0.04	(0.02)
Living standard	-0.01	-0.03	(0.02)		-0.08	-0.12	*** (0.02)
Year x gender	-0.01	-0.02	(0.03)		0.00	0.01	(0.02)
Year x age	0.03	0.03	(0.02)		0.02	0.00	(0.01)
Year x centre-per.	0.02	0.01	(0.04)		0.04	0.05	(0.03)
Year x education	-0.01	0.01	(0.02)		-0.03	-0.02	(0.01)
Year x living std.	-0.03	-0.02	(0.01)		-0.03	-0.01	(0.01)
(Constant)		3.88					
Adjusted R ²			0.01				0.02
F change			2.06	*			5.33 ***
df1 df2			12 2496				12 2232

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b s.e. = standard error

Overall, these findings demonstrate that people who are objectively disadvantaged show higher levels of dissatisfaction with their living conditions than people who are objectively advantaged. Obviously, this does not come as a surprise. Interestingly, black respondents were more dissatisfied with their personal situation than were whites after controlling for objective inequality, whereas white respondents were more dissatisfied about the situation of people they identified with and about the situation of South Africans in general. In addition, the R squares became smaller the more inclusive the group is. That is, one's objective personal situation is more important for dissatisfaction with one's personal situation than for dissatisfaction with one's group or the national situation. Social psychology suggests that these racial differences in satisfaction with

conditions on various levels relate to the way in which people compare their situation. As was argued, dissatisfaction is partly the result of a process of judging one's situation by applying comparison dimensions and standards.

Relative Deprivation

Based on theories of relative deprivation, I hypothesised that net of the impact of objective conditions, comparison will add to the process of grievance formation. The question is, however, how comparisons relate to grievances. In the process of comparing one's situation, one may apply social comparisons (i.e. using other people as comparison standard), but also intrapersonal or intragroup comparisons (i.e. comparisons with past conditions). Folger's Referent Cognitions Theory points to a third dimension or second type of intrapersonal or -group comparisons, namely expectations of amelioration in the future. If people believe their situation may improve in the foreseeable future, feelings of deprivation will not develop. In order to investigate whether social comparison was related to higher or lower levels of dissatisfaction, we asked people to apply these various comparison dimensions.

Dimensions of comparison in relative deprivation

Respondents compared their current (individual and group) situation with others (individuals or groups) with the situation as it was five years back and with what they thought their situation would be in five years time. With regard to the national situation, we asked respondents to compare the current national situation with that of the past and their projected views on the future.

Overall, the findings presented in Figure 5a through 5f suggest that on average white respondents were more negative about their situation than were blacks. However, a deviating pattern emerged in levels of deprivation regarding one's personal situation compared to that of others (Figure 5a). After an initial increase in feelings of deprivation regarding one's personal situation among the white respondents and a decrease among the black respondents, the racial difference widened, with black respondents being more negative than whites. When asked to compare their personal situation with that of others, blacks felt that their situation was equal or slightly worse. This pattern was relatively stable after 1996. White respondents, in contrast, generally felt that their personal situation was somewhat better than that of others. Feelings of deprivation first, increased somewhat but then declined again between 1999 and 2000.




Figure 5a: Feelings of personal deprivation:
Self/other comparison




Figure 5d: Feelings of group deprivation
Group/other groups comparison




Figure 5b: Feelings of personal deprivation:
Self/past comparison




Figure 5e: Feelings of group deprivation:
Group/past comparison




Figure 5c: Feelings of personal deprivation:
Self/future comparison




Figure 5f: Feelings of group deprivation:
Group/future comparison

The same changes over time emerged with regard to comparison of the present with the past. However, here and with the other types of comparisons presented in Figure 5b through 5f, white respondents showed on average higher levels of deprivation than did blacks. When asked to compare their current situation with that of five years ago, black respondents believed that little had changed. Among white respondents the number of respondents who thought their situation had worsened was somewhat larger than

that among blacks. However, when asked about their expectation of the future, racial disparities considerably increased. Optimism prevailed among blacks and pessimism among whites. Until 1998, both groups become more pessimistic about the future, with 1998 apparently being a turning point. From then on, respondents became more positive. Especially among whites, the decreases in negative perceptions, which set in after 1998, were relatively steep between 1999 and 2000.

Feelings of deprivation regarding the situation of one's group were generally higher in 1998 than in the other rounds. During this period of time, discontent seems to have accumulated, as the data presented on protest and dissatisfaction suggested as well. Feelings of deprivation generally lessened after 1998. The decrease was steeper among whites, which resulted in a narrower gap between the race groups. More specifically, feelings of deprivation resulting from intergroup comparisons had increased between 1996 and 1998 and decreased after 1998. Interestingly, blacks felt that their group situation was somewhat better or the same as that of other groups. Whites, in contrast, on average believed that the situation of the group they identified with had become worse than that of other groups in South Africa. This racial gap was more pronounced with regard to intragroup comparisons (comparisons of one's group situation to the past or the future). In the same vein, whites expected that their situation would deteriorate in the future, whereas blacks expected the opposite to happen.

At the national level, comparisons with the past and the future were assessed. The results were similar to that at the group level, though more pronounced. Evaluations of the situation of South Africans in general compared with that of five years ago and with that of five years from then were much more negative among whites than among blacks (see Figure 6a and b).




Figure 6a: National deprivation: South Africans compared to past




Figure 6b: National deprivation: South Africans compared to future

Overall four trends can be distinguished. First, comparisons with abstract standards resulted in relatively large racial differences in feelings of relative deprivation. Especially comparisons of the national situation and comparisons of the present with the future resulted in significant disparities between whites and blacks, the latter being more optimistic than the former. This relates to the second point, namely that white respond-

ents were on average more negative about their situation than were blacks, except for their personal situation. The black respondents seem to have reasoned that “Personally I am worse off than other people in South Africa, but the group I feel close to is better off than other groups in the country.” The whites seem to have espoused the opposite view, namely that “Personally I am better off, but my group is worse off” (see also Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 2001: 66). Thirdly, racial disparities had become larger after 1995 and narrowed again in 2000. Finally, in 1998, respondents showed relatively high levels of relative deprivation.

The significance of racial disparities was confirmed by regression analyses for each type of deprivation.¹⁰ The analyses were straightforward and similar to the analyses of grievances presented before. Therefore, I will not report them here in detail. Except for feelings of personal deprivation resulting from interpersonal comparisons, which were most strongly related to variation in living standard, all other types of relative deprivation were most strongly related to racial differences. Disparities in class formed another significant explanation for variation in feelings of relative deprivation, with respondents with a lower standard of living feeling most deprived.

Interestingly, with regard to (personal, group and national) comparisons with the past and the future, significant differences between younger and older respondents were evident. Younger respondents displayed less strong feelings of deprivation than did older respondents. This was the case among black and white respondents. However, past and future comparisons were less negative among younger white respondents, whereas among blacks the age difference mainly applied to future expectations. In addition, group future expectations among white women were less negative than among white men. Comparisons of the national situation were more negative within the periphery than within the centre. Interestingly, among black respondents within the periphery future expectation were more negative, whereas among whites living in the periphery comparisons with the past were more negative.

Grievances and relative deprivation

The following analyses show that social comparisons related to grievances. Indeed, as was anticipated, the outcomes of social comparison processes accounted for a significant proportion of the variation in grievances. Comparisons of one's personal situation (with others, the past and the future) contributed significantly to the explained variance in dissatisfaction with one's personal situation. In the same vein, group comparisons and national comparisons related to dissatisfaction with the group and national situation, respectively. Table 5 presents the proportion of variance explained by Model a, which is similar to the models presented above and that of Model b, which in addition to the independent variables in Model a, includes the outcomes of comparisons on the three dimensions (others, past and future).

Model b explained almost 39% of the variation in dissatisfaction on the various levels. Comparisons with others were particularly important for explaining differences in dissatisfaction with one's personal situation ($B = 0.32$). Comparisons of the situation of the group of people one identified with to that of other groups and expectations for the

future were important in explaining dissatisfaction with the group situation ($B = 0.55$, $B = 0.17$, respectively). Dissatisfaction with the situation of South Africans in general was most strongly related to comparisons with the past.

Table 5: Explained variances in dissatisfaction and betas for the outcomes of comparisons

	Personal situation			Dissatisfaction with: Situation of group people identify with a			Situation of South Africans in generala		
Model a									
Adjusted R2	0.12	***		0.03	***		0.12	***	
F and df1, df2	50.19	13	4614	10.41	14	4229	45.78	14	4413
Model b									
Adjusted R2	0.39	***		0.39	***		0.39	***	
F and df1, df2	182.28	16	4611	158.31	17	4226	180.73	16	4411
Bb and s.e.c: Others	0.32	***	(0.01)	0.55	***	(0.02)			
Past	0.10	***	(0.01)	0.05	**	(0.02)	0.34	***	(0.01)
Future	0.12	***	(0.01)	0.17	***	(0.02)	0.24	***	(0.01)

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

a These regression models also included time2

b B = unstandardised beta coefficient

c s.e. = standard error

These findings confirm the social comparison literature, where it is argued that inter-personal comparison has more impact on people's assessment of their situation than intrapersonal comparison (Hegtveldt and Markovsky, 1995).

Further analyses revealed that once the subjective feelings of deprivation were included in the regression equation, the objective characteristic added R^2 change = .07 for dissatisfaction with one's personal situation, R^2 change = .02 for dissatisfaction with the group situation and R^2 change = .01 for dissatisfaction with the situation of South Africans in general. This suggests that subjective evaluations play a more important role in evaluations of the group or the national situation than in evaluations of one's personal living conditions. In other words, the more inclusive was the living situation to be evaluated, the weaker was the impact of objective disadvantage and the stronger the impact of subjective disadvantage. This is conceivable, since perceptions of one's group situation or the national situation are further removed from one's personal experience than are perceptions of one's personal situation.

Expectations for the future had an increasingly strong effect on dissatisfaction as the situation became more inclusive. Regression analyses of dissatisfaction on national level for each year revealed that the beta coefficient of future expectations had increased from $B = .17$ in 1995 to $B = .24$ in 1996, and to $B = .31$ in 2000. A test for the differences in coefficients in 1995 and in 2000—the changing parameters model - revealed that the

betas significantly differed from each other ($p > .001$). Thus, in addition to feelings of deprivation regarding the past, dissatisfaction with living conditions in South Africa was increasingly linked to what respondents expected to happen in future.

In the above analysis, future expectations are treated as main effects, and as such they are regarded as independent direct effects on dissatisfaction. However, as Folger suggests in his Referent Cognitions Theory future expectations could also be conceived of as moderators of the relation between dissatisfaction and outcomes of comparisons with the past or with other people. The reasoning is simple: feelings of relative deprivation resulting from comparisons with others who are better off might be levelled off by the perception that one's situation might improve. In the same manner, dissatisfaction resulting from uncomfortable comparisons with the past might render insignificant or bearable if one expects in future things to improve.

Overall, the results pertaining to interactions between future expectations and comparisons with others and the past pointed to weak and questionable, though in some cases statistically significant, effects. Clearly, the future, past and social comparisons each had a strong independent main effect on dissatisfaction and unreliable interaction effects only marginally contributed to the explained variance. The suggestion elicited by Folger's Referent Cognitions Theory that future expectations moderate the relation between dissatisfaction and outcomes of comparison processes could neither be confirmed nor refuted by our data.

Perceptions of government and discontent

Trust in government constitutes an essential precondition for a legitimate government (Barnes and Kaase (1979). Trust as Tyler and his colleagues have argued (Tyler and Lind, 1992) plays an important role in the development of feelings of procedural justice. According to the group-value model developed by Lind and Tyler, if they trust authorities to do their job in a correct and fair manner, people will be more likely to perceive their outcomes as fair, more easily bear hardship and accept decisions, which may not be advantageous to them (at least not in the short run). In other words, the outcomes people receive, i.e. their living conditions, job opportunities, education, health service and the like, are not always enough to evoke feelings of (in)justice if people trust the authorities to govern in fair manner. As Tyler *et al.* argue, relational concerns (e.g. trustworthiness) play a very important role as well. Here I will analyse the relation between trust on the one hand and feelings of relative deprivation and dissatisfaction over living conditions on the other (see Figure 7).

The conviction that people can exert influence on governmental decisions is by some authors included in the concept of procedures (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Reis, 1986; Leventhal, 1980). Thibaut and Walker's Process Control Theory proposes that people view procedures as fair if those procedures allow them to control outcomes of exchanges in social interactions. If third parties are given control over the outcomes (judges, managers, politicians), people want to be able to influence the decisions taken by authorities. However, in this study perceived influence is conceived as a form of efficacy, i.e. the feeling that one is able to influence decision-making processes (Reis, 1986; Bandura, 1997).

Trust and efficacy are in all likelihood related, although the two concepts might very well relate to different dynamics.

Expectations for the future might partly explain why people link trust and efficacy to feelings of deprivation. Tyler (1994) has argued that trust in the authorities and perceived control over their decisions is commonly related to peoples' expectations of the future. Following this reasoning, it was hypothesised that the relation between perceptions of the government and relative deprivation thus might be (partly) explained by the role government plays in shaping future expectations (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Potential relations between perceptions of government, discontent and identification with the government

The following sections deal with the complex relation between grievances, perceptions of government and feelings of deprivation. As was shown above, grievances over living conditions are partly explained by feelings of deprivation, which as will be argued, are partly shaped by perceptions of the government. However, irrespective of objective disadvantage, grievances over living conditions and feelings of relative deprivation will in all likelihood intensify negative evaluations of the government – perceived lack of efficacy and distrust – as it is the authority in control of the distribution of all kinds of assets in a society.

Trust and efficacy

The mean of 2.6 (std = 1.16) on the five-point scale of trust in government clearly indicates that the newly elected authorities did not enjoy considerable broad-based trust among the respondents.¹¹ Trust declined until 1998 after which it increased again in 1999, just before the elections (see Figure 8).

Although we found some fluctuations, the level of trust was quite stable over time. The same pattern emerged with regard to efficacy vis-à-vis government. The mean on the seven-point scale was 3.7 (std. = 1.37).




Figure 8: Trust in government (scores from 1 to 5) and efficacy (scores from 1 to 7)

The graph suggest that, as one would expect, trust in the government and efficacy were positively related (Pearson's $r = 0.44$). The correlation is significant and reasonably strong, with trust explaining 19% of the variation in efficacy or visa versa. Moreover, this correlation was fairly stable over time (respectively, 0.42; 0.46; 0.41; 0.35; 0.50; and 0.43 in 1995 through 2000), which suggests that the two concepts are indeed related.

In the following paragraphs I will analyse to what extent trust in government and efficacy could be explained by demographic characteristics and support for the ANC. The latter factor was included, since I expected that support for the ANC would be an important factor in explaining variation in trust and efficacy. ANC support could be treated as an indicator of identification with the incumbent government.

Regression analysis showed that black respondents trusted the government more and exhibited higher levels of efficacy than did white respondents (see Table 6 and Table 7). Over time trust and efficacy had somewhat declined as the negative sign for the beta-coefficient for year indicates. The racial disparities in trust and efficacy had not changed significantly over time as the insignificant beta-coefficients for the interaction between year and race in Model 1 revealed.

Table 6: Regression analysis of trust in government

	R		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
			B ^a		(s.e.) ^b	B		(s.e.)	B		(s.e.)
Race ^c	0.37	***	0.87	***	(0.03)	0.96	***	(0.05)	0.49	***	(0.06)
Year	-0.01		-0.03	**	(0.01)	-0.03	***	(0.01)	-0.03	**	(0.01)
Year ²	0.13	***	0.05	***	(0.01)	0.05	***	(0.01)	0.05	***	(0.01)
Yr x race	0.00		-0.02		(0.02)	-0.01		(0.03)	-0.01		(0.04)
Gender	0.04	*				0.05		(0.03)	0.04		(0.03)
Age	-0.10	***				-0.01		(0.02)	0.00		(0.02)
Cen-per.	0.10	***				-0.03		(0.04)	-0.04		(0.04)
Education	-0.21	***				-0.01		(0.02)	0.00		(0.02)
Liv. st.	-0.27	***				0.03	*	(0.01)	0.03	*	(0.01)

Yr x gender	-0.03		-0.03	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)
Yr x age	0.02		0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Yr x cen-per	-0.01		-0.05	*	(0.02)	-0.05 * (0.02)
Yr x educat.	0.01		-0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Yr x liv. st.	0.02		0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
ANC	0.42	***			0.70	*** (0.05)
Year x ANC	0.02				0.02	(0.03)
(Const)		1.99	(0.03)	1.95	(0.04)	2.21 (0.04)
Adj. R2		0.14		0.14		0.19
F model		212.55	***	62.22	***	72.72 ***
Df1 df2		4 4633		14 4623		16 4621

*p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.
^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient
^b s.e. = standard error
^c Race: dummy with black =1 and white =0.

Support for the ANC and standard of living contributed significantly to the explanation of trust independently from race. These factors remained significant over the course of our research. As one would expect, respondents who would vote for the ANC if elections were held trusted the government more than did those who would not vote for the ANC. Obviously, support for the leading party played a stronger role among the blacks, since among whites support for the ANC was limited. The following graph (Figure 9) shows the gap among the black samples in trust in government between ANC supporters and those respondents who did not indicate they would vote ANC.




Figure 9: Trust in government by ANC support (black respondents only)

Trust was also higher among respondents who had a relatively high standard of living. In other words, after controlling for racial and political differences, lower-class respondents were less likely to trust the government than were those from higher-class. Within the white samples, higher educated and those on a higher standard of living showed higher levels of trust than did lower educated and lower-class respondents. Among the blacks no such differences were found.

As is shown in Table 7 analyses of efficacy revealed very much the same results as with trust in government, although less variance could be explained (Adjusted R² = 0.12. $p = <.001$ versus 0.19 in Table 3.5) and the beta-coefficient for the ANC support was less high than that for race.

Table 7: Regression analysis of efficacy

			Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	r		B ^a		(s.e.) ^b	B		(s.e.)	B		(s.e.)
Race ^c	0, 29	***	0.82	***	(0.04)	1.19	***	(0.06)	0.94	***	(0.07)
Year	-0, 07	***	-0.07	***	(0.01)	-0.09	***	(0.01)	-0.09	***	(0.01)
Year ²	0.10	***	0.05	***	(0.01)	0.05	***	(0.01)	0.04	***	(0.01)
Yr x race	0.00		-0.01		(0.02)	-0.01		(0.04)	-0.02		(0.04)
Gender	-0.02					-0.08	*	(0.04)	-0.08	*	(0.04)
Age	-0.11	***				-0.02		(0.02)	-0.01		(0.02)
Cen-per	0.08	***				0.02		(0.04)	0.01		(0.04)
Education	-0.10	***				0.06	**	(0.02)	0.07	**	(0.02)
Liv.st.	-0.17	***				0.09	***	(0.02)	0.08	***	(0.02)
Yr x gender	-0.01					-0.01		(0.02)	0.00		(0.02)
Yr x age	0.00					0.01		(0.01)	0.01		(0.01)
Yr x cen-per	-0.02					-0.05	*	(0.03)	-0.05	*	(0.02)
Yr x educat.	0.04	**				0.01		(0.01)	0.02		(0.01)
Yr x liv. st.	0.03	*				0.02		(0.01)	0.00		(0.01)
ANC	0.28	***							0.37	***	(0.05)
Year x ANC	0.01								0.05		(0.03)
(Const)			3.08	***	(0.03)	2.90	***	(0.04)	2.53	***	(0.07)
Adj. R ²			0.10			0.12			0.12		
F model			170.16	***		46.37	***		44.55	***	
df1 df2			4	4849		14	4639		16	4837	

* $p <.05$; ** $p <.01$; *** $p <.001$.

^a B = unstandardised beta coefficient

^b s.e. = standard error

^c Race: dummy with black =1 and white =0.

With regard to trust, the beta-coefficient for ANC support was higher than that for race. Over time efficacy had decreased among our respondents. Again, racial differences and support for the ANC were the main factors. Black respondents and ANC-supporters were more likely to believe that they could exert influence on the government than did others.

The graph in Figure 10 shows that indeed respondents who said that they would vote for the leading party were more likely to believe that they could influence the government than did respondents who had not indicated that they would vote for the ANC. In addition, men, higher educated and those within the higher-classes scored relatively higher on efficacy.

Regression analysis within the black samples and within the white samples separately revealed that standard of living played a role in both groups: those within the higher-class were more likely to believe that they could influence governmental decisions than did lower-class respondents. Among the black samples, higher education also contributed to more efficacy. Within the white samples, on the other hand, age played a more prominent role, with the older respondents perceiving less influence than did the younger. Furthermore, efficacy decreased between 1995 and 1998 among black and white respondents. On the eve of the second national elections, efficacy increased again and remained at that level in 2000.

In sum, after an initial decrease in trust and efficacy, perceptions of the government improved again in 1999, just before the national elections, although they did not recover to the levels found before 1998. Trust in government and efficacy were strongly determined by race and support for the leading party in government: the ANC. Black respondents and ANC supporters were much more likely to trust the government and to believe that they could influence governmental decision-making processes than did white respondents and those who had not indicated that they would vote for the ANC. The relation between trust and ANC-support was stronger than that between efficacy and ANC-support. Trust more strongly varied according to ANC support than did efficacy. Efficacy, on the other hand, was strongly related to race. Clearly, whites felt that it was difficult for them to influence governmental decisions.




Figure 10: Efficacy by ANC support (black respondents only)

Future expectations and trust and efficacy

Optimism and pessimism about one's personal, group or the national situation was partly dependent on how respondents perceived the government. Pearson correlations between the three levels of future expectations and trust and efficacy were fairly stable over time and all three types of comparisons with the future correlated significantly with trust in the government and efficacy. The strength of the correlations for personal, group and national evaluations were fairly equal, though somewhat stronger for national evaluations.

Table 8 shows the average correlations for the three levels as well as for a composite measure of future expectations in which the levels are combined.¹² This composite measure of future expectations will also be used in the remainder of this section.

Table 8: Pearson correlations a of trust and efficacy with future expectations

Perceptions of the future:	Trust in government			Efficacy		
	Pearson r		N	Pearson r		N
Individual future situation	-0.40	***	4510	-0.30	***	4712
Group future situation	-0.41	***	4239	-0.30	***	4410
National future situation	-0.47	***	4298	-0.35	***	4470
Future Expectations	-0.49	***	4010	-0.36	***	4154

*p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.

^a Controlled for race, gender, age group, centre-periphery, education, living standard and support for the ANC.

The correlations reveal that the more respondents trusted the government and thought that they were able to exert influence on governmental decisions; the more optimistic they were about the future. Future expectations were some what more strongly related to trust than to efficacy. Since trust and efficacy are correlated, I also performed partial correlational analyses between future expectation and perceptions of government controlling for either trust or efficacy and the demographic variables (see Table 3.8). These partial correlations enable one to distinguish between the belief that government is trustworthy irrespective of whether one feels able to influence its decision-making and independently of whether one trusts the government.

Table 9: Partial correlations a of trust and efficacy with future expectations controlled for efficacy and trust, respectively

Perceptions of the future:	Trust in government			Efficacy		
	Partial r		N	Partial r		N
Individual future situation	-0.32	***	4000	-0.16	***	4000
Group future situation	-0.32	***	4000	-0.16	***	4000
National future situation	-0.37	***	4000	-0.19	***	4000
Future Expectations	-0.39	***	4000	-0.20	***	4000

*p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.

^a Controlled for race, gender, age group, centre-periphery, education and living standard and support for the ANC.

Overall, the correlations were lower after controlling for the interrelatedness between trust and efficacy and showed the relatively stronger relation between trust and future expectations. However, clearly, both trust in the government and efficacy played a role in our respondent's views on the future. Optimists were more likely to believe they could trust the government and influence its decisions than were respondents with pessimistic views on the future.

In short, instrumental concerns (being able to influence decisions) seemed to be of less importance for expectations of the future than were relational concerns (trust). This confirms studies by Tyler and Lind (1992) as well as statements by other authors such as Barnes and Kaase (1997), which suggest that trust is an important component in reducing uncertainty over the future and evaluating fairness of procedures.

Schematically these findings relate to Figure 7 as follows (see Figure 11):




Figure 11: Relations between perceptions of government and future expectations

Linking perceptions of the government to feelings of relative deprivation

I hypothesized that both the belief that the government is trustworthy and the perception that people can make an impact on governmental decisions imply that the situation of people could change for the better. Without trust or with low efficacy, the chances to secure or improve one's living conditions will be slimmer, evoke pessimism, and, as will be shown here, amplify feelings of deprivation. That is, the more people trust the government and feel they are able to exert influence over the decisions made, the less negative they will be about the future. The relation between perceptions of the government and relative deprivation thus might be (partly) explained by the role government plays in shaping future expectations. This is exactly what the data showed.

The items concerning feelings of relative deprivation included comparisons with others and the past concerning the personal, group and national situation and evaluations of the outcomes of these comparisons. These nine items were combined into a single measure of feelings of relative deprivation.¹³ Table 10 shows the zero-order correlations between perceptions of the government and feelings of deprivation as well as the partial correlations, in which was controlled for future expectations, race, gender, age group, centre-periphery, education and living standard, support for the ANC and efficacy and trust, respectively.

Table 10: Zero-order and partial correlations^a of trust and efficacy with feelings of relative deprivation controlled for future expectations and zero-order correlations between feelings of relative deprivation and future expectations

Feelings of Deprivation	N	Df	Future expectations		Trust in government			Efficacy		
			Zero-order r		Zero-order r	Partial r		Zero-order r	Partial r	
1995	667	658	0.45	***	-0.26	***	-0.07	-0.17	***	-0.02
1996	597	588	0.72	***	-0.38	***	-0.07	-0.32	***	-0.07
1997	642	633	0.75	***	-0.36	***	-0.02	-0.31	***	-0.03
1998	634	625	0.67	***	-0.39	***	-0.11	-0.29	***	-0.13
1999	613	604	0.65	***	-0.34	***	-0.05	-0.25	***	-0.02
2000	678	669	0.62	***	-0.29	***	-0.13	-0.32	***	-0.21
Overall	3829	3820	0.65	***	-0.35	***	-0.06	-0.28	***	-0.08

*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

^a controlled for race, gender, age group, centre-periphery, education, living standard, support for the ANC, and efficacy and trust.

The overall zero-order correlations reveal that feelings of deprivation significantly relate to trust and efficacy ($r = -0.35$; $r = -0.28$). Respondents who distrusted government and/or felt they could not influence decisions made by the government showed higher levels of deprivation than respondents who were more positive about the government. However, the partial correlations show that once for future expectations are controlled for the relation between feelings of deprivation and perceptions of government almost disappears ($r = -0.06$; $r = -0.08$). Future expectations related strongly to feelings of deprivation. That is, the more pessimistic respondents were, the more deprived they felt. Optimists, on the other hand, were generally more positive about their current situation. Further analysis showed that after controlling for optimism/pessimism, the relation between feelings of deprivation and perceptions of government became much weaker. One might conclude that feelings of deprivation related to perceptions of government, because the perceptions of government determine people's expectations of the future. However, this could partly be explained by the fact that expectations of the future and feelings of deprivation were measured in a similar manner, which would imply collinearity. After checking of the tolerance levels, collinearity appeared not to be seriously affecting the results, however.¹⁴

Overall, these findings suggest that feelings of deprivation are influenced by future expectations and that these in turn are partly determined by efficacy and trust in the government. A direct relation between deprivation and perceptions of the government was apparent in 1998 and 2000 when among optimists and pessimists distrust and feelings of inefficacy were associated with somewhat stronger feelings of deprivation.

This suggests that feelings of deprivation had started (1998 and 2000) to generate distrust and lessen feelings of efficacy irrespective of what people expected from the future. Another or an additional explanation might be that trust and efficacy were more

strongly influenced by dissatisfaction with living conditions in those two years, since feelings of deprivation strongly related to dissatisfaction with living conditions, as was shown earlier. Indeed, further analysis revealed that when adding dissatisfaction with living conditions to the analyses of trust and efficacy, the relation between feelings of deprivation with trust and with efficacy weakened. As will be shown below, dissatisfaction did seem to influence trust and efficacy and during the last three years this was also related to feelings of national identity, which might have moderated the link between grievances and evaluations of government.




Figure 12: Relations between perceptions of government, discontent and identification with the government

Perceptions of the government: the impact of dissatisfaction

As was shown earlier, dissatisfaction with living conditions can be partly explained by feelings of deprivation, i.e. the outcomes of comparison processes. Strong feelings of relative deprivation in turn were related to objective disadvantage but also to distrust and inefficacy. The correlations between trust and efficacy on the one hand, and feelings of deprivation on the other, appeared to be insignificant or marginal once I controlled for future expectations. These had become stronger in 1998 and 2000 through the impact of feelings of relative deprivation on dissatisfaction. I hypothesised that perceptions of the government might be affected by grievances over living conditions, as it is the authority that controls the distribution of all kinds of assets in a society. For instance, prolonged dissatisfaction over housing conditions might affect one's trust in the government. I will analyse to what extent the South Africans we interviewed linked dissatisfaction with their living conditions to trust in the government and efficacy.

To complicate matters further, a strong national identity (i.e. superordinate identity) might play a moderating role in the relation between grievances and trust and efficacy. As studies by Tyler and colleagues (Lind and Tyler, 1992, Tyler and Lind, 1992, Huo, Smith, Tyler and Lind, 1996) suggest, grievances or dissatisfaction with one's outcomes might translate less easily into negative perceptions of the government (i.e. distrust and possibly feelings of inefficacy) if people have a strong national identity.

The analyses of the effect of grievances on living conditions on trust and efficacy partly replicate the analyses of trust and efficacy in section 3.5.1. The analyses differ in that the interactions over time were excluded, because these appeared to be very weak (see Table 6 and 7). Grievances were entered before a stepwise analysis including the

variables listed in Table 6 and 7. In the next step future expectations were entered. Lastly, I controlled for the correlation between trust/efficacy.

Table 11: Regression of trust in the government: the impact of dissatisfaction

			Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	R		β^a		β		β		β	
Hierarchic:										
Dissatisfaction:										
Personal	-0.17	***	-0.04	*	-0.18	***	-0.14	***	-0.12	***
Group	-0.26	***	-0.13	***	-0.07	***	-0.03		-0.02	
National	-0.37	***	-0.31	***	-0.13	***	-0.06	**	-0.04	*
Stepwise:										
ANC	0.42	***			0.22	***	0.18	***	0.17	***
Race ^b	-0.38	***			-0.22	***	-0.13	***	-0.08	***
Year	-0.01				-0.33	***	-0.26	***	-0.20	***
Year ²	0.03				0.29	***	-0.23	***	-0.19	***
Hierarchic:										
Future Expectations:										
Personal	-0.41	***					-0.11	***	-0.09	***
Group	-0.41	***					-0.06	**	-0.05	**
National	-0.46	***					-0.15	***	-0.12	***
Efficacy	0.28	***							0.25	***
Adj. R ²			0.15		0.29		0.32		0.37	
F model			237.13	***	223.09	***	184.61	***	209.44	***
df1 df2			3 3896		7 3892		10 3889		11 3888	

*p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.

^a β = standardised beta coefficient

^b Race: black =1 and white =2.

Overall, the results presented in Tables 11 and 12 show that dissatisfaction did contribute to the explanation of differences in trust or efficacy. Moreover, the results pertaining to trust and efficacy and their relation with dissatisfaction show similar patterns. Grievances concerning one's group situation or the national situation were to a large extent determined by one's race or translated into support for the ANC and thus related to trust or efficacy indirectly (Model 1 compared to Model 2). Dissatisfaction concerning one's personal situation appeared to have a direct relation with trust and efficacy, however. Hence, what these findings suggest is that South Africans who are dissatisfied over their personal living circumstances trust the government less than people who are content with their situation. This was irrespective of their race or their support for the ANC.

Interestingly, once controlled for support for the ANC and race, the partial correlations between trust/efficacy and personal dissatisfaction increased. To a certain extent ANC support and race suppressed the link between personal grievances and distrust

and inefficacy. Respondents who supported the ANC and who were black showed relatively high levels of trust and efficacy, but were also more dissatisfied about their personal situation than were people who did not support the ANC and/or who were white. Dissatisfaction with the national situation and with one's group situation was, as was outlined before, strongly related to being white. Therefore, group and national dissatisfaction was less strongly related to trust and to efficacy after controlling for racial differences (see Model 1 and 2).

Furthermore, the partial correlations concerning dissatisfaction decreased after controlling for future expectations (compare Model 2 with Model 3). This implies that future expectations partly explained the relation between grievances and trust/efficacy. This probably reflects the role future expectations play in the formation of grievances through their impact on feelings of relative deprivation, as is shown in section 3.3.

Table 3.11. Regression analysis of efficacy: the impact of dissatisfaction

			Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	R		β ^a		β		β		β	
Hierarchic:										
Dissatisfaction:										
Personal	-0.12	***	-0.01		-0.13	***	-0.10	***	-0.05	**
Group	-0.22	***	-0.12	***	-0.08	***	-0.06	**	-0.05	**
National	-0.29	***	-0.24	***	-0.11	***	-0.05	**	-0.04	*
Stepwise:										
Race ^b	-0.32	***			-0.36	***	-0.29	***	-0.26	***
Year	-0.06	***			-0.32	***	-0.27	***	-0.20	***
Year ²	-0.03				0.22	***	0.18	**	0.11	*
Education	-0.11	***			0.08	***	0.07	***	0.08	***
ANC	0.30	***			0.08	***	0.05	*	0.00	
Living standard	-0.19	***			0.08	**	0.07	**	0.07	**
Hierarchic:										
Future Expectations:										
Personal	-0.32	***					-0.08	***	-0.04	*
Group	-0.31	***					-0.02		0.00	
National	-0.36	***					-0.12	***	-0.07	**
Trust	0.45	***							0.30	***
Adj. R ²			0.10		0.19		0.21		0.27	
F model			143.43	***	102.25	***	85.30	***	118.14	***
df1 df2			3 3896		9 3890		12 3887		13 3886	

*p <.05; ** p <.005; *** p <.001.

^a β = standardised beta coefficient

^b Race: black =1 and white =2.

In other words, trust and efficacy relate to optimism and pessimism, which in turn affect feelings of deprivation and hence dissatisfaction with living conditions. Once this relation between trust/efficacy and future expectations is controlled for, the beta-coefficients in Model 3 for the dissatisfaction variables more truly reflect the potential impact of dissatisfaction on trust in the government and efficacy. Model 3 suggests that dissatisfaction with personal living conditions and to a lesser extent also dissatisfaction with the national situation partly explained why people had more or less trust in the government and felt that they could or could not influence governmental decisions. This was irrespective of whether they were black or white, supported the ANC or not and whether they were optimistic or pessimistic about what would happen to them in future.

In order to be able to distinguish between the relation between trust and dissatisfaction and the relation between efficacy and dissatisfaction, I controlled for efficacy in the analysis of trust and for trust in the analysis of efficacy (Model 4). In Model 4, the beta-coefficients for dissatisfaction were somewhat further reduced after controlling for the relation between trust and efficacy.

Contrary to trust in the government, efficacy was only weakly related to support for the ANC after controlling for race. This might point to a relational or identity component attached to trust, which does not manifest itself with regard to efficacy as was already outlined in 3.5.1. In addition, education and living standard played a role in explaining efficacy. Higher educated and higher-class respondents were more positive about their ability to influence the government than were lower-class and lower educated respondents.

In short, Model 4 in Table 11 and 12 shows that dissatisfaction is modestly though significantly related to trust and efficacy. Dissatisfaction with one's personal situation appeared to be a better explanation of distrust and inefficacy than was dissatisfaction with the situation of one's group or with that of South Africans in general. The relations of trust and efficacy with dissatisfaction with living conditions at group and national levels were largely dependent on one's race and with regard to trust also at people's support for the ANC. ANC supporters and blacks trusted the government more and showed higher levels of efficacy than did non-ANC supporters and whites, who were generally more dissatisfied with their group and the national situation.

In addition to the direct relation between dissatisfaction and trust and efficacy, I hypothesised that dissatisfaction might affect perceptions of the government more strongly among people who exhibit a weak national identity than among people with a strong national identity. That is, evaluation of the government will be less dependent on dissatisfaction over living conditions, especially over living conditions of one's group, if people exhibit a strong sense of belonging and closeness to the state than if they do not. Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo (1997) argue that a strong national identity makes it possible for people to look at subgroups in a different way and to accept that subgroups in a society are treated differentially. These authors argue that this is so because superordinate identity changes the relationship between subgroups and authorities. The absence of superordinate identity makes that relationship solely instrumental – what are authorities doing for my group. Superordinate identity makes it possible for people to accept disadvantages done to their subgroup in the interest of the larger community.

Following Tyler *et al.* (1992; 1996; 1997), I expected that among dissatisfied people who do not strongly identify with South Africa, distrust would be higher than among dissatisfied people who exhibit a strong national identity. Before turning to these intricate issues, it is informative to first see how national identity developed over the years studied.

National identity

From 1998 onwards we asked people how proud they were to be called a South African and how important it was to them to be a South African. The answers to these questions were combined into a single measure of national identity. Table 13 reveals that approximately one fifth of the respondents did not identify with the nation but that substantial proportions indicated that they strongly identified themselves as South Africans.

Table 13: National identity

National identity	1998		1999		2000	
Does not identify	22	%	22	%	16	%
N	178		167		132	
Does identify	52	%	40	%	39	%
N	421		309		330	
Strongly identifies	26	%	38	%	45	%
N	206		289		376	
Total	100	%	100	%	100	%
N	805		765		838	

Overall, national identity increased substantially over the three years. However, as depicted in Figure, black and white respondents strongly differed in degree of national identification. In addition, significant disparities between ethnic groups emerged. The proportions of respondents with a weak national identity ('does not identify') significantly declined between 1999 and 2000 among blacks and whites. However, in 2000 the proportion of white respondents with a weak national identity was still almost twice as big as that among black respondents (21% versus 12%). Overall, the proportion of respondents with a strong national identification had increased by over 10% per year. This resulted in an increase from 31% to 49% among black respondents and an increase from 20% to 39% among the white respondents.

These findings suggest that more and more people perceived themselves as South Africans and feel that they belong to the nation. However, the racial gap remained significant. With regard to the nation building efforts these findings look comforting.




Figure 12: National identity by race (%)

Logistic regression analysis revealed that exhibiting a strong national identity was unrelated to demographic factors such as one's gender, age, class, or location. The only significant factors were race and time (both $p < .05$).

Further analysis within the racial groups revealed that national identity significantly varied between ethnic groups. I will illustrate the importance of ethnic differentiation by focussing on the largest groups within each of our samples, i.e. Afrikaans and English whites and Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana blacks (see Figure 13).




Figure 13: National identity by ethnic group (%)

Tswana respondents displayed by far the strongest national identity in 1998 and 1999, but this proportion decreased between 1999 and 2000. The Xhosa respondents, who increasingly identified with the nation, showed the highest levels of national identity in 2000. Afrikaners closely resembled the Xhosas in 1998 and 1999. However, Afrikaners

displayed a less strong increase in national identity than the Xhosa between 1999 and 2000. The proportion of Zulu respondents who identified strongly with the nation slowly increased over the three years. However, due to the stronger increase among the Xhosa the gap between the Zulu and Xhosa in national identity had grown in 2000. National identity among the English-speaking whites had not changed between 1998 and 1999, but increased considerably between 1999 and 2000, which almost closed the gap between them and Afrikaners. Overall, the data reveal that within all five ethnic groups, national identity had increased between 1998 and 2000 though at different paces and in varying degrees.

It is important to note that these findings suggest that national identity increased across ethnic groups and race groups. In other words, national identity is not solely linked to one or another social group.

Identity and the relation between discontent and legitimacy of government

In order to assess a potential moderating effect of national identity on the impact of dissatisfaction on trust and efficacy, I calculated for respondents with a strong and for those with a weak national identity the partial correlations between dissatisfaction and trust and efficacy while controlling for future expectations, race, gender, age, centre-periphery, education and living standard, as well as for efficacy and trust.¹⁵

The partial correlations for strong and weak identifiers differed, indeed (see Table 14). This suggests that the strength of a superordinate/national identity affected the extent to which respondents' related dissatisfaction to distrust. Respondents with a weak national identity linked dissatisfaction more strongly to distrust than did respondents with a strong national identity. However, the moderating effect of national identity seems to be weak and only applicable to the relation between dissatisfaction with respondents' personal situation and trust/efficacy and to a lesser extent to the relation between group dissatisfaction and trust.

Table14: Partial correlations of trust and efficacy with dissatisfaction among respondents with a weak/strong national identity controlling for demographics and future expectations and for efficacy and trust, respectively

Perceptions of government		Dissatisfaction					
		Personal		Group		National	
		Partial r		Partial r		Partial r	
Trust							
	Weak nat. id. (n=1223)	-0.19	***	-0.07	**	-0.12	***
	Strong nat. id. (n=732)	-0.09	**	0.01		-0.11	**
Efficacy							
	Weak nat. id. (n=1223)	-0.07	**	-0.11	***	-0.08	**
	Strong nat. id. (n=732)	-0.21	***	-0.12	**	-0.07	*

*p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001.

Among respondents with a strong national identity, dissatisfaction with their personal situation was more weakly related to distrust ($r_{\text{partial}} = -0.09$) than among respondents with a weak national identity ($r_{\text{partial}} = -0.19$). This suggests that people with a strong national identity were less likely to distrust the government if they were dissatisfied. On the other hand, if people did not exhibit a strong national identity, they would distrust the government more, the more dissatisfied they were. However, if we look at the three years separately an important shift over time emerged among respondents with a strong national identity, whereas among respondents with a weak national identity the correlations were stable. Among those with a strong national identity the correlation between trust and personal dissatisfaction was relatively high in 1999 ($r_{\text{partial}} = -0.18$ compared to that in 1998 ($r_{\text{partial}} = 0.04$) and that in 2000 ($r_{\text{partial}} = -0.08$). These shifts suggest that with the upcoming elections in 1999 dissatisfaction was linked to distrust and satisfaction to trust of the government, irrespective of the strength of one's national identity.

Dissatisfaction over one's group situation was also somewhat more strongly related to distrust among respondents with weak a national identity ($r_{\text{partial}} = -.07$) than among those with a strong national identity ($r_{\text{partial}} = .01$). The relation between trust and dissatisfaction with the national condition was not moderated by national identity.

An opposite pattern was found with regard to efficacy. Feelings of lack of efficacy were strongly related to dissatisfaction with one's personal situation among respondents with a strong national identity than among those with a weak national identity. This suggests that people who strongly identify with the nation translate dissatisfaction with personal conditions into the feeling that one is unable to influence politics rather than into distrust of the government. As with trust, no differences were found in 1999, however. The partial correlation between efficacy and personal dissatisfaction was relatively low among those with a strong national identity in 1999 ($r_{\text{partial}} = -0.10$ compared to $r_{\text{partial}} = -0.19$ in 1998 and $r_{\text{partial}} = -0.26$ in 2000).

The findings with regard to the moderating effect of national identity suggest an intriguing pattern that calls for further research. Apparently, among people with a strong national identity dissatisfaction tends to translate into the belief that one is not able to influence government, whereas among people with a weak national identity dissatisfaction tends to translate into distrust of the government. Moreover, among people with a strong national identity the relation between evaluations of the government and dissatisfaction seem to be less stable than among people with a weak national identity. Just before the elections in 1999, national identity did seem to matter less than in the year before or in that after the elections. This partly explained why in 1998 and 2000 the relation between feelings of relative deprivation and evaluations of the government were more directly related (not mediated by future expectations) than in the other years: dissatisfaction more strongly related to negative evaluations of the government and this was enhanced by differences in national identity, which had strongly increased during these years.

Returning to the model proposed in Figure 7, our data suggest that dissatisfaction had a weak influence on trust in the government, although the relation between dissatisfaction and trust was stronger among respondents who exhibited a weak national

identity. Dissatisfaction also weakly influenced efficacy and this was somewhat stronger among respondents with a strong national identity.

Dissatisfaction was dependent on feelings of relative deprivation resulting from comparisons people made with the past, with others or with the future. Dissatisfaction with living conditions on a personal and group level related primarily to feelings of deprivation resulting from comparisons with others and comparisons to the past and racial differences, whereas national grievances also related to future expectations concerning the general situation in South Africa and were less strongly related to race.

Perceptions of the government appeared to influence feelings of relative deprivation indirectly through their relation to future expectations. Optimism coincided with more trust and higher efficacy.

Trust and efficacy were weakly influenced by dissatisfaction with living conditions and quite strongly by support for the ANC and race. Trust was high among black respondents and ANC supporters. Feelings of efficacy were high among black respondents.

The moderating effects of national identity on the relation between evaluations of the government and dissatisfaction were significant and in the expected direction, though weak and only significant for the relation between dissatisfaction over personal conditions.

The Model following from our findings thus looks as follows (Figure 14):




Figure 14: Relations between perceptions of government, discontent and national identity

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Following the euphoric elections of 1994, the government gradually lost some of its appeal among the respondents. Trust in government as well as perceived influence on governmental decisions, i.e. efficacy, slightly decreased, though recovered somewhat in 1999 just before the second national elections. Trust strongly depended on support for the ANC. ANC supporters were much more likely to trust the government. The relation between trust and ANC-support was stronger than that between efficacy and ANC-support. It seems obvious that the vast inequality in South Africa, especially between

blacks and whites, affects people's perceptions of government. Political and racial inequality had motivated a struggle for decades. The findings presented here suggest that indeed, perceptions of the government as well as grievances seem to be racialised and politicised, especially, as was pointed out earlier, if the object of grievances is on a more inclusive level.

In all likelihood the differential correlation between ANC-support and race with trust and efficacy relates to what Tyler and Lind (1992) mean with the different psychological meanings of trust and efficacy. Trust differs from efficacy in the sense that the former is a "relational" component of legitimacy of the government and the latter an "instrumental" component of legitimacy. Efficacy more strongly related to race, which might point to the fact that the whites form a minority versus the black majority and therefore white people feel it is difficult to influence the governmental decision-making processes (see also Appelgryn and Bornman, 1996). Lack of identification and familiarity with the government in terms of colour, ideology and culture might also have played a role.

However, both trust and efficacy played a significant role in peoples' expectations of the future. Optimism was mainly found among people who thought that they could trust the government and influence its decisions. Various social scientists have argued that trust in the authorities is crucial for democracies to survive or bloom. The reason for this is that trust makes people feel less uncertain about what will happen in future (Tyler, 1990). In the same vein, perceived influence on governmental decisions might give people more security, since it provides them with a means to control the processes through which they are governed (Leventhal, 1980; Tyler and Lind, 1992).

In addition, current hardship is bearable if people believe the government can be trusted to change people's lives for the better, as relative deprivation theorists argue. Trust relates to the belief that the system is responsive to people's needs (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), that it will act in the interest of the people and in a fair way (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Caine, 1981) and that the government respects its citizens (Tyler and Lind, 1992; Smith and Tyler, 1996). Indeed, it has been shown here that the role government plays in shaping future expectations (partly) explained the relation between perceptions of the government and feelings of relative deprivation. Feelings of deprivation were influenced by future expectations, which in turn were partly determined by efficacy and trust in the government.

However, a direct relation between feelings of deprivation and distrust in government and feelings of inefficacy was also found. In 1998 and 2000, deprivation was higher among people who distrusted the government and who felt inefficacious irrespective of how optimistic or pessimistic they were. This suggested that the mediating role of future expectations had become weaker. Another explanation could be that feelings of deprivation indirectly via dissatisfaction fed back into negative evaluations of the government. Indeed, trust and efficacy were influenced by dissatisfaction with living conditions.

Overall, the relation between dissatisfaction and evaluations of government appeared to be weak if one realises that the government is to a large extent responsible for people's living conditions and opportunities for improvements. On the group and national levels, the relations of trust and efficacy with dissatisfaction with living condi-

tions seemed to be mediated by race and support for the ANC. That is, dissatisfaction with group and national conditions tended to be higher among respondents who did not support the ANC and/or who were white and this was reflected in lower levels of trust and perceived efficacy.

One factor that seemed to play a role in the translation of discontent with personal living conditions into distrust and perceptions of efficacy was the extent to which people exhibited a strong national identity. Respondents with a strong national identity were less likely to link their personal (mis)fortune to (dis)trust in the government than did people who exhibited a weak national identity. Dissatisfaction with one's personal situation also tended to weakly influence efficacy, however, and this appeared to be somewhat stronger among respondents with a strong national identity. This suggests that control over how the government exercises its power, instead of that the government exercises its power, comes into play when people exhibit a strong national identity.

Interestingly, the moderating effects of national identity were only significant in 1998 and 2000. This might partly explain why in those same years the relation between relative deprivation and future expectations was stronger than in the other years. In these other years, those who exhibited a stronger national identity (which seemed to have increased over the years) were more likely to link dissatisfaction to feelings of inefficacy than those with a weak national identity, while those with a weak national identity were more likely to link dissatisfaction to distrust. In 1999, however, no differences between high and low identifiers were found. The strong increases in national identity and positive perceptions of government between 1998 and 1999 seem to have rendered differences between strong and weak identifiers less significant in 1999. In addition, the fact that in 1999, respondents with a strong national identity also tended to link (dis)satisfaction to more (dis)trust in the government and less strongly to (in)efficacy, suggest that with the upcoming elections relational concerns were more important than instrumental concerns. Perhaps the latter were less salient or less contested than the former in that year than in the other two years in which national identity was assessed.

These findings partly corroborated Tyler and colleagues' statements that the link between dissatisfaction and evaluations of authorities is influenced by superordinate identity. Earlier studies by Tyler *et al.* suggest that if people exhibit a strong sense of belonging and closeness to the state, the evaluation of the government will be less dependent on dissatisfaction with living conditions, especially with conditions of one's group, than if they do not exhibit a superordinate identity (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo, 1997). These authors, however, did not report on dissatisfaction with personal versus group circumstances.

In short, the above findings seem to suggest the following chain of reasoning: Trust and efficacy (two procedural aspects of legitimacy of the government of which trust is coined "relational" and efficacy "instrumental") seem to be only weakly influenced by grievances over living conditions. Race and support for the ANC, which could be interpreted as components of identity, largely determined people's evaluations of the government. These evaluations in turn, seem to impact on expectations of the future, which strongly influenced feelings of deprivation. Trust in the government and feelings of efficacy in turn, were lower the more dissatisfied people were about their living conditions. However, dissatisfaction with one's group or the national situation was strongly

related to racial differences and whether one did or did not support the ANC. Once these relations were taken into account, dissatisfaction with one's personal situation appeared to impact on evaluations of the government. The extent to which evaluations of the government were influenced by personal dissatisfaction differed for people with a strong national identity and those with a weak national identity and varied over time. These latter findings call for more in-depth research.

Two last points to take into consideration in future research. In this study the implication of national identity has been explored but further research is needed to disentangle the meaning and functions people in strongly and less divided societies attach to their membership of various groups and of the nation in particular in order to understand the dynamics between national and group identity. Especially in South Africa, a better understanding of the notion of national identity is important since it is being used in various ways to influence attitudes and behaviours of common citizens in their roles as voters, activists, consumers, clients and servants of the state. In addition, no attention has been given to national identity in relation to regional identities, such as Southern African or African, which in international and national politics also play an important role. The findings presented here suggest more fluctuation in the relevance of dissatisfaction for perceptions of government among high identifiers than among weak identifiers. Given the increase in levels of national identity, this seems a relevant area for further study in the South African context.

On several occasions, the importance of the 1999 elections was highlighted for people's perception and reaction to what happened at that stage in particular. Why the elections had such an impact on evaluations of the government, optimism or the role of national identity in moderating the relation between dissatisfaction and perceptions of government, for example, is difficult to explain. To complicate matters even further, what effects did the local elections in 2000 and those held in 1995/6 have on feelings of injustice? It would be interesting to see whether elections in other young democracies have had similar effects and why. In this study, perceptions of political leaders, exposure to campaigns and promises were not assessed, though these could be some of the crucial factors.

NOTES

1. Justice appraisals may also be influenced by other factors, such as the presence of laws, contracts, and commitments or earlier experienced relationships between pre-conditions and outcomes as well as bargaining power (Major, 1994).
2. See Boulding (1962) for a similar distinction between personal and political discontent (cf. Dube and Guimond, 1986).
3. 'Black' and 'white' South Africans refers to the official categorisation under apartheid used to classify the indigenous peoples such as the Zulu, Xhosa and Sotho as 'black' and the people of European descent such as the English and the Afrikaners as 'white'. The other two racial categories, 'Indian' or 'Asian' and 'coloureds', were used to classify respectively those of Indian descent and those of Khoi or San or mixed race descent. Some people rather use the term 'African' instead of 'black'. I will refer to 'black' since this term is still most common in daily conversations among all racial groups.

4. The 1994 results are reported on elsewhere, which if compared to the following years proved that before and after the first inclusive democratic elections the socio-political climate in South Africa had changed significantly in many respects (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 1998, 2001; Roefs, Klandermans and Olivier, 1998). A comprehensive report was published in 2001. In "The State of the people" (Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 2001), as this report was titled, one will find detailed descriptions of changes in grievances, future expectations, evaluations of the government, action preparedness and other aspects related to participation.
5. A panel or semi-panel design would have been preferable for studying changes over time. However, this was not feasible as the incomplete and unreliable citizen administration in South Africa combined with social mobility would not enable one to track respondents over time.
6. Realised samples for 1995 through 2000: 2, 226; 2, 228; 2, 220; 2, 227; 2, 210; 2, 666.
7. Metropolitan areas are those around cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Pretoria. Non-metropolitan areas are around the smaller cities.
8. The lifestyle classification that was used in 1999 and 2000 was very similar to the socio-economic classification that was used from 1995 to 1998.
9. We also asked such a general question about people's personal situation. However, the results pertaining to the composite and the single-item questions were much the same and did not produce significant different results in further analyses. Therefore, I decided to use the composite score. I felt it would be a more reliable and viable indicator of dissatisfaction with various aspects of people's living conditions.
10. Independent variables included: time, time2, race, gender, age, education, centre-periphery, class, and interactions of these last 7 variables with time. The explained variance ranged from 0.04 to 0.27 with on average most variance explained in future expectations and least in deprivation resulting from comparisons with the past.
11. It should be reiterated here that these findings must not be mistaken as representative. White people were strongly over-presented in this study and generally have less trust in government. Therefore the means presented here are lower than they were in reality.
12. Principal component analysis revealed that the future related questions composed a single component, explaining 67% of the total variance. This was confirmed by reliability analysis, which resulted in a Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$. One measure for future expectations was constructed, which included five items: the individual (comparison and evaluation), group (comparison and evaluation) and national expectations (comparison) of the future.
13. Principal component analysis revealed that the four items tapping individual relative deprivation formed one component and group and national deprivation items formed another component. However, PCA of the combined measures for individual, group and national deprivation as presented in section 3.1, resulted in one component, which explained 51% of the total variance. I decided to combine all the items into one measure of feelings of relative deprivation. The Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.83$.

14. In order to estimate the seriousness of this, I performed hierarchic regression analysis and checked the tolerances of future expectations and relative deprivation. In the first model feelings of deprivation were entered and in the second future expectations. The standardised beta-coefficient for deprivation changed from -0.35 to -0.05 and that for future expectations was -0.46, which confirms the results presented in Table 15. More important here is that the Tolerance levels were not too low with a tolerance of 0.58 (the standard tolerance SPSS uses for excluding variables is < 0.01). Moreover, the fact that the partial correlations between relative deprivation and trust/efficacy were higher in 1998 and 2000 than in the other years while the correlations between future expectations and relative deprivation were as high as in the other years confirms that collinearity did not play a serious role here.
15. Questions on national identity were only included in the questionnaire from 1998 onwards, the findings involving national identity are therefore only applicable to the last three interview rounds.

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CHARITY BEGINS ABROAD: RESPONSES TO THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Ukoha Ukiwo

The literature on the democratisation processes that spread through much of Africa from the early 1990s features critical commentaries which posit that though the principal cause of what has been referred to as 'Africa's second independence' was the ferment among African peoples against decades of misrule, dictatorship, economic decline and social insecurity, the intervention of external forces in support of democratisation was critical in its resolution (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Amuwo, 1992). References have been made, *ad nauseam*, to the historic Franco-African Summit in Le Baule where Francois Mitterand of France fired the salvo: No election, No Aid! Those who eavesdropped on President Andre Kolingba of Central African Republic have also told us how in response to the Summit, a frightened leader addressed his kitchen cabinet:

Those who lend us money for the development of our country have requested us to create several parties. We have to accept that (cited in Amuwo, 1992: 23)

Even in countries such as Nigeria where democratisation was 'home grown' and predated the Franco-African Summit, the fact that the seemingly endless transition terminated after fierce external intervention was significant. Indeed, while the explanation that the excommunication of the regime which entailed that a sick Gen. Sani Abacha could not travel freely abroad for medical treatment contributed to the death of the dictator through cardiac arrest may be far-fetched, the instant death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola after the visit of an American delegation which prevailed on him to forget the June 12 mandate is too close to be ignored – especially as the political logjam gained momentum after Abiola's death.

A critical consequence of the external intervention in Africa's democratisation was the simultaneous alienation of popular groups and social movements that championed the democratic movements in the first place. Across the continent, the transition programmes were hijacked by civilianizing military dictators, recycled politicians and re-

turnee Bretton Woods African employees. Ultimately, the outcome of the transition was less than was expected by African peoples. The perceptive Claude Ake described the phenomenon as "the democratisation of disempowerment", to wit:

The quality of democratisation in Africa is in question. It would appear that the process of democratisation in Africa is not a process of emancipation. On the contrary, it is legitimizing the disempowerment of the people of Africa, leaving them possibly worse off than before by concealing their disempowerment so that it no longer appears problematic (Ake, 1995a: 78)

It is hardly surprising therefore that without exception, the new inheritance elite that superintends the post-transition countries of Africa have unabashedly implemented structural adjustment programmes against the wishes of their peoples. Consequently, for Africa, it does appear that democracy has been ritualized and trivialized to begin and end with the conduct of elections. It would seem that democracy does not also include empowering the people to make choices on how they want to be governed and to what ends. It is worthwhile to note that vigorous pursuit of the doctrines of Bretton Woods despite popular rejection contributed to loss of power by elected governments in Benin Republic, Zambia, Cape Verde and Senegal. However, the seeming belief among the dominant political class that it is not so much inappropriate policies as bad politics that was responsible for the misfortunes of their unfortunate colleagues has emboldened them to proceed with business as usual.

It is against this backdrop that the *raison d'être* and *modus operandi* of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) can be appreciated. The advertised blueprint for African development was prepared by a clique of African leaders in consultation with technical advisers and donor agencies and presented to the industrialized countries for approval. It is presently being 'downloaded' on African peoples, the people whose survival NEPAD is supposed to be all about. This is a case, *par excellence*, of charity beginning abroad. The central argument of this chapter is that NEPAD, having been formulated without the consent of African civil society, lacks popular support across the continent. However, NEPAD has been warmly embraced by industrialized countries because it is a rehearsal of neo-liberalism. We shall conclude that like previous top-down policies NEPAD alienates the people from development, and is *ipso-facto* not a recipe for popular development.

To demonstrate the foregoing, we shall attempt a content analysis of the NEPAD document and discuss some of the reactions it has elicited within and outside Africa. The source of data shall therefore be principally secondary. Apart from the NEPAD document, there is a growing literature on NEPAD that will be reviewed. We shall also make extensive use of communiqués of civil society groups and results of opinion polls on NEPAD. In the sections that follow, we present the theoretical framework of the chapter and give an overview of the objectives and origins of NEPAD. The final section will discuss the responses of Africans to NEPAD to show that the people are not even in a position to support the document because they hardly understand what it is all about. The rest are concluding statements on the implications of the lack of popular participation in the preparation of NEPAD.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A number of theoretical approaches have been adopted over the years to interpret Africa's relations with Europe, the West and, since the eclipse of the Soviet bloc, the international community. Early works in the 1960s adopted the traditional functionalist behavioural approach. The traditional approach which was mainly descriptive, focused on major foreign policy developments, issues, personalities, institutions and specific aspects of political developments – such as colonial experience, ideology and resource availability. The traditional approach was criticized for being merely descriptive and theoretically crude. In the main, it separated the sub-system from the totality of the system (Allen, 1976; Falola and Ihonvbere, 1988). In the 1970s, the world system perspective advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein became ascendant. This led to the blossoming of the structuralist school whose principal variant is the dependency approach. The approach conceptualizes a world system that is stratified with some countries at the core and others at the periphery. According to this perspective, the system is an exploitative one where core states benefit at the expense of the periphery states. All African states are located at the periphery and their foreign policies and external relations are tied to developments in the world system. The dependency approach also threw up other perspectives based on what should be or was the basis for global stratification. While Claude Ake (1978) opined that class was of the essence and indeed branded countries at the core as bourgeois and those at the periphery as proletariat, Ali Mazrui (1977) saw caste as the basis for stratification. Unlike those who felt that the global stratification could be determined by the relation of each country to the means of production, Mazrui argued that race, colour and language were the criteria for stratification. Thus, unlike the two-layer (labour-capital) stratification, preferred by the class-based dependency, there are multiple layers in the global caste system.

In whatever colour dependency was presented however, it attracted a barrage of criticism. Proponents of the radical political economy school, for instance, argued that it is ahistorical and ignores the internal dimensions of external relations. A more coherent critique of the dependency school was associated with the decolonization and complex interdependence schools.

In a seminal article on Africa relations with Europe, William Zartman (1982) criticized the static mode of dependency theory. He argued that there have been some progressive changes in Africa's relations with Europe, contrary to the proposition of dependency that political independence was a façade and that the metropole is still in control.

By arguing that things really have not changed since colonial times, it both denies past change and ignores the possibility of future change, in a world whose generally recognized nature is change *par excellence*. It is easy to see this static quality, for dependency is a mirror-image idea. It responds to the equally static racist caricature of the colonialist perspective, which held that the African nature was inherently incapable of civilization, by claiming that it is the Westerner who is inherently incapable of allowing development, since it is not in his interest. Thus, dependency has a scapegoat function, comforting the slow developer by showing him that the fault is not his but rather that of the outside forces of evil, which, more insidiously than ever, because of their very subtle mechanisms, are keeping him down (Zartman 1982: 276).

Decolonization theory, therefore, advances an evolutionary view, showing the gradual nature of change in relations between Europe and Africa. Using EEC – ACP conventions, monetary alliances, defence alliances and cultural cooperation as examples, Zartman shows that there is a progressive move towards self assertion. Decolonization theory thus resents the precipitous withdrawal or delinking from the global system canvassed by dependency theory, citing the catastrophic example of Guinea. Gradual change allows African countries to build capacity to handle issues hitherto handled by departing colonizers, and provides spaced occasions for renegotiating relations between new nations and former metropole.

However, while the dynamic scenario presented by decolonization appears more realistic, it assumes, and erroneously for that matter, that evolution is always progressive and furthers the independence of the post-colonial societies. Moreover, the decolonization perspective simplifies the world system, privileging relations between post-colonial states and former colonial masters. The world is indeed more complex and one of the emerging realities of global politics for the new nations is the diversification of relations, on the basis of reciprocity. This is the point of departure of the complex interdependence school, which in the main was a response to the realist theory of international politics but also tackles some of the assumptions of the class/caste struggle among nations painted by the dependency school. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989), advocates of this school, assert that power and influence is diffused in the world system. No one country or set of countries possesses all indices of power, which it uses to oppress the powerless. Rather, independent nations relate with others to attain their objectives. The categorization of issues in international politics as High Politics and Low Politics is a straitjacket that does not reflect the complexity and dynamism of international relations. International relations are symbiotic and the world is one of a division of labour in which each part needs the other. It is, therefore, not a conspiracy of some of against others. Keohane and Nye argue that there may be unequal relations especially in issues requiring high politics but on other soft issues, nations are interdependent. Complex interdependence is the intellectual precursor of the globalization perspective (Lechner and Boli, 2000). Its claim to interdependence blurs the reality of dependency and unequal relations in global politics. Its attempt to downplay the importance of military strength in national power is certainly not helped by the fact that it is the case that the most powerful nations of the world in military terms are easily the most industrialized countries. Despite the interdependence of nations in the past 40 years some nations have remained marginal to the global political economy.

It is against this background that several African commentators on the globalization debate have tried to show that the continent is marginalized (Ake, 1995b). Wittingly or unwittingly, the dependency approach has been rejuvenated to show that Africa is located in the periphery of the global system. This perspective has been sharply criticized by Jean Bayart (2000) who argues that the best way to understand Africa's relation with the world is within the context of extraversion dependency. The extraversion paradigm rejects the marginalisation perspective of skeptics of globalization, arguing that Africa, contrary to the thinking of neo-Hegelians, has been part and parcel of the world system that has changed over time. Bayart, posits that "Africans have been active agents in the *mise en dependence* of their societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining

in it". Tracing the historicity of extraversion, Bayart shows that whether it was the slave trade, produce trade, formal colonialism, dependence and cultural ties, brain drain or international trafficking of women and narcotics, Africans have acted in their own interests as part of an organic world, of which Africa is part. It is this action of Africans in the world and not the structure of the world system, as classical dependency would have us believe, that matters. All told, African relations with the world are underlined by the fact that African actors are outward looking and seek to extract valuable goods from it through a combination of formalities of action which Bayart lists as coercion, trickery, flight, mediation, appropriation and rejection.

The extraversion paradigm is useful for our discussion of the tendency for Africa leaders to conceptualize development as an exogenous phenomenon, one that can only materialize with the support of the outside world. It is, however, fraught with problems. First, it is presented as if extraversion is unique to African state-building and development and therefore falls into the trap of afro-pessimism. Even in Europe, as Charles Tilly (1995) has shown, the process of state building was violent and criminal. Secondly, it is easy to see how extraversion, by focusing on action, underestimates or indeed overlooks the structure, which is the linchpin of dependency. While it is important to expose the actions and motivations of actors in the international system, it is also important to highlight the structural context of such actions. This notwithstanding, we adopt the extraversion paradigm because the importance of action is that it is not uniformly determined by the structure. Several countries operating within a similar structure take different actions. We shall show that NEPAD represents another 'extraversive' tendency of African elites who Franz Fanon described decades ago as "white men in black skins."

ORIGINS OF NEPAD

Africa entered the 21st century with great fears and uncertainties accentuated by the afro-pessimism of the 1990s. Among the political leadership and intelligentsia (Aremu, 2002: 51), there was the real need to renew the hope of the African peoples. It was this that motivated President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to initiate the African Renaissance project to contribute "to the revitalization of values considered and valued as both genuinely African and human (in the sense of being civilized as opposed to derogatory heirs of primitiveness)" (Melber 2001: 4). While the African Renaissance project succeeded in providing the platform to counter an inferiority complex and dependency syndrome that was so prevalent in Africa and had become internalized, it failed to establish a political concept and instrumental strategy. The need to translate the African Renaissance into policy concepts and programmes culminated in the introduction of the Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme (MAP). The MAP document emerged after an extraordinary meeting of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in 1999 that mandated the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria to engage Africa's creditors for total cancellation of Africa's external debt. The Presidents of Nigeria and Algeria supported the document the South African President prepared had presented it to the World Economic Forum Meeting in Davos on January 28, 2001. At the forum, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal also presented his 'Omega Plan', aimed at the economic recovery and development of Africa.

The Ninth Session of the Joint Conference of African Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Planning and Economic Development met from 8-10 May in Algeria under the aegis of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to discuss MAP and the Omega Plan. The meeting agreed that it was in Africa's best interest to consolidate the two programmes rather than dissipate energy attempting to achieve the same goals through separate initiatives. Consequently, the plans were referred to a group of experts who held workshops in Abuja, Nigeria and Dakar, Senegal to refine and harmonize them in preparation for the OAU summit of July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia. On July 11, 2001 the summit of the OAU approved the New African Initiative, which was an amalgamation of MAP and the Omega Plan. It also set up a ten-member Implementation Committee and a 15-member Steering Committee for NAI. It is against this background that the Heads of States of the Implementation Committee, meeting in Abuja on 23 October, 2001, finalised the policy framework and renamed it the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

OBJECTIVES OF NEPAD

NEPAD has been described as "a holistic, integrated sustainable development initiative for the economic and social revival of Africa involving a constructive partnership between Africa and the developed world" (Nkuhlu, 2002: 1). In the introductory section, it is described as "a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction" that the task of eradicating poverty and engendering sustainable development is incumbent on them. Further, NEPAD is said to be "anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world" (para 1). The rhetoric of the introduction is radical. It contrasts Africa's stark poverty with the wealth of the developed world and asserts that this and the "continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalization process... and social exclusion of its peoples is a threat to global stability". It decries the debt trap in which the continent is mired as well as the phenomenon of decreasing aid since the 1970s. NEPAD puts Africa's socio-economic morass in graphic detail:

In Africa, 340 million people or half of the population live on less than US\$1 per day. The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. Only 58 percent of the population have access to safe water. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 percent. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa, compared with 146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high income countries. (para.4)

African leaders proceed to state the *raison d'être* of NEPAD:

The initiative calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid nor for marginal concessions. (para.5)

The basis for such an outburst is the availability of the resources, both material and human, in abundance in Africa as well as the determination of Africans to take the bull by the horns.

In Section 2, the strengths of Africa are further expanded, viz: mineral, flora and fauna; the ecological lung provided by the continent's forest; palaeontological and archaeological evidence that Africa is the cradle of human evolution; and the richness of Africa's cultural diversity. However, despite these resources, the continent has historically been impoverished by a combination of factors, namely the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, the nature of the international economic system and the poverty of development policies pursued by the post-independence administration including structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). In spite of the constraints the continent has faced in the international economic system, NEPAD sees an opportunity for Africa in the global revolution:

What is needed is a commitment on the part of government, the private sector and other institutions of civil society, to the genuine integration of all nations into the global economy and body politic. This requires the recognition of global interdependence in respect of production and demand, the environmental base that sustains the planet, cross-border migration, a global financial architecture that rewards good socio-economic management, and global governance that recognizes partnerships among all peoples. We hold that it is within the capacity of the international community to create fair and just conditions in which Africa can participate effectively in the global economy and body politic. (para 41)

In Section 3, entitled "The New Political Will of African Leaders", NEPAD identifies some changes in the international system such as the ascendancy of democratic regimes, vibrancy of civil society, rising goodwill for African development, stronger intra-Africa regional organizations, etc. It is against the backdrop of these changes that the leaders pledge to strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at regional and continental levels; promote and protect democracy and human rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance; restore and maintain macro-economic stability especially by developing appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and strengthening the concomitant institutional frameworks; etc.

African leaders in Section 4 of NEPAD outline the strategy for achieving sustainable development in the following structure:

- a. Preconditions for development, which include peace, security, democracy, and political governance; economic and corporate governance with a focus on public finance management; and regional cooperation and integration.
- b. Priority sectors which are infrastructure, information and communications technology, human development, with a focus on health and education and skills development, agriculture and promoting diversification of production and exports with a focus on market access for African exports to industrialized countries.
- c. Mobilizing resources, namely increasing savings and capital inflows via further debt relief, increased ODA flows and private capital as well as better management of public revenue and expenditure.

The document discusses the above objectives and strategies and outlines actions that are required both at the African level and the international level.

In Section 6, NEPAD restates the potential of the continent, which is the underlying basis for development. The document, while decrying the problems associated with development assistance, calls for a new relationship that should “set out mutually agreed targets and standards for both donor and recipient”. Pursuant to this, leaders set out the responsibilities and obligations of the developed countries and multilateral institutions. These include improving ODA flows to Africa, debt relief and enhancing access of Africa goods to markets of industrialized countries.

In Section 7, there is an outline of how the mechanism will be directed. This includes the need to have the initiating heads of state advise the OAU on an appropriate mechanism to implement NEPAD and the need for a technical support team to assist the heads of state in research and policy formulation. Finally, there is a schedule of activities for the first six months, which include bodies to be set up or consulted in Africa and meetings that would be held with the world community.

It was at the first meeting of the implementation committee on October 23 in Abuja, Nigeria that the name New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was adopted. The meeting set up an organogram for NEPAD made up of the Implementation Committee, ¹ a Steering Committee² and a Secretariat.³

ASSESSMENTS OF NEPAD: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature on NEPAD has blossomed in the past year. Broadly speaking, commentary on the new African initiative can be divided into two. On the one hand, are authors who are overly optimistic about NEPAD and see it as the road to salvation of the continent. For such commentators, what is needed to make NEPAD work is to dot a few “i’s” and cross some “t’s”. On the other hand are those who feel the initiative is fundamentally flawed, unattainable and could also end up perpetuating Africa's dependency.

Ravi Kanbur (2001), in one of the first commentaries on NEPAD, described it as an initiative that should, “be welcomed wholeheartedly”. This is because its overarching features, especially “its strong emphasis on democracy and governance”, make it different from past attempts at fashioning Africa-wide initiatives for African development. While also noting that NEPAD shares some characteristics with past efforts such as its broad spread and generalization, Kanbur justifies such characteristics as being inevitable in a wide-ranging document. He therefore devotes his article to developing a model for the assessment of the implementation of NEPAD. This model includes the need for comparative advantage; NEPAD should not be seen to duplicate efforts of other regional agencies and the initiative should prioritize poverty reduction.

This is also the approach adopted by Kempe Ronald Hope Sr. (2002) who describes NEPAD as, “the most significant initiative ever advocated for moving the African continent from crisis to renewal in the past forty years,” and “the one last opportunity to get the global economy to take Africa to seriously”. Such characterization of NEPAD implies that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. It is therefore necessary, according to Hope, for the challenges of NEPAD to be robustly confronted. Such challenges include strengthening capacity, monitoring the performance and behaviour of organs, and reducing poverty. It is the view of Hope that once these challenges are

confronted the 'home-grown' initiative for African development would accomplish the objectives set by its initiators.

Writing from the same point of view, Akinrinade (2002) applauds African leaders for the initiative that is different from previous efforts because of the political commitment of the leaders, especially the peer review mechanism. He addresses such challenges as the persistence of conflicts and the non-consultation of civil society but notes that the peace and security initiative of NEPAD as well as response of the leaders in making amendments to NEPAD are ongoing efforts to overcome them.

Also optimistic about the potentials of NEPAD is Alex de Waal (2002), who focuses on the governance issues raised in the NEPAD document. He also identifies weak capacity, lack of will to sanction offenders as in the case of Zimbabwe, and the need to democratize process as critical challenges that should be addressed to make NEPAD work. Another commentary by Chris Alden (2002) seeks to draw attention to action that should be taken to ensure that NEPAD does not remain "words without deeds", thereby preventing the historic opportunity from turning into an international jambo-ree. However, Alden unlike other commentators also outlines a number of actions to be taken by the industrialized countries. These include fulfilling promises for debt cancellation, opening up markets for African agricultural products and improving ODA. For Africa, the commitment to peer review should be honoured and civil society should be involved. This is also the submission of Richard Joseph (2002) who believes that Africa could witness a new wave of recovery and renewal as a result of NEPAD. Joseph however, discusses structural constraints, especially the fact that NEPAD seems to be more popular abroad than at home. At the core of his recommendation is the need to evolve a variety of leaner or "smart" partnerships alongside NEPAD. Such partnerships with people and institutions which are aimed at strengthening capacity would ensure that the broad objectives of NEPAD are translated from knowledge to action.

Critical commentaries on the other hand take issue with the *raison d'être* of the initiative. Ian Taylor and Philip Nel (2001) argue that NEPAD seeks to entrench Africa's dependent position in the global political economy. This is why a new hearing is being given to the African leaders. According to Taylor and Nel, the message "fits the neo-liberal discourse". While acknowledging that NEPAD stresses commitment to good governance, they opine that the absence of a strategy to ensure that global power games do not undermine the noble goals of NEPAD is worrisome. Moreover, Taylor and Nel describe the role of the new transnational elite of Africa as that of a commission agent seeking to entrench Africa's subservient relations with the West. The open embrace of NEPAD by the West as against their opposition to other African programmes is also intriguing to Adebayo Adedeji (2002). He shows how the development merchant system sabotaged five African initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, which were anchored on the imperative of promoting self-reliant development. He argues that NEPAD is fundamentally flawed because, rather than proceed from the knowledge of Africa's persistent failure to decolonise its political economy by confronting the past and making necessary changes for socio-economic and political transformation, it attempts again to make Africa "march towards its future hand-in-hand with its colonial mono-cultural, low productivity and excessively dependent and open economy". This option, Adedeji argues, will not assure Africa a dignified future.

NEPAD, in seeking to draw more resources from the donor community and more direct supervision from various international institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that have directed the development path of virtually all African countries since independence and more so since 1980s, must ensure that African people and their governments occupy the drivers' seats of their development train. Indeed, in the Omega Plan, which together with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) constitutes NEPAD, it had been suggested that the management and administration of the African initiative should be entrusted to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representatives. This is worrisome. It would exacerbate neo-colonialism rather than advance the cause of economic decolonization. NEPAD should aim to let Africa loose from the noose of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions rather than tighten it (Adedeji, 2002: 8)

The positive response of the West to NEPAD is also the point of attraction to Ben Turok (2002a and b). In trying to explain the open support of Western leaders for NEPAD, he draws attention to the terms of the new partnership with Africa, especially the fact that structural adjustment programmes will be intensified. He says that the principal basis for this change of mind is the increasing realization among industrialized nations that poverty in developing countries constitutes "the ultimate systemic threat" to the world economy. Other factors include the "embarrassment of riches" as a result of development reports published by development agencies, big power rivalry that has not died in the era of *Pax Americana*, overwhelming immigration into Europe and North America, persistent opposition to globalization and the protest movements that canvass such oppositions. He argues that the support constitutes an attempt by the industrialized nations to reach out for legitimization:

It seems to be agreed that signals are required to show an acceptance that Africa needs saving. So the big powers and their institutions seem to be reaching out for a change of image to show that they care about poverty and inequality and are willing to make efforts to address some of the stark problems in Africa (Turok, 2002a: 133).

This suspicion that NEPAD is the voice of Jacob but the hand of Esau also engages the attention of Dani Nabudere (2002), who provides relevant substantiation for the fact that NEPAD was developed after enormous consultation with the donor community. It was therefore "panel-beaten" into a saleable document acceptable to the donor community. In this bid to please the donors, Nabudere also highlights a feature of NEPAD that seeks to divide and rule Africa. This is the principle of selective engagement. He argues that it will make non-compliant countries isolated and marginalized while compliant ones are rewarded. Clearly, "the partnership was not to unite Africa to tackle its own problems, but to disorganise them on the basis of new Western philanthropy – a new recolonization" (2002: 16). NEPAD is the noose that will be used to hang Africa. The fact that this is so, is seen in the response of most of the donor community to the Zimbabwean elections:

Whatever one may say or think about the elections in Zimbabwe, it is important that both Nigerian and South African observers to the elections had come to the conclusion that the election on the whole was free and fair. Whether that conclusion was correct or

not is not the issue here. The fact of the matter was that although the two leaders constituted a majority of the three-man Commonwealth committee, they were made to accept the view of Australia and Britain to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for a year. This showed how NEPAD was being used to achieve certain security objectives of the “partners” than of addressing poverty and conflict in Africa. (2002: 21)

The controversial Zimbabwean election has consequently been held as a signpost to the unworkability of NEPAD and the insincerity of African leaders. This is the subject of a commentary by Ian Taylor (2002). He shows that elite preservation is one of the key objectives of the advocates of NEPAD and when this interest is at stake, African leaders will prefer to trample on the principles of peer review, the most celebrated feature of NEPAD. According to Taylor (2002: 406), “despite the rhetoric of the NEPAD, the ordinary African will lose out whilst the elites carry on with business as usual”. This is also the view of Patrick Chabal (2002) who, after taking a look at the character of politics in Africa, shows a persistence of neo-patrimonialism and disorder. He argues that democratisation has been manipulated to give a new lease of life to dictators. NEPAD should therefore be understood as a populist measure of African leaders to appear to be in support of democracy and the market in order to guarantee transfer of resources to Africa: “a continuation with, rather than a break from, the type of relations that has guided the continent’s engagement with the international community since independence” (2002: 462).

Against this backdrop, therefore, a number of scholars argue that there is nothing that is new about the NEPAD. This includes Suzanne Dansereau (2002) who shows that fundamentally speaking, NEPAD is significantly similar to previous attempts of African leaders for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). She sees the only crucial difference as the fact that, under NEPAD, the role of the state in development is slashed in line with the new thinking in Bretton Woods for a diminished state. But given the fact that even state-controlled economies were aimed at strengthening the elite and not reducing dependency, Henning Melber (2002b) describes NEPAD as old wine in new bottles. For him, NEPAD is a strategic response of African leaders to diminishing aid and investments to Africa. It is not about development and this is why it alienates the people who are supposed to be the agents and end of development. This alienation of the people and popular social movements in the processes that led to the establishment of NEPAD is rather than being an oversight, a design. According to Patrick Bond (2002) who has prepared an annotated critique of NEPAD, NEPAD is a vindication of Fanon’s warning that the African governing elite would always seek to enhance its role as middle man by marginalizing the people, while embracing the colonial masters. We seek in the next section to show that this indeed is the case with NEPAD.

RESPONSES TO NEPAD

This section examines responses to NEPAD both within the continent and outside it. The target of responses is social groups, institutions and leaders of such institutions and organizations. Thus we shall rely on the communiqués, press statements or position papers of such groups as well as opinion polls that aggregate the position of cross sections of societies

African responses to NEPAD

NEPAD has attracted responses from various social movements and civil society organizations in Africa despite the fact that it is not well known across the continent. The responses of these groups have largely been critical and even outright rejection. For instance, African civil society groups who participated in a conference on NEPAD organized by the Canadian International Development Admission (CIDA) in Montreal, on 4–5 May 2002, posited that though “well intentioned” NEPAD “suffers from serious flaws”. According to the participants, two of the most fundamental flaws are that NEPAD privileges neo-liberal economic policies and the fact that “the programme did not sufficiently engage the diversity of African people in its conception and formulation and it remains largely unknown to most Africans” (Gosselin, 2002: 2).

Interestingly, as the delegates were making their positions known, another group had reached the same conclusions back in Africa the previous day. Civil Society *Indaba* resolved on 4 May 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa that:

NEPAD has been imposed on the continent by the few governments and elites, supported by the countries of the North and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Africa and her people have not been involved in devising this path of development. (cited In Bond, 2002: 29)

The group, which was made up of delegates from various civil society formations in South Africa, also observed that, “NEPAD embraces the forces of neo-liberal globalization, and promotes these forces as a cure for Africa’s ills”. It frowned at the fact that NEPAD embraces the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organisation and other institutions of neo-liberal globalization that, “have a long history of plunder and exploitation of African’s resources and her peoples, as partners in African development”. *Indaba* concluded that the development path adopted by NEPAD would push Africa and her people further into poverty, ill-health, hunger and marginalisation.

A month earlier in Accra, Ghana, a Joint Conference on “Africa’s Development Challenges in the Millennium” organized by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar and Third World Network – Africa, Accra adopted a declaration on Africa’s development challenges on 26 April 2002. On NEPAD, the groups concluded that:

While many of its stated goals may be well-intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it canvasses for the realization of these goals are flawed. As a result, NEPAD will not contribute to addressing the developmental problems of Africa. On the contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and the internal weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to African’s development. Indeed, back from international goals that have been won through global mobilization and struggle. (cited in Bond, 2002: 32)

CODESRIA and TWN–Africa further criticized NEPAD for reproducing central elements of the World Bank’s *Can Africa claim the 21st Century?* and the ECAs *Compact for African Recovery*, which include *inter alia*, a neo-liberal economic framework despite the disastrous effect of SAPs on Africa.

These concerns have resonated in the position of trade unions across Africa. For instance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) decried the fact that, “NEPAD was developed only through discussions between governments and business organizations, leaving the people far behind” (Bond, 2002: 35). COSATU also expressed concern about the economic proposals of NEPAD and cautioned in particular against any macro-economic governance that strays too far towards stabilization. This position was made earlier by the African Trade Union Conference, which met in Dakar, Senegal on February 20, 2002. Representatives of workers and trade unions of Africa, after puncturing the neo-liberal underpinnings of NEPAD, its failure to place itself on extant structures, and its top-down approach to development, noted:

While we accept the concept of, and the need for, partnership with Africa's development partners, we believe NEPAD should have addressed the asymmetrical relationship that has existed between Africa and her partners since independence. (Bond, 2002: 40)

African workers therefore declared that:

NEPAD should be regarded as a working platform that needs recrafting to avoid pitfalls of earlier programmes and ensure that the envisaged partnership is symmetrical and mutually beneficial. It should represent a paradigm shift in Africa's relationship with her international development partners (Bond, 2002: 40).

In another meeting in Dakar, Senegal, African labour leaders under the aegis of the Organization for African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU) raised critical issues with NEPAD. These include the feasibility of NEPAD in an environment of incessant conflicts and the complicity of several African governments in such conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the uncritical acceptance of the ideology of marketization and state withdrawal, as well as the dissonance between NEPAD and existing pan-African initiatives on development (*The Guardian*, 8- 8- 2002: 12).

Several African lobby groups also expressed opposition to the NEPAD. In a press statement at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico 18–22 March 2002, a civil society group called the African Financing for Development Caucus noted *inter alia*;

Our first protest is against the marginalisation of civil society from the process. We are convinced that without popular participation, NEPAD will suffer the same fate as other past initiatives ... Secondly, we are concerned that our leaders are placing Africa's development in the hands of speculators, the gamblers of the global casino and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The success of NEPAD is being made contingent on the generosity and charity of wealthy nations. This is dangerous and should be reversed. It is never too late. (cited in Bond, 2002: 37)

The Caucus issued a communiqué during the 4th preparatory conference for African Financing for Development, held in January 2002, in which it noted with apprehension the prominence given to NEPAD by the financing for development process. It called for transparency and participation of all stakeholders and opposed any attempt to use

NEPAD to deepen African's external dependence and the exploitation of its resources. The World Forum for Alternatives and the Third World Forum, Dakar, which convened the African Social Forum in Bamako, Mali in February 2002, expressed similar reservations. The Forum feared that given the historical role of international financial institutions in ignoring African initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action, "the help given to the New Partnership shows its neo-liberal orientation". The Forum, whose slogan is that "Another Africa is Possible" submitted that NEPAD, which was elaborated by four African heads of state without consultation with their populations and institutions, is capable of giving international financial institutions and multinational corporations a new instrument to perpetrate their control over African economies and macro-economic policies.

At the G6 Billion People's Summit convened by the International Society for Peace and Human Rights (ISPHR) to provide an alternative forum to the G8 summit which met in Kananaskis, Canada from June 26 to 27, 2002, 1, 200 civil society representatives saw "NEPAD as the zone of class war declared on African people because it is founded on the doctrine of debt servicing and good governance in exchange for foreign aid and investment" (Ogwo, 2002: 39). The summit rejected the neo-liberal stance of NEPAD, its non-participatory adoption process, its conservative, refusal to consider the reparation option and the fact that the document was neck deep in modernization waters with its "catch-up" mentality. These positions were reflected in the position of the CASS Board of Economists on NEPAD. In a communiqué released after the Board's meeting in October 2002, CASS said:

The goals of NEPAD are laudable. However, a close examination indicates that NEPAD is predicated on the notion that foreign assistance is indispensable to national development. That presupposes that the forces of development are largely exogenous. Such notion negates the experiences of developed countries. There is no substitute for development forces that must come from within. NEPAD is a partnership of African leaders and the international community. The people are not carried along as revealed in several surveys of African countries. (CASS Newsletter, 2002)

One such survey was conducted by *Guardian Newspapers* in Nigeria. According to the reputable paper, "it can be safely assumed that most Nigerians are not aware of the existence of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)" (*The Guardian*, 4/9/2002: 8). The survey polled 1, 200 respondents from 24 states of the federation across the six geo-political zones. Out of this, 600 respondents, that is 50 percent answered "No" to the question, "Have you heard about the existence of NEPAD?", 426 respondents (35.5 percent) said they had heard about NEPAD. The poll showed great regional disparities in awareness of NEPAD, with 61 percent of respondents from North Central, 59.5 percent from South-West, 46 percent from North West, 45 percent apiece from South-East and South-South, and 43.5 percent from North-East claiming ignorance of NEPAD.

This high level of ignorance over the existence of NEPAD in Nigeria is one of the worrisome. This is because President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria is a foremost salesmen and chair of the NEPAD Implementation Committee. This poor awareness is also worrisome because the profile of the respondents as shown in Tables 1 and 2, is indica-

tive of the fact that they were literate, predominantly belonged to the professional cadre, and should under normal circumstances be aware of such policies.

Table 1: Level of education attained by respondents

Level of Education	% of respondents
Bachelors degree	39.7%
Professional Qualification (ACA)	19.8%
GCE /WASC	17.8%
Masters' degree	11.6 %
First school leaving certificate	4.0 %
Doctoral degree	2.8 %
Other specified degrees	4.4 %

Table 2: Occupational background of respondents

Occupation	% of respondents
Civil servants	30.7 %
Professionals	15.6 %
Artisans	3.4 %
Military officers	2.9 %
Traders	4.6 %
Contractors	3.8 %
House wives	2.5 %
Farmers/fishermen	1.1 %
Religious leaders	3.3 %
Casual workers	2.8 %
Other specified occupations	4.1 %

It could be safely concluded from the above that majority of Nigerians are not aware of NEPAD since the predominantly literate sampled population was not aware of NEPAD.

In response to a follow-up question, “what chances do you think NEPAD has in bringing development to Africa?”, 558 respondents (46.5%) answered “None”, 408 (34%) answered “Little”, while only a marginal 218 (18.2%) answered “Great”.

The conclusion from the foregoing is that even among those who are aware of NEPAD, the initiative is unpopular and not trusted to lead African countries out of the woods of poverty, chronic indebtedness and incessant conflicts. The responses of Africans to NEPAD are generally not charitable. This opposition to NEPAD is not restricted to the ivory towers, civil society and grassroots organizations. Indeed, some African governments oppose NEPAD. For instance, during the United Nations World Summit for Sustainable Development, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his Namibian counterpart, Sam Nujoma, dismissed NEPAD as “a neo-colonial scheme” (ARB, 2002).

Extra-African responses to NEPAD

Western responses to NEPAD have been largely positive and warm. After the first official presentation of the plan to the G8 Summit in Genoa in 2001, the G8 announced the Genoa Plan for Africa which vowed to “support the consolidation of democracy, pluralism and electoral air” in Africa. The Action Plan of Genoa started with an agreement by the Heads of State that all countries should designate high-level personal representatives to work out a concrete plan, in liaison with committed African leaders, for the next G8 Summit. Meanwhile across Europe, the plan was celebrated. A German minister welcomed the initiative as “groundbreaking” and indicated it would form “the benchmark for Germany’s policy on Africa” (Melber, 2002a: 201). Following a meeting of African leaders with the European Union (EU) on 10 October 2001 in Brussels, the EU expressed its support for the “new political will” of African leaders (Melber, 2002a: 201). The British government also openly supported the initiative. Tony Blair’s visit to four African countries in February 2002 was used to mobilize support for NEPAD. Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the British Treasury, promised that Britain would support “substantial assistance along the lines of the Marshall Plan to Africa” (Tembo, 2002: 32). Tony Colman, a member of the British Parliament, was full of praises for NEPAD:

NEPAD is a comprehensive and promising strategy, but it is not a revolution in development policy. The most central difference is that it is African owned. It is not the result of ideas dreamed up in American or European policy institutes but of African experience and resolve. NEPAD has potential because it puts into action the idea of development by the people, for the people. The strategy is unified and brings together existing best practices. NEPAD could be the light at the end of the tunnel in which African countries have found themselves stranded for some decades. (Colman, 2002: 9)

The position of the United States as encapsulated in the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) shares the NEPAD dream of providing the “reforming African countries with the most liberal access to the US market available to any country or region outside the North American free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)”. Indeed, Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative who visited Kenya and South Africa in February 2002 said “the need for increased trade and investment in sub-Saharan African is as stark as it is in any region in the world because this is the poorest region in the world and encompasses some 10 percent of the world’s population”. (Tembo, 2002: 32)

One of the strongest supporters of greater development assistance to Africa is the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien. He strongly supported the NEPAD initiative and was determined to use the G8 summit which he hosted in Kananaskis “to push through his agenda of stepping up international support for African development” (ARB, 2002). It is against this background of overwhelming support that the G 8 Summit’s response to NEPAD should be examined.

Describing NEPAD as “a bold and clear-sighted vision of African’s development”, the G8 said:

The NEPAD provides an historic opportunity to overcome obstacles to development. Our African Action Plan is the G8’s initial response, designed to encourage the imaginative effort that underlines the NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for future cooperation. (G8, 2002a: 1)

While noting previous attempts to engender development in Africa, the G8 described NEPAD as an initiative that offers something different:

It is first and foremost, a pledge by African leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development. (G8, 2002a).

The G8 leaders said they were supporting the initiative because:

Half of Africa's population lives on less than US\$ 1 per day, and alone among the continents, African is becoming poorer and poverty is on the rise. Alone among the continents, the average life span in Africa is becoming shorter and is now 16 years less than in the next lowest region and has dropped 3 years in the last 10. The rate of illiteracy for persons over 15 is 41 percent, and Africa is the only region where school enrollment is declining at all levels, and particularly among women and girls. While Africa accounts for 13% of the world's population, Africa's exports accounts for less than 1.6% of global trade, and that figure is falling. Africa currently attracts less than 1% of global investment and is the only major region to see per capita investment and savings decline since 1970; indeed as much as 40% of Africa's own savings are not invested within the continent. Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa has fallen from previous levels of US\$ 17 billion to US \$ 12 billion today. (G8, 2002b: 1)

Based on this and the fact that Africa's leaders "emphasized good governance and human rights as necessary preconditions for Africa's recovery", the G8 said it was "committed to establishing enhanced partnerships with countries that are committed to and implementing the NEPAD" (G8, 2002b: 2). This would entail putting measures in place to find peace in Africa, to boost expertise and capacity to encourage trade and direct growth-oriented investment, and to provide more effective Official Development Assistance (ODA). The group listed its action plan in the areas of resource mobilization, peace and security, governance and human resources. For instance, under resource mobilization, the G8 promised to allocate at least 50 percent of the G8 share of US \$ 12 billion per year in new resources to Africa. It also said it would use grants instead of loans for the poorest debt -vulnerable countries and provide US \$1 billion to meet the projected shortfall in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

It is apposite to note that the G8 support for NEPAD is predicated on the commitment of African leaders to promote democracy, good governance, human rights and open market economies. Thus more assistance to Africa is a *quid pro quo* for the liberalization of markets and adoption of liberal democracy. This is why Western excitement over the letter and spirit of NEPAD is dampened by historical experiences of African leaders refusing to honour and respect agreements or protocols. Indeed, the few skeptical views on NEPAD in the developed world are hinged on the fear that African leaders will not honour their own commitments. As Melber (2002: 201) rightly observed:

There has been growing skepticism among members of the donor community that the request for massive additional financial support to implementing the initiative will come all too soon, while the political will indicated with regard to issues of governance will remain only a vague promise.

Unfortunately for African leaders reasons to doubt their newfound political will came all too soon. As the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe took place amidst protests by opposition groups at attempts by the ruling party to rig the elections, the expectation in the West especially after the government's handling of the land issue was that the 'new breed' of political leaders of Africa would condemn Robert Mugabe's sit-tight antics. This was not to be as the leaders failed to condemn what many Western leaders felt was Robert Mugabe's manipulation of the electoral process. Morgan Tsvangirai, the embattled Zimbabwean opposition leader who is deemed to have the support of several Western governments, pointedly expressed the disappointment of the international community that NEPAD would not stop dictatorship and abuse of human rights:

You know this is the saddest thing about Africa, all these flowering declarations and act without commitment. There's no commitment because there is no holding to account... These declarations are not worth the paper they're written on. Releasing such paper creates a feel good atmosphere and, when leaders are reminded of what they had signed, they retreat into the defense of the sovereignty of nations. (cited in Taylor, 2002: 405- 406)

This is exactly what African leaders did in response to Western queries to the Zimbabwe crisis. While Nigeria and South Africa acquiesced in the Commonwealth suspension of Zimbabwe to save the meeting at Kananaskis from collapsing, the South African Deputy President warned the West not to take African leaders for granted and indeed accused the West of blackmail and conspiracy:

We need to vigorously challenge the doctrine of "collective punishment" that is emerging in relationship between Africa and the developed North. This is the doctrine that any significant project initiated by our continent, particularly NEPAD, will not be supported if a particular leader or country behaves in a manner that is unacceptable. (cited in Melber, 2002: 206)

EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES

We have shown above that while NEPAD got a cold reception in Africa, leaders of industrialized countries and the international financial institutions have generally lauded the initiative. Thus for NEPAD, it has been a case of charity beginning abroad. How do we explain the differential responses?

It has been shown in this chapter that NEPAD was formulated through a process that ensured regular and profound consultation with the leadership and institutions of industrial countries. This has been acknowledged by both critical and liberal commentaries on NEPAD. It is our considered position that the intense consultations, which the originators had with Western leaders and institutions explain the warm reception the initiative has received from the West. This is because in the process of such consultation NEPAD was adapted to suit the fancies of the West. In fact as the CODESRIA and TWN joint conference pointed out, the model of development and partnership sought by NEPAD was lifted from position papers of the World Bank and its sister organizations. Moreover, a liberal commentary confirms that:

The NEPAD focus on such productive partnerships with donors is also consistent with the views of internationally reputable and recognized commentators on African development problems. Indeed, some of those views seem to have had a significant influence on the framing of the NEPAD document. (Hope, 2002: 395)

Even the title of NEPAD was influenced by current thinking in the international donor community. In 1999, Jeffrey Sachs had in a seminal article called for “A New Partnership for Growth in Africa” in which he called for substantial rethinking of development assistance to Africa. It is instructive that the drafters of NEPAD merely supplanted Sachs’s “Growth” with “Development” to get a title.

It is also apposite to recall the extensive consultations that the originators of NEPAD had with the developed world by quoting President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa *in extenso*:

During the year 2000, we spent some time meeting the political leadership of the developed world—the North. Accordingly, in May we met Prime Minister Blair and President Bill Clinton in London and Washington D.C. respectively. We also met the then Governor George W. Bush in Austin, Texas. In June, we were part of the Berlin meeting on progressive governance... In the same month, we visited to participate in and addressed the meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers. Again in June, we addressed the meeting of the European Council held in Portugal, which was attended by all heads of government of the EU. In July, together with Presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflika, we met heads of state and governments of G7 in Tokyo and had the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori. While in Tokyo we also met the President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn. Later, in Pretoria we also held discussions with the Managing Director of the IMF, Horst Kohler. In September, we addressed the UN Millennium Summit and had an opportunity to meet President Putin of Russia, among others. Before this, we had also interacted with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who committed the UN to operate with us as we worked on the MAP (cited in Nabudere, 2002: 5-6).

Throughout all the briefings Africans, even African leaders, were not informed. As Mbeki later said:

We intend to brief all African Heads of State over the next few months. Our aim is to be as inclusive as possible. Thereafter substantial consultations with the leaders of the developed countries and multilateral institutions would take place... The implementation of the plan will commence as soon as briefings have been completed and commitments made by a critical number of African countries... Countries that are not ready will be welcome to join late. (cited in Nabudere, 2002: 6-7)

The ignorance and antipathy of African peoples and some leaders to NEPAD is therefore understandable. Indeed, as a Nigerian participant in a Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) conference on NEPAD noted, most Africans learnt about the initiative through Western sources. In response to how he encountered NEPAD, Ngoyi, a human rights activist said:

Because we are used to hunting for policy documents, we stumbled upon NEPAD. We were not surprised not to have heard about it because we are used to the government not telling us what they are doing. We called our Canadian Partners who sent us NEPAD.

With our limited means we made copies and called for a meeting of intellectuals and activists to discuss it. Only through our partnership with our brothers in Canada was this possible ... Since our leaders have brought NEPAD here to you before bringing it to us, tell them we came here and we want real partnership, not just between leaders of Africa and the leaders of G8, but also between leaders and civil society in Africa. (cited in Gosselin, 2002: 1-2).

It is evident from the foregoing that there is a feeling of alienation among civil society organizations from the processes that led to the adoption of NEPAD and that this alienation is critical to the cold reception and fears that NEPAD has generated across the continent.

CONCLUSION: DOES POPULAR PARTICIPATION MATTER?

This chapter has shown that while industrialized countries of the world have embraced NEPAD, African social movements have generally disowned the document. What are the implications of this scenario for the success of NEPAD? It is important to raise this question because some commentators have argued that much ado is being made about the non-consultation. While African leaders have generally accepted that there was an error in not consulting Africans,⁴ partly in response to neo-liberal revisionist views on development, which have embraced the necessity of popular participation as demonstrated, for instance, in the World Bank's insistence that Country Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers should be prepared in consultation with civil society; some analysts believe that there was nothing wrong with the approach and that the present effort to sell NEPAD to Africans is enough and would not jeopardize its chances of turning the fortunes of African countries around. Luc Sindjourn's position captures the defense:

You can't ask for NEPAD or African Union what you did not ask for the Treaty of Rome (which founded the European Union). How many ordinary Germans or French have been associated with the Treaty of Rome or even know its details? But see what it has done for Europe. (cited in Ogola, 2002: 12)

It is pertinent to note that such defense is common to all top-down development models and is indeed the rationalization for the devaluation of democracy (Ake, 2000). It is factually incorrect for it overlooks the fact that in several countries of Europe the EU was adopted only after referenda were conducted. In fact, it is increasingly being widely acknowledged that the bane of regional integration schemes in Africa is the lack of popular participation (Asante, 2002; Oj, 2002). Moreover, the United Nations Development Programme has in several reports shown that top-down approaches to poverty alleviation have, rather than alleviate poverty, led to poverty aggravation. This is because the non-participatory approaches promote social exclusion and alienation, which often make even the poor sabotage the programmes because they suspect ulterior motives on the part of government (UNDP Nigeria, 1998). Since poverty reduction is a principal objective of NEPAD, the prospects of success could be limited by the non-participation of the people.

Moreover, African social movements, especially labour unions, who have kicked against liberalization and privatization which NEPAD promotes stand to work against

its actualization. It is not only social movements that are likely to work against NEPAD but also governments that were marginalized in the process of its preparation. For instance, President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya has criticized NEPAD for its capitulation to neo-liberalism (*The Guardian*, 8-8-2002: 12). In the event that such leaders would not implement NEPAD, selective engagement of compliant countries by Western donors under the principle of 'enhanced partnerships' enshrined in NEPAD would promote suspicion and rivalry among African countries and therefore work against African unity, which is one of the advertised objectives of NEPAD. Clearly, therefore, while NEPAD may succeed in helping a few countries in Africa get more foreign aid it would not lead to the envisaged development. For it is not anchored on the principles and values that promote development such as popularity, self-reliance, empowerment confidence and self-realization, but rather on alienation (Ake, 1996: 140-141). For development to be feasible, "the people have to be the agents, means and ends of development". NEPAD, by depending on a received neo-liberal model ignores the fact "Development cannot be received; it has to be experienced as participation in the process of bringing it about" (Ake, 1996: 140). In this respect, NEPAD faces the same fate of previous development strategies that marginalized the people. For, as Ake posited:

If the people possess their development, the development process would not turn out to be an exercise in alienation, as has been the case in much of Africa. What is happening now is an attempt to develop against the people- a strategy characterized by appropriating the people's right to develop themselves... What is needed is to move away from the fixation on how Africa ought to be and to force-feed Africa into a state of being. Development must take the people not as they ought to be but as they are and try to find how the people can move forward by their own efforts, in accordance with their own values. (Ake, 1996: 141-142)

It is therefore necessary that African peoples be allowed to reconstruct NEPAD in accordance with their values. It would not be enough for the leadership to just inform the people and expect them to comply with NEPAD.

NOTES

1. The committee which has Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo as chairman, and Algeria's President A. Bouteflika and Senegal's President A. Wade as Vice Chairmen, meets once every four months.
2. The steering committee is charged with the responsibility of developing a strategic plan for marketing with the aim of mobilizing domestic support and facilitating private sector and international partnership.
3. Based in Pretoria, South Africa, the secretariat has a small staff.
4. One reaction is to hold workshops to inform different groups of the objectives of NEPAD. Thus a workshop was held for African Parliamentarians. See Aderinwale, 2002.

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TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAN-AFRICAN UNIVERSITY: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT PAPER

Dani W. Nabudere

Pan-Africanists and people of goodwill towards Africa's advancement for a long time have advocated the establishment of a Pan-African University, and yet this hope has never been realised despite various attempts having been made in this direction. The challenge is that such a University must be a *new University*, not only in the approach to teaching and research, but more fundamentally, in its strategic conception and its placement at the base of African and human emancipation and liberation. In being a new University, it has to play the vital role of freeing knowledge production from narrow class, technical, and instrumentalist dominance by a few specialists to a broader theatre of recognition of other producers of knowledge, which matters in their lives and which has validity in their cultural contexts. This is what has made the creation of such a University more difficult because its creation would not only undermine existing dominant interests, but also challenge the citadel of Eurocentric paradigms and Western 'scientific' epistemologies of knowledge.

Yet it is time that such a task be embarked on headlong. As Chancellor Williams cautioned us in his last book, *The Rebirth of African Civilisation* (1963), the task of establishing an African University "even when pushed on all fronts, as it must be, with the speed consistent with careful study and soundness, will nevertheless be like building a cathedral—which one expects to see completed in his lifetime or that of his children" (p. 212). Williams called for a Master Plan with a clear goal but with which we will begin to build, no matter in what small way, but begin to build concentrating on those tasks which can be done but which become the foundation for the rest (Ibid). In somewhat similar vein in advising on the embarking on this task, Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah, advised that it is better to take small steps but which, when put together, lead to success. In whatever case, he added, we must ensure that "we do not fail".¹

It is for this reason that the Afrika Study Centre Trust (ASCT) based in Mbale, Uganda, wishes to be associated with those institutions, organisations, and individuals both on the African continent and in the African Diaspora that wish to see the fulfilment of this dream in the furtherance of African emancipation and liberation. Afrika

Study Centre was established and registered in Uganda on 2 December 1994 as a Trust under the Trustees Incorporation Act, (Cap 147). Under the Act, ASCT has the status of *universitas personarum* with a perpetual succession unaffected by changes in members of its trustees, which is capable of owning property and incurring liabilities in its own name of suing and being sued in court of law. Therefore, the ASCT has, in relation to its property and affairs, and for the purposes of carrying out its objects or performing any acts incidental thereto, all rights, powers, and privileges which it would have possessed had it been a private individual of full legal capacity, except as limited by law.

At the first meeting of the Board of Trustees, held shortly after its registration, it was noted by the promoters of the project that the Trust was the collective outcome of the thoughts and efforts of a small group of Ugandans of varied intellectual and professional backgrounds who were united by a common desire to contribute constructively to the emancipation of Africa through study and research. The Trustees also noted that this was part of a multifaceted struggle of the African peoples, both on the African continent and in the African Diaspora, who were ceaselessly engaged in the human endeavour of uplifting themselves from centuries of degradation, exploitation, and domination by others who had enslaved and colonised them. Without improving their knowledge of the world around them and their memory of their world of the past, they could not foster their authentic and wholesome development against great historical and contemporary odds.

Among the broad goals of the Trust, the following were central to its general vision: sponsoring, promoting, undertaking, establishing and conducting research into recognized subjects and academic study, including African history, African culture, African society, African links with other peoples on other continents now and in the past, problems of transition of African societies and the role of African tradition and institutions in the world, as well as the dissemination for public benefit of the useful results of such research by publishing the same for worldwide distribution and consumption to include educational establishments throughout Uganda, Africa and the world. In addition, the ASC Trust was to establish, set up, promote, organise, and maintain or assist in so doing seminars, conferences, public and private meetings, displays, libraries, study centres, resource centres, and the like—all intended to advance African research and learning.

Since then Afrika Study Centre has, from its small semi-rural enclave in Mbale, Eastern Uganda, embarked on a number of research, training, and collaborative activities that have helped inspire the Trust to pursue the vision of the establishment of a Pan-African University in collaboration with other institutions and organisations. These have included:

- Making contacts with individuals, organisations and institutions standing for the same ideas as the Trust in order to maintain the image of the Trust;
- Carrying out some limited research for the production of academic papers as well as the writing of monographs and books on current issues of African culture and development. One such major book is the manuscript now with the publishers entitled: *Africa In the New Millennium: Towards a Post-Traditional Renaissance*, which was submitted to Africa World Press in 2000, but which is coming out in 2003. Another, which has come out of the political activity connected with the African Renaissance and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (including the emer-

gence of continental economic programmes such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development-NEPAD), entitled: *The African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism*, is due to be published also by Africa World Press in 2003.

- Collaborating with other institutions in Uganda, other parts of Africa and the world at large. This included collaboration with the Islamic University in Uganda aimed at staff development as well as co-hosting of Swedish students from Osterlenes Folk High School to double with African students in small-scale research in communities and institutions that encourages cross-cultural learning and understanding. We hope that this programme can lead to the creation of department of Afrikan-Skandinavian Studies within the Pan-Afrikan University.
- Three-year research programme on violence and conflict in agro-pastoral communities supported by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation of New York. This research has resulted in the production of five monographs on sub-themes on the subject and a book manuscript entitled *Globalization, Arms Proliferation and Transformation in Agro-pastoral Communities in Eastern Africa*. As a result of this research, ASCT developed a "Field Building" research activity on security in agro-pastoral communities.
- Collaboration with the Social Science Research Council of New York, supported by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation in "Field Building" research activity aimed at bringing together academic scholars, practitioners, and indigenous knowledge experts and custodians. This activity was intended to result in the pooling of skills and expertise from these sources of knowledge so that such pool of knowledge can be made accessible to all users. This activity has led to the questioning of the dominant Eurocentric epistemologies which had eclipsed endogenous knowledge systems but which are now being recognized. To complete this challenge, we have to elaborate further the epistemology and methodology that can inform knowledge production in Africa as part of the process of creating a truly global knowledge in which African sources are fully recognized (Nabudere, 2002).
- The promotion of the idea of establishing a Pan-Afrikan University. Currently the ASC Trust is developing a collaboration arrangement with the University of South Africa (UNISA) and other like-minded institutions of higher learning aimed at creating an African-centred higher education (including materials, books, curriculum development, etc.) consistent with the need for the African renaissance and African rebirth.

THE PAN-AFRICAN UNIVERSITY

The establishment of the Pan-Afrikan University should have as its overall goal the provision of opportunities for higher and advanced education for students and adult learners in the context of a new Afrikan-based epistemology and methodology. It should give them the opportunity to acquire and produce new knowledge in the context of the African condition and the global environment in which we exist. It should provide innovative ways of researching, learning, and sharing of knowledge in, and with,

the communities in which the researchers and learners are engaged in acquiring such knowledge in Africa and elsewhere in the world. It is, more importantly, a response to the cry of the African people for an African Renaissance and rebirth that can reawaken and reactivate their genius and create an atmosphere for self-transformation and development to recover what has been lost and forgotten.

But for the Pan-African University to set a new path in the search for knowledge and truth, it must first and foremost be built on a sound spiritual basis that highlights those aspects of African spiritual life that has enabled the African people to survive as a human community throughout the centuries. It should, as Chancellor Williams, reminds us, go beyond European classical humanism with its class, socio-economic and geographical limitations based on Greece and the Athenian City-State, which was based on a system of slavery. Pan-African humanism must lead to “enlarged humanities” and recapture that original meaning of humanity which Western scholars, beginning with Plato, in their hollow and lopsided search for material progress, abandoned. By privileging “reason” above everything else and abandoning the spiritual aspects of life, including the idea of the immortal soul, western scholarship embarked on a path that is increasingly bringing humanity to the brink of destruction through violence and ecological destruction).

The task of contemporary African philosophy is to critique the Eurocentric “Idea” and “general philosophy” in its metaphysical belief that European humanism is superior to that of the African people. This falsehood, which Europe perpetuated and still does, in so many ways, is based on the idea that the rest of humanity has to be *forced* to believe like Europe in order to be “humanised” into a singular humanity. This, in the words of Tsenay Serequeberhan, implies the “singularisation of human diversity by being forced onto a singular track of historical ‘progress’ grounded on an emulation and/or mimicry of European historicity” (Serequeberhan, 2002:67). According to Serequeberhan, this “pretext” that flattens all difference, has to be critically “de-structured” by contemporary African philosophy if “our shared humanity” that Kant talks about is to be realised and critically appropriated. Indeed for him, the task of contemporary African philosophy—its critical-negative project— is the critique of Eurocentrism and recognition and “de-structuring of its speculative metaphysical underpinnings, which still holds us in bondage” (Ibid: 75).

The African Renaissance, which should inform the establishment of the Pan-African University, must therefore recapture those basic elements of Afrikan humanism (*Ubuntu, sommun bonus, eternal life and immanent moral justice*) as the opening of the way to a new humanistic universalism. This, according to Williams, “is the spiritual and moral element, actualised in good will among men (and women), which Africa itself has preserved and can give to the world”, (Williams, 1966: 208, 213).

This task has not been achieved by the existing African universities, which have failed to generate the kind of knowledge environment required for the social and economic transformation of their societies. They have continued to reproduce dependent Eurocentric knowledge, a knowledge that is dependent on its actualisation in centres that exploit the Afrikan people and utilise African resources freely. They have failed to transform themselves into centres of learning so as to strengthen African independ-

ence and development. They have become satellite universities of other universities outside the African continent serving outside interests and agendas instead of serving the African people.

The models of Western Universities, which Africa adopted, have proved completely unsuitable for Africa's needs. According to Dr. Alex A. Kwampong, the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana, the post-colonial African universities came into being at the same time as the birth of new African states or soon after the attainment of their independence. They were consciously conceived and designed by the new African leadership with their former colonial advisers as "prime instruments" for the attainment of national independence, as well as the consolidation of that independence. But this independence has continued to reflect European dominance by Western educated African elites, which continue to peddle Eurocentric "development" models.

Thus in addition to serving the universal and basic objectives of universities everywhere, these universities were expected, above all, to promote the development and modernisation of their various countries along Western lines in the process of "nation-building". According to Kwampong, they were meant to be "development universities," expected to play much the same role as the land-grant colleges of the United States in the 19th. But forty years on, the African university and the African governments that created them had dismally failed to chart new paths for Africa's emancipation and liberation and Africa finds itself in deep, multidimensional crises that require deeply thought-out solutions and responses, if the African rebirth is ever to be achieved. (Vilakazi, 2002: 205-6)

But in embarking on this great task, we have to realise that we are not beginning from nothing. The university as an institution of learning and knowledge reproduction has its origin in Africa. The Sankore university founded in the City of Timbuktu in the Songhay Empire was the latest and best of its kind anywhere in the world. The University was the intellectual capital of the Western Sudan and provided a vibrant learning environment for the learners and the teachers. Felix DuBois in his book, *Timbuctoo the Mysterious* described the scholars at this university in the following words:

They astounded the most learned men of Islam by their erudition. That these Negroes were at a level with the Arab savants (men of exceptional learning) is proved by the fact that they were installed as professors in Morocco and Egypt. In contrast to this, we find that the Arabs were not always equal to the requirements of Sankore: (Quoted by Mzamane (1999:179).

Thus, before colonisation and the Arab and European enslavement of Africans, Africa provided the best institutions of learning that there were at the time. It is recorded that when the Moroccans invaded Timbuktu in 1552, Professor Ahmad Baba, the last Chancellor of the university, was the author of some 40 books on different subjects. He had a collection of some 1, 600 books in his library. He was exiled and this treasure was destroyed in the hands of the Arab invaders (Ibid: 180). The basis of African civilisation was weakened and efforts were made to destroy it. But although weakened it did not die nor was it destroyed.

The physical structures were destroyed but not the soul of the Africans who believed in *eternal life* and *immanent moral justice* of humanity. It is this soul of humanity that survived and that seeks to rebuild what was lost of the institutions Africans created in the past, but which have relevance in their lives of today's world. Thus, the establishment of the Pan-African university does not begin from a vacuum but has a deep heritage of culture and civilisational values that must inform its recreation. These institutions are to be found within Africa's ancient achievements. They have to be unearthed and reclaimed.

Indeed, as George James points out in his *Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy*, many of the one thousand books credited to Aristotle were not his products. Most of them were copied from Egyptian texts, which Alexander the Great had looted from the libraries of Egypt during Greek conquest and occupation of that African civilisation. From his research, James was able to observe that:

Certainly he could not have obtained them from the Greeks, for that vast body of knowledge, which bears his name and which was presented as new, would really have been the traditional common possession of all who were members of the Greek Schools of philosophy for they would have been the only persons inside Greece permitted to own such books; for knowledge was protected as secret. Under these circumstances it is evident that the vast body of scientific knowledge ascribed to Aristotle, was neither in possession of the Greeks of his time, nor was there any one in Greece competent to teach him Science and, least of all, on so vast a scale. (James, 1992: 129)

James concluded that the Greeks, among the surrounding nations, were the most anxious to obtain the valuable secrets of the Egyptians, in the ancient Sciences, and this opportunity came when Alexander the Great invaded Egypt. According to Strabo and Plutarch, whom James quotes, Alexander entrusted these books in the hands of Aristotle, and upon Aristotle's death, the looted books fell into the hands of Theophrastus who succeeded him as head of his School. Later the Roman Army looted these books in style when Greece fell to them in 84 bc. They were carried by Sulla to Rome, where Tyrannio, a grammarian, secured copies and enabled Andronicus of Rhodes to publish them.

Cheikh Anta Diop has pointed out that until Africa is able to reclaim this historical and Promethean consciousness that is embodied in the achievements of ancient Egypt, the history of Black Africans, and that of humanity in general, will "remain suspended in air." According to him, such a history can never be written correctly, "until African historians dare to connect it with the history of Egypt" (Diop, 1974: xiv-vi). In his view, even the study of languages, institutions, etc. cannot be treated properly until this is done, "in a word, it will be impossible to build an African humanities, a body of African human Sciences, so long as the relationship does not appear legitimate" (Ibid: xiv).

If the Pan-African University is, therefore, to respond to this historic challenge and be part of the correction of this historical distortion and theft of African heritages, it has to provide a deeply thought out and well-conceived vision and mission, with a well articulated strategy to achieve its objectives. To succeed, it must be part of the creation of a counter-hegemonic discourse which can enable the "triple agenda of deconstruction, reconstruction and regeneration" to be undertaken at the same time (Odora Hoppers,

et al. 2002: 236). To achieve this counter-discourse, the Pan-Afrikan University has to try to develop the university as a new institution of higher education, which can help and contribute to reshaping the direction of education on the continent towards a more culture-specific and culturally relevant curriculum and pedagogy of liberation.

The Pan-Afrikan University must draw from these heritages and provide the students, adult learners and the communities with a space in which they can learn as well as carry out their research for analysis into dissertations and theses after having interacted with and been trained by their teachers, community experts, and consultants at the university campuses as well as in the community knowledge sites. The university should also provide them with the facilities necessary for expanding on their existing knowledge and, with their teachers and indigenous knowledge experts, and carry out theoretical formulations and reflections in an interdisciplinary, pluridisciplinary and comparative manner. It is to provide conditions for the acquisition of knowledge not only for “its own sake” but for the *sake of humanity and African recovery and rebirth*.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY

For the Pan-Afrikan University to have a real impact and meaningful and innovative contribution, the university should develop new methodologies and techniques for accessing, utilising, and storing all knowledge based on an African epistemology and cosmology. This would imply the development of an all-inclusive approach, which recognises all sources of human knowledge as valid within their own contexts. This requires the adoption of hermeneutic philosophy in its African essence (Nabudere, 2002).

An African-based epistemological foundation is a prerequisite for the production and development of knowledge. Foucault in his book, *The Order of Things: The Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1970), coins the concept “episteme” from its Greek origin to mean the *fore-conception of any investigation in the search for knowledge*. An episteme is therefore formed beforehand through an “inner structure of being”, which constitutes its order. It is this order that arranges the world of being through which the “symbolic disclosure” is produced. According to Foucault:

Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by glance, an examination, a language.
(Foucault, 1970: xx)

This means that every speaker or investigator acts in accord with the symbolic order of which he/she may at times be unconscious in the activities within the given culture and “discourse framework”. According to Foucault, “The fundamental structures of a culture—those governing its language, its schemes of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices—establish for every man from the very start, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home” (Ibid). It is these prior historical forms, which constitute the ordered space that makes possible the articulation of particular statements while excluding others.

They also constitute the conceptual framework, which makes it possible to establish functional rules of discourse as well as methodologies and techniques “with respect to the formulation of statements that are possible in the corresponding discourse.” The symbolic order that forms this framework is, therefore, not merely formal, universal, or transcendental presuppositions of discourse or language: “Rather they consist in historically, culturally, and discursively specified modes of disclosure in which substantive, deeply embedded assumptions about being, nature, subjectivity, time, and so on, are introduced as material presuppositions for serious discourse about the corresponding domains” (Kögler, 1999: 96).

Methodology enables these conceptual frameworks to be articulated by formulating rules and procedures to be followed in producing knowledge within the particular epistemology. These rules and procedures govern the construction of the concepts and their use in analysis. Therefore, a research methodology is not only important in defining how the research investigation is to be carried out, it also determines the instruments to be used and *how the findings are to be interpreted*. Furthermore, methodology determines the questions to be posed as well as the issues to be investigated. It follows that the “facts” to be found from the research are to a great extent determined by the methodology employed, which is also based on an epistemological foundation. The methods, techniques, and tools, which are utilised in gathering evidence and the ‘facts’ in the course of investigation, are all determined by the methodology. Methodologies, methods, techniques and tools are therefore not ‘neutral’ instruments to be used by any system of knowledge, although a lot can be learnt from them in a cross-cultural way.

In our view, the methodological approach used by researchers should be hermeneutical. It should be open-ended to permit cross-cultural communication and exchange of ideas and opinions to promote understanding between all knowledge systems in their diversities (Habermas, 1984). This is an African philosophical approach based on acceptance of pluralism and cultural diversity. The name of Hans-Georg Gadamer is associated with this line of argument in hermeneutics in which he has stressed the need for the “fusion of historical horizons” as the best way of transmitting understanding between the different lived histories or experiences of different communities as the basis of their existence. Hermeneutics insists on both the cultural context as well as the historical contingencies of events as necessary in bringing about a true understanding of the different lived experiences. Furthermore, hermeneutics has its roots in the African/Egyptian mythical figure of Hermes, the messenger of knowledge from the Gods to mortals, and that is why “hermeneutics is without reason, named after Herms, the interpreter of the divine message to mankind”. (Gadamer, 1975: 98-100)

This philosophic-pedagogic approach should be used based on the premise that encourages self-directed learning, which engages with the knowledge, interests, and real life situations that the learners can bring to their learning situations. This notion of site-specific knowledge tries to correct the Eurocentric tendency to universalise knowledge around Occidental centres and sites of knowledge which are privileged to the disadvantage of others, claiming to be the only sites of “rationality” and “scientific knowledge”. The recognition of these other sites and centres creates a truly multipolar world of global knowledge drawn from all sources of human endeavour.

Practically this means that the Pan-Afrikan University will identify these sites as centres of learning for both the students and the communities and, in the process, create directories of experts in Afrikan knowledge systems wherever Africans are to be found. The student will be allocated to these knowledge sites where an expert in the specific area of his/her knowledge will be allocated to him/her. In addition, local research assistants approved by the expert will be allocated to him/her to guide him/her in accessing knowledge from the community and the environment generally. The students will be required to spend 20 percent of their requisite period of learning at this site studying and learning from these local sites of knowledge and their experts.

During this time, the students will also be required to spend 20 percent of this time teaching the local people some of the knowledge they have acquired through the formal educational system in areas of interest to the local people. In this way, the students will not be engaged in just *pirating and privatising* knowledge but will also be *depositing and banking* some of this knowledge in the communities in a mutual exchange of learning. The students and the communities will in this way have mutually created “learning societies” at the site of knowledge, where new libraries of knowledge will be created in an organic way. The notes of the indigenous knowledge made by the student in the local dialects and languages will be copied and deposited into a community library, which will emerge and expand as the university expands its work into the communities.

The gap that has been created between the African elites and their people arises out of the fact that the elites were taught through foreign culture, which included foreign languages. The result has been that the African elite has acquired extensive knowledge, which is not relevant to their communities. In the same way, because the elites did not learn through their mother tongues, they have not accessed the vast amount of knowledge that is still available there. The consequence is that we have scholars and intelligentsia that do not understand and respect the strength of their cultures and knowledge base, while imbibing that of other cultures. At the same time, we have rural communities that are illiterate but are depositories of indigenous and practical knowledge that could educate and enrich the education of the elites.

The elite looks at their village compatriots as ignorant and illiterate, while the villagers look upon the elites as agents of foreign culture and economic interests. Hostility exists between the two and there is no trust between them since relationships between them are based on top-down “development” dictates passed on by the elite to the “ignorant masses”. This is the reason why African cultures and civilisation have stagnated, only changing to accommodate foreign inspired solutions. As Hubert Vilakazi has argued:

The peculiar situation here is that knowledge of the principles and patterns of African civilisation remained with ordinary, uncertificated men and women, especially of those in rural areas. The tragedy of African civilisation is that Western-educated Africans became lost and irrelevant as intellectuals who could develop African civilisation further. Historically, intellectuals of any civilisation are the voices of that civilisation to the rest of the world; they are the instruments of the development of the higher culture of that civilisation. The tragedy of Africa, after conquest by the West, is that her intellectuals, by and large, absconded and abdicated their role as developers, minstrels and trumpet-

ers of African civilisation. African civilisation then stagnated; what remained alive in the minds of languages of the overwhelming majority of Africans remained undeveloped. Uncertificated Africans are denied respect and opportunities for development; they could not sing out, articulate and develop the unique patterns of African civilisation. (Vilakazi, 2002: 203)

Vilakazi adds that Afrika therefore finds herself in an awkward situation. Afrika needs to develop an educational system founded upon and building on the civilisation of the overwhelming majority, yet her intellectuals are strangers to that civilisation. They have no spiritual or intellectual sympathetic relationship with the culture and civilisation embracing the masses of African people, “The biggest spiritual and mental challenge to African intellectuals is that in this massive re-education process (which is necessary), the only teachers they have are ordinary African men and women who are uncertificated, and who live largely in rural areas.” He concludes:

We are talking here about a massive cultural revolution consisting, first, of our intellectuals going back to ordinary African men and women to receive education of African culture and civilisation. Second, it shall break new ground in that un-certificated men and women shall be incorporated as full participants in the construction of the high culture of Africa. This shall be the first instance in history where certificated intellectuals alone shall not be the sole builders and determinants of high culture, but shall be working side by side with ordinary men and women in rural and urban life. Intellectuals must become anthropologists doing fieldwork, like Frobenius. But unlike academic Western anthropologists, African intellectuals shall be doing field work among their own people as part of a truly great effort aimed at reconstructing Africa and preparing all of humanity for conquering the world for humanism. (Ibid: 204)

Vilakazi is quoted here at length to demonstrate that the exercise we are trying to set in motion has occupied the sharpest minds on the Afrikan continent. He is also quoted at length because of the relevance of his ideas to what we are trying to do—and more so on the issue of linking the rural communities to centres of high learning. Prof. Vilakazi challenges all of us to wake up to this challenge and create a new university that will resurrect the deep values of Afrikan humanism (*Ubuntu*) that are so badly needed in today’s gadgetised and digitised world without the human touch and spirit. The Pan-Afrikan University is intended to bridge that gap.

This approach would be one which departs from the one-sided Western “Africanist” who, in his/her search for the “authentic” African and the depository of genuine African discourse, seeks to locate the “real” African, seeks to establish an iron wall between “the man in the bush” vis-à-vis the westernised educated African. While the problem Vilakazi poses is a real one, there exists nevertheless a link between the two components of African society. A non-African cannot play the role the African elite is required to play in the transformation of his/her society, nor can the creation of a new African university be established without both of them. Therefore, the new approach seeks to build on the *unity of the two* social forces as necessary for the reconstruction of Africa from ruins inflicted by Europe.

Just like Vilakazi, who would like to see the African intelligentsia being tutored by their “uncertificated” men and women to jointly produce a new African high culture that would be at the base of the African Renaissance, Y. V. Mudimbe too would like to see the emergence of a “wider authority” of a “critical library” of the Westernised African intellectual’s discourses developed together with “the experience of rejected forms of wisdom, which are not part of the structures of political power and scientific knowledge” (Mudimbe, 1988: x-xi). This is a useful reminder despite the fact that Mudimbe himself “lamentably fails to emancipate himself from the vicious circle inherent in the deconstructionist stance” of how this “usable past” should be used by African “experts” to construct an “authentic” African *episteme* (Masolo, 1994: 179). The object of the Pan-African University is indeed to overcome this epistemological divide between the “uncertificated Africans” and the African intelligentsia.

Afrikan languages shall therefore be at the centre of developing the university at all knowledge sites. Language, as Cabral pointed out, is at the centre of articulating a people’s culture. He points out that the Afrikan revolution would have been impossible without Afrikan people resorting to their cultures to resist domination. Culture is therefore a revolutionary force in society. It is because language has remained an “unresolved issue” in Afrika’s development that present-day education has remained an alien system. Mucere Mugo quotes Franz Fanon who wrote: “to speak a language is to assume its world and carry the weight of its civilisation” (Mugo, 2002: 218). Kwesi K. Prah has argued consistently over many years that the absence of Afrikan languages has been the “key missing link” in Afrikan development (Prah, 1998).

It follows that the Pan-Afrikan University has to build its curriculum on the basis of promoting Afrikan languages at the sites of knowledge and at the same time try to build libraries at those sites in the language of the people living there. They shall be promoted as languages of Science and Technology. This implies a complete revamping of the epistemological, cosmological worldview of the present day discourse. It will also mean the application of different methodological and pedagogical approaches to learning and research in Afrikan conditions.

For instance, ICT should be used to serve the multicultural and multilingual base of African countries, which demand user interfaces to work within given cultural contexts, graphic literacy, language interfaces, etc:

The diversity of language and high illiteracy rate demands applied research on the appropriate systems platform for local community environments, such as generic voice applications (automated voice responses and recording, s library systems, synthesised voice output for web documents, and so on). ...Opportunities offered by the growth of ICTs that make it easier to design tools for illiterates and others with impairments of the visual, language or motor faculties required for reading (Bounemra, Soltane and Adam, 1999: 341)

According to the three authors quoted above, research on tools for community participation in higher education requires the representation of local alphabets in a digital environment by mapping them and creating new applications for the purposes of communication, information search and retrieval using local languages which therefore re-

quires the representation of local language; hence the need for tools that can be used to search and retrieve information using local languages.

This requires considerable work in setting standards, developing sophisticated search algorithms, designing tools and creating search engines for specific languages. This would mean the development of African languages through their application to technology by developing translation tools to create speech production dictionaries, simple single-word language and sentence translation facilities in order to assist the illiterate speakers (Ibid: 341-2). Thus, development in general human welfare would result in the development of African languages applied to technological research, management and change.

The methodological approach should also be one that uses open and resource-based learning techniques available in the actual learning situations. It has therefore to draw on the indigenous knowledge materials available in the locality and make the maximum use of them. For instance, in the area of agriculture, the local practices of inter-cropping and use of shifting cultivation that take into account the ecological conditions have to be drawn upon for the purposes of learning since this brings new knowledge that is relevant if the local communities consider them necessary. The aim is not to counterpose “Scientific” techniques and tools to the local Science and knowledge materials. This enables a more legitimate framework for understanding the relation between the two approaches by the learners (Crossman and Devitch, 2002: 113, 116-7).

It also means that instead of lamenting the absence of “laboratories” and other technical equipment for Science education, teachers and students, while awaiting such amenities, are able to use the environment as a “living laboratory.” As Tema has correctly observed:

A positive spin-off of this practice may be that it will teach students some of the practices that are in danger of extinction with advancing urbanisation. Most urban children do not have an idea of how all the items mentioned above are constructed. Thus, conservations of traditional African culture could be achieved during Science and mathematics lessons. (Tema, 2002: 137)

Here, Tema was referring to how much mathematics is contained in the construction of a hut, and how much physics is contained in the construction of a drum. He adds, quoting Mbeki in the appeal for an Afrikan renaissance, that the challenge of an Afrikan Science educator is, to “encourage her (who carries the burden of colonial domination to rebel) to assert the principality of humanity”. This can be done, Tema adds, by having “the courage to bring the contextual knowledge of the Afrikan learner into the classroom and make it a subject of study, and a scaffold to assist learning” (Ibid: 136).

The issue of practical methodology has therefore to be faced squarely if we are to make a meaningful change in Afrikan education. The Pan-Afrikan University should be the starting point. One of the fundamental problems facing African economies and African scholarship is the dependency syndrome. This condition has replaced colonialism in the form of neo-colonialism. According to philosopher Paulin Hountondji, research in Afrika has been extroverted (externally oriented) just like Afrikan economies because knowledge production is a specific form of production “akin to the production

of goods” (Hountondji, 2002: 26, 28). He demonstrates how this was done in colonial France by showing how research centres were established in the metropole based on colonial agricultural production. It is these centres, which interpreted the raw research done in the colonies. This heritage has continued up to the present so that research by Afrikan universities remains at the level of collection of data while interpretations of it are till done at the external centres of knowledge and power.

Tema questions whether this is the correct method of conducting research. He quotes Jensen, who argues that the problem with Afrikan research is not the problem of lack of research skills, but one of epistemology. Jensen argues that it is the latter, which decides the *research issues*. He argues that in his view, therefore, “instead of using methodology as a starting-point for introducing students to research, universities should develop students’ skills to identify the questions worth studying. It is hoped, that with this approach, students would unearth their own issues and questions, and thereby become internally motivated to conduct their own research” (Tema 2002: 135).

On this issue we would like to add that the students and learners must decide the issues and the questions to be investigated not in isolation, but together with those involved in the issues to be investigated. This then raises a deeper matter than that of method and goes back to the issue of epistemological foundations for knowledge production, which must be Afrikan-centred. This is why Tema’s other point about the student introducing his/her “prior knowledge” into the classroom as the beginning of learning attains significance. In this context, the student’s prior knowledge would mean allowing students to use their “traditional world-view against the scientific paradigm.” He quotes Baimba as saying:

Traditional beliefs which make sense of the world to traditional students, often conflict with what is taught in Science lessons. Hence, for the majority of students, meaningless information given them in Science lessons is often shelved to be used only for the purpose of passing school examinations. Once outside school, it is traditional knowledge which they use to make sense of the world. (Quoted in Tema, 2002: 131)

This means that the student is denied from learning Science from his/her actual lived experiences. The student is assumed to be an empty slate—*tabula rasa*—on whose brain knowledge can be implanted without experiential or contextual background. Learning already assumes a minimum level of prior knowledge and that minimum is passed on to the student in her/his mother in the context of the culture of that person. This must form the base of education otherwise the whole exercise of education turns out to be alien culture imposition.

But more fundamentally, the idea of a new university in Africa must aim at recovering those high spiritual virtues of humanity that have been sidelined in the modern chase of materiality, as we pointed out earlier. Chancellor Williams has called this the “new Humanities” in university and college education.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

The above implies the need to develop a new curriculum that takes these epistemological, cosmological, methodological and pedagogical challenges into account. Hence, the curriculum should be culture-specific and knowledge-source-specific in its orientation. As such, curriculum development should aim at:

- Increasing Afrikan knowledge in the general body of global human knowledge;
- Creating linkages between the sources of Afrikan knowledge and the centres of learning on the continent;
- Establishing centres of learning in the rural communities and ensuring that these communities become “learning societies”;
- Linking knowledge to the production needs of Afrikan communities;
- Ensuring that Science and Technology are generated in relevant ways to address problems of the rural communities where the majority of African people live and that this is done in Afrikan languages;
- Reducing the gap between the African elites and the communities from which they come by ensuring that education is available to all Afrikans and that such knowledge is drawn from the communities.

As already pointed out, to engage in interdisciplinary and pluridisciplinary approaches will require that we take aboard African knowledge systems. This will need a redefinition of these disciplines into more conjoined intellectual arenas. Life situations cannot be studied in isolation of related life problems. In the European experience, social and human Science disciplines appeared because of real problems, which needed to be studied and understood. Today, Africa’s problems, challenges and concerns require comprehensive and all-sided approaches that can deal with issues in a holistic manner. The curriculum development must take up these methodological challenges.

This does not mean abandoning the existing Social and Human Science disciplines. All it means is that these disciplines must now subjected to interrogation and problematisation in ways that can enable us to synthesize some of them into new related subject matter. This requires curriculum development and since it also requires other deep considerations of epistemology and methodology, time will be required to develop them and subject them to seminars and consultations across the board with other stakeholders in Africa, the Diaspora, and globally.

But there has to be a break that sets in motion the new paradigm. We must reject the basis of the present Western university, which began with the noble idea of being a place of learning for masters and their students. Originally this was associated with the idea of rendering mutual aid. Later we see the university becoming a place where Western knowledge became privileged as the “universal” norm while degrading other knowledge and belief systems of other societies. Still later, the university became a place where religious studies were abandoned and students were relegated to “secular” education, which increasingly came to be linked to secular utilitarian concepts of possessive economic individualism. In this way, each man became his own priest. He (not she) became an egoistic knower able to produce knowledge for the market and for himself. Classic edu-

cation became the preserve of the gentleman of leisure who could enjoy its fruits for its “own sake”. Such education placed a premium on mental and intellectual development linked to the search for a materialist “good life” and ignored the character of individuals “as it unfolds in interaction with his fellows”. (Williams, 1993: 202-3)

As Chancellor Williams correctly points out, the purpose of the university should concern itself with the development of the *whole person*, and, “therefore fully integrated with whatever spiritual and moral forces there are in the world”. It should lead to the “actual improvement of human life on this planet” (Ibid: 203). Our task, William adds, “is to determine the general line of (the) march towards a higher civilisation than now exists in the world today, and to carefully, step by step, develop a concrete and realistic scheme by and through which the advance is to be made” (Ibid: 199). The scheme, Williams proposes is to establish a University, which breaks with this tradition of greed, and establishes an “enlarged humanity”. He proposes the creation of a department of the new humanities as the core department in the division of the university, concerned with research and advanced studies. Says Williams:

It will have the task of enlisting the services of the world's best thinkers of the work of developing a Science of humanity through studies expressly aimed at better human relations. It is to be at the heart of the entire educational system and, therefore, the nation.
(Ibid: 219)

Chancellor Williams goes to some length to explain the philosophy behind the ideas of a Science of Humanities. He believes the central idea in this philosophy is life. He argues that since neither Western Science nor Religion have given satisfactory answers to three questions, “where do we come from? Why? And where are we bound?”, it becomes a duty of the African University to provide space for discussing these questions, which are eternal. Such a free exploration and discourse that gives every human being a right to an education and exploration is the very expression of human freedom and will help to debunk one-sided theories such as those advanced by Darwin’s *Origin of the Species* and their advocacy of “survival of the fittest”—theories that have given license to particular power groups to exterminate the weak ones. Instead, the enlarged humanities and the Science of humanity should explore cooperative ways of survival of the entire humanity in the spirit of *Ubuntu* or humanness, which holds, *I am because We Are*.

The approach put forward here by Chancellor Williams suggests a reorganisation of the disciplines of the social and human Sciences as well as the natural Sciences into a holistic approach of learning. The reorganisation should lead to the breaking down of the over-compartmentalisation and over-fragmentation of faculties, departments, and branches of knowledge. It should explore the reunification of allied disciplines such as Anthropology (sub-divided into sub-disciplines such as social Anthropology, cultural Anthropology, political Anthropology, Ethnography, Physical Anthropology, etc), History, sociology, economics, Political Science, Cultural Studies, Area Studies, etc. into unified fields of study.

These disciplines have been so fragmented that there is no basic understanding between them. Through them, knowledge has been narrowed so much that, in isolation, it no longer makes sense. This sub-division also encourages snobbery and elevated pride,

which are based on hollow self-esteem. The “knowledge” they wield is in many cases irrelevant to the needs of society as a whole. This also creates a false “independence” and “neutrality” of the knowledge-bearers as well as a much-elevated “academic freedom”, which is elevated above society in general. The Pan-African University must be people-centred and community-based in which the freedom to learn and speak belongs to everyone.

It should be remembered, as Michel Foucault has noted, that today’s Social and Human Sciences were themselves the product of historical necessity in the European society. These Sciences did not inherit a certain (preordained) domain “which it was then their task to elaborate with positive methods and with concepts that had at last become scientific”. They did not appear because “of some pressing rationalism, some unresolved *scientific* problem, some practical concern.” According to him, at that juncture when it became necessary to analyse “man” in society, “it was decided to include man among the objects of Science”. The Human Sciences appeared “when man constituted himself as both that which must be conceived of and that which is to be known”. He adds:

There can be no doubt, certainly, that the historical emergence of each of the human Sciences was occasioned by a problem, a requirement, an obstacle of a theoretical or practical order: the new norms imposed by industrial society upon individuals were certainly necessary before psychology, slowly, in the course of the nineteenth century, could constitute itself as a Science; and the threats that, since the French Revolution, have weighed so heavily on the balance, and even on the equilibrium established by the bourgeoisie, were no doubt also necessary before a reflection of sociology type could appear. (Foucault, 1970: 344-5)

Moreover, many of the social Science disciplines and their methodologies, methods and techniques were created in defining moments of colonisation by Europe over non-European societies in the process of subjecting their knowledge systems to European dominance. A discipline such as Anthropology and its sub-disciplines is a good example in this respect. Most of the “traditional” disciplines are also grounded in cultural world-views, which are either antagonistic to other belief systems or have no methodology for dealing with them. Some of them draw their methodologies and techniques of research from studying the “other” societies that were regarded as primitive. In this respect, it can be stated emphatically that the colonies were the testing laboratories of Western Science (Smith, 1999: 65).

Thus a process of redefining the boundaries between the different disciplines in a Pan-African University is the same process of reclaiming, reordering, and, in some case, reconnecting “those ways of knowing”, which were submerged, subverted, hidden or driven underground by colonialism. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith has noted of native Australian knowledge systems, which were colonised:

In terms of the way knowledge was used to discipline the colonised, it worked in a variety of ways. The most obvious forms of discipline were through exclusion, marginalisation and denial. Indigenous ways of knowing were excluded and marginalised(ed.), ... Discipline is also partitioned (like land-DWN), (where) individuals (were) separated and space compartmentalised. ... This form of discipline worked at the curriculum level,

for example, as a mechanism for selecting our 'native' children and girls for domestic and manual work. It worked also at the assessment level, with normative tests designed around the language and cultural capital of white middle classes. (Smith, L. T, 1999: 68)

Creating a holistically defined curriculum will, therefore, of necessity, mean reasserting African ways of knowing and ordering of knowledge. Such a process of reclaiming our own ways of knowing is in fact a liberatory process, which must be reflected in the academic curriculum by participatory research in which the masses of the African people must participate.

Thus it is incumbent on Afrikan scholars who live in this age with the specific problems and concerns of the moment to work together with the "uncertificated" Afrikan men and women to determine the nature of our Social Science disciplines and to pursue them in ways that can address societal problems. Since our problems are multidimensional and multifaceted, it is necessary that they be investigated in a multidimensional and holistic manner. It is this that calls for interdisciplinarity and pluridisciplinarity in our methodologies. The interdisciplinary approach also draws from the Afrikan-centred approach, which was holistic and complementary, as opposed to the dualistic Newtonian deductive approach that established a body-mind dichotomy.

The interdisciplinary and pluridisciplinary approach and methodology will facilitate access to the theoretical resources of the various disciplines and also entail the combining of the Natural Sciences with the Social Sciences and the 'humanities' so as to have a holistic understanding of nature and the way it relates to human kind and society in general. The study of Afrikan society will also not just be theoretical—it will have to delve into political and ideological questions, which Science has to underlie.

The study and research will reflect the daily dealings of society and the challenges of daily life of the people. Therefore, as Sémon Pathé Guéye has pointed out, the problematic of the African Renaissance must be tackled through a fruitful dialectic between theory and practice, intellectual elaboration and practical experience. He adds:

This dialectic will be based on, and underlined by, a permanent and constructive dialogue between the scientists and politicians who are committed to the same objective of renewing our continent, but also between the masses and the elite, who pretend to think and act in their name but sometimes confine themselves to intellectual speculation that has nothing to do with the daily life of the common people. The concept which will result from our discussions would be able to meet the needs and demands of the masses and to become, in their hands, a powerful instrument for positively transforming their current situation and opening the prospect of a better future. (Guéye, 1999: 244)

The basic idea is to redefine the role of the university in the world today and define its specific responsibilities for enhancing human civilisation in general. This requires the widening application of the hermeneutic philosophy that recognises the basic unity of human endeavour through "discourse" which, according to Heidegger, expresses "the intelligibility of being-in-the world" (Heidegger, 1962: 204).

ASC Trust, in carrying out this task, has entered into a collaborative arrangement with other institutions of higher learning to promote and advance the process of cur-

riculum development in the context of these realities. We have created a collaborative arrangement with the University of South Africa (UNISA) in a joint venture to develop such an Afrikan-centred curriculum based on a hermeneutic approach. More efforts will be made to enter into similar arrangements to broaden this process, which has to be ongoing. Furthermore, the effort will involve post-graduate students who have to embark on research at the sites of knowledge so that the new curriculum reflects the actual knowledge on the ground.

Taban lo Liyong, Head of the Centre for African Studies at the University of Venda, South Africa, who has been involved in elaborating an Afrikan-centred curriculum for teaching at the Centre, has argued that each discipline must elaborate and extend its curriculum to embrace the African indigenous world-view, or social practices, or scientific and technological usages and developments.

According to Liyong, past technological developments and achievements of Afrika, their techniques, arts and artistries, the products and processes of production and their techniques must be studied with a view to “modernising them”. At the same time, he argues that technological innovations from Europe and Asia “should be married to the native ones to produce a third new and appropriate technology.” In whatever event, he advocates that the “African rhythm should control the speed of adoption or adaptation; African ethos of communal care and spiritual life should determine what we get from outside or keep from our past”. (Liyong, 1999)

We think this is the correct approach because, besides recognising other systems of knowledge, it leaves open the need for African systems of knowledge to acknowledge and learn from others in a discourse of cross-cultural understanding. But we do not agree that in developing a new curriculum, each discipline should elaborate an Afrikan-centred curriculum to embrace an African indigenous world-view and practices in that particular discipline. This would be “adding” to the confusion of fragmentation, which would add the Afrikan world-view that should be holistic to the heap of existing fragmented knowledge.

We acknowledge that the territory from which we are operating is a hostile one and what Taban lo Liyong proposes is an engagement in a kind of “guerrilla warfare” on hostile territory. But we must go beyond that and capture the truth in Chancellor Williams’ paradigm, which builds on a holistic challenge to the Western fragmentation. Indeed, this how I would be understand Liyong’s appeal that Afrikan rhythms should control the process. In my view, it should not only control the speed, but should, more fundamentally, aim at the content and the quality of the development of the curriculum.

We agree with these observations broadly as a basis for debate and work in progress. The field of curriculum development needs to go beyond the present-day approaches and move towards *integrated and synthesized knowledge*. Privileging an Afrikan-centred curriculum must go beyond a narrow conception of what is purely African to include such knowledge within the wider synthesised framework of global knowledge. There are several levels at which this can take place. There is the level of integrating the traditional African depositories of knowledge with modern Science teaching and the application of technology into a holistic knowledge. This would imply the integration of both the cognitive and conceptual frameworks in both systems of thought and understanding.

The question however is can the duality between rationality and non-rationality be synthesised? If this is done, it will mean a new form of knowledge that has meaning and significance for human life and human community as a global entity with its diversities.

We agree with Fatnowna and Pickett when they say that to achieve the above synthesis would, in one sense, be a “return” but also a “a re-integrative process of recovering wholeness”. In this sense, according to them, such integration “goes beyond itself because the same process engages us in *transformation*.” It is a dialectical transformation of the different parts that existed before, but which now exist in *new* form and with new content. It is a transformation, which involves the liberating of knowledge at both ends of the sites of knowledge as well as “being intimately bound up with the transformation of values and a sense of belonging to a whole-earth, a perspective that privileges the local within commitment to the global”. This essentially is a transformation of human consciousness “both driven by and necessary for those changes in knowledge systems” creating a “relational nature of things”. (Fatnowna and Pickett, 1999: 222-3)

The process of establishing the Pan-Afrikan University and the development of the new curriculum will very much be assisted by the fact that the university will at first offer post-graduate courses. It means that the students who engage in this transformative education will be part of the designing of the new curriculum in the process of their assignments in the different fields of study. Responding to the call for a completely new approach, these students will visit actual sites of knowledge where they will learn and relate to them in a culturally-sensitive way. In so doing, they will already imbue a new form and sense of content in the new curriculum. Together with their teachers at the campuses and knowledge sites, they will build, define and articulate a new approach to producing knowledge, which will reconnect with the African world. The fact that the African social discourse is still coherent and un-segmented will provide a cementing element to the crafting of a new curriculum. Thus new disciplines and subjects will be defined by the actual theoretical development, practice and the application of new theory being developed by the students and the communities. But to begin the process, a minimum design of a curriculum will be necessary and this can be undertaken in collaboration with other institutions already devoting attention to this important matter.

AFRIKAN-BASED PEDAGOGY

The above epistemological foundations and methodology based on the need to develop a new curriculum already imply a different pedagogy to teaching and learning. If we are to draw our inspiration and materials for our learning from the real life situations of the Afrikan people, especially in the rural areas, we have to adopt those pedagogical methods and techniques that inform their philosophy of life, their world-view and their lived experiences and practice. The key to developing an Afrikan-centric pedagogy will arise from the fact that the university will be based in the knowledge-specific sites where African experts of different branches of knowledge are to be found. These sites will help to define the content as well as the pedagogy. Initially, the students will, on the basis of existing knowledge, undergo methodological workshops where the Afrikan-based

pedagogical tools of teaching and passing on knowledge are used in those cultural environments.

African systems of communication, learning, entertaining and socialising are based on the spoken word or orature. One of the processes of privileging Western knowledge has been the undermining of the oral tradition and orature in general. Walter Ong has pointed out in his extensive work on orality and literacy that the widespread use of literacy in the West has brought about a cultural mutation in the encoding, storing and transmission of knowledge, which has had profound consequences for the recognition and mobilisation of endogenous knowledge. Many scholars have pointed out that cultures based on oracy for encoding, storage, and transmission of knowledge share their knowledge in very practical, community-based, interactive, multisensual transactions. Crossman and Devisch, for instance, state that:

Oracy is very dependent on the participants' culture-specific habitus, bodily dispositions, culture of speech/rhetoric, and (gender-, status-, role-and age-specific) styles of communication. Oracy anchors memory in the (rhythmic, performative and ritualising) body and in particular in the heart as the source of sentiments and morality, and the seat of both secrecy and opacity with regard to the memory and interpretation of life-events. Oracy favours 'figuration,' a recognition of polysemic reality informed often by unknowingly-by metaphor. Literacy, in contrast (at least alphabetic or lineal writing) entails a technè that anchors knowledge in vision (more traditionally called observation) and in the homogenising text. Writing also produces a 'distancing representation' of ideas in line with a more solitary and critical interaction with the text and its claims to authority. ... In summary, literacy has favoured an essentialistic dynamic of 'literalisation' in which knowledge is equated with mirroring 'ostension' or the 're-representation' of reality. (Crossman and Devisch, 1999: 114)

Crossman and Devisch add that the *techno-Science* and the massive power of the conjoined media promote a form of methodologisation (with emphasis on procedure rather than substance), operationalisation, prospect and homogenising order as techniques of government and Science management. This essentialising undermines other forms of knowledge, especially those in "speech communities" and "communities of conversation" based on oracy to the extent that it marginalizes and destroys useful and practical knowledge in those communities, which could be of importance to the other communities in the world. For instance, during the establishment of the medieval university in Europe, the first university in Southern Italy utilised the African practice of palaver to teach law students rhetoric, speechifying and oratory. This is today's legal art called Advocacy, which has encompassed other areas of human communication.

These pedagogical approaches, which are implied in oracy, contain forms of art and techniques to which they give expression, which are essential for adult learning. They create for the scholar cognitive shifts in the way new knowledge is accessed and acquired as well as opening up new culture-specific, cognitive horizons such as parody, drama, and performative arts, which they could not access before. This also changes the process of knowledge exchange and negotiation, of roles of power as well as influence, which have been denied these forms of expression as well as their power. By mainstreaming

these forms of expression, the agents of these forms of expression gain visibility and recognition in knowledge creation and production. In this way, indigenous tales, stories, proverbs, legends, myths, symbols and epics come back to life. These cultural forms of knowledge incorporate people's philosophies of life, norms, values in a kind of "moving" and "living library".

Mucere Mugo of Kenya has perfected the combination of literal and oral techniques of learning and transmitting knowledge and messages in her academic work. She has used orature interludes as a methodological approach in critical analysis as a way of developing an emancipatory and liberatory education and culture. The interludes "punctuate" the literal discourse and the discussion. She does this because she argues that literacy should not be privileged over orate traditions, consumed by the majority of African people (Mugo, 1999: 211, 225). We agree with this approach.

LIFELONG LEARNING

Lifelong learning has recently become a clarion call of many countries of the developed world as well as international organisations as a new approach to learning in the 21st century. Yet this educational approach is deeply embedded within the African culture and epistemology. According to Mucere Mugo, learning and culturalisation in African societies were considered continuing processes "that took place from birth until death with the family unit, extended family, the village and the entire community participating". She adds:

This extended, collective participation in educating children and inculcating cultural ethos, however, did not replace the efforts of the professionals who taught very specialised knowledge and skills, especially at given milestones of the journey of life. The education was also very practical in conception and methodology. It was oriented towards problem posing and problem solving at individual and communal levels. (Ibid: 213)

Mugo refers to the work of Jomo Kenyatta in his anthropological work about the Gikuyu, *Facing Mount Kenya*, and Julius Nyerere's *Arusha Declaration* and *Tanzania After Ten Years After Independence*, as approving this method of learning and as justifying them on the basis of the long African cultural experience.

The new concept applied in new conditions by the international community is important for African education at this juncture because it enables us to open up new institutions and processes of learning to the masses of the people whom Vilakazi referred to as "uncertificated" African men and women to attain higher learning. But the idea of lifelong learning is not new, as pointed out above. In the case of the developed capitalist world, it emerged as part of the effort to deal with growing unemployment in the industrialised countries after the mid-1980s with the advent of globalization. Before that it applied to adult learning, especially in the Scandinavian countries, where lifelong learning was seen continuing education. Later it became a means by which workers could be retrained for different kinds of 'flexible' employment.

However, the 1997 UNESCO Fifth International Conference on Adult Education held in Hamburg, Germany, advanced our understanding of the concept to a new level.

The concept and strategy took on a wider meaning. In article 19(a) of the Agenda for the Future adopted by the Conference (CONFETIAV), the international community committed itself to:

Open schools, colleges and universities to adult learners:

- i. *by requiring institutions of formal education from primary level onwards to be prepared to open their doors to adult learners, both women and men, adapting their programmes and learning conditions to meet their needs;*
- ii. *by developing coherent mechanisms to recognize the outcomes of learning undertaken in different contexts, and ensure that credit is transferable within and between institutions, sectors and states;*
- iii. *by establishing joint university/community research and training partnerships, and by bringing the services of universities to outside groups;*
- iv. *by carrying out interdisciplinary research in all respects of adult education and learning with the participation of adult learners themselves;*
- v. *by creating opportunities for adult learning in flexible, open and creative ways, taking into account the specificities of women's and men's lives.*

These commitments fit in very well with the vision and objectives of the Pan-Afrikan University for they provide for the mechanisms and strategies, which can enable us to bring adult learners to formal institutions of learning and remove the divide between informal, non-formal and formal education in line with African traditions and cultures. They also provide for cooperation in research between the University and communities, as well as providing for the recognition of learning outcomes obtained through their own contexts outside the formal system of education.

Other bodies have taken up the CONFINTEA V Agenda as well. Under article 1(a) of the *World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First century*, it was stated that the core values of higher education are to:

provide opportunities for higher learning and for learning throughout life, giving to learners an optimal range of choice and flexibility of entry and exit points within the system, as well as an opportunity for individual development and social mobility in order to educate for citizenship and for active participation in society, with worldwide vision, for endogenous capacity building, and for the consolidation of human rights, sustainable development, democracy and peace, in a context of justice.

The first university to take the Hamburg CONFINTEAV commitment seriously was the University of Mumbai (Bombay), which in article 9 of their *Mumbai Statement on Life Long Learning, Active Citizenship and the Reform of Higher Education* argued that in their understanding the transformation to genuine lifelong learning:

requires a holistic approach which (a) supports the institution becoming a life long learning community itself; (b) integrates academic, financial and administrative elements; (c) provides structures which are responsible for organisational, staff, student and curricu-

lum development and community engagement; and (d) aligns the various supportive structures such as academic information systems, library provision and learning technologies to the new mission of universities in learning societies.

The statement continued, to point out that the key purpose of lifelong learning was active citizenship, which was important in terms of “connecting individuals and groups to the structures of social, political and economic activity in both local and global contexts. Democratic citizenship highlights the importance of women and men as agents of history in all spaces of their lives” (Article3).

These Mumbai positions point to the importance of the Pan-Afrikan University beginning to build on the foundations of the link between the university and the community. It also emphasizes the fact that lifelong learning is dependent on both the individual and the social context and that learning occurs in institutions, but also anywhere and anytime throughout life. What is crucially important is to recognise it and work on that basis for higher education to become part and parcel of the daily life of individuals and communities. This is the only way in which education can become a practical right for all human beings.

This approach means that lifelong learning enables students and adult learners to learn at different times, in different ways, for different purposes at various stages of their lives and careers. It is thus connected with providing learning opportunities throughout life. It also means that in institutions of higher learning, all members of the institution are learners and that at different times these members will take different roles as educators, students, administrators, cleaners and other support staff positions.

These positions were picked up, adopted and developed further by the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. In the *Cape Town Statement*, characteristic elements of a lifelong learning higher education institution were laid out. These were to be used as an instrument to assist transformation within the institutions of higher learning. These elements have been taken into account in this concept paper and will continue to be used to develop and monitor various activities to ensure proper development of the system.

Thus applied to African conditions, the concept of lifelong learning can meet the needs of rural communities who are denied access to higher education. This can be done by adopting the idea of *recognition of prior learning* which enables learners to be accredited for different kinds of learning they have acquired through different contexts of their lives. This recognition is based on the idea, according to the Cape Town Statement, that there are different “ways of knowing”, which valued, enable marginalised social groups to become full participants in the creation and dissemination of knowledge. It is also based on the creation of a resource-based learning environment accessible to learners wherever they are and not just on campus. The adoption of this approach requires the university to make provision for self-paced independent study by providing students and learners “to study effectively wherever, whenever and whatever pace is appropriate for them”. (p. 11)

The concept of lifelong learning also widens the scope for students and learners in course presentation and opportunities to enrol for and study courses which include the use of multi- and combined-media delivery and support, utilising the technologies,

both old and new, and the flexible learning structures of open and distance learning, such as those suggested here of identifying and locating sites of knowledge which can also be centres of learning for rural communities. The multi- and combined media delivery and support would include the provision of print, correspondence, mass media (such as radio), occasional face-to-face tutorials and study-groups as well as the provision of information communication technologies in rural areas as well. We have argued the feasibility of such an approach for pastoral communities through community-based telecentres of learning (Nabudere, 2002).

The application of Information Communication Technologies (ICT) will also promote the linkage between Science and Technical Research in the university and its link to production units, as well as encouraging technological research in rural communities, which are underserved by modern technology, it will also encourage applied research relevant to local technologies with which people have some familiarity. Improved connectivity will also enable the removal of hindrances to good higher education such as limited staff resources, poorly prepared students, outdated curricula, declining academic quality and lack of library resources. By providing higher education access to remote rural areas through distance education, the Pan-African University will be able to reach out to a wider student body in line with the principles of life long learning.

NOTE

1. This came out of a consultation between Prof. Prah and members of the Task Force of the Afrika Study Centre, at the Sheraton Hotel, Kampala, on 10th December, 2002.

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21

NEPAD AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: THE MUSINGS OF AN ACADEMIC PESSIMIST

Kwame Boafo-Arthur

The determination to push forward the development of Africa has spawned several policy frameworks in the last four decades. The Lagos Plan of Action, the Structural Adjustment Programmes sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions, and the African Alternative framework to Structural Adjustment programmes (AAF-SAP) for instance, readily come to mind. The New African Initiative that has been renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the latest development paradigm aimed at facilitating the economic growth and development of African countries. Coming in the wake of the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the re-democratisation of Africa, and the general acceptance of the efficacy of neo-liberalism as a development paradigm, NEPAD has been touted as an indigenous development policy formulation capable of fast-tracking the development of the continent. The major question is whether NEPAD has what it takes to stimulate African development.

Given the track record of African countries in terms of attempts to facilitate development and the debilitating self-destructing measures and occurrences in Africa, one cannot help being pessimistic about the future development of Africa. Whereas NEPAD has been implemented in a supposedly congenial international political environment that should normally have facilitated development, the numerous problems confronting the continent could upstage any attempt at development whether the development mantra being applied is homegrown or not. The seemingly unfriendly global economic system presents yet another developmental hurdle that needs to be scaled before one can meaningful talk about development in Africa.

In the first part of the chapter, I give a general developmental background of NEPAD focusing on the need for such an omnibus continental plan. The origins of NEPAD follow in the next section. The success of any programme hinges on the implementation and management structure. The chapter looks at NEPAD's implementation and management structure before discussing the grounds for optimism followed by the pessimism perspective. The final section deals with the conclusion.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL BACKGROUND OF NEPAD

It must be noted from the outset that NEPAD evolved against the background of failed development plans that aimed at uplifting Africa from the economic doldrums. All the African-initiated development strategies were unfortunately opposed, undermined and thrown overboard by the Bretton Woods institutions and “Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future”.¹ The latest development paradigm, which is a strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21st Century, as noted above, is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Unlike earlier development paradigms for Africa, NEPAD has an obtained undiluted support and promises of assistance from the industrialized countries. Thus, from the outset, NEPAD has an advantage over the earlier development paradigm, which never had the blessings of donors. For instance, the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989), was particularly frowned upon by the West because Africans wanted it to replace Western-sponsored and initiated structural adjustment programmes. That AAF-SAP did not make any headway was not because of its theoretical weaknesses or lack of ideological rigour but because it never had overwhelming support from the West. Most probably, AAF-SAP was construed by donors as a “socialist blueprint” in an age of rapid global economic shift to neo-liberalism and therefore anachronistic. Assuming this to be correct, the impression one gets is that Africans have been divested of their sovereign right to take decisions on issues affecting their development unless that decision has the overt support of the advanced industrialized countries. However, African leaders never shied away from the formulation of development programmes, the earlier frustrations notwithstanding. It is against this background and the ever-growing dichotomous rates of growth between the North and South, and especially the endemic poverty of Africa, that NEPAD came into being.

In a condensed or summary form, NEPAD is a holistic, comprehensive, integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa. The NEPAD document provides the vision for Africa, a statement of the problems facing the continent and a Programme of Action to resolve these problems to reach the vision. According to the document, the primary objective is to eradicate poverty in Africa and place African countries both individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth and development, to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalization process.² NEPAD, therefore, sets “an agenda for the renewal of the continent.”³ In the words of the framers of the document, NEPAD “is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic.”⁴ The programme rests “on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world” and also “a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over the centuries of

unequal relations”.⁵ The principle of partnership with the rest of the world is equally vital to the process of accelerating development in Africa. Such partnership must be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared responsibility and mutual accountability.

Some people are skeptical when the issue of *ownership* of NEPAD is raised. While some believe that the document cannot be absolutely free of donor influence in conception and eventual execution, others are of the view that this is the only authentic African-initiated development paradigm with no external input. The question is: how did NEPAD originate? I believe that an examination of the origins of NEPAD will help some of us to put the issue of ownership to rest once and for all.

Origins

The mandate for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) originated at the Organisation of African Unity Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya during September 1999. The Summit mandated President Mbeki of South Africa and President Bouteflika of Algeria to engage Africa's creditors on the need for a total cancellation of Africa's external debt. Following this, the South Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, held in Havana, Cuba during April 2000, mandated President Mbeki and President Obasanjo of Nigeria to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and the Bretton Woods institutions.

Given the fact that debt relief is only one critical aspect of the overall development agenda for Africa and the correlation between the two mandates given by the OAU and the South Summit, the OAU Summit held in Togo in July 2000 enjoined the three Presidents to engage the developed North with a view to developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the continent. As a result, the three Presidents raised the issue of a partnership with the leaders of the G-8 at their Summit in Okinawa, Japan during July 2000. A Steering Committee was appointed by the OAU to pursue the issue of partnership and other related matters after the Okinawa G8 Summit. The difficult task of working on the development of NEPAD, which at this stage was referred to as the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP), then began in earnest at bilateral and multilateral levels.

During the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Lybia, from 1 to 2 March 2001, President Obasanjo made a presentation on MAP and President Wade of Senegal presented the OMEGA Plan. The OAU endorsed the work being done by the four Presidents, Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade. Having recognized the synergy and complementarities between the various initiatives (MAP, OMEGA and the ECA Compact for Africa's Renewal), the OAU called for the integration of all the initiatives to facilitate the rapid economic recovery and development of Africa.

The merger was completed on 3 July 2001. Consequently, President Wade presented the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia on July 11, 2001. Before this, the product of the integration of the initiatives was called the New African Initiative (NAI). NEPAD was received and unanimously adopted in the form of Declaration 1 (XXXVII) as Africa's principal agenda for development, providing a holistic, compre-

hensive integrated strategic framework for the socio-economic development of the continent. The Summit called for the establishment of a Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. This committee had its first meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 23 October 2001.

Overview of NEPAD's aims

NEPAD, as noted above, is a very ambitious and wide-ranging programme that focuses on the social, economic and political priorities of Africa. It came into being because of the abject poverty of Africa, hence the omnibus vision of "eradicating poverty in Africa". In writing the document, the leaders also reflected on the reasons for Africa's underdevelopment. The document therefore highlighted some of these problems which include:

- Colonial exploitation
- Political instability
- Poor leadership
- Weak institutions
- Poor infrastructure
- Poorly diversified economic structures
- Unsophisticated or rudimentary financial systems
- Limited technology
- Limited human capital resources.⁶

It is interesting to note that the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed on aid-dependent African countries in the 1980s were strongly attacked for their social bankruptcy. According to NEPAD, "structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s provided only a partial solution. They promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, *but gave inadequate attention to the provision of social service*" (my emphasis).⁷ These problems had deleterious effects on the development of Africa and NEPAD captures this by stating, "the net effect of these processes has been the entrenchment of a vicious cycle, in which economic decline, reduced capacity and poor governance reinforce each other, thereby confirming Africa's peripheral and diminishing role in the world economy. Thus over centuries, Africa has become the marginalized continent."⁸

Overly aware of these problems and determined to carry out its omnibus vision of eradicating poverty in Africa, the document dealt with the following which also serve as the building blocks or the priorities of NEPAD:

- Peace and Security (management, prevention and conflict resolution)
- Political Governance and Democracy
- Economic and Corporate Governance
- Human Resource Development
- Regional Infrastructure
- Economic Integration and intra-African trade
- Market Access and Agriculture
- Capital flows

The partnership is equally premised on the fact that many of the challenges facing Africa require a continental response and co-ordination. For instance, prevention, management and resolution of conflict; eradication of communicable diseases; and preservation of the natural resources and environmental assets of the continent cannot be meaningfully tackled on an individual country basis. There is the need for continental and in some cases, even global action, to deal with such problems, and Africa stands the best chance of getting such assistance with a partnership agreement of the type NEPAD espouses.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development seeks the transformation of the relationship between Africa and her development partners. However, African leaders recognize, *ab initio*, that they must carry their partners along if they are to attain the major goal of eradicating poverty in Africa. In addition, there must be proper cooperation and integration at the regional levels whilst paying attention to the dynamics of development at individual national levels. Consequently, the new mode of partnership will operate on three levels:

1. On the global level will be Africa and donors, development partners, international financial institutions, etc.
2. On the regional level will be African states cooperating in joint ventures and integration, cross border projects, etc
3. On the national (domestic) level will be revitalized partnerships among the public sector, the private sector and civil society.

Such a grand project must be backed by an efficient implementation machinery to assure a modicum of success. The question, therefore, naturally arises as to what administrative mechanisms have been put in place by NEPAD to see to the implementation of these lofty proposals.

Implementation/Management Structures

At the inaugural Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee meeting held in Abuja on 23 October 2001, the Heads of State and Government established a 15-member Task Force for the implementation of NEPAD. A three-tier governing structure was accepted for NEPAD.

Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee

This committee is chaired by President Obasanjo, with Presidents Wade and Bouteflika as Vice-Chairpersons. The Implementation Committee comprises of 15 (three per OAU geographic region), including the five initiating states, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt. The composition is as follows:

- North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia
- West Africa: Nigeria, Senegal, Mali
- Central Africa: Cameroon, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe
- East Africa: Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda
- Southern Africa: South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique

The main function of the Implementation Committee is to set policies and priorities and the Programme of Action. The Implementation Committee is expected to meet three times per year. It reports annually to the African Union Summit.

Steering Committee

The Steering Committee is composed of the personal representatives of the five initiating Presidents, and is tasked with the development of the Terms of Reference for identified programmes and projects, as well as overseeing the Secretariat. At its second meeting in Abuja on 26 October 2001 the Committee was also mandated to develop a strategic plan for marketing and communications at the national, regional continental and international levels.

Coordinating Secretariat

The full-time, small core staff of the Secretariat located at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand provides the liaison, co-ordination, and administrative and logistical function for NEPAD. It is also responsible for outsourcing of work on technical detail to lead agencies and/or continental experts.

Five task teams made up of the initiators were established with responsibilities for the co-ordination of specific aspects of the programme as follows:

- South Africa: peace, security, democracy and political governance initiatives
- Nigeria: economic and corporate governance/banking and financial standards/capital flows initiatives
- Egypt: market access and agriculture initiatives
- Algeria: human development initiative
- Senegal: Infrastructure Initiative.

In terms of governance in Africa in general, a novel idea was developed as part of the political governance principles. This is the mechanism for African Peer Review (APRM). Under this, African leaders are expected to mount effective monitoring of their own colleagues to ensure compliance with the various principles under NEPAD. The African Peer Review Mechanism is expected to enhance African ownership of its development programme by means of a system of self-assessment that will ensure that policies of African countries are based on best current knowledge and practices. An effective monitoring mechanism must be seen to be credible and transparent to assure the world of the preparedness of African leaders to take their own colleagues to task when they default on the various principles underlying NEPAD.

On 26 March 2002, the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee had their second meeting at Abuja, Nigeria. The centrality of Africa's commitment to peace was stressed and accordingly, the sub-Committee on Peace and Security was enjoined to critically focus on the following priority areas:

- Enhance capacity to conduct thorough, inclusive strategic assessments of situations in regions affected by conflicts;
- Support efforts at developing early warning systems at continental and regional levels, including the development of strategic analysis and database systems;

- Support post-conflict reconstruction and development in all affected countries, including rehabilitation of national infrastructure, the population as well as refugees and internally displaced persons, with special focus on sustainable programmes of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation;
- Support efforts to curb the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons in Africa;
- Support efforts to promote democracy, good governance and respect for human rights through appropriate policy and institutional reforms; Assist in resource mobilization for the Africa Union Peace Fund.

At the end of the second meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, eight Draft Codes and Standards for Economic and Corporate Governance for Africa and an African Peer Review Mechanism were approved. These codes cover areas such as monetary, financial and fiscal policies, budget and debt management, and transparency, corporate governance, auditing and bank supervision. It was also recommended that an independent, credible African institution, separate from the political process and structures, should conduct the technical aspects of the Peer Review Mechanism. It is very likely that the recommendation by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee for an independent and credible African institution to conduct the technical aspects of the APRM was due to the strong criticism on the original conception of the mechanism. If this recommendation is implemented, it will pave the way for other stakeholders to draw attention to lapses in the implementation of NEPAD by African states.

In light of the monumental problems of Africa, the failure of earlier development paradigms, and the broad areas covered by NEPAD, can one be overly optimistic about the development prospects of Africa in the 21st century?

It must be noted that most Africans have a very optimistic outlook so far as NEPAD is concerned but a sizable number are also cautiously pessimistic about the overall effect of NEPAD on African development. What accounts for these positions?

THE BASIS FOR OPTIMISM

We started by indicating that with reference to development paradigms, NEPAD is not Africa's first-born. There have been several such development strategies, which were promoted by Africans themselves, and others imposed by her development partners. Most of us are aware that Africa never successfully implemented any of the earlier grand development programmes/strategies. Even those initiated and imposed through economic conditionalities like SAPs had questionable ramifications on Africa's development. So can one be so optimistic about the chances of NEPAD in pulling Africa from economic the doldrums?

What must be stressed is that African leaders mean very well. If we consider the number of times our leaders discussed these at various meetings before merging the MAP and OMEGA plans, one cannot but applaud them for their foresight and commitment to the development of Africa. However, having a development plan is one thing

and implementing it effectively to attain a stated result is quite another. This means that a lot has to be done to attain the laudable vision embedded in NEPAD.

Africa, however, seems to be at a great advantage in the present scheme of things for the following reasons. First, the Cold War that virtually polarized Africa and prevented any form of united economic and political action to facilitate African development is now history. The end of the Cold War has also seen the end of acrimonious ideological competition and open intermeddling in African affairs by external forces. The current understanding of developmental realities in Africa that served as an impetus for the drafting of NEPAD could not have been achieved in the Cold War era. For once, Africa appears largely united in its effort to tackle the debilitating problems of Africa. This gives some hope for the success of the programme.

Secondly, whether we like it or not, global politico-economic transformations have been at a very fast pace and we need to either pull up our boots straps or be consigned to the fringes of global interactions forever. The rapid global transformations call for proactive measures that will assure effective participation on a very strong footing, in the international system, to attain whatever is good for the development of Africa. Our leaders constantly harp on the endowments of Africa—natural and human—nonetheless, I am yet to see any brilliant person who, being aware of his/her potential, sits back on the assumption that this acknowledged brilliance will facilitate his/her personal advancement. As it is with individuals, so it is with nations and even continents. It is trite that Africa possesses immense national and human resources. At the same time we are aware that effective mechanisms to tap these for the continent's development are in short supply. Embedded in NEPAD are the various mechanisms capable of assisting in making effective use of our natural and human resources. The support has to come from all of us if the set goals are to be attained. Granting that maximum support is attained from all stakeholders, one could hope for a radical positive change in Africa's development through NEPAD.

Thirdly, less than a decade ago, the most industrialized country of Africa was under the iron grip of the obnoxious apartheid system. Fortunately for the continent that era is gone and South Africa, the largest and most industrialized economy in Africa, has started fervently to integrate more with the rest of the continent's economies. The key role the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, played in bringing NEPAD into being is just one manifestation of what the magnitude of loss to Africa would have been if apartheid had not come to an end.

Fourthly, many Africa states, through commitments to regional economic groupings such as ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, etc., have been implementing some of the programmes being advocated by NEPAD. A very good example is the West African Gas project involving Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. Thus, it may not be too tasking to bring into being other equally useful regional-based schemes aimed at facilitating development across Africa.

Fifthly, unlike other developed areas that had to start their development from scratch, Africa need not re-invent the wheel. African countries could put their economies on a fast growth mode by adopting new technologies, and improving production capacity and growth exponentially. The assumption then is that Africa would not do a lot of ex-

perimentation to assess all forms of technologies. They have been tested already and all that is needed is to have the resources, the skilled manpower, and leaders with foresight and commitment to tap the technology for the development of the continent. It seems to me that NEPAD demonstrates an attempt by foresighted and committed leaders to come to terms with Africa's developmental realities who are acting appropriately to deal with festering developmental problems.

Sixthly, currently, NEPAD is not competing with any other development plan for Africa. I am not unaware of the HIPC initiative and the variants of adjustment programmes at various stages of their implementation in individual countries. NEPAD is a continent-wide development paradigm and has no other competing paradigm. This implies that all attention will be focused on NEPAD and its mechanisms of implementation. In fact, at the time AAF-SAP was introduced in 1989, many African countries were deeply engrossed in the implementation of orthodox structural adjustment policies. There was, therefore, confusion as to whether one should give way to the other. Since NEPAD has no such competitor, Africa's intellectual and other resources could be channeled to assure the realization of its lofty objectives.

The seventh issue of importance is the wholesale support NEPAD has gained from its development partners, the IFIs, and the UN. No indigenous plan has received such overwhelming global support as NEPAD. For instance, Western support to the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) aimed at an eventual bridging of the developmental gap between the North and the South in the mid-70s was lukewarm. The same indifference was exhibited towards continental objectives enshrined in AAF-SAP and the Lagos Plan of Action. NEPAD, therefore, has a lot of international goodwill and support and these must be capitalized upon. The G8 Action Plan for Africa issued in support of NEPAD after the Kananaskis G8 Summit amply testifies to such goodwill. Even though the financial commitment so far falls short of the anticipated \$64 billion from the G8, that should rather spur the leaders to fast track various implementation mechanisms through the enhanced mobilization of domestic resources to ensure the realization of the various objectives. NEPAD should not wait until Africa receives the full component of the anticipated financial support from the international community. Such goodwill must be re-tooled to unlock foreign assistance doors long closed as a result of donor fatigue and frustration over the slow pace of African development. Since there appears to have been re-awakening in tandem with the democratisation on the continent, an "aggressive" and focused economic diplomacy by the AU or the Implementation Committee of NEPAD to win over the development partners to Africa's cause is likely to sustain donor commitment to the programme. This will further ensure that the rhetoric of such development partners is replaced with concrete and positive action.

Finally, since decolonisation, there has not been such an opportune moment for the promulgation and implementation of continent-wide development programmes in Africa. This is because "for the first time since independence, the local and international context have improved, relatively, in the post-Cold War period, allowing the bearers of the struggle for political change to organize and assert themselves more boldly and openly than in the past".⁹ But more importantly, global political changes have blessed Africa with a new breed of leaders who are painfully aware of the realities on the ground

and also are not in doubt about the means to deal with Africa's developmental crisis. Unlike the immediate post-independent African leaders who were drawn into the vortex and maelstrom of Cold War politics as well as various kinds of authoritarianism culminating in the setting up of numerous one-party totalitarian governments, or even their predecessors who were largely disgruntled military officers who perceived military administration as the panacea to Africa's hydra-headed problems, this new breed of leaders are post-Cold War leaders, democratically minded, and poised to make democracy work in Africa. This is based on their acceptance that any other mode of governance conceived cannot compete with democracy in terms of assuring the short and long-term wellbeing of the generality of the people. This is not to say that there are no pockets of leaders with questionable democratic credentials. But, by and large, most African leaders have accepted, in both words and deed, the need to sustain democracy as a means of assuring development. Since NEPAD is the baby of this breed of leaders who also have tremendous goodwill in the international community, on account of their brand of leadership, one can only hope that their vision which has gained acclaim internationally will translate into reality.

The foregoing does not detract from my cautious pessimism. Like any development plan, there are bound to be bottlenecks to implementation and attainment of stated objectives. Apart from these, one cannot so easily be overly optimistic about the long-term implications or impact of NEPAD on African development given our long developmental trajectories and past failures.

THE PESSIMIST MATRIX

First, NEPAD appears to be a reformulation of the neo-liberal creed for Africa in the 21st century with the singular distinction of purporting to be a home-grown development mantra. Whilst neo-liberalism has all that it takes to assure development in Africa, the experiences of the continent point to the contrary for both internal and external reasons. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, in my view, represented the zenith of neo-liberal experimentation in Africa. The developmental paradigm the donors and development partners ushered in through the front door has been smuggled back in through the back door by African leaders through NEPAD. It is quite instructive that NEPAD attests to the failures of SAPs. These failures were magnified because of unbending or rigid implementation of the neo-liberal creed. If NEPAD could critique SAPs for inadequate attention to the provision of social services that helped in entrenching a vicious cycle exemplified by economic decline, reduced capacity, poor governance, and diminished role in the global economy, then one is baffled that NEPAD should be hinged on the same neo-liberal creed that it has ridiculed. If anything, SAP reinforced externalized economic decision-making which was overly detrimental to African development. In a way, although NEPAD claims to be homegrown, the theoretical underpinnings of neo-liberalism, apart from ignoring the developmental realities on the ground as regards the dimensions of the poverty situation, is likely to facilitate covert external intermeddling in economic decision making in the long run.

Second, objections to the neo-liberal basis of NEPAD are reinforced by the anticipated support from the international community or our development partners. These partners, as clearly specified in the G8 Action Plan for Africa, are bound to re-impose the economic conditionalities for every dollar they give to Africa in the name of NEPAD. Thus, by looking to the West for funding support, the assumed African ownership of NEPAD is to a large extent compromised. NEPAD's hope of an effective take-off is inextricably tied to external financial inflows, which at best have proved unreliable in our context for the development of the continent in the past. NEPAD is ominously silent on how the negative implications of external financial inflows by way of loans could be checked through, for instance, financial packages with greater concessional components. Perhaps, this explains the overly neo-liberal groundings of NEPAD since that makes it easier for the acceptance of any tied support from the development partners. But will that help Africa? What have been Africa's experiences since the dawn of tied aid? I leave my readers to reflect on the answers themselves. My belief, however, is that unless neo-liberalism is re-tooled to suit Africa's development needs, we stand to lose once again in our effort to kick-start development in Africa. It must also be reiterated that any attempt to pin the overall financing of NEPAD on the same developed countries that have over the years been funding aspects of African development programmes without serious attempts at re-tooling domestic policies, especially in the area of income generation and prudent economic management, weakens NEPAD at birth. The emphasis on domestic income generation should, therefore, take precedence over expectations of financial support from our traditional partners.

Added to the above is the failure of our development partners to abide by the pledges they make to Africa. More often than not donor financial pledges are not met. This becomes the case because of in-built frustrating demands by the donors that make the accessing of such pledges very difficult. It could be argued that in most cases donors are not sincere when it comes to pledges and such pledges become mere public relations gimmicks to the detriment of African countries. This makes it difficult to pin hopes on the receipt of financial support from the West. In some instances too, the proffered support is inadequate and this stalls the impact they are expected to make. In effect, tying our development to Western financial support is a recipe for mortgaging the future of Africa. However, external support with grant components must be seriously encouraged and sought.

Thirdly, how confident are we to surmount the serious domestic obstacles to development and growth in Africa? The nagging issues of corruption, nepotism which puts square pegs in round holes, economic mismanagement by ruling elites, conflict, intra-state wars, etc., constantly challenge our ability to govern ourselves. These are issues of immense developmental implications which must be dealt with if Africa is to attain the kind of socio-economic and political climate that made the economic growth of our development partners and the newly industrializing countries or Asian Tigers possible. Until the measures put in place to deal with such problems bear fruit, the level of pessimism of some of us shall deepen. Whichever geographical region one turns to in Africa, one is confronted with avoidable conflicts and simmering conflicts as well as interminable civil wars. How can development be assured within such a debilitating political

climate? Irrespective of the soundness of NEPAD, if serious attention is not paid to the raging conflicts on the continent, the developmental malaise will increase.

Fourthly, even though the concept of peer review calls for applause, it is felt, however, that if peer review is taken from the domain of the Heads of State, a lot could be achieved in the diagnosis and treatment of the numerous ailments that afflict African leaders. I strongly believe that an identifiable group or class of higher extraction such as the Heads of State and Government cannot be an impartial judge in any case that may have implications for the collective group. The pessimism of many on the efficacy and impartiality of the Peer Review Mechanism would be abated or scaled down if the APRM is genuinely wrested from the bosom of African leaders as intimidated.

To what extent have African nations demonstrated their commitment to NEPAD? Apart from Ghana and a few others who have elevated NEPAD to the status of a Ministry, we continue to hear the stale cacophony of extolling the virtues of NEPAD without concrete steps on the ground to aid its implementation.

The foregoing, in brief, casts NEPAD in a pessimistic mould. To stem the tide of Africa's maldevelopment and peripheralization demands more from African leaders in the areas of transparent governance, tackling domestic developmental distortions, especially effective generation of internal resources, demonstration of the willingness to put generated resources to effective use, etc. In effect, sound mechanisms to dismantle the internal structures that inhibit development are urgently needed.

CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude by stating that overall, the vision inherent in NEPAD is fundamentally sound. The vision is in line with the EU's Copenhagen criteria as well as the guidelines of the IMF's Washington Consensus. However, propelling the principles embedded in these two propositions is the neo-liberal creed. As noted above, in my view, African countries can benefit from the neo-liberal paradigm only when certain inhibitory and destructive policy measures (so far as Africa is concerned) are expunged. Measures such as the blanket withdrawal of subsidies and the privatization of water and electricity delivery systems would in the long run aggravate the already deplorable human security situation on the continent. Serious reflections in the light of the realities of African situation are called for if neo-liberalism is not to continue polarizing African societies along the 'have' and 'have not' matrix. And until that is done, I will continue to have an overly pessimistic view of the much-touted NEPAD, because NEPAD as it is, hinges on neo-liberalism, and cannot under any stretch of imagination stem the tide of the serious human security problems confronting the continent. All is not lost, however, if African leaders nurture the habit of listening to constructive suggestions from African stakeholders in NEPAD. On the other hand, if the leaders allow themselves to be consumed by elitism, which to me is destructive when it comes to fighting development battles, then we still have a long way to go. As pointed out by Johan Lamprecht, "in the end, it is not necessarily the details of the programme which are important, it is the effectiveness of implementing the programme that is really going to determine whether

NEPAD will make a difference or not.”¹⁰ With our poor implementation record as demonstrated by the lip service paid to various protocols of regional groupings, one cannot but be a bit skeptical about the future of Africa under the aegis of NEPAD.

Feeding this skepticism is the unsavoury track record of failed developmental paradigms, the heightened lack of belief in African capabilities in the face of a constant brain drain, interminable conflicts and civil wars, the never-ending catalogue of unredeemed pledges by the donors and development partners, the tying of our development to the apron strings of the West in the face of clear signs of “aid fatigue”, and the unrelenting penchant to undermine our ability to decide for ourselves by means of tied aid, the overwhelming evidence that we are not prepared to learn from our past mistakes, and hanging on to the monstrous tentacles of neo-liberalism that makes me cautiously pessimistic over the long-term developmental effects of NEPAD. If time helps us to surmount some of these debilitating problems, the likelihood of winning over some of the pessimists is bright.

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DOMESTICATING AFRICA: FRAGMENTS OF OLD VISIONS

Manar El Shorbagy

In the face of consistent predictions that Africa would be further marginalized in the US policy agenda after the Cold War, American attention in the nineties was focused on Africa as never before. Bill Clinton's visit in 1998 was the first by a sitting US President. While Clinton returned to Africa the following year, his Vice-President visited the continent four times, and Madeline Albright paid an annual visit to Africa during her tenure as Secretary of State. The last few years of the decade witnessed an unprecedented effort to build a constituency for Africa that culminated in the 'National Summit on Africa.' In 2000, a proposal to promote trade with and investment in Africa was passed into law.

This chapter argues that the unprecedented attention to Africa in the 1990s has more to do with American domestic politics than with a new vision for the US foreign policy toward Africa. The debate over the policies adopted during that period was hardly between different visions of what the US policy toward Africa should be. It was rather a debate among competing "particularistic interests"¹ committed to fragments of the same earlier visions: the dominant perspective drew largely from what remained of the Cold War approach, adapted to a world without the Soviet Union. The basic impulse behind this same Cold War paradigm has been yet again accommodated to the post- September 11th world, in which the security threats from Africa have created new types of policies reminiscent of Cold War policies.

During the Cold War, there were basically two competing visions of US policy toward Africa: the realist orientation and the idealist perspective. The former, dominant in the foreign policy establishment, viewed Africa through the prism of the Cold War. American interests in Africa were derived from non-African concerns. Economic and military aid to African countries fluctuated during the Cold War according to the US assessment of the Soviet influence.² Where no strategic interests were involved, the Reagan administration, by the end of the 1980s, emphasized the role of economic assistance as a stimulator of private enterprise and a shift to market economies in order to open African markets for American goods³. The collapse of the Soviet Union diminished the strategic importance of Africa, thus rendering the 'Africa-as-a-market' rationale the main pillar around which relations with the African countries could be built. The dominant vision

within the establishment had thus become preoccupied with US economic interests in the continent. With the sluggish economy, and the increasing shift of the American mainstream to the right, selling Africa to skeptics as a potential market for American goods was an attractive idea to the Africa bureaus within US government agencies keen to protect their turf from further decline.

The second enduring vision, emerging in a nation at the helm of the civil rights movement, was one that found similarities between the African-American struggle for freedom and the national independence movement in Africa, and was critical of the establishment's approach. For this progressive trend, the problems of colonization, white rule and apartheid outweighed the danger of communism. This vision gained steam in the 1980s with its focus on the apartheid regime in South Africa. TransAfrica, the Africa-oriented organization, with its ties to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), lent visibility to this approach. The most important achievement, changing the US policy toward the apartheid regime, was due to the "institutionalization" of the civil rights movement,⁴ and the shift of mainstream America towards its position on this particular issue. In the 1970s and 1980s, the civil rights movement had been incorporated into political institutions. African-American leaders played a critical role *within* the decision-making institutions in pressing for this change. The success of such efforts was largely because they were formulated to advocate a cause that embodies 'American values' and principles.

However, by the end of the Cold War, and with the American mainstream moving steadily to the right, the institutionalized black elite became divided from within on Africa policy. Out of pragmatism, a considerable segment of this elite responded to the new situation by adapting to elements of the establishment's 'realism', in an effort to extract the best it could 'for Africa' in a conservative era. Just as electoral politics and the institutionalization of the black movement were perceived as crucial for the black freedom struggle in the post-King era,⁵ 'constructive engagement' with the establishment's orientation on Africa was perceived as the only route if African-Americans were to continue to make a difference to the Africa policy in an increasingly conservative America.

The other segment of the black elite, which continued to push for its progressive stance focused on the post-independence challenges facing Africa: debt relief, poverty, human rights and the AIDS epidemic. But this segment found itself increasingly outside the mainstream that was already moving to the right, leaving them largely marginalized in the institutional debates over the Africa policy.

These essential dynamics, out of which emerged the current domestication of Africa, are nowhere clearer than in the US legislature. On the one hand, while being a key foreign policy player in general, the US Congress, when it comes to Africa, does not just react to executive proposals, but also initiates policies, as in the case of Somalia, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Sudan Peace Act. On the other hand, Congress is the arena where particularistic interests are displayed in action and lobbying efforts manifest themselves in building coalitions to kill or pass legislation.

Thus, this chapter focuses on Congressional action during the 1990s. It highlights the types of coalitions that emerged during that period. Such coalitions are one evi-

dence of the domestication thesis, manifested in the dramatic changes in the types of coalitions that occurred during that period. While the CBC remained at the heart of such coalitions, new players have become actively engaged on African issues. Of these, corporate America and the religious conservatives have been the most important. The new players reflect the collapse of an overarching vision with a stable coalition to support it. The remaining fragments of the old vision attract different groups who engage with temporary and shifting partners with whom they share no long-term commitment to Africa *per se*. The politics of the CBC reflect the predicament of the idealist vision in the post-Cold War conservative era. A considerable number of the CBC members have opted for engaging the 'new mainstream' on Africa. For those members, a Congress with Republican majorities since 1994 and a "New Democrat" at the White House defined the type of "possible" policies. More so, redistricting has resulted in a more diversified CBC in terms of members' constituents, leading to more pragmatism, not just in coalition building (a characteristic streak of the CBC since its inception), but also in ideological stances. A minority of CBC members, however, continued to advocate the Africa policies that represent a continuation of the progressive trend of earlier times. While elements of the old idealist vision are still observable, they no longer constitute a constant, considerable pressure.

Key case studies illustrate this thesis, beginning with the case of Somalia and ending with the post-September 11 era. Somalia marked the shift from Cold War politics to the dynamics of domesticating Africa. The way in which Congress handled the Rwandan crisis, initiated and passed AGOA, and dealt with issues like HIV/AIDS, debt relief and the conflict in Sudan shows the shifting dynamics of the new era and highlights the logic behind each policy.

The research contained herein is based on primary sources, including Congressional Records, Committee hearings and reports, documents obtained from Congressional offices, as well as interviews with Congressional staff members who played a role in shaping policy, or were close observers of such dynamics from their positions in relevant committees or offices of key players.

SOMALIA: FROM PRODDING TO PULLING THE PLUG

In 1992, key members of both houses of Congress were highly active in urging the Bush administration to lead a worldwide humanitarian effort in Somalia. A series of hearings, letters to the executive and trips to Somalia were critical in publicizing the crisis, articulating the basis for US intervention, and above all, in prodding a reluctant administration toward action.

At the center of Congressional concern was that the Bush administration was not doing enough in the UN "to lead the world body in responding to the Somalia crisis".⁶ In a Senate hearing early in 1992, Senator Nancy Kassebaum "criticized the Bush administration for having watered down the language of a UN Security Council resolution calling for the deployment of UN peace keeping troops to Somalia".⁷

Senator Kassebaum played a leading role in the Senate after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. She was the first member to visit the famine-stricken areas, introduced a

resolution that helped focus attention on the Somalia crisis and was the first Senator to suggest the use of US troops as a humanitarian interventionist force.⁸

In the House of Representatives, the CBC members played the key role. Representatives Donald Payne (D-New Jersey) and John Lewis (D-Georgia) focused the House attention on the crisis and led a large delegation to Somalia. In October 1992, Rep. Lewis introduced a resolution (H.Con. Res. 370) which passed both Houses urging the President to “inform the UN of the US willingness to participate in the deployment of security guards.”⁹ Because of the legislative “prodding”¹⁰ and the media images that framed public opinion, the US engagement was finally announced by the outgoing President Bush on December 4, 1992.

However, despite the role of those key members in pushing for US engagement, the Somalia intervention did not have broad-based support in Congress. Some members had reservations on the kind of precedent Operation Hope would set for the future use of US military force. Other members wanted the administration to define clear objectives for the mission. Concerns about the cost of the operation were also voiced. Such reservations would later develop into Congressional action to pull the plug when the operation started to stumble.

From the beginning, skepticism was higher in the Senate than the House. The two chambers never reconciled their differences on a resolution (Res.45) that passed in both, but were different in their vision of the scope of the US mission in Somalia. The Senate adopted a narrow definition of the mission and found that the House version amounted to nation-building.¹¹ When security conditions deteriorated in Somalia, Congressional opposition mounted and was led by Senator Robert Byrd, the Chairman of the powerful Appropriations committee, who was joined by Republican members of both Houses. By late September 1993, Congress was actively working on restricting Presidential power through legislation. Senator Byrd wrote an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill that passed both houses and required the President to report to Congress by October 15 a description of the mission and anticipated duration of American forces in Somalia.¹²

The tool of executive reporting was used again by Congress when the situation in Somalia deteriorated further. When clashes between US forces and Somali militias led on October 3 to the killing of 18 US rangers and the wounding of 78 others, Congress pressured the President to send his report sooner than the October 15 deadline. On October 7, President Clinton made a speech in which he specified the mission and stated that US forces would pull out by March 31. Clearly, the pressure pushed the administration to alter its previous position of opposing any setting of a deadline for the pullout.¹³

But the deadline set by the President was opposed by some members of Congress who called for a withdrawal by the end of January 1994, and a further narrowing of the scope of the mission than what was outlined by the President. A compromise was reached with the White House that kept the March deadline but limited the scope to strictly humanitarian support, while the administration dropped its plans to continue to pressure Aideed.¹⁴

The withdrawal of US troops from Somalia marked the beginning of Congressional neglect of that country. Not until the September 11 attacks did Congress renew its inter-

ests in Somalia. In 1998, Donald Payne and Tom Campbell (R-California) introduced a resolution that urged the administration and the world community to continue its foreign assistance to Somalia and called on President Clinton to “increase involvement in the reconciliation and reconstruction efforts” in that country.¹⁵ The resolution never reached the House floor as it died in the House Committee on International Relations.

However, the Somalia episode in Congress remains particularly important in that it represents the transition between two different eras. The ‘prodding’ demonstrated the same dynamics of a waning epoch, while ‘pulling the plug’ carried the seeds of the new dynamic. In the prodding stage, the leading players were the same actors who traditionally influenced Africa policy in Congress. Just as during the Cold War, the CBC members were in the lead of the House. In the Senate, with usually far less, if any, African-American members, the key players have been the members of the committees of jurisdiction. Just as in the Somalia prodding stage, Nancy Kassebaum, a senior member in the Senate Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on Africa, played a major role in approving the sanctions against South Africa.

The new era’s rules of the game started to take shape in the stage in which Congress took the lead in ‘pulling the plug.’ The members who advocated a more active interventionist US role in Somalia were outnumbered by a bipartisan majority wary of US involvement in Africa where strategic interests were no longer at stake, and no robust domestic constituency behind it. The African-American constituency’s interest in Africa has never been enough to force a change in US policy unless its positions were formulated as compatible with mainstream America. While this formulation seemed plausible at the beginning of the Somali humanitarian crisis, it became an impossible task once American soldiers started to fall. Somalia completely faded away from the American agenda and largely contributed to the way in which the Rwanda disaster was handled.

RWANDA: NOT ON THE RADAR SCREEN

The American response to the disaster in Rwanda was largely due to the new political dynamics in Washington. The case of Rwanda ushered in a new era with specific criteria for US attention and involvement. While the response of the Clinton administration was a direct reaction to the administration’s Somalia debacle, in Congress, the muted response was due to the lack of strategic and economic interests coupled with the absence of a domestic constituency for an issue competing for attention with other issues on the agenda.

After Somalia, the Clinton administration issued the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) that imposed stringent conditions for US participation in UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁶ The first international situation where this PDD applied was Rwanda. The administration instructed US spokespersons to avoid describing the massive deaths in Rwanda as genocide¹⁷ because such a description would have called into question the US response to the crisis.

The administration’s desire to demonstrate to its critics inside and outside Congress that it could be tough on the UN led to delays in the UN action that certainly contributed to further loss of lives in Rwanda.

In Congress, Kweisi Mfume, then Chair of the CBC, and Donald Payne, the CBC's point man on Africa, sent a letter to Clinton on May 4, 1994 requesting the President's "personal attention" to the unfolding disaster in Rwanda. When no response was received, another letter was sent on June 16, criticizing the slow response of the administration, but reserving its harshest critique for the US Representative to the U.N. Madeline Albright, who was regarded as deliberately stalling the UN response to the crisis¹⁸. Donald Payne later led a delegation that visited Rwanda and the Goma refugee camp in Congo¹⁹.

It is interesting, however, to note that the CBC response to the Rwanda disaster was basically confined to the above-mentioned tools of prodding. The CBC engagement on this issue pales in contrast to that body's activism on other African issues of lesser magnitude. For example, neither bills nor resolutions were introduced, and no statements by CBC members were made on the House floor. In fact it was the Republican John Mica who took to the floor of the House to describe the US policy in Rwanda as a "disaster (that) failed to stem a disaster".²⁰ Needless to say, none of the dramatic gestures used by the CBC members from time to time, such as demonstrations, were used in the case of Rwanda. Although the CBC members' threat to boycott a White House conference on Africa led to a meeting between CBC staffers and White House officials and subsequently to a meeting between Rep. Payne and the President that discussed Rwanda, the threat stemmed from CBC members' anger over a cluster of issues, including Haiti and crime legislation, and not just Rwanda.

This pale account of the CBC members' response to the Rwandan disaster is due to the fact that the disaster unfolded at a time when CBC members' attention was focused on Haiti.

Since the overthrow of President Aristide in September 1991 by the Haitian military, the CBC had articulated a position that was different from that of Bush, and later the Clinton administration. The Caucus demanded the equitable treatment of Haitian refugees 'regardless of color' and was later critical of the initial Clinton policy which centered on persuading Aristide before his return to agree to a 'power sharing' mechanism of governance.²¹

The issue of Haiti, in which the CBC has traditionally been heavily involved, had several elements with squarely domestic policy resonance, and thus was one of the issues ranking high on the members' agenda. The way in which the 'boat refugees' were treated as compared to other refugees made it an issue directly linked to domestic issues already on top of the CBC agenda (racism in immigration and refugee policies, as well as welfare policies, especially in Florida). Besides, the presence of an active Haitian-American community, especially in New York, meant the direct involvement of CBC members from that state.²²

In contrast, Rwanda had no domestic advocacy constituency. Rwanda competed with an issue for which there was a vocal constituency and direct domestic interests at stake.

In interviews I conducted with Congressional staffers who worked with CBC members or in relevant committees during the crisis, it was interesting to find out that Rwanda was not even "on the radar screen"²³, as one congressional aide put it, of those staffers

themselves. An issue finds its way to a member's agenda through constituents' interests or through the interest of and research by staffers. Rwanda lacked both. In those interviews, there was a wide consensus that the preoccupation with Haiti and the unawareness of the magnitude of the Rwandan disaster were main reasons behind the CBC members' muted response. Some even suggested that the after-the-fact guilt over Rwanda was behind the subsequent energy that African American members put into AGOA.

AGOA: NO 'WELFARE' FOR AFRICA

The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 was yet another layer added to the ongoing shift of the American mainstream to the right. It was a shift to be only further intensified two years later with the Republican takeover of the majorities in both houses of Congress.

Running as a 'New Democrat', Clinton adhered to the plan put forward by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) that he co-founded, then chaired in 1991 before running for President. A group of white conservative and centrist Democratic politicians, the DLC claimed that the only way the Democratic Party could win back the White House was to win back the sector of voters known as the Reagan Democrats: the white middle and working class voters who were alienated by the Presidential Democratic candidate's racial, social and economic liberalism.²⁴ This segment of voters was convinced by Reagan that the Democratic Party has become the party of 'handouts' to the poor and minorities. The Clinton campaign strategy was to convince those voters that a 'New Democrat' could be moderate in social policy, disciplined in fiscal policy, and tough on crime and welfare. The campaign also de-emphasized race by embracing a universalist agenda that appealed to 'all' Americans, especially health care coverage and the economy.

Acting on his campaign promise to focus on the economy as a 'laser beam', Clinton gave high priority to investing in America's infrastructure and human resources. In foreign policy, the translation of this campaign promise was an emphasis on America's status in the global economy. Trade relations were defined as a national security issue and the Clinton administration worked hard on opening markets for US goods and businesses abroad.

In the first year of his term, and amidst the push and pull from the left and right in Clinton's own party, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was seen as the measure that would return the President to the 'New Democrat' themes that put him in the White House. The administration thus led a campaign to convince Congress to approve NAFTA, building a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats. In other words, NAFTA was passed by the traditional 'conservative coalition', over the vehement opposition of organized labour, a core Democratic constituent.

The shift to the right was therefore already present before the Republican takeover of Congress, which only pushed it further. Therefore, the American political spectrum was already experiencing a series of developments that would lead to the type of legislation for Africa embodied in AGOA.

The end of the Cold War made the shift from 'aid to trade' inevitable. There was no reason to continue the aid for African countries previously perceived as of strategic significance in preventing Soviet expansion. Already during the Reagan years, economic aid was continued to some African countries where the US had no political interest in order to help stimulate private enterprises and open markets for US goods.²⁵

By the end of the Cold War, foreign aid to Africa had to be shifted anyway to the former Soviet Union states. Meanwhile, by 1993, many countries in Africa had shown levels of economic growth that helped change the image of Africa from merely a basket case into a potential US market.²⁶

It is in this context that AGOA was born and passed into law six years later (P. L. 106-200, Title I). AGOA represented the 'new' mainstream's approach to Africa policy. It was defined by its proponents as 'trade not aid' to accommodate the new political atmosphere and its distaste for so-called handouts. The bill's eligibility criteria for African countries reflected the American national security as defined in a new era. Beneficiary countries must show significant progress towards establishing market-based economies and eliminating barriers to US trade and investment. They must also not engage in any activities perceived as undermining US foreign policy interests.²⁷

A new form of policy toward Africa also implied a new kind of politics, i.e. new coalitions including strange bedfellows. While the bill was dubbed 'NAFTA for Africa' by its opponents, the coalition that passed AGOA went far beyond the traditional conservative coalition that passed NAFTA. It was an unusual coalition that, besides the elements of the conservative coalition, included some liberal Democrats and a considerable number of progressive CBC members. In fact, it originated in the office of one of the most liberal members in the House, Rep. Jim McDermott (D- Washington).

In 1994, Mike Williams, an African-American staff member working for Rep. Jim McDermott, jotted down the basic ideas which become the seeds of what was later known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act. It was clear to Williams and fellow staffers that the emerging global economy would further marginalize Africa.²⁸ In its legislation to implement the Uruguay Round trade agreements, Congress in 1994 required five annual reports to be submitted by the President on trade and development policy toward Africa.²⁹

Concerned with the impact of the Uruguay Round on Africa and disappointed by the limitations of the Clinton administration's policies, the informal bipartisan African Trade and Investment Caucus took up Williams' original idea and decided to develop their own initiative, which was later introduced in the House in September 1996³⁰. The bill contained a clear neo-liberal economic approach toward Africa's development and obviously reflected the emerging interest of corporate America in the African markets after the encouraging signs of economic growth in the early 1990s. It emphasized "economic self reliance through expanded private sector activities, increased trade and investment, elimination of trade barriers and by focusing on countries committed to economic reform".³¹

The long journey of this bill since it was first introduced in 1996 until it was passed into law in May 2000 tells a great deal about the prospects and limitations of US policy towards Africa. It is an excellent example of the way in which a combination of political

and institutional variables shapes the policy outcome and thus illustrates the scope of the possible.

When AGOA was first initiated, it had few supporters inside or outside of Congress. After the battle over NAFTA and GATT, the Democrats were in no mood for supporting a new trade bill.

But the bill was not just any 'trade' bill. It was a trade bill for Africa. The CBC members, whose support for African legislation lends moral credibility, were divided over AGOA. Coming of age, and reaching a record high of 39 members, the CBC constituencies had become more diversified than ever. Some CBC members from textile states were concerned about the loss of American jobs to African nations. Others were concerned about the very approach of the bill. They feared the bill would open African markets to exploitation by the multinationals and opposed placing conditionality on sovereign African nations. The White House, too, was initially opposed to the bill. Not until the bill gained momentum did the White House come on board. Initially, however, the textile provisions were of particular concern to the Clinton administration.³² The White House was also concerned that a new trade bill would generate the same kind of politics seen over NAFTA, thus derailing the passage of 'fast track' authority that was on top of Clinton's priority at the time.³³

Supporters of the bill in Congress knew that a trade bill for Africa would need more supporters than just the traditional conservative coalition to pass. But they also knew that the neo-liberal approach of AGOA would make it hard to rely on the traditional Africa constituency that passed the sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s. A new constituency should, therefore, be created.

For a bill defined by its proponents, at least in the beginning, as a 'trade not aid' bill, corporate America was an obvious constituency that soon joined the effort. The support of the African diplomatic corps in Washington was solicited and gained as well. It was indeed a new and unusual coalition of left and right forces. African ambassadors were accompanied on Capitol Hill by the representatives of corporate America in a concerted lobbying effort for AGOA. Conservative Republicans and some CBC members who usually stand on different sides of the issues joined forces in support of AGOA. In fact, a critical role was played by senior CBC members in committees of jurisdictions. Charles Rangel, (D-New York) senior member in the powerful House Ways and Means committee, and Donald Payne, the key CBC spokesperson on Africa, played leading roles in passing this legislation.

Of all the characteristics of the CBC since its establishment in 1971, pragmatism was the decisive streak that determined the position of CBC members who supported AGOA. Trade was the only 'possible' track if something was to be done for Africa in a Republican Congress.

The coming together of as different forces as the conservative pro-free trade Republicans and the progressive CBC members with their passion for Africa brought together very different constituents to be addressed with starkly contrasting discourses.

In her testimony before the Senate Finance committee on AGOA, Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that the philosophy behind the bill is "simple. America stands ready to help those African countries that help themselves".³⁴ Adding that the "benefits contained in the bill are not entitlements".³⁵ Albright was clearly addressing the very

same constituents targeted by the New Democrats. AGOA, she meant to assure them, was not a 'welfare programmes' for Africa.

In the same hearing, Charles Rangel, who also testified on behalf of AGOA, addressed a totally different audience concerned that the eligibility criteria amounted to conditionality imposed on sovereign states. He "reminded" his constituency that AGOA "is not a treaty nor a trade agreement". Eligibility criteria, he claimed, are "only to direct that the President of the US immediately move in to work out agreements with those sovereign and great nations".³⁶ It is only within this domestic context of race relations that the conditionality in the bill should be read. Without such conditionalities, it was impossible to gain the support of the dominating forces in Congress for a bill for Africa.

It is also in this domestic context that the debate over the bill can be adequately understood. It was by and large a debate over American jobs and the American market opportunities rather than a debate over African development.

The most contentious issue facing the bill and derailing it for almost five years was the imports of textile and apparel. In the US, the textile and apparel industry is considered 'import sensitive'. The wages in this industry are low compared to the rest of the US manufacturing sector. But because those wages are higher than in Africa, this industry is considered vulnerable to trade liberalization.³⁷ Although African exports represented only a tiny fraction of all sources of US imports, AGOA's provisions caused concern among manufacturers and their representatives in Congress. Manufacturers feared the transshipment of Asian textile and apparel products through the African beneficiary countries.³⁸

Although the opposition came from members of South-Eastern states in both houses of Congress, the rules that govern Senate business made it more difficult for the bill to pass there than in the House. Unlike the majority-based House, where members from textile states can be outvoted, the senate needs a 60-vote-majority to end a filibuster carried out by few senators. And with no CBC membership and a non-enthusiastic Republican leadership, the bill's Senate coalition was far less robust as compared to the one built in the House.

Consequently, the provisions on the textile industry were more stringent in the Senate version than the House's. The House bills, introduced in two consecutive Congresses, would have allowed the President to grant duty-free treatment to textile and apparel to the beneficiary countries as long as the products were not import sensitive. The senate versions, however, would have allowed free and quota-free treatment of apparel products only if the apparel were assembled in beneficiary countries from fabric made in the US from US yarn.³⁹ And while versions of both Houses required the beneficiary country to have adequate visa systems to protect against transshipment, the Senate version required the beneficiary country to enact laws to permit US customs service verification teams to have access in order to investigate transshipment allegations.⁴⁰

The compromise that was reached accommodated the institutional obstacles in order to pass the bill. It granted duty free treatment and eliminated quotas on textile and apparel articles imported from a beneficiary country if such country: a) adopted an efficient visa system and passed domestic laws to prevent transshipment; b) permitted US customs service verification teams to have access necessary to investigate transship-

ment allegations; and c) agreed to report at the request of the customs service on its total exports and imports with respect to such articles used⁴¹. The bill also directed the President to suspend the duty free treatment of articles proved to have caused serious damage to the domestic industry.⁴²

Moreover, it was clear that folding the provisions on Africa into a larger trade package was another institutional tool to help pass the bill in the Senate, where support for the Caribbean basin provisions was stronger. The House made it clear that the Caribbean basin provisions would only pass in the House if AGOA passed in the Senate.

The bill was finally passed, but against the opposition of a coalition that took a radically different approach towards the Africa policy. It was a coalition that opposed the very logic on which AGOA was built.

HOPE IS IN THE AIR

In opposition to the pro-AGOA forces, a coalition emerged around a bill introduced by Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D- Illinois), known as Human Rights, Opportunities, Partnership and Empowerment of Africa (HOPE).

Based on a coalition of forces representing the labour, environmental, humanitarian and human rights constituencies, HOPE adopted an entirely different approach to dealing with Africa. This coalition can be seen as an extension to the progressive traditional Africa constituency, albeit addressing the challenges facing Africa in the post-independence era.

In the 1970s and 1980s, such a constituency gave priority to issues of national liberation and white rule. In the post-colonization and apartheid era, these progressive forces addressed a wide variety of issues from debt relief to combating HIV/AIDS and from addressing the landmines and deforestation crises to combating the 're-colonization' of Africa.

This different approach culminated in the bill that was introduced by Rep. Jackson Jr. in the House and sponsored by Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin) in the Senate. The substance of the bill was different from AGOA in several important ways.

While AGOA used the non-binding language of the 'sense of Congress' with respect to debt relief, HOPE included extensive provisions for the relief of debts owed by sub-Saharan African countries. Besides the full cancellation of the relatively small debt owed to the US, HOPE called for full cancellation of Africa's foreign debts and it directed the Secretary of Treasury to urge foreign governments and use the US vote in multinational financial institutions to advocate "the unconditional cancellation of all debts".⁴³ The bill would have also made it the US policy to encourage the African countries benefiting from the debt cancellation to allocate 20% of the national budget to basic services in accordance with the UN 20-20 Initiative.⁴⁴

The two bills were distinctively different in terms of eligibility criteria for sub-Saharan African beneficiary countries. AGOA's criteria are market-oriented. Unlike HOPE, a country would be eligible for AGOA's duty-free treatment if it has established or is making progress towards establishing a market-based economy and the elimination of

barriers to US trade and investment. The country must also be certified as “not engaging in activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interest”, and as not providing “support for acts of terrorism”.⁴⁵ HOPE requirements were respect for internationally recognized human rights, and workers’ rights and taking adequate measures to prevent transshipment.⁴⁶ But while AGOA required a beneficiary country to have a system for protection of internationally recognized workers’ rights, HOPE denied market access to products produced under conditions that violated internationally recognized labour rights. In terms of the scope of violations, AGOA denied benefits to countries that engage in “gross violations”, while HOPE denied them to countries engaging in “significant” violations.⁴⁷

Unlike AGOA, HOPE included provisions that guaranteed a minimum level of US development assistance (at the level of the 1994 appropriation of \$802 million) and changed the priorities of areas deserving such assistance to put women’s programmes, health care, education, and AIDS education, prevention and treatment on top of the list.⁴⁸ HOPE also stipulated that companies benefiting from the trade preferences must employ 90% African workers.⁴⁹

By the time HOPE was formally introduced in Congress, AGOA was already gaining much momentum. As AGOA’s unusual coalition gained strength, the White House abandoned its reluctance and came out fully in support of the legislation, bringing with it the votes of some reluctant Democrats in both Houses. Although Nelson Mandela, in a joint press conference with Clinton, described AGOA as “not acceptable”,⁵⁰ the vocal support of the African ambassadors to Washington, including – later – the South African ambassador, lent the bill more strength.

HOPE therefore was at a disadvantage in terms of timing and momentum. But it also carried in its genes other causes for its quick demise in Congress. HOPE took an entirely different approach to doing business in Congress. In other words, it was not just a radically different approach substantively, i.e. in terms of the policy toward Africa; it was also radically different procedurally.

In an inherently incremental institution like Congress, HOPE was too revolutionary to sell. In terms of its content, it represented a sharp turn away from the approach of moving from aid to trade systematically adopted since the Reagan years. HOPE was described by its own proponents as “a Marshall plan for Africa”⁵¹ in a Congress that had already reduced economic aid for the continent since the fiscal year 1996.⁵²

It is important to note that the incrementalism of Congress does not mean that new, radically different ideas—in the abstract sense of the term—are impossible to consider. It rather means that any such idea needs a relatively long life cycle of its own—one idea at a time—*inside* Congress until an institutional memory emerges. HOPE contained too many new ideas to be passed all at once, in an institution that can barely deal with one at a time.

In addition, the fact that some leading CBC members were sponsors of AGOA made it particularly hard for the HOPE coalition to claim the moral ground. The CBC, which perceives itself as the “conScience of Congress”,⁵³ was divided over AGOA, with some of its members supporting HOPE, and some others sponsoring both.

Institutionally, what mattered was that AGOA had champions in the committees of jurisdiction. The fact that Charles Rangel, the ranking member in the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, was leading the efforts for AGOA complicated HOPE's prospects. A junior member of both Congress and the CBC, Jackson's alternative bill and vocal opposition of AGOA appears to have been seen as a challenge to the codes of seniority embodied in Rangel whom Jackson used to call "Uncle Charlie".⁵⁴

HOPE, on the other hand, had no champions in the key committees in either house. Neither Jackson nor any of the House vocal supporters of HOPE had a seat in the Ways and Means Committee, which had primary jurisdiction over the bill. Senator Feingold was not a member of the Senate counterpart, the Finance committee.

HOPE's sponsors did attempt to add some of its provisions as amendments to AGOA on the House floor, but even that proved unsuccessful. AGOA's supporters found such amendments risky to the critical balance they created and needed to keep in order to maintain AGOA's unusual coalition. Besides, HOPE was already perceived as an alternative plan put forward to sink AGOA.⁵⁵ Already gaining momentum, AGOA's supporters found no need to reach a compromise with the HOPE camp.⁵⁶ HOPE never made it out of committees in either House.

But as Rep. Jackson put it, while "AGOA passes, HOPE is still in the air".⁵⁷ In the incremental Congress, some of the ideas of HOPE may later take a life of their own if pushed further one at a time. Indeed, some such ideas already are. Debt relief, and HIV/AIDS provisions have taken on a life of their own, embraced by yet another unusual coalition. Indeed, it is the most unusual of all coalitions. This time, it is the African-American members of Congress and the Christian conservatives.

DEBT RELIEF AND AIDS: LOOSE COALITIONS

Once again, American domestic politics leaves its mark on Africa policy. Since the early nineties, the Christian conservatives have become more interested and involved in US foreign policy. From the Jerusalem Embassy Act to the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act, Christian conservatives have made their clout felt on Capitol Hill. Out of religious conviction, the Christian right has been particularly interested in several African issues, from debt relief and combating AIDS, to the civil war in Sudan. Despite the wide gap of opinions on almost every other issue, the CBC found in the Christian Right an equally passionate group when it came to some issues related to Africa. Even though the two camps differ on the details on these very same issues of mutual concern, they have worked together for the first time, forming one of the most unusual coalitions in Congress.

Of the African issues in the post-AGOA Congress, African debt relief has the loosest coalition, comprising the Christian conservatives and African American members. On the one hand, the African debt owed to the US is rather small, thus necessitating work through the international financial institutions. Unlike the CBC members, Christian conservatives insist on attaching conditions to relief efforts. For example, the Foreign

Operations Appropriations bill that passed into law in October 2002 (PL107-115) stipulated that debt reduction authority given to the President in accordance with the law be exercised only with respect to a country whose government “does not have an excessive level of military expenditures”, has not provided “support for international terrorism”, has cooperated on international narcotics control and “has not been engaged in a consistent pattern of gross” violations of human rights.⁵⁸

On the other hand, although both CBC and Christian conservative members give special attention to the issue of debt relief, they do not necessarily work on this issue as a coordinating coalition in concrete terms.

On AIDS, however, the coalition between the two is somewhat stronger. Although the Christian conservative members have only recently joined the efforts on this issue, they have left an important mark in a Republican Congress. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), publicly said that he was “ashamed” that he had not done more on this issue.⁵⁹ Influenced by the prominent ministers Franklin and Billy Graham, Helms described the AIDS crisis in Africa as the most “heartbreaking tragedy in the world today” and vowed to offer an amendment to add \$500 million to USAID’s programmess to fight the epidemic.⁶⁰

Still, the Christian conservatives’ approach to the HIV/AIDS policy differs from that of the CBC members, in that it focuses on funds for eliminating mother-to-child transmission and abstention rather than education and parental treatment.⁶¹ However, this unusual coalition of liberal and Christian conservatives has led to a remarkable change in the second Bush administration’s position on HIV/AIDS. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, the President pledged \$15 billion over the next five years to help countries in Africa and the Caribbean fight AIDS. The President’s statement marked a sharp shift from statements made earlier, when senior officials questioned the wisdom of trying to save the lives of those already infected with AIDS, as well as the capacity of health systems in African countries to handle the money donated for prevention and drug treatment.⁶² The shift again reflects the domestication of Africa, as it is mainly due to the lobbying of Evangelical Christians—a crucial political base for the Republican President—and the direct prodding by Republican members of Congress, on top of which are Senator Bill Frist, the Senate majority leader who volunteers annually as a medical missionary helping AIDS patients in Africa. The White House debate over whether the Mexico City policy, withholding money from clinics that conduct or discuss abortion, would apply to the President’s initiative is yet another clear example of how domestic considerations top the factors that shape the Africa policy.

SUDAN: THE EMOTIONALLY-DRIVEN POLICY

Of all the African issues, nowhere has the Christian conservative/ CBC coalition been stronger than on Sudan. Depicted as a religious war between the Arab-Muslim North and the African Christian South, the conflict in Sudan has galvanized the Christian evangelicals. The issue of slavery and human rights abuses brought African Americans to the forefront of efforts to put pressure on the US government to do more about a conflict loaded with emotional issues for both African Americans and Christian conservatives.

By the end of the 1990s, the grassroots efforts of churches and human rights, humanitarian and civil rights organizations captured the attention of policymakers in Washington. The types of issues involved drew together strange bedfellows. Kenneth Starr, the former Whitewater Special Prosecutor, joined Johnnie Cochran, O.J. Simpson's attorney, in representing the American protesters who chained themselves to the front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington in the spring of 2001.⁶³ While the Christian music star Ken Tamplin produced a CD dedicated to the Sudan cause⁶⁴, Freedom House's Center for Religious Groups—which organized seven days of prayer vigils outside the State Department—worked with Walter Fauntroy, former DC delegate and head of the CBC affiliate National Black Leadership Roundtable, to push Congress for action against the Sudanese government.⁶⁵

Thanks to such continuous campaigns, a country that was perceived as only a base for both oil reserves and Islamic terrorists,⁶⁶ was shown in new and dramatic light, begging for action by lawmakers.

In 1999, several versions of a bill on Sudan were introduced in both Houses. A version of the bill was considered and passed in the Senate in November of the same year, and referred to the House. Both versions called for sanctions against Sudan if the government does not take part in peace talks. Both also authorized aid for groups outside of government control.

During the consideration of the bill in the House, Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-Alabama) picked up on an idea that appeared in the Report of the US commission on International Religious Freedom. The resulting Bachus amendment, which derailed the legislation in Congress for two years, would have barred oil companies doing business in Sudan from trading securities and raising capital in the US. The amendment would have applied to non-US companies, since an executive order by President Clinton in 1997 had already barred US companies from working in Sudan.⁶⁷

Opponents of the Bachus amendment feared that such sanctions would set a precedent that would lead to a flood of attempts to politicize the US capital market. The manipulation of the Senate rules was the easiest way to block the legislation. Opponents were able to abort successive attempts by the Senate leadership to appoint members to the conference committee that would reconcile the differences between the two houses' versions. Senator Phil Gramm of Texas used the Senate technique of putting bills on hold to stop any further action on the bill in that chamber.⁶⁸

The incoming Bush administration joined the anti-Bachus forces, on the same above-mentioned grounds. The events of September 11, and the Sudanese government's cooperation in fighting terrorism, referred to by the administration as a "useful source of intelligence" that should be maintained, became another source for the White House's opposition to the Bachus amendment.⁶⁹ The bill's momentum was lost, to the disappointment of the Sudan coalition.

No less important was the fact that the powerful pro-Israel lobby did not come through on its understanding with the Sudan coalition to help pass the Sudan Peace Act. The Sudan coalition wanted to amend the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 2001 to include Sudan. Worried that such an amendment could jeopardize the renewal of ILSA, AIPAC's (American Israeli Public Affairs Committee) legislative director prom-

ised the Sudan coalition to support a separate Sudan bill, in exchange for the coalition dropping its support of the amendment to ILSA. Congress passed ILSA, a top priority for AIPAC in July 2001, but by mid 2002, the pro-Israel lobby had not yet acted on its promise, except for a call to a Daschle aide urging the appointment of conferees⁷⁰, a less than modest effort given AIPAC's lobbying record.

However, July 2002 carried news that boosted the Sudan Peace Act, namely the Machakos Protocol. Already responding to an important Republican constituency, the Bush administration had elevated the level of US involvement in Sudan since June 2001. Bush had, then, appointed former Senator Danforth as his special envoy to Sudan, a move that was applauded by the Sudan coalition, at least until his report was unveiled. The administration's subsequent heavy involvement in the Machakos negotiations gave the White House leverage to convince the Christian conservatives to dropping the capital market sanctions. House sponsor of the Sudan bill, Tom Tancredo, finally worked out a compromise with Senator Brownback and the White House that led to the passage of the bill in October 2002 after drop the sanctions. The CBC members were reportedly not involved in the talks with the White House. Tancredo, however, warned that if the bill did not bring the warring parties to the peace table he would be prepared to introduce a new bill to push the US out of the peace talks and recognize Southern Sudan as an independent nation.⁷¹

POST- SEPTEMBER 11: FULL CIRCLE TO THE SAME OLD VISION?

The events of September 11 returned security to the top of the list of the US policy agenda in Africa, as elsewhere. During the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union had focused the US interest in Africa on helping African countries that help themselves, mainly through 'trade not aid', a discourse that was perpetuated by the Bush administration once it took office.

Besides trade, September 11 brought back another fragment of the old vision: security. The National Security Strategy announced in September 2002 has made clear that special importance will be given to weak states, because they are "vulnerable to terrorist networks"⁷²

Politically unstable poor countries, perceived since the Somalia debacle as strategically unimportant and remote from US security interests, have become a priority. And by the end of 2002, the Pentagon had already established the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, to oversee anti-terrorist operations in that region.⁷³

While the Bush administration started off with a statement by the new President that "Africa does not fit into America's strategic interests"⁷⁴, the wide range of activities related to Africa during the Clinton years made it difficult for any incoming administration to simply pull the plug. For the Bush administration, the outright reversal of policies, obvious in cases such as the Middle East, the Kyoto protocol and North Korea, was not possible on Africa.

For one thing, AGOA had actually institutionalized the relations with Africa. Section 105 of AGOA required the President no later than May 2001 to establish a US-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum. AGOA required the President to also direct

the Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and State, as well as the US Trade Representative, to host annual meetings with their African counterparts.⁷⁵

Requiring the President to submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on the US Trade and investment policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, AGOA has in fact created a lot of activities, falling under the turf of a myriad of executive departments and agencies, with the goal of trade capacity building.⁷⁶

It is important, however, to remember that what was institutionalized was in fact the neo-liberal approach to market economies and free trade, a fragment of the old realist vision. Such an approach was by no means incompatible with the incoming Bush administration's perception of Africa policy. As early as January 2001, an official at the State Department reiterated the same ideas using the very same words to describe the prospects of relations with Africa. "We will be there with a helping hand", he said, "but no more hand-outs will be the order of the day."⁷⁷

Equally important, it was Clinton's symbolic politics, rather than substantive policies, that made him the 'first black President'. The incoming 'compassionate conservative' who won a percentage of the black vote smaller than both Robert Dole in 1996 and his own father in 1992, George W. Bush had an interest in keeping the symbolism at least in a policy area that was increasingly appealing to his own religious conservative base.

Nevertheless, while the Democrat's symbolism did matter in an era of a combative Gingrich-Helms Congress that assaulted the civil rights era accomplishments, under Bush, symbolism was reduced to almost irrelevance for both African-Americans and Africa.

With almost no communications in his first year in office with major black organizations, including the CBC, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League, George W. Bush, when asked at the NAACP 2002 annual conference why black leaders were critical of his civil rights record, replied that sitting around the table with "*foreign leaders*", there he was "looking at Colin Powell and Condi "(Condoleezza Rice)".⁷⁸

The same contrast, obvious in the above-mentioned statement by the US President, is added to the domestication dimension to produce policies for Africa that are undone by domestic considerations. While the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), designed to "encourage economic freedom", was perceived by the President's political aides as emphasizing the theme of 'compassionate conservatism', the \$180 billion farm bill, passed into law in 2002, cost African countries more than the assistance provided.⁷⁹ African officials were quick to point to such huge US agricultural subsidies, unfavourable to African products, when the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick urged them in the AGOA conference in 2003 to "eliminate agricultural subsidies and other impediments to fair and open competition".⁸⁰

CONCLUSION

The fact that September 11 has brought back the security dimension to the economic approach does not mean that both add up to a concrete or consistent US policy toward Africa, nor does it mean a full circle back to the Cold War paradigm.

The fragments are not tightly linked, with each working parallel to the other, rather than in tandem.

The shift to a 'trade not aid' perception implies the existence of rigid eligibility criteria that exclude countries that have become of security concern to the US. Weak states are dealt with through humanitarian or counter-terrorism assistance as they are ineligible for trade benefits, nor for development aid, which now has similar criteria. This contradiction was recognized by even some of the most ardent supporters of the AGOA approach. Reflecting on AGOA in a post-September 11 arena, Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa under Clinton, found that AGOA's eligibility criteria must be more flexible to include failing states, 81 the assistance of which has now become a security concern.

The domestication of Africa thus explains to us the limits of US policy even after September 11.

September 11 has not ended the shift to the "foreign policy of particularism" that has been increasingly on the rise since the early 1990s. The steady shift of the American mainstream to the right intensifies the impact of such particularism on policy toward Africa, as it limits the options available to develop a concrete and consistent perspective towards Africa that takes into account the complexities of the African realities.

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The Coming African Hour:

Dialectics of opportunities and constraints

The Coming African hour is not a slogan, nor a wishful thinking. It is a conclusion that derives from an insightful analysis of the current situation pertaining on the continent. Several African scholars, coming from different regions and academic backgrounds are elaborating ideas and arguments in order to explain the constraints and to illustrate the opportunities. The result of that scientific gathering is a book that synthesizes and renews the reflections on development.

What is at stake is not to be pessimistic or optimistic about Africa. The epistemological challenge is to understand what is going on. By focusing on converging and diverging African realities, on the issues of state, civil society, gender and development strategies, the authors of the book show under which conditions the African hour is coming. At that level, the commitment for political science meets the commitment for Africa. The main success of this book is to overcome the preconceived ideas and self-fulfilling prophecies about Africa. Here, the analysis avoids the trap of indulgence; then hope is based on truth. Consequently, the coming African hour is not inescapable: it is, as analyzed, a possibility that its achievement depends on institutional, human, political, social and economic factors.

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